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The problem statement of this thesis is ascertaining the legal nature of debt securities in furtherance 
of a consistent and coherent legal description of the South African positive law as it relates to this 
class of instruments. It focuses on four core issues: the legal history, legal nature, classification, and 
current legal issues relating to debt securities.  
Historical and analytic-systemic approaches to the problem statement make up Part 1 of the study. 
The historical approach shows an emergent commoditisation of debt, which is an important 
phenomenon in the analysis of securities law. It further shows a great deal of English influence in 
the development of the South African legal environment, most notably in terms of company law (as 
the primary driver of securities law) and the financial marketplace, its institutions and its regulation. 
Also highlighted is a notable scarcity of debt securities relative to equities, which materially impacted 
legislative developments. Finally, it points to an increase in the legal importance of the “securities” 
concept as a legal term to describe and govern debt and equity securities.  
Thereafter the analytic-systemic approach is used to identify a set of private law-rooted first 
principles applicable to South African registered securities, and therefore to debt securities as well. 
It posits that these securities should be understood conceptually as comprised two interdependent 
but functionally separate legal objects, rather than in terms of two different kinds of ownership (i.e. 
beneficial and registered). The first object is the “security instrument”, a locus for (holdership of) the 
incidents that flow from the entitlement of determination (beskikkingsbevoegdheid) over the 
underlying complex of rights and competencies of registered securities. These can be understood 
as incidents of execution. The second is the “security asset”, a locus for (holdership of) the incidents 
that flow from the entitlement of enjoyment (genotsbevoegdheid) over that underlying complex, and 
corresponds with the proprietary, patrimonial dimension of securities. These can be understood as 
incidents of enjoyment. This construction enables a more coherent understanding of the sui generis 
relationship of agency between beneficial owner and her nominee, as well as of the dynamics of 
ownership and quasi-possessio. These insights are then applied to the uncertificated environment, 
addressing a number of difficult and uncertain problems within the system that enables uncertificated 
securities and their holdership. Finally the particularly difficult issue of how to classify (and therefore 
identify) debt securities is dealt with. Here it is concluded that a typological approach is the only 
viable methodology to deal with this problem, and a number of necessary and thereafter possible 
classificatory indicia are outlined for this purpose. 
The functional-policy approach makes up Part 2 of the study. It is a policy-aware application of the 
theoretical framework developed to a select number of themes and legal issues of the current 
environment. Principally it shows that the reconceptualisation of registered securities has 
explanatory and problem-solving value, specifically relating to transfer, the granting of limited real 





Die probleemstelling van hierdie tesis is die vasstelling van die regsaard van skuldeffekte, ten einde 
‘n konsekwente en koherente regsbeskrywing te formuleer van die Suid-Afrikaanse positiewe reg 
soos dit betrekking het op hierdie klas instrumente. Dit word gedoen deur te fokus op vier 
kernaangeleenthede, naamlik die regsgeskiedenis, regsaard, en klassifikasie van skuldeffekte, 
asook die huidige regsproblematiek hierom. 
Deel 1 van die studie vervat die historiese en analitiese-sistemiese benaderings tot die 
probleemstelling. Die historiese benadering wys op die voortkomende “kommoditisering” 
(“commoditisation”) van verbintenisse – ‘n verskynsel belangrik tot die ontleding van die effektereg. 
Dit beklemtoon verder die wesenlike Engelse invloed in die onwikkeling van die Suid-Afrikaanse reg, 
veral in terme van die maatskappyereg (as die primêre drywer van ontwikkeling in die effektereg) en 
die finansiële markte, sy instellings en die regulasie daarvan. Verder word die noemenswaardige 
afwesigheid van skuldeffekte relatief tot ekwiteite uitgelig as ‘n wesenlike beperkende faktor op 
wetgewende ontwikkeling.  Laastens dui dit op die toenemende belang van die regskonsep van ‘n 
“effek” vir doeleindes van die beskrywing en regulering van skuldeffekte en aandele. 
Die analitiese-sistemiese benadering word vervolgens aangewend om ’n stel “eerste beginsels” te 
identifiseer, gegrond in the privaatreg, wat van toepassing is op Suid-Afrikaanse geregistreerde 
effekte en dus ook skuldeffekte. Dit word voorgestel dat díe effekte konseptueel verstaan moet word 
as twee interafhanklike – maar funksioneel afsonderlike – regsobjekte, eerder as in terme van twee 
verskillende tipes eienaarskap (i.e. voordelig en geregistreerd). Die eerste objek is die “effekte-
instrument”, ‘n lokus vir (houerskap van) die uitvoeringsinsidente wat vloei vanuit die 
beskikkingsbevoegdheid oor die onderliggende kompleks regte en ander bevoegdhede van 
geregistreerde effekte. Tweede is die “effekte-bate”, ‘n lokus vir (houerskap van) die genotsinsidente 
wat vloei vanuit die genotsbevoegdheid oor daardie onderliggende kompleks, en wat ooreenstem 
met die eiendomsgeoriënteerde en vermoënsregtelike dimensie van effekte. Hierdie voorstelling 
illustreer ‘n meer samehangende konseptualisering van die sui generis verhouding van agentskap 
tussen die voordelige eienaar (“beneficial owner”) en haar genomineerde,  asook van die dinamika 
van eienaarskap en quasi-possessio. Hierdie insigte word vervolgens toegepas in die 
“ongesertifiseerde” konteks ter adressering van verskeie problematiese en onsekere regsprobleme 
binne die stelsel wat ongesertifiseerde effekte en hul houerskap in staat stel. Laastens word die 
besonderse problematiek rondom die klassifisering (en derhalwe die identifisering) van skuldeffekte 
ontleed. Hier word die gevolgtrekking verdedig dat ‘n tipologiese benadering die enigste haalbare 
metodologie daarstel om hierdie problematiek aan te spreek. ’n Aantal nodige en daarna moontlike 
indicia word geidentifiseer vir hierdie doeleindes. 
Deel 2 van die studie vervat ‘n funksionele beleids-analise van die probleemstelling. Hierdie analise 
behels ‘n beleidsbewuste toepassing van die teoretiese raamwerk wat ontwikkel is, inklusief vanom 




“herkonseptualisering” van geregistreerde effekte verduidelikend en probleemoplossende waarde 
het, veral soos dit betrekking het op oordrag, die skep van beperkte saakregtelike belange, ter goede 
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1 Introduction 
1 1 Preliminary observations 
Borrowing is one of the most important means by which firms and governments raise capital in the 
modern economy. Debt capitalisation can vary greatly in complexity and structure, but is typified by 
its larger scale as compared to retail borrowing as conducted by private individuals and small 
business concerns. Borrowing at scale can be achieved in three main ways: borrowing a large sum 
from a lender, borrowing a large sum from a syndication of lenders, or borrowing small to medium 
sums from a multitude of lenders. The last method requires a sophisticated market of many 
borrowers and lenders, operating within a reliable pricing environment and a stable transactional 
framework. Despite these complex prerequisites this kind of borrowing has become one of the most 
important and prolific features of the global financial system. It is enabled by the structuring of loans 
as securities. 
The subject of securities is a vast, complex and nebulous field. It spans a multitude of disciplines, 
including mathematics, finance, economics, law, and even politics. In purely financial terms, a 
security can generally be thought of as a readily transferable financial asset.1 However, in legal 
terms, the subject is more challenging.  
At its core, a security is built on either a single personal right or a materially related set, or “bundle”, 
of personal rights held by a security-holder as performance-creditor, and operative against the issuer 
of the security as performance-debtor.2 What differentiates securities from other collections of rights 
held by a person (routinely encountered, for example, in complex contractual arrangements) is that 
these rights are structured, evidenced, and dealt with in a very specific way. Much attention has 
been devoted to this issue in the context of shares. 
 
 
1  J Benjamin Interests in Securities: A Proprietary Law Analysis of the International Securities Markets (2000) 4. 
2  See for instance K van der Linde & S Lutz “Aspects of the cross-listing of securities” (2009) 21 South African 




Yet the law as it relates to debt securities is rightly describable as a much “neglected area of South 
African law”.3 It is the aim of this work to address this issue in as much detail as possible within the 
confines of (1) the immense complexity and depth of this field from any disciplinary viewpoint (both 
domestically and internationally), and (2) a realistic view of the possible scope of the format of this 
dissertation.  
At the outset, a foundational terminological observation is necessary. As will become clear in both 
the following section and throughout, the term “security” appears to have a contextually variable 
denotation in South African law. The full extent of what the legal term is meant to signify differs, often 
quite dramatically, depending on the legal rule or principle in question. Nonetheless, its ambit can 
be made manageable. 
As a point of departure, the view is taken here that derivatives (such as options, futures and forward-
contracts, or swaps) should not be regarded as securities in the true sense, despite their inclusion 
in the definition of securities in the Financial Markets Act.4 Securities, for current purposes, should 
only include equity securities (such as ordinary or preference shares), and debt securities. This may 
seem controversial, but the defensibility of this position will become increasingly clear during the 
course of the dissertation. 
On this basis, debt securities can be divided into three groups. First are company debt securities, 
typically referred to as bonds, notes, debentures or, in the context of securitisation, asset-backed 
securities, revenue-backed securities or collateralised debt obligations. Second are government and 
supranational debt securities, typically referred to as bonds or gilts, and Eurobonds respectively. 
Third are money market securities, which could include certificates of deposit, negotiable certificates 
of deposit, short-term bills, and commercial paper. 
There are a number of ways in which debt and equity securities can be differentiated from one 
another, and in so doing grouped together by common characteristics. Important variations of this 
include groupings based on whether securities are: bearer or registered, tangible or intangible, 
divided or indivisible, and (quasi-)fungible or non-fungible.5 The fungibility distinction is analysed in 
Chapters 5 and 6 for specific purposes, and fungibility is not useful for the present discussion. The 
divisibility issue is the focus of Chapter 4 and further discussed in Chapter 5,6 and may similarly be 
ignored at this stage. It will also become obvious throughout that both of these distinctions are 
 
 
3  A phrase borrowed, gratefully, from Prof R Wandrag in an internal report written as part of the completion of certain 
formalities with respect to this dissertation.  
4  19 of 2012, s 1 v. “securities”. The overreach of this Act’s definition is also dealt with in more detail in the section 
below. 
5  See for instance Benjamin Interests in Securities 32-36. 




secondary considerations in understanding the legal nature of debt securities in South African law, 
and do not take any kind of systematised analysis forward in a meaningful way. 
This leaves the tangible-intangible and bearer-registered dichotomies, both of which run along quite 
similar lines. Nonetheless the former is, in South African law, problematic and of little analytic use. 
In main, this is because the concept of a tangible security in the domestic legal system is fatally 
flawed. 
It is trite that bearer securities are negotiable instruments. It is also clear that negotiable instruments 
are regarded as corporeal and tangible property despite being structured around obligations, which 
are regarded as incorporeal and intangible patrimony. Thus, at face value, it appears as though one 
must regard bearer securities as tangible securities. This is not so. In the law of negotiable 
instruments:7 
“[t]here is…an important measure of truth to these generalisations concerning the roles of property and 
contract; but they do not give the complete picture. Indeed, without qualification, they may mislead, because 
the truly distinctive and characteristic features of negotiability are exceptions to, or deviations from, basic 
principles of both the law of contract and the law of property.” 
The negotiability concept does not render a previously intangible and incorporeal obligation suddenly 
tangible and corporeal. Instead, the negotiability concept establishes a particular “nexus between 
the obligation and the document”, allowing certain legal rules applicable to corporeal property (most 
notably possession, ownership and transfer by traditio) to be applied to that instrument.8 It is crucial 
to understand that these rules of corporeal property law are applied directly to the document and 
have only indirect effect, by virtue of this nexus between document and right, on the obligation it 
embodies. This is because:9 
“such embodiment does not mean that the document constitutes (in the sense that it is) the right. In other 
words, there is no complete merger between the right and the document. The best illustration of [this] 
fact…[is that] if the instrument is accidentally destroyed, the right embodied therein does not come to an 
end.” 
This is also why negotiable instruments are also referred to as “documentary intangibles”.10 The 
rights, unlike their documentary instruments, remain intangible.  
 
 
7  DV Cowen & L Gering The Law of Negotiable Instruments in South Africa: Volume One 5 ed (1985) 12. 
8  This was confirmed in Randfontein Estates Gold Mining Co Ltd v Custodian of Enemy Property 1923 AD 576 581-
582, as quoted in Chapter 3, § 3 1 1 1. See also Cowen & Gering Negotiable Instruments (1985) 24.  
9  Cowen & Gering Negotiable Instruments (1985) 26-27 [own emphasis]. 




Thus, with respect, it is submitted that it is incompatible with South African law to state, as it has 
been in England, that:11 
“[t]here is an important exception to the rule that securities are intangible. Bearer securities in their 
traditional form (i.e. in the absence of computerisation) comprise of pieces of paper…[and] the paper is 
treated by a legal fiction as constituting the debt. This means that bearer securities are tangible and, and 
therefore choses in possession.” 
Accordingly, the tangible-intangible distinction is of limited to no use. In stark contrast, the registered-
bearer dichotomy avoids this issue altogether, and presents the most theoretically cogent basis for 
analysing the general legal dynamics of (debt) securities in the domestic system of law. 
What is perhaps most in need of justification, however, is that (with the exception of Chapter 6) this 
dissertation will focus only on registered debt securities.  
The designation bearer should be clear from the above – a bearer security is a security that is in 
negotiable form. Conversely, by way of an over-simplified introduction, a registered security is a 
security where holdership is evidenced but not embodied by either (1) if certificated: a physical 
certificate coupled with entry of the holder’s details on a securities register; or (2) if uncertificated: 
solely by entry of the holder’s details in an electronic ledger (which functions as the securities 
register) in accordance with the relevant legal requirements. As a result, transfer of registered 
securities occurs by replacement of the details of the transferor with the transferee on such a 
securities register, and, if certificated, the issue of a new security certificate.  
It is tempting to justify such a narrowing of scope by arguing that bearer securities are a relative 
scarcity in the South African securities markets, existing at almost negligible volumes relative to 
registered securities. This is not an adequate reason for the omission of these securities from a 
dissertation ostensibly dealing with the “legal nature of [all] debt securities”. The more compelling 
reason is that these securities are theoretically irrelevant. 
At this stage, two types of debt securities identified above can be excluded entirely from the 
argument. The first is company securities. It is clear from the architecture of the new Companies 
Act12 that companies must issue registered securities, and are no longer able to issue bearer 
 
 
11  Benjamin Interests in Securities 34. Whether this is the correct view in terms of its English law context is beyond 
the scope of this point, and unnecessary to pursue. 




securities.13 Second, the international class of Eurobonds are not only typically issued, held and 
traded in foreign jurisdictions, but are inevitably heavily intermediated. Any domestic issues they 
raise are either addressed in § 5 2 of Chapter 5, or are beyond the scope of this work, as the case 
may be. This leaves only domestic sovereign debt securities and money market securities which 
may potentially be issued to bearer. Bearer securities which have remained documentary (i.e. have 
not been dematerialised) will be dealt with first, and thereafter those that exist in dematerialised form.  
Documentary bearer securities, quite simply, raise no contentious points of law. The South African 
law of negotiable instruments is clear, well developed, and leaves no ambiguity as to the legal issues 
involved in the creation, holdership, transfer, or other legal ramifications of bearer securities. In short 
their legal nature is clear, and there is little contribution to be made to the South African law in this 
area.  
Dematerialised bearer securities are theoretically irrelevant for a very different reason – as shown in 
§ 5 2 of Chapter 5, they are integrated into the dematerialised system by the creation of a secondary, 
representative registered security. Whatever the arrangements made in the Securities Services 
Act,14 neither the currently operative Financial Markets Act, nor Strate Limited’s central depository 
rules appear to maintain or evidence any differentiation between bearer and registered securities in 
dematerialised form.15 The Act and Rules deal only with uncertificated securities, and the legislative 
framework does not countenance any form of true immobilisation.  
This is probably a result of legislative path-dependency caused by the intercedence of a brief period 
of putative immobilisation of registered securities in domestic legal development. These 
developments saw the law moving from solely paper-based trading to the immobilisation brought 
 
 
13  Clear, for instance, from the wording of s 37(9), and the general scheme of s 49, s 51 and s 53 of the 2008 Act. 
Even under the regime of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 the issue of bearer securities was prohibited (unless issued 
pursuant to an exemption granted by the Treasury). This was due to the (still continuing) operation of s 15(2), (3) & 
(7) of the Exchange Control Regulations in GNR 1111 in the Government Gazette no. 123 of 1 December 1961, 
issued under the Currencies and Exchange Act 9 of 1933. See also Cowen & Gering Negotiable Instruments (1985) 
256. See also JL Yeats, R de la Harpe, R Jooste, H Stoop, R Cassim, J Seligmann, L Kent, R Bradstreet, RC 
Williams, MF Cassim, E Swanepoel, FHI Cassim & K Jarvis, Commentary on the Companies Act of 2008 Int-85 – 
Int-86 & Int-99 & 2-512. 
14  36 of 2004.  
15  See Strate Ltd Rules of Strate (Pty) Ltd [Reg. No. 1998/022242/07] (updated as per Government Gazette Number 
40188 dated 5 August 2016). 
In fact, the only mention of bearer securities in the entire FMA is an opaque reference in s 36(1), dealing with the 




about by the Safe Deposit of Securities Act 85 of 1992, to eventual dematerialisation.16 Although this 
is dealt with far more fully in Chapters 3 and 5, 17  the outcome is that any characteristics of 
negotiability of dematerialised bearer securities is ultimately notional, as these securities are held 
and transferred by electronic ledger entry. Thus they are made to function in exactly the same 
manner as true registered securities. 
For these reasons, there are no theoretical issues regarding dematerialised bearer securities 
because there are no dematerialised bearer securities functioning as such within the uncertificated 
securities environment.  
Therefore, this work is limited, generally, to the legal nature of registered debt securities.18 
 
1 2 Research problem 
The object of the research is to establish a consistent and coherent legal description of the South 
African positive law as it relates to debt securities. This work focuses on four core issues: (1) the 
legal history, (2) the legal nature, (3) the classification, and (4) current legal challenges relating to 
debt securities. Subsequent chapters deal with each of these themes in detail, and there is some 
unfortunate but inevitable overlap in the exposition of the research problem here. For clarity, these 
issues will be presented below in a different order than they appear above as well as in the rest of 
this work. 
It is vital to note that due to the similarity of debt and equity securities’ treatment in South African 
law, it is the case that many of the outcomes of the research will be outcomes about securities at 





16  Interestingly, the dematerialisation of sovereign and company debt securities only occurred in 2004 (see Chapter 
3, § 3 2), but money market securities were dematerialised even more recently. Due to increased volumes of money 
market securities, Strate Ltd began settling new money market securities electronically in dematerialised form in 
2009, although any existing securities were not dematerialised. Due to the short-term nature of money market 
securities, these older instruments have no bearing on the present issues. 
See both Strate “Money market settlement services” <http://www.strate.co.za/processing-your-transactions/money-
market-settlement-services> (last accessed 12-12-2016), and SAIFM “The Dematerialisation of Money Market 
Instruments” Financial Markets Journal 7 ed (2008) 
<http://financialmarketsjournal.co.za/oldsite/7thedition/dematerialisation.html> (last accessed 12-12-2016). See 
also Chapter 3, § 3 2 2 2. 
17  See § 3 2 and § 5 1 of these chapters. 
18  Thus, again with the exception of Chapter 6, unless the context indicates otherwise the term “security” or “securities” 




The classificatory problem 
An appropriate point at which to begin is the classificatory aspect of the research problem. The 
scope, complexity and significance of the global financial market, as a factual phenomenon, presents 
a unique set of challenges to the legal sphere. Primarily, in the “esoteric, fast-developing and highly-
globalised world of the finance industry”, typified by “fast developments of financial instruments, 
transactions and techniques”,19  the law is challenged to strike a very fine balance between a 
necessary certainty in its application, and an equally necessary flexibility vital, from an economic 
perspective, to the efficient and effective functioning of the financial marketplace. This is increasingly 
true as intangible assets become more and more important determinants of wealth within the broader 
global economy. 
A great number of different financial products are created, utilised and traded within the financial 
sphere. From a taxonomical perspective, among this range of products lies the genus of financial 
instruments, within which, in turn, securities is encountered.  
Financial instruments include shares, depositary receipts, debentures, interests in a collective 
investment scheme, a legion of different types of derivatives, certain negotiable instruments, as well 
as, potentially, a number of other instruments or “arrangements”. Which of these instruments are 
securities for the purpose of the application of law? 
At first glance, statute appears to provide the answer. In terms of currently enacted law, sections 1 
of the Companies Act of 2008, the Financial Markets Act of 2012 (“FMA”), and the Securities Transfer 
Tax Act20 (“STTA”) all provide a definition of “securities”. Yet each of these Acts defines the concept 
enumeratively rather than substantively, providing a list of instruments which are to be considered 
securities for the purposes and application of that particular Act. Central to the issue is that the 
definition in each act differs in scope. 
The definition in the FMA reads (with own emphasis) as follows: 
“‘securities’ means— 
(a) listed and unlisted- 
(i) shares, depository receipts and other equivalent equities in public companies, other than 




19  H Cousy “The delicate relationship between law and finance: the classification of credit default swaps” (2014) 
Tydskrif vir Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 227 227. 




(ii) debentures, and bonds issued by public companies, public state-owned enterprises, the 
South African Reserve Bank and the Government of the Republic of South Africa; 
(iii) derivative instruments; 
(iv) notes; 
(v) participatory interests in a collective investment scheme as defined in the Collective 
Investment Schemes Control Act, 2002 (Act 45 of 2002), and units or any other form of 
participation in a foreign collective investment scheme approved by the Registrar of 
Collective Investment Schemes in terms of section 65 of that Act; and 
(vi) instruments based on an index; 
(b) units or any other form of participation in a collective investment scheme licensed or registered 
in a country other than the Republic; 
(c) the securities contemplated in paragraphs (a) (i) to (vi) and (b) that are listed on an external 
exchange; 
(d) an instrument similar to one or more of the securities contemplated in 
paragraphs (a) to (c) prescribed by the registrar to be a security for the purposes of this Act; 
(e) rights in the securities referred to in paragraphs (a) to (d), but excludes- 
(i) money market securities, except for the purposes of Chapter IV; or if prescribed by the 
registrar as contemplated in paragraph (d); 
(ii) the share capital of the South African Reserve Bank referred to in section 21 of the South 
African Reserve Bank Act, 1989 (Act 90 of 1989); and 
(iii) any security contemplated in paragraph (a) prescribed by the registrar…” 
The definition provided by the Companies Act states that: 
“‘securities’ means any shares, debentures or other instruments, irrespective of their form or title, issued 
or authorised to be issued by a profit company…” 
This must be read with s 43(1)(a) of the Act, entitled “[s]ecurities other than shares”. This section 
uses “debt instrument” as its operative term, and states that: 
“(a)  "debt instrument" 
(i)  includes any securities other than the shares of a company, irrespective of whether or not 
issued in terms of a security document, such as a trust deed; but  
(ii)  does not include promissory notes and loans, whether constituting an encumbrance on the 
assets of the company or not…”  





(a) any share or depository receipt in a company; or 
(b) any member's interest in a close corporation, 
excluding the debt portion in respect of a share linked to a debenture…” 
From the above, shares are clearly securities. Yet for the purposes of the FMA, the shares of 
shareblock companies are excluded, whereas the STTA makes no such exclusion. Additionally, the 
latter Act also includes members’ interests in a close corporation, but it is the only act to do so. 
Debentures and bonds (terms which denote the same type of instrument, and are legally 
indistinguishable)21 are also clearly securities, yet they – in turn – are excluded from the STTA. The 
FMA does consider debentures to be securities, and goes much further, including also a range of 
other financial instruments. This forces one to conclude that whether a particular financial instrument 
is, or is not, a security is contextually variable, and contingent on the application of the act or legal 
rule in question. 
However, this alone does not sufficiently resolve the matter.  Both the Companies Act and the FMA 
contain plenary, catchall provisions when dealing with securities. In the latter Act, there is ss (d) and 
(e)(iii) of s 1 (viz. “securities”); in the former, s 43 ostensibly includes “any other securities other than 
the shares of a company”. Other than the eiusdem generis canon of construction, there is nothing 
contained in the common law, nor any case law, that allows the law to make a satisfactory 
determination about whether a particular legal arrangement or interest will fall into this category. 
The FMA contains by far the broadest definition of securities, including the category of derivatives.22 
This particular inclusion aptly illustrates this element of the research problem. The Act clearly states, 
enumeratively, that the term securities includes derivatives; yet, substantively, it is uncontentious to 
assert that not all (if any) derivatives are true securities in the manner in which they function or are 
structured. This is most obvious in the case of swaps, which operate to spread financial risk between 
two parties, who each hold both rights and duties in terms of their leg of such a swap. 
 
 
21  Therefore all references to this type of instrument will be limited to “debt securities” unless the context requires 
otherwise.  
22  Which, interestingly, does receive a substantive rather than enumerative definition: see s 1 viz. “derivative 
instrument”, which reads: 
  “‘derivative instrument’ means any— 
(a) financial instrument; or 
(b) contract, 
that creates rights and obligations and whose value depends on or is derived from the value of one or more underlying asset, 




There are strong arguments in favour of regulating certain types of swaps as insurance contracts 
rather than securities,23 as well as some international debate as to whether swaps in general should 
be regulated as securities, forward-contracts or as sui generis instruments.24 There is also general 
international consensus (at the very least amongst the Anglo-American oriented jurisdictions) that 
futures and other forward contracts are not true securities, although this consensus is fragile.25 
Options are another type of financial instrument (or derivative, as it is perhaps to be regarded as 
such) that illustrates the deeper problem. Certain options could be classified as securities 
(specifically: options to take up securities, often referred to in English-law influenced jurisdictions as 
warrants), whilst others could in all likelihood not be. However, as is shown in Chapter 6, this issue 
must be understood relative to the legal rule in question. 
On a deeper level, the problem of derivatives reveals not only that securities can be, and are, 
differentiated from other similar financial instruments, but also that the term – in law – must be 
contextually variable. Hence a functional classificatory methodology must also, accordingly, be 
teleologically flexible. Further, it becomes obvious that this area of South African law is in great need 
of further development. As stated in the previous section, the FMA certainly overreaches in terms of 
its definition, but the crux of the problem remains.  
The ability of the domestic law to make distinctions such as these is vital to its role in preserving 
systemic stability in the financial sector through effective, accurate and sometimes pre-emptive 
regulation and dispute resolution. Specifically, considering the prevalent risk of financial fraud or 
even the lesser systemic risks of mere financial irresponsibility, 26  the law must be certain. 
Conversely, however, in order to give meaningful effect to the economic policy objectives of financial 
and securities regulation, and (somewhat counter-intuitively) to prevent an uncertainty-driven chilling 
effect on healthy financial innovation, the law must be flexible. 
In sum, South African law must be capable of classifying instruments as securities, and thereby 
identifying and distinguishing securities from other financial instruments. This is something which, at 
present, it does not have the tools to do adequately. Thus it is an aim of the dissertation to address 
 
 
23  Cousy (2014) SA Merc LJ 223-235, also discussing specifically Credit Default Swaps. 
24  See for instance WE Gibson “Are swap agreements securities or futures? The inadequacies of applying the 
traditional regulatory approach to OTC derivatives transactions” (1999) 24 Journal of Corporation Law 379.  
25  This is very well demonstrated in the context of anti-money laundering and the combating of the financing of 
terrorism (AML-CFT), where the difficulties in arriving at a common definition of securities across jurisdictions are 
set out and discussed at length in Financial Action Task Force Guidance on Money Laundering and Terror Financing 
in the Securities Sector (October 2009), at § 3.1-3.2, 14-17 & n 24.   
26  Specifically regarding debt securities: see for example HC Nel The Final Report of the Commission of Inquiry into 
the Affairs of the Masterbond Group and Investor Protection in South Africa Vol 1-3 (2001), or essentially any 




this aspect of the research problem by developing a classificatory methodology that enables robust, 
consistent, and yet teleologically flexible determinations, especially in hard cases. 
Historical developments 
The second key element of the research problem is the legal nature of financial instruments that are 
already classified, or classifiable, as debt securities. This issue is the core of the overall research 
project. Without a functional understanding of the nature of debt securities, and to a lesser degree 
securities at large, neither an informed classificatory methodology, nor a deeper analysis of any of 
the current legal problems regarding securities can be achieved. However, to fully appreciate the 
nature of the modern debt security in South African law, the trajectory of legal development of 
securities and securities law over the course of the 19th and 20th centuries is a necessary 
prerequisite.  
The value of the historical element of this work is not to be underestimated and should be introduced 
first. The modern debt security has its origins in the Italian city-states of the 1100s, where city-state 
governments first began issuing transferable, structured, fixed-interest debt instruments to their 
citizens to finance public expenditure.27 By the 17th century, cities like Antwerp, Amsterdam and Paris 
began greatly to improve this “instrumentalisation” of debt, and build functioning markets around the 
concept. 28  However, for the purposes of South African law, the modern debt security and a 
recognisable securities market truly emerged in modern form in England shortly thereafter, building 
on these earlier and more prototypical developments on the Continent.29 
At this time, securities were essentially still: (1) being used only for public (i.e. government-related) 
finance, and (2) overwhelmingly debt based. It was only upon the advent of the Industrial Revolution 
that large infrastructure, transport and mining projects gave rise to quasi-public corporate entities 
with financing needs similar in scope to those of government. In these new ventures the investing 
public was assured by the government-backed creditworthiness of these public enterprises (placing 
such debt, and then gradually equity, securities on a perceived equal footing with sovereign debt), 
and began increasingly to invest in non-government issued securities.30 However, before 1856, 
limited liability through the corporate form was not freely available in England. Until then, 
incorporation by statute or charter was the only manner in which to imbue an enterprise with 
 
 
27  JB Baskin & PJ Miranti A History of Corporate Finance (1997) 35 & 37; and RC Michie The Global Securities Market: 
A History (2006) 17. 
28   Michie The Global Securities Market 23-25; Baskin & Miranti A History of Corporate Finance 89; F Braudel 
Capitalism and Material Life, 1400-1800 (1973) 357-72, CP Kindleberger A Financial History of Western Europe 
(1984) 35-54. 
29  JB Baskin “The development of corporate financial markets in Britain and the United States, 1600-1914: overcoming 
asymmetric information” (1988) 62(2) The Business History Review 199 206. 




corporate personality, freely transferable joint-stock, and limited liability. Yet more informal so-called 
“deed of settlement” companies (which were not true companies in the modern sense)31 had already 
begun to take advantage of the public’s increased appetite for non-governmental investment by 
creatively emulating chartered juristic personality. In these developments lie the prolific rise of the 
equity security. 
This is highly relevant to the South African legal position regarding securities. The concept of the 
registered security originated with these deed of settlement companies, to overcome inherent 
limitations to the transfer of personal rights (and thus the transfer of interests in these enterprises) 
in the English law at that time.32 Such a transfer required an agreement of novation involving the 
company, the seller and the buyer. The direct and necessary involvement of the issuer in each 
transfer of its securities led, over time, to the development and use of a securities register. This 
register functioned to ease the administrative burden of novationary, tripartite transfer transactions.33 
More importantly, despite such securities becoming freely transferable shortly thereafter,34 issuers 
(i.e. the company, either itself or through specialist service-providers acting on its behalf) persisted 
as the main administrative functionary of securities’ transfer, entrenching the use of a securities 
register. This development was, generally, not evident on the Continent, hence the registered 
security is an almost uniquely English law construct. 
South African law, despite the Civilian character of its private law, directly adopted English company 
law legislation,35 and from this also adopted the use of the securities (initially a respective share and 
debenture) register. A marked English influence is also evident in securities exchange law, 
domestically promulgated first in the Stock Exchanges Control Act,36 and later amended by the Stock 
Exchanges Control Amendment Act.37 Further, due to South Africa’s political history, the entire 
British institutional approach to securities markets and regulation was also instrumental in the 
development of the domestic dispensation. Thus it can be said that English law and practice has, 
historically, exerted a very high degree of influence in South Africa’s financial sphere, and the 
 
 
31  See generally LCB Gower Principles of Modern Company Law 5 ed (1992) 29-47. 
32  Traditionally, the English common law did not allow legal assignment, but English law gradually came to recognise 
the (weaker) claim of equitable assignment in this context – see WS Holdsworth A History of English Law Vol 5 
(1924) 299. It was only through s 25(6) of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act of 1873, and thereafter s 136 of the 
Law of Property Act of 1925 that legal assignment of choses in action, subject to strict formality requirements, was 
accepted. See Benjamin Interests in Securities 65-66 for an insightful summary of the above; as well as the work 
of E Micheler “English and German securities law: a thesis in doctrinal path dependence” (2007) 123 Law Quarterly 
Review 251. 
33  See Micheler (2007) LQR 262-263 
34  I.e. through English legislative interventions between 1844 and 1856 as per Gower Principles 29-47.  
35  See for instance E De la Rey “Aspekte van die vroeë maatskappyereg: ’n vergelykende oorsig” (1986) Codicillus 4 
4, 9 & 13-14, and JT Pretorius (ed), PA Delport, M Havenga & M Vermaas Hahlo’s Company Law through the 
Cases 6 ed (1999) 1, 2, 5 & 6. 
36  7 of 1947. 




emergent properties of the South African securities law system are decidedly English. In contrast to 
this system of evidentiary certification and registration, Continental securities are typically 
considered negotiable instruments,38 and thus subject to the transfer requirements of corporeal 
property. 
Developed securities markets, specifically those of the Continent and in England, were (and still 
are)39 dominated by debt securities. This was not the case for emerging markets such as South 
Africa and Australia. These countries’ early economies were primarily mining- and transport-driven,40 
and made use (by reason of English colonial influence) of a branch rather than unitary banking 
system which required far less liquid, i.e. invested-yet-readily-accessible, capital. 41  This, in 
conjunction with South Africa’s rich gold reserves, dampened the demand for debt securities in the 
country, so that the South African capital marketplace heavily skewed towards equity. 
Crucially, this trend caused legislative attention in South Africa to be devoted primarily to regulating 
shares, with little attention being given to what were then called “debentures” (i.e. debt securities). 
This trend is evident, even today, from various legal sources. First, it shows in the provisions of the 
Companies Act of 1926. It is also underscored by the detailed treatment of share-related issues and 
conversely scant detail on debt securities in the Report of the Company Law Commission of 1935-
1936,42 the interim and final 1948 Reports of the Commission of Inquiry regarding the Amendment 
of the Companies Act,43 and the (“Van Wyk De Vries”) Commission of Enquiry into the Companies 
Act.44 It is also shown by the fact that there are only two significant South African reported judgments 
dealing directly with the legal nature of debentures – Coetzee v Rand Sporting Club, 45  and 
Randfontein Estates Co Ltd v Custodian of Enemy Property.46 Neither are remotely recent. There is 
also precious little academic analysis of the domestic securities law environment that directly relates 
to debt securities. 
Despite the share-centricity exhibited by South African law, the concept of securities grew 
considerably in legal importance during the 20th century in South Africa. This was accelerated after 
a sudden and significant up-tick in the volume and velocity of debt securities being actively traded 
 
 
38  See specifically Micheler (2007) LQR 251 et seq. 
39  Baskin & Miranti A History of Corporate Finance 19. This fact is not always appreciated as equities often appear 
more prominent.  
40  Michie The Global Securities Market 83-84, 92 & 111; Baskin & Miranti A History of Corporate Finance 143 & 144-
145; and EC Kirkland History of American Economic Life 4 ed (1969) 304-307. 
41  Michie The Global Securities Market 125-128. 
42  U.G. No. 45, 1936 (“the Lansdown Report”).  
43  U.G. 78/48 and U.G. No. 69-1948 respectively (“the Millin Commission” – “interim Report” and “final Report”) [own 
translation]. 
44  R.P 45/1970. 
45  [1918] WLD 74. 




between 1975 and 1990,47 and this shift in focus deepened further as the market began assimilating 
new and hybrid financial instruments such as derivatives, interests in collective investment schemes 
and debt-equity instruments.  
Understanding the effects of the rise of the more holistic securities concept in a share-centric legal 
environment is central to the research problem, as well as to its solution. 
Put simply, debt securities were increasingly being regulated as “securities" and yet most securities-
related legislation remained designed (at least primarily) with shares in mind. To understand why the 
securities concept had a fundamental impact on debentures, the manner in which the Companies 
Act 61 of 1973 defined debentures must be understood. This definition (virtually identical to the 
contemporary English equivalent) read:48 
“'debenture' includes debenture stock, debenture bonds and any other securities of a company, whether 
constituting a charge on the assets of the company or not…” 
This definition followed the 1926 Act in using an “includes…” formulation, appearing as both nominal 
(referring to already established instruments by name) and enumerative (listing a number of these 
established instruments), rather than substantive (in the sense of providing abstract characteristics 
or guidelines to test a given instrument against). However, the definitional similarities between the 
two regimes end there. The key to this observation is the phrase “any other securities”, newly 
inserted, which represented a significant (yet perhaps at the time still not fully appreciated) shift in 
the legislature’s approach. As a point of departure, it can be said that the word “includes” shows that 
it was not a numerus clausus, and the phrase “other securities” points to a eiusdem generis 
interpretation that required, at least, a relationship of debt. 
The Act did not define the securities concept save in s 134 (for the purposes of s 135-138 and 140 
dealing with “listed shares or interests” and later also in s 91A and s 440A). In both cases it 
incorporated the definition in the Stock Exchanges Control Act.49 The definition of this latter Act, as 
amended by the Stock Exchanges Control Amendment Act, 50  was obviously of very limited 
application within the overall framework of the Companies Act, dealing only with the transfer of listed 
 
 
47  M Bryant Taking Stock: Johannesburg Stock Exchange – the first 100 years (1987) 177. This was in all likelihood 
a function of the inflationary and interest-rate environment of that era. This trend appears to be continuing, although 
at a more stable rate than this initial explosion of the debt market. The impact of the (reasonably probable) 
impending and already underway credit-ratings downgrade of the ZAR may indeed further increase the volume, 
velocity and volatility of the domestic debt securities market. 
48  Section 1 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 [own emphasis]. 
49  7 of 1947 as amended. Again, this discussion of the Companies Act excludes the definition found in the later added 
s 91A.  




securities. Assimilated from an act with a very different purposive bent, it was of little to no use in 
informing the debenture concept. 
However, this “includes…and any other securities” construction indicates not only that all debentures 
were considered securities, but more importantly that all [company] debt securities were considered 
debentures. 51  MS Blackman et al, on the 1973 Act, describes a debenture as “…a written 
acknowledgement of debt, irrespective of its form, executed by the company, which may (but need 
not) include terms providing for the indebtedness to be secured by a charge over the property of the 
company.”52 This definition is, unfortunately, unhelpful in ascertaining the substantive properties of 
the modern debt security. Under a more rigorous analysis, the term debenture appears to have no 
ascertainable ordinary meaning, and if it did, that meaning would shift over time (as indeed the 
debenture concept has, and rightly should have, done). Furthermore, the present commercial reality 
ascribes little to no importance to the term debenture. The current Companies Act has replaced it 
with “debt instrument”, and the JSE deals overwhelmingly in bonds and notes rather than 
debentures. 
This leads to a more fundamental terminological point regarding the importance of the securities 
concept vis-à-vis the debenture concept. Under the 1973 Act, the operative word remained 
“debenture”, but the operative concept had shifted to securities (due to “and any other securities”) 
that are rooted in debt (due to the eiusdem generis rule) – i.e. debt securities. This had a profound 
impact on the legal meaning of the term debenture. 
Historically, the debenture concept denoted only the (specialised) written acknowledgement of 
indebtedness, in accordance with the Blackman et al definition above. However, the securities 
concept denoted (and still denotes) a more holistic construct, including both the formal, documentary 
dimension of registered rights, as well as the substantive rights it is founded upon (the beneficial 
interest). The legal meaning of debenture had already begun to approximate the legal meaning of 
debt security, but the Companies Act of 1973 effectively (at least for the purposes of company law) 
married the two terms, to signify not only the accessory and documentary instrument, but also the 
debt itself. This trend culminates in the Companies Act 71 of 2008. The inclusion of the word 
“debenture” in s 1 (v. “securities”) means little to nothing, as the overall scheme of the Act makes it 
 
 
51   A Milne, C Nathan, KL Smith & PM Meskin in Henochsberg on the Companies Act 61 of 1973 3 ed (1975) argue at 
218 that a “security” generally refers to an asset, and that – since a debenture constitutes a liability from the 
company’s perspective – it generally means a “secured obligation” viewed from the perspective of the holder.  
However they further argue that since debentures can also be unsecured, it is more likely that “security” merely 
refers to “…what is included in the term debenture [which] would also have its general meaning of an 
acknowledgement of debt”. In other words, the term security really means any type of debenture, usually one which 
is secured. This, clearly, is a circular argument. See MS Blackman, RD Jooste, GK Everingham, JL Yeats, FHI 
Cassim & R de la Harpe Commentary on the Companies Act: Volume 1 (RD 8 2011) 5-328 n 4.  




clear that the operative term for securities “other than shares” is “debt instrument”, as per s 43. Here 
the securities concept is even more significant, and yet it still remains ill-understood and uncertain. 
Another particularly significant symptom of share-centricity in the securities concept is found in the 
advent of the uncertificated security. The attainment of the dematerialisation of listed securities 
began first with a brief period of immobilisation. Thereafter both the Companies Act of 1973 and the 
Safe Deposit of Securities Act (later known as the “Custody and Administration of Securities Act”)53 
were amended in 199854 to allow for the dematerialisation of securities. In principle, this facilitated a 
system whereby all listed securities could be centrally deposited, whether in certificated or 
uncertificated form. The change allowed for a parallel system of certificated and uncertificated 
deposit through various collective securities depository participants (i.e. approved intermediary 
depository institutions accepted as participants by the central securities depository). 
In this system s 91A of the Companies Act served as the keystone of dematerialisation.55 It applied 
only to “securities as defined in s 1 of the [then operative] Stock Exchanges Control Act 1 of 1985”, 
which included debt securities. Yet, s 91A fell under the sub-heading “Shares (s 91-91A)”. This new 
section was silent on the matter of the register of debentures as required by s 128 (then still a 
separate register to the share register). In Act 38 of 1998, it was provided that “‘uncertificated 
securities’…means uncertificated securities as defined in section 91A of the Companies Act…”.  
This made s 91A the operative provision, incorporating the expansive definition of “securities” as 
found in the Stock Exchanges Control Act into s 91A by reference. Yet no further arrangements were 
made for the dematerialisation of debt securities in the amendment to the Companies Act. It was 
only in 2004, with the changes brought about by the Securities Services Act,56 that company and 
sovereign debt securities were widely considered to be able to take uncertificated form. Money 
market (debt) securities, as noted in the previous section, were only dematerialised in 2009. 
As long as the South African securities market was driven by equities, this would not (and indeed 
did not) lead to significant legal issues. The dominance of equities had mostly held true during the 
20th century, continuously reaffirming company law as the principal source of best practice regarding 
key legal aspects of securities in general. Yet the expansion of the role of debt securities in South 
African capital markets towards the end of the 20th century, and the country’s persistently sub-par 
 
 
53  In 1992 the legislature enacted the Safe Deposit of Securities Act 85 of 1992 (known after its 1998 amendment as 
the Custody and Administration of Securities Act), allowing for the notional – as South African securities are not 
negotiable instruments – immobilisation of securities through collective deposit. 
54  By Act 38 and 60 of 1998.  
55   For a more detailed discussion of the details and operation of s 91A, as well as immobilisation and dematerialisation 
in general, see Blackman et al Commentary 5-200-1 to 5-238-1. 




macroeconomic performance amongst its developing peers in the last two decades, raises questions 
as to whether the trend of primacy of equity will continue. 
Then there is also the advent of the technique of securitisation (to which debt securities are central), 
the use of hybrid debt-equity and convertible securities, as well as new contractual financial 
instruments which have more in common with debt securities than equities. Such developments 
further indicate that there may be a very tangible future downside to the current lack of legal 
discernment and deeper understanding in the realm of debt securities. As the securities concept 
increasingly becomes the operative concept on which the application of legal rules (many of which 
are designed to protect the stability, integrity and functionality of the financial marketplace as a 
material element of the broader economy) rests, the law must be modernised and rationalised. 
The legal nature of (debt) securities 
With this in mind the third (and most significant) aspect of the research problem – the legal nature 
of modern debt securities – can be directly addressed. In light of modern developments, it becomes 
increasingly clear that neither the common law definition of debenture nor that of Blackman57 
remains appropriate or even sufficient. This is not only because the term has been effectively58 
removed from the Companies Act 71 of 2008, but also (more generally) as governmental and private 
issuers of debt securities have long since ceased to use the term debenture. 
The logical question then becomes: what is the underlying structure, and corresponding nature, of 
the debt security? Again, history is instructive. Both the Companies Act of 1926 and 1973 obligate, 
in s 27 and 104 respectively, companies to recognise only the registered holder of a share to the 
exclusion of all others. From at least the early 20th century, debt securities (in order to function 
efficiently in the developing and equity-dominated secondary marketplace) began structurally to 
converge with shares, emulating the registered holdership of equities through provisions contained 
in the debt security itself, of which a typical example is:59 
“4. The registered holder will be deemed exclusively entitled to the benefit of this debenture, and the 
company and all persons may act accordingly. The company shall not be bound to enter in the register 
notice of or in any way to recognise any trust or the right of any person other than the registered holder to 
any benefit under this debenture save as herein provided.” 
 
 
57  See Randfontein Estates Co Ltd v Custodian of Enemy Property 1923 AD 576 580 and the Blackman et al definition 
as quoted above. 
58  The somewhat misplaced reference to “debentures” in s 1 viz. “securities” notwithstanding.  




This is not only true of corporate debt securities, but also of public-sphere debt securities such as 
Treasury bonds. For example, the Terms and Conditions of the National Treasury’s R208 bond 
state:60 
“9.2  The Register of Bondholders shall:  
    … 
9.2.8 will [sic] only recognise a Bondholder as the owner of the Bonds Registered in that 
Bondholder's name as set out in the Register; and 
 9.2.9 shall not be bound to enter into the Register, the fact that a Bondholder may be holding Bonds 
in trust or as agent or mandatory for any third party and the Issuer shall have no responsibility 
whatsoever to such third party.” 
Through this structural convergence of debt and equity instruments, the separation between 
beneficial holdership and registered holdership became entrenched as a feature of all securities. 
The common underlying architecture also facilitates debt securities being held and traded in 
uncertificated form. Yet the legal interest underlying debt securities, and indeed every security or 
other financial instrument without an equity component, arises contractually, rather than by virtue of 
a constitutive quasi-contractual statutory instrument (i.e. the memorandum of incorporation).  
Importantly, once a financial arrangement bestows on a particular party a legal interest which is 
classified – or classifiable – as a security, the content and import of that legal interest will also 
undergo further change. As a security, the underlying interest therefore also includes other rights 
and competencies61 which arise consequentially. This is because, as a security, the positive law 
attaches additional content and consequences to that legal interest. Thus a central concern is the 
complex relationship between: the contract as the agreement constitutive of a security’s underlying 
rights, the security’s consequential rights and competencies, and registered (certificated or 
uncertificated) holdership. Each of these elements of a debt security must be understood as part of 
the whole. 
Furthermore, the proprietary dimension of securities poses another unique problem when it comes 
to debt securities. But for the far-reaching English law influence on this branch of law, South African 
debt securities may well have developed as negotiable instruments, as is the case in Continental 
 
 
60   E Emmet Pyemont’s Company Law of South Africa 5 ed (1940) 200 – an example chosen to illustrate that this 
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61  I.e. those benefits or other aspects of the underlying interest which cannot easily or uncontentiously be 
characterised as personal rights in the strict sense. The chosen term, competency, is thus meant to encompass all 
other terms such as capacity, power, non-subjective right, or privilege. For example, in the context of company 
securities specifically, voting rights or statutory remedial rights are seen as such competencies though they are 




jurisdictions with a similarly Civilian character, such as Germany and the Netherlands. But as this is 
not the case, the reception and perpetuation of English law principles and practices must accord 
with the mixed legal heritage of South African law. This is especially so in the context of contractual 
securities (such as debt securities), where the underlying bundle of legal interests is more directly 
subject to a Civilian system of private law. 
Most pertinently, English law contains a distinction between beneficial (or equitable) ownership and 
legal ownership, and correspondingly reads a constructive trust into the relationship between the 
registered holder and the beneficial owner of a security. Neither dual ownership nor constructive 
trust is recognised in South African law.62 Nonetheless, the (quintessentially English) distinction 
between registered title and beneficial ownership of shares has long been recognised and retained.63 
As a result, “[b]y approximating registered title and ownership to legal and equitable title respectively, 
the concept of the share as found in English law is at least superficially integrated into the South 
African legal fabric.”64 The contractual emulation of these arrangements by debt securities makes 
this equally applicable to all South African registered securities. 
However, the doctrinal incongruity of this superficial reception causes persistent practical and 
theoretical problems and uncertainties. 
In this light, a reconceptualisation of the underlying structure of debt securities is necessary. Most 
importantly, a uniform account of the nature and form of securities in South African law must be 
sketched – one which, because it is in harmony with the unique configuration of South Africa’s 
residual Civilian-Common law mixed heritage, is legally consistent and has backward- and forward-
looking problem-solving qualities. 
Consequent application to extant legal issues 
The outcomes of this more in-depth treatment of these issues must thereafter in terms of the fourth 
problem-solving aspect of the research problem, be tested against the current body of law. Here the 
central question is whether these outcomes elucidate currently unresolved, unclear or as yet 
unconsidered issues in the positive law as they relate to debt securities. It is unnecessary to canvas 
these issues, as they are dealt with at length in Part 2 of the dissertation. 
 
 
62   Lucas' Trustee v Ismail and Amod 1905 TS 239 247-248; Princess Estate and Gold Mining Co Ltd v Registrar of 
Mining Titles 1911 TPD 1066 1078.  
63   See for instance Farrar's Estate v CIR 1926 TPD 501; Jeffery v Pollak and Freemantle 1938 AD 1 at 18; West v De 
Villiers 1938 CPD 96 at 102; Moosa v Lalloo 1956 (2) SA 237 (D); Verrin Trust and Finance Corp (Pty) Ltd v Zeeland 
House (Pty) Ltd 1973 (4) SA 1 (C); Oakland Nominees (Pty) Ltd v Gelria Mining & Investment Co (Pty) Ltd 1976 (1) 
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64   A Borrowdale “The transfer of proprietary rights in shares: a South African distillation out of English roots” (1985) 




Finally, in so far as was possible, much care was taken to ensure that the theoretical outcomes of 
this work should not be at odds with practice or commercial reality. It is hoped that the foundations 
have been improved with little to no damage to the structure that has been erected upon it. 
 
1 3 Methodological considerations 
A suitable methodological framework for this type of analysis is found in DV Cowen & L Gering’s The 
Law of Negotiable Instruments in South Africa. 65  The authors identify four approaches which, 
because the nature of legal issues raised by negotiable instruments and debt securities show many 
similarities,66 can be usefully applied to this research problem. The original formulation has been 
preserved as far as possible, but with certain necessary contextual changes for application to 
securities rather than negotiable instruments. 
The first is an historical approach, premised on the notion that “in most legal systems, [the securities 
concept has] been a growth, rather than conscious or planned graft; and that depending on the issue 
involved, the legal system concerned, and even the time in which the observer lives, the rules 
governing [debt securities] may be seen to reflect important or drastic deviations from the ordinary 
principles of law.”  
The second is a functional-policy approach, with an “emphasis on the purposes or objectives of the 
[financial marketplace] during the great formative periods of the relevant law, and especially the 
various considerations of policy which, from time to time, influence legal systems in adopting certain 
solutions rather than others.” 
The third is a comparative approach, which due to its popularity amongst legal scholars requires no 
elaboration here. 
Last is an analytical-systemic approach. This approach “focuses attention on how [debt securities] 
and the rules governing them fit into the overall system of private [and commercial] law…[and its] 
main concern is with ‘legal dogmatics’, and with analysis of concepts and their systemisation.” 
Ultimately, in the context of analysing negotiable instruments, the authors favour a combined 
 
 
65   See 7-15. 
66  See specifically Cowen & Gering Negotiable Instruments 7-8, where it is stated that: 
 “[a]n understanding both of the ‘negotiability concept’ and of the nature of a ‘negotiable instrument’ is fundamental to the study 
of the rules applicable to the three specific documents regulated by the Bills of Exchange Act…Not only do these concepts 
give meaning and coherence to the rules applicable to bills of exchange, cheques and promissory notes, but, without a firm 
grasp of them, one cannot understand, less apply in practice, the detailed rules (both common law and statutory) which 
comprise the relevant body of law.” 
 If one replaces “negotiability concept” and “negotiable instrument” with “securities concept” and “registered and 




approach. This approach is also favoured here, and informs the overarching structure of this 
dissertation.  
Each of these approaches is used to address the various components of the research problem. This 
brings one to the order in which these four aspects of the research problem have been outlined in 
the previous section, and how this corresponds to the sequence of chapters that follows. The 
historical approach is utilised first, after which an analytical-systemic approach is used to outline 
both the legal nature and an appropriate methodology of classification of (debt and other) securities. 
Lastly, using the insights from these two approaches, the most relevant elements of the existing 
legal problems surrounding debt securities are dealt with, through the lens of the functional-policy 
perspective. 
The comparative dimension of the research is not dealt with separately. Due to the unique mixed 
legal heritage of South African law, as well as the nature of the subject matter, legal problems centred 
around debt securities typically contain Civilian and common law (especially through legislation) 
elements. A dedicated, isolated comparative section or chapter will not yield readily applicable legal 
answers, and thus any comparative analysis which is undertaken is integrated into the dissertation, 
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2 A historical perspective on debt securities 
The aim of this chapter is to provide a historical account of the emergence of debt securities both 
globally and in South Africa. Such an account is vital to an informed, coherent, and more accurate 
analysis of the legal history found in the following chapter. This chapter is divided into three sections. 
The first considers the early emergence of securities and securities markets, from the earliest proto-
debt securities in medieval Italy to the sophisticated and internationalised markets and instruments 
of the 20th century. The second centres on selected relevant developments in England. Most of the 
practices in domestic securities markets derive from England and it has been the biggest single 
contributor to the South African law on securities. The section focuses on the consequences of the 
English legal approach to property, obligations and corporate law, moves on to the decisive role of 
similarities in English and South African banking practices, and finally deals with the effect of past 
English regulatory attitudes on South Africa. The final section sketches the progression of the 
domestic securities sector. It deals with the development of securities before the 20th century, and 
thereafter the development of the modern position. 
 
2 1  A global overview 
Globally, debt securities are held far more widely than equity.1 Seemingly, this has been true since 
the first instruments to resemble modern securities arose in the medieval Mediterranean. This is 
unsurprising. From an economic perspective, like all markets in the real world, securities markets 
are characterised by varying degrees of imperfection. The theoretical ideal of a perfectly competitive 
 
 




market has never been achieved, and the efficiency of a given market is determined by the extent 
to which it approximates the standard of a perfectly competitive market. One of the key aspects of 
securities markets in particular is risk, a variable which is in many ways tied to market imperfection. 
Today’s securities, although structurally similar, are not homogenous. Modern securities markets do 
not exhibit perfectly free entry or exit, an infinity of identical buyers and sellers, or, most importantly, 
perfect information. 
It is submitted as self-evident that the more immature a market or set of markets is, the less it will 
resemble a perfectly competitive market environment. Put a different way, the more primitive a 
market is, the more market imperfections it will exhibit. In such imperfect markets, participants 
naturally react to these circumstances, exhibiting a preference for goods or services which mitigate 
the market’s deficiencies. 
This explains why debt securities remain more popular than equity securities.  
Fixed income securities exhibit stable cash flows and minimal variations in underlying value, which 
make them more attractive to investors facing imperfect informational environments. This is because 
they are, as a result, easier to price. Equity instruments are particularly volatile, and therefore harder 
to price in imperfect informational environments. Among all fixed-income securities, debt instruments 
enjoy primacy, and their characteristics (for example fixed returns, stable asset value, real security, 
and an overall safer risk profile) made them not only more secure, but also easier to market. 
Furthermore, as shown throughout this chapter, equity’s rise to prominence in the investing world is 
a relatively recent one, whilst the concept of debt is arguably as old as money itself. For this reason, 
the institution of law did not historically imbue equity instruments with the same remedial safety (and 
therefore protection, for example from “overly sanguine” or fraudulent ventures) as their fixed-income 
counter parts.2 
In sum, debt instruments are easier to price accurately, less volatile, and until recently offered more 
investor protection in markets where the price mechanism does not operate perfectly and can 
therefore not be totally relied upon.  
For these reasons debt securities (or to a lesser degree securities that resemble or function like debt 
instruments, such as preference shares) were able to overcome the informational and structural 
defects of markets in earlier economic eras. As a consequence, markets for these securities became 
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prolific and active far earlier and more readily3 than instruments structured around ownership (in the 
colloquial sense), control and profit-sharing, such as joint stock and later shares.  
This development history begins with the arrival of the first instruments comparable to debt securities 
in the Italian cities of the 11th century. Governmental institutions, rather than merchants, appear to 
have “invented” the debt security, using it as a means to finance public expenditure. At the time city 
states such as Venice and Florence implemented a number of fundamental financial innovations in 
their regional trading economy, which at that time had undergone somewhat of a re-invigoration. 
Gradually their policies and practices for raising of capital and dealing with risk began to inform the 
practices of other contemporary European centres of trade and finance.4  
For current purposes, the most important of these commercial advances is the pioneering use of 
dynamic contractual techniques, such as early bills of exchange and promissory notes. This was 
made possible largely by the legal and commercial convergence of practice occurring in the medieval 
Mediterranean.5  These mercantile financial innovations strongly influenced the public financing 
practices of Mediterranean states, notably the Genoese Republic, Venice, and Florence. The 
governments of these states increasingly began to experiment with structured debt instruments, to 
which their citizens could subscribe. 
In a number of cases this type of financing even began to resemble joint-stock enterprises, 6 
prompting a number of scholars to argue that the joint-stock principle itself has its legal origin in 
these schemes. This appears incorrect. As far as the developments in Italy are concerned, any such 
joint-stock characteristics in public finance arose as coincidental mutations of the debt-instruments 
that preceded them, and for various reasons did not give rise, through actual legal reception, to the 
modern method of raising capital through equity.7 
Whilst isolated instances of fragmented and transferable ownership were indeed known by European 
business practitioners at the time,8 the idea of raising capital from the many via public subscription 
 
 
3  Baskin & Miranti A History of Corporate Finance 19.  
4  Baskin & Miranti A History of Corporate Finance 35 & 37.  
5  D Puga & D Trefler International trade and institutional change: Medieval Venice's response to globalization (2012) 
Discussion Paper No. 9076, Centre for Economic Policy Research  Discussion Paper Series, August 2012 (copy 
available at < www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP9076.asp >) 2. 
6  Compare the description of Mediterranean proto-corporations such as the compagnia in Baskin & Miranti A History 
of Corporate Finance (at 38-40) to the emergence of guilds and regulated companies (at 55-60). Michie calls these 
earlier enterprises “joint stock companies” – RC Michie The Global Securities Market: A History (2006) 20 – yet 
Schmitthof authoritatively and correctly rejects this terminology (along with the entire Italian reception theory) in CM 
Schmitthoff “The origin of the joint-stock company” (1939) 3(1) University of Toronto Law Journal 74. 
7  Schmitthoff (1939) University of Toronto LJ  79. 




came from these early city states. More importantly, it was achieved using debt. As RC Michie 
states:9 
“[i]f a particular event can be taken to represent the beginnings of the global securities market it was the 
forced loan that Venice imposed on its inhabitants in 1171–2.” 
At this time the Venetian state initiated a programme of compulsory lending from its citizens. The 
borrowing took the form of fixed-interest debt instruments (“prestiti”), without a set repayment date. 
This had two important results: (1) these proto-bonds became increasingly trusted to yield the 
promised interest; and (2) they began to be traded amongst Venetian citizens. Between the 13th and 
14th centuries, the Venetian state unfailingly paid out the stipulated 5% interest per annum and as 
an investment the prestiti circulated across Europe. The spread was primarily driven by the 
international merchant banking network, which was dominated by the Italians. Other city-states 
implemented similar schemes, including Sienna and Florence. The latter city state took matters 
further, eventually restructuring the transferable, interest-bearing bonds they had issued into one 
consolidated negotiable “stock” in the 1340s.10  
It is clear that from as far back as the 1100s, it became standard practice for Italian city states to use 
such publicly-subscribed debt instruments (loans which became known as “montes” subdivided 
equally into parts termed “loca”, and widely seen as personal rights) to finance conflicts, colonial 
conquests, and even agriculture or construction at home.11 Such publicly funded pools of debt were 
structured as perpetuities, and it was cardinal to their success to make these debt perpetuities 
transferable, in order to ensure they were attractive to subscribers.12 It is therefore unsurprising that 
negotiability, one of the earliest legal weapons against market imperfections, became a common 
attribute of these instruments. Certain issuing city states had even begun to make use of a registry 
of creditors (“cartulario”).13 
This is the essence of the emergence of the first discernible debt securities. The influence of radical 
and lasting developments in merchant banking (most significantly the instrumentalisation of debt in 
the money markets through bills of exchange and promissory notes) spurred on further systemic 
financial innovations. As a result, the public and quasi-public sphere began to utilise similar 
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10  Michie The Global Securities Market 17.  
11  Schmitthoff (1939) University of Toronto LJ 76. 
12  Michie The Global Securities Market 17. For these early developments generally see also therein cited E Miller 
“Government Economic Policies and Public Finance, 1000–1500” in CM Cipolla (ed) The Fontana Economic History 
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13  Schmitthoff (1939) University of Toronto LJ 76. The negotiability of securities persists today as an attribute of a 




contractual techniques to draw investment from the public to finance capital intensive activities. In 
order for these cities’ permanent funded debt to be attractive to the public, however, these debt 
instruments had to be both trustworthy and transferable. In solving these problems, the medieval 
Mediterranean city-states essentially created tradable, compartmentalised and commoditised debt 
– i.e. something very akin to the modern debt security. 
As noted, the practice also spread north. There, the familiar features of modern debt securities and 
their markets began to develop from the end of the 17th century. These later advances built upon the 
early innovations of the medieval Mediterranean, but occurred in Antwerp, Amsterdam and France 
and England. During this period the imperfections of financial markets were also greatly improved 
upon,14 and the securities market begins to look increasingly familiar. 
Importantly, a formal distinction between commercial financing and the funding of state expenditure 
(i.e. corporate and public finance) was not a feature of these earlier Continental capital markets.15 
Not only did debt overshadow equity (an as yet unheard of concept in these capital markets), but 
almost all securities invariably also had a governmental or quasi-public dimension. Mirroring 
developments on the Continent:16 
“[a]nonymous public markets in England for securities first arose to trade government issues.” 
What this statement implies is three-fold. First, English government-issued securities were legitimate 
and advanced enough to be traded broadly and anonymously. Second, seeing as government rarely 
(if ever) issued proto-equity instruments, the overwhelming majority of these securities must have 
been debt securities. Third, the formation of such broad and anonymous markets must have required 
(1) a large number of different security-like instruments available to investors, and (2) a sustainable 
volume of such securities in circulation.  
During this period the English greatly refined their use of securities. Most importantly, debt securities 
had to be transferable, and since obligations were not freely transferable, English debt securities 
 
 
14   Michie The Global Securities Market (2006) 23-25; Baskin & Miranti A History of Corporate Finance 89; F Braudel 
Capitalism and Material Life, 1400-1800 (1973) 357-72, CP Kindleberger A Financial History of Western Europe 
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African dispensation. 
15  JB Baskin “The Development of Corporate Financial Markets in Britain and the United States, 1600-1914: 
Overcoming Asymmetric Information” (1988) 62(2) The Business History Review 199 208.  




were classified as chattels.17 The government (as the dominant issuer of securities) also began to 
improve its understanding of how to achieve monetary policy stability (including the interrelation 
between short- and long-term borrowing). It further responded to the needs of the investing public 
by adapting the contractual dispensations of securities to reflect investor preferences. As a result of 
this, and the influence of successful Dutch, French and Belgian precedents, from the start of the 18th 
century onwards the focus shifted to longer-term instruments, such as tontines, annuity contracts, 
bonds and lotteries.18 
Securities also began to play an increasingly important role as instruments for the financing of 
commercial enterprises. However, the modern joint-stock corporate form – with limited liability and 
full juristic personality – is a product of the mid-19th century.19 Before this, state intervention was 
integral to the creation, operation and financing of the type of business ventures requiring the 
participation of the investing public. This is for a simple reason: juristic personality was not, until the 
mid-1800s, attainable without Royal charter or an empowering Act of Parliament, which could only 
be bestowed by government.  
Irrespective of whether these securities were debt or equity based, the vast majority of issuers were 
essentially parastatal enterprises. This implied a certain guarantee, reassuring the investing public. 
As a party with seemingly near-unquestionable creditworthiness and reliability, the state’s close 
involvement reduced the public’s perception of the risk inherent in these investments, ensuring such 
securities were easier to price, and generally less volatile. This is illustrated by the manner in which 
the initial involvement of government in the infrastructure boom of the late 18th and 19th century 
helped overcome public scepticism regarding commercial securities, and paved the way for 
corporation-based entrepreneurship free from case-by-case government sanction. 
By this time the use of debt securities was reaching a modern degree of sophistication. Yet the 
securities issued by the government and its select few quasi-public firms (incorporated by charter or 
statute) remained overwhelmingly the only securities enjoying broad-based trust, and therefore 
popularity and dominance, among investors. 
Towards the end of the 18th century there was a dramatic upswing in economic activity. This was 
mainly caused by technology-driven efficiency gains, structural improvements in organisational 
productivity, and the rise of free trade – collectively better known as the Industrial Revolution. The 
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Revolution fundamentally changed the nature of England’s capital markets. Britain became the 
world’s leading economy, and steam energy in particular brought about immense development in 
transportation infrastructure, specifically in canals and railroads.20 As a consequence, vast amounts 
of capital accumulated in Britain, and infrastructure projects (both at home and in its colonies) were 
legion. 
The industrial boom brought with it the creation of a host of new enterprises, and consequently a 
large number of new investment opportunities. Yet at the start of the 19th century the indistinct 
relationship between public and commercial financing persisted. Railways and canals are highly 
capital-intensive public infrastructure projects (and also arguably locked in as natural monopolies). 
Therefore it is unsurprising that the British government again paired up with its wealthiest 
businessmen to provide such infrastructure. The government also, as always, secured its 
involvement by imposing heavy-handed prerequisites for the granting of charters or statutes of 
incorporation, especially regarding corporate finance.21 These companies, in turn, were able to trade 
on existing trust in the markets through their quasi-public image.22 Accustomed to investing in 
government-backed business opportunities, the investing public had in this way been introduced to, 
and learned to trust, investment in commercial enterprise on a larger scale.  
However, by 1856, regulatory shifts had made the benefits of incorporation accessible to virtually 
anyone, allowing entrepreneurs and wealthy capital owners to loosen their ties with government. 
The attainment of freely available juristic personality and limited liability through the legislative 
interventions during the second half of the 19th century facilitated the formation of corporations no 
longer tied to government, but still able to contract and take on rights and duties in own capacity.23  
The corporate form had begun to gravitate away from its mercantilist origins.  
Economic growth, and infrastructure development in particular, had remained strong. Thus newly 
formed, truly private, companies moved into capital intensive sectors such as railway, mining and 
canal building, beginning to make use of the existing securities market infrastructure to raise funds 
independently of government. Yet no matter how much legitimacy their new legal status granted 
their securities, they still traded in largely the same high-risk, low-information environment they had 
been in since the 17th century. The solution for these English firms was reliance on debt financing.  
 
 
20  Baskin & Miranti A History of Corporate Finance 127.  
21  Baskin & Miranti A History of Corporate Finance 132 & 133; Baskin (1997) Bus Hist Rev 208-210; MC Reed, 
Investment in Railways in Britain, 1820-1844 (1975) 76-98; and FA Cleveland & FW Powell Railroad Promotion and 
Capitalization in the United States (1909) 84 for a similar position in the USA.  
22  Baskin (1997) Bus Hist Rev 208; Baskin A History of Corporate Finance (1997) 132-133. 




The British railroad industry was especially competitive, characterised by large regional firms which 
were built up through the gradual consolidation of many small, independent lines. 24  Imperfect 
markets for securities and the competitiveness of the railroad industry (increasing the risk of investing 
in one firm among many) reinforced amongst financiers and investors the belief that debt was 
preferable to equity. Debt, which generally confers no participation or residual rights, also has no 
effect on ownership-control dynamics.  
However, despite these instruments’ structural and nominal similarities to sovereign securities, the 
core concern from an investor’s perspective remained credit risk, where the government retained an 
edge. Therefore, to ensure the competitiveness of their securities relative to those of government or 
quasi-public enterprises, private companies issued instruments which approximated the 
characteristics of these competing securities. Most importantly, firms provided real security in the 
form of a fixed or floating charge over some or all of the company’s assets, in order to simulate the 
trusted creditworthiness of the state.25  
It is also for this reason that early legislation dealing with company debt securities was primarily 
focused on real security arrangements.26 Tradability – a central feature of modern debt securities – 
was still a secondary consideration, and the policy-stance of legislative intervention reflected this. 
Although real security enhanced tradability (as the creditworthiness of the instrument is a material 
consideration in secondary market transactions), securities’ usefulness in the primary market (capital 
raising) remained their principal function. 
As the 20th century approached, securities markets had not only become far more accommodating 
and trusting of commercial securities, but the sharp modern divergence of public and corporate 
finance had begun to emerge. By the middle of the 19th century England’s securities market 
consisted of numerous satellite markets led principally by London,27 and had grown from a small, 
incidental feature of the financial marketplace to a large and powerful force within it. It was no longer 
merely a stabilising augmentation to the money market, nor an adjunct of government borrowing. 
The securities sector had become a self-sustaining and important element of the capital market as 
a whole, having moved:28 
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“out of the realm of government debt and entered the mainstream of economic activity, becoming 
increasingly central to the processes whereby business obtained finance, banks balanced risk and return, 
and investors employed their savings.” 
It was from this point forward that two deeply important developments caused an unprecedented 
global integration and proliferation of securities. These were the telecommunications revolution 
(most importantly the telegraph), and the ultimate acceptance of commercial debt and equity 
instruments as equally suitable investments in comparison to government debt securities. From 1850 
onwards, securities exchanges also began to spring up outside of Europe and North America. 
However, these “new world” markets differed in two important respects from those of Britain and 
Europe.  First, there was a far greater emphasis on commercial financing. Second was a strong 
preference for equity, especially in the mining and public transport sectors, being these markets’ 
staple industries.29 
None of this, however, had changed the fact that securities remained until the 20th century primarily 
a tool for raising capital. Securities were viewed as issuer-centric devices for financing large business 
ventures, and the investor-centric emphasis on trading, wealth- and portfolio-management had yet 
to come to prominence. Recognisably modern, broad and near-perfect markets for securities, 
operating at high volume and velocity, only arose during the 20th century. Trading activities only 
became genuinely important during this period, and it is no coincidence that securities law (and 
regulation) also only came into its own in the latter half of the 20th century.  
Over the course of the 20th century the focus shifted from out-and-out investing (i.e. buy and hold 
for return on capital) to securities trading (buy and sell to maximise variable portfolio gains). In 
addition to the increasing structural reliability of the secondary market, this was brought about by: 
the specialisation and perfection of exchange-industry techniques, increasing globalisation in finance 
and commerce, the introduction of electronic trading, immobilisation and dematerialisation, the rise 
of derivatives and securitisation, and the telecommunications revolution.  
On a more macroeconomic level, the fall of the Gold Standard, the end of the Bretton-Woods system, 
as well as the oil price shocks of the 1970s and concomitant new inflationary environment all 
contributed to a gradual change in the role played by debt securities within the global financial 
context in this pivotal 100 years. Where they originated as financing tools, to be held by the investor 
until maturity, they have become tools for the securitisation of fixed-income bearing assets of many 
classes, the levers of exchange- and interest-rate arbitrage, hedging instruments, leveraging tools, 
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American countries. See Michie The Global Securities Market 83-84, 92 & 111; Baskin & Miranti A History of 




investments traded at high velocity and volumes for marginal profits, and even significant economic 
indicators.30 
As will be shown in the following chapter, legal development has, over time, reflected this change. 
However, the law generally eschews radical or speedy change, and typically develops in a path-
dependent manner. The speed at which the modern financial marketplace developed has, therefore, 
caused it to fall mainly to legislation (as, arguably, the source of law capable of the fastest systemic 
change) to address this rapid evolution. Despite this, enacted law always relies on the existing body 
of more static positive law, less capable of such systemically radical change, to give meaning and 
effect to its objects. It follows that many legal aspects of debt securities are not directly addressed 
by statute. 
This illustrates a problem typical of financial law. Statutory provisions, often incorrectly, assume 
doctrinal coherence with the broader legal system and evolve without a matching development of 
the sources of law that support them. The mixed legal heritage of South Africa has compounded this 
– many of the traditionally civil aspects of the private law are not readily compatible with the received 
content of the English common law in the companies or securities field. To understand the intricacies 
of the current regime, one must understand its past. 
To complicate matters further, the global and domestic financial system continues to change rapidly. 
The most recent globally significant development was the rise and fall (and perhaps rise again) of 
complex asset securitisation techniques, which played a leading role in the financial crisis of 2009. 
Debt instruments are essential, if not central, to the process of asset securitisation, and almost all 
asset-backed securities (ABSs) are debt securities.31  Yet, since at present the global financial 
system is still contending with the fallout of this event, this section concludes here. 
 
2 2 Observations regarding the English securities environment  
The English legal approach to commercial securities had a profound impact on the South African 
system.32 In this section, certain preliminary comparative observations regarding the English law on 
securities (and its developmental environment) are made, so as to highlight its profound influence 
on the resulting South African dispensation. The purpose of this specific analysis is to show how 
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obligations (CBOs) and the many others that emerged in more recent years.  




legal norms persistently influenced extra-legal institutions, and conversely how financial institutions 
and practices in turn also shaped aspects of the law.  
 
2 2 1  Real rights, personal rights, and the securities register  
Fundamental to the distinctive character of English law is its approach to real and personal rights, 
and the consequent development of the securities register. Regarding real rights, unlike Civil law 
Continental counterparts such as the Netherlands or Germany, the English system does not 
recognise the vindicatory action. This is because, more foundationally, real rights are not in principle 
enforceable against “all the world” and the English common law does not contain a principle whereby 
dominium over a thing operates universally. Instead, the common law only solves bilateral “priority” 
disputes regarding title, determining only the legal position between parties to a dispute, on a case 
by case basis.33 
The Roman-Dutch underpinning of South African private law gives its property law a Civilian 
character, which does allow, for instance, universal dominium against third parties, the rei vindicatio 
for corporeal things and the quasi-rei vindicatio in certain circumstances for quasi-real rights (and 
perhaps certain other incorporeals).34 Whilst legal development in (Continental) Civilian jurisdictions 
has systematically afforded more protection to bona fide acquirers, eroding some of the operation of 
the vindicatory action, South Africa has retained a stricter protection of dominium in this regard. This 
has a fundamental impact on securities. However much as they are bundles of personal rights, there 
is far greater emphasis on their proprietary dimension, as constituting movable incorporeal 
property.35 
These divergent property law dispensations determine, on first principles, whether property rights 
are enforceable universally against third parties, or merely subject to “stronger” and “weaker” claims 
in title inter partes, as per the South African and English dispensations respectively. This highlights 
 
 
33  S Worthington Personal Property Law (2000) 457-458 and M Bridge Personal Property Law (2002) 162-164. 
34  CG Van der Merwe Sakereg (1979) 3-9 (character and origins of South African property law), 11 (the principle of 
absolutism, and the corresponding effect of the vindicatory action), 28 and 109-110 (quasi-possession of 
incorporeal things); AJ van der Walt & GJ Pienaar Introduction to Property Law 5 ed (2006) 3-8 & 13-14 & 156-172; 
and PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar, H Mostert & M Van Rooyen The Law of Property 4 ed (2004) 19-30 (the nature 
and doctrinal basis of property) and 51-73 (nature of real rights, and absolute enforcement) and 223-228 & 236-
241 (the rei vindicatio). 
35  In England, securities are of course also considered property, but it is the divergent legal consequences of 
something being property in the two systems (the originating system being England, and the derivative system 
South Africa) that are important here. Much like its contemporary English counterparts, s 22(1) in Chapter II of the 
Companies Act 46 of 1926 expressly made provision for the fact that “shares or any other interest which any 
member has in a company” are to be regarded as movable property, as did s 91 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973, 
and so also does s 35(1) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008.  




a fundamental difference in how securities are treated in South African law vis-à-vis the system from 
which its securities concept was received. 
In the English securities context, without recognition of a vindicatory action, entry on the securities 
register serves merely as an indication of stronger title in a particular legal dispute. Contrastingly, in 
the context of shares the South African courts have recognised that a quasi-vindicatory action is in 
principle possible.36 The restored possession in question, it seems, is being on the applicable 
securities register, and not possession of the security certificate (as it serves more of an evidentiary 
function). It seems a quasi-vindicatory action in this context amounts, underwhelmingly, to one of 
the ways in which a beneficial interest holder may regain the ability to exercise her rights. This is 
effected through restored quasi-possession in the form of reflection of ownership on the register. 
Differences in the applicable legal dispensation regarding personal rights, or more broadly 
obligations, is equally important. A fundamental developmental distinction between the English 
common law and the more Civilian tradition of South African private law is the approach to 
assignment.37 Historically, in English law debt was initially seen as a personal obligation which could 
not be transferred. Gradually the law began recognising the assignment of choses in action – first 
only as a weaker claim in equity, but after 19th century statutory intervention enabled legal 
assignment as well (although subject to strict formality requirements).38 However, during these 
earlier developmental years choses in action were, in the absence of empowering (incorporating) 
legislation or status as chattels, not transferable without the assent of the corresponding holder of 
the duty (the debtor). This remains at least partially true.39 It follows that debt securities (with the 
exception of those of incorporated companies, the Monarchy and the state) could not be transferred 
without the consent of the issuer.40 
 
 
36   Oakland Nominees (Pty) Ltd v Gelria Mining & Investment Co (Pty) Ltd 1976 (1) SA 441 (A) generally as well as 
462, and Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd & another v Ocean Commodities Inc & others 1983 (1) SA 276 (A), 
specifically 290 & 294; and RN Eskinazi “The protection afforded in South African law to a purchaser of listed 
securities on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange” (1989) 1 SA Merc LJ 145 149-151. This is the primary focus of 
Chapter 11 of this work. 
37  “Assignment” in the broad sense – to denote cession, as well as delegation and true assignment.  
38   First through s 25(6) of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act of 1873, and thereafter s 136 of the Law of Property 
Act of 1925. 
See, generally, WS Holdsworth A History of English Law Vol 5 (1924) 299; and Benjamin Interests in Securities 65-
66.   
39  G Tolhurst The Assignment of Contractual Rights (2006) 212, generally; specifically in the context of debts cf. Ellis 
v Torrington [1920] 1 KB 399 410-411, CA and for a broader policy perspective Linden Gardens Trust Ltd v Lenesta 
Sludge Disposals Ltd [1994] 1 AC 85, HL. 
 It is understood that the point made above is greatly simplified, as it is not necessary to give this aspect any detailed 
or nuanced review here. 
40  E Micheler “English and German securities law: a thesis in doctrinal path dependence” (2007) 123 Law Quarterly 




As English commercial minds became aware of the benefits of formal incorporation, attempts were 
made to simulate its effects through the law of trust and partnership.41 After the passage of the 
Bubble Act in 1720, 42  the number of such unincorporated enterprises (“deed of settlement 
companies”, functioning more like partnerships than modern companies) steadily increased. This 
persisted until the legislative intervention of the mid-19th century made incorporation freely available 
by registration. A major legal obstacle to fully simulating incorporation remained the free 
transferability of members’ interests. Still regarded as personal rights, they were subject to the same 
problems of delectus personae as debt securities. Companies formally incorporated by Charter or 
statute (i.e. true incorporation) did not have this problem, as their statutory founding instruments 
functioned to circumvent the common law in this and other matters.43 
The English solution to this legal problem was creative use of novation, rather than assignment. The 
transfer of debt securities as well as members’ interests would take place via an agreement of 
novation between the issuer, the transferor and the transferee. It effected the extinguishing of the 
old bundle of obligations, and a creation of a new set of identical obligations, so that the new holder 
was effectively put in the position of the old, exiting holder. 44  The South African approach to 
assignment is quite different – in principle the cession of a debt may occur without notice,45 a transfer 
document,46  or the consent of the debtor.47  As such, debt instrument holders’ interests are in 
principle freely assignable. Yet, perhaps even as late as 1973, this seems not to have been fully 
understood by the domestic legal system.48 
The important point, nonetheless, is that in England this direct and necessary involvement of the 
issuer in each transfer of its securities led, over time, to the development and use of a securities 
register. It functioned to ease the administrative burden of these novationary, tripartite transfer 
transactions. More importantly, although such securities became freely transferable,49 the issuer (i.e. 
 
 
41  Gower Modern Company Law 29-33; and generally F Evans “The evolution of the English joint limited stock trading 
company” (1908) 8(5) Columbia Law Review 339; HA Shannon "The coming of general limited liability" Economic 
History (1931) 2(6) 267; and S Williston “History of the law of business corporations before 1800” (1888)  Harvard 
Law Review 2(3) 105. 
42  6 Geo I c 18. 
43  “Although the transferability of shares was in practice procurable under a skillfully drafted deed of co-partnership, 
its legality, except under a power expressly conferred in a charter, was not free from doubt, for choses-in-action 
were not assignable at common law.” – Gower Modern Company Law 22 [own emphasis]. 
44  Micheler (2007) LQR 262-263 and Benjamin Interests in Securities 64-70 – “negotiation” is, of course, the third 
manner in which free transferability may be effected, but this was simply not the route of development taken for 
commercial securities in England.  
45  Brook v Jones 1964 (1) SA 765 (N). 
46  Trust Bank of Africa Ltd v Standard Bank of South Africa 1968 (3) SA 166 (A) and Botha v Fick 1995 (2) SA 750 
(A). 
47  LTA Engineering Co Ltd v Seacat Investments Ltd 1974 (1) SA 747 (A). 
48   See Chapter 3, § 3 1 for detailed analysis of this.  




the company, and later specialist service-providers acting on its behalf) persisted as the main 
administrative functionary of securities’ transfer, occurring through the use of a securities register.  
In this way the securities register (1) had become a permanent feature of English company law; and 
(2) ensured that a system interposing the issuer (to destroy the old, and issue the new certificates 
as well as amend the register) between the buyer and the seller had prevailed.50 This, in sum, is the 
origin of registered securities. In contrast, the Continental trend in solving the transferability problem 
was the use of negotiability, as is for example evident in Germany’s securities system where almost 
all were bearer securities.51 
This highlights a curious feature of South African securities law. In the South African securities 
environment, the use of English principles, practices and institutions caused these English structural 
legal features, and thus the prevalence of registered securities, to persist.52 This is despite the 
system being welded onto a legal chassis which has out-and-out dominium over property, a far freer 
system of cession, and far fewer consequential doctrinal complications regarding transfer or 
ownership. Nonetheless, as is often the case, certain legal usages transcend their original purpose 
and take on new, wholly justifiable roles. The securities register and certificate53 are good examples 
– today, they serve many important functions including publicity, disclosure, protection of bona fide 
acquirers, as well as facilitating the exercise of the rights of registered holders.  
 
2 2 2  The role of the banking sector  
The structure of the securities exchanges and custody and administration systems operating in 
various countries differ widely, and highly influential institutional determinants of this divergence are 
the roles of government and the banking sector. In Anglo-American jurisdictions, trading 
infrastructure was largely self-regulated (or perhaps more accurately, unregulated), whilst in Europe 
the trend (not without its exceptions) leaned towards more intervention by government.54  Two 
 
 
50   Micheler (2007) LQR 262-265 (§ 1.4.1 & 1.4.2). 
51  See Micheler (2007) LQR 262-264 & 272-276; HD Jencken “On some points of difference between the English 
system of law and that prevailing on the Continent regarding negotiable securities” Journal of the Institute of Bankers 
1 (1880) 430; FR Malan Collective Securities Depositories and the Transfer of Securities (1984) 7-11; and JL Yeats, 
R de la Harpe, R Jooste, H Stoop, R Cassim, J Seligmann, L Kent, R Bradstreet, RC Williams, MF Cassim, E 
Swanepoel, FHI Cassim & K Jarvis (2018) Commentary on the Companies Act of 2008 2-811. 
 Since 31 December 2015, the Aktienrechtsnovelle 2016 (BGBl. v. 22.12.2015, 2565). has been in force, and under 
which the issue of bearer shares may only occur in limited instances (see § 26h, Einführungsgesetz zum 
Aktiengesetz). Thus there has been a shift toward a registered securities dispensation, at least for equities.  
52   See also Chapter 3, § 3 1and Chapter 4, § 4 1, for an analysis of the harmonisation of the received (English) 
common law securities law concepts with more Civilian character of the underlying South African private law.  
53   Or, later in the case of uncertificated securities, both in the form of the electronic register entry. 




consequences of this divergence are important to understanding the development of securities 
markets and the role of debt securities within them. This is best illustrated by the contrast between 
England and Germany.  
First, there is significant divergence in terms of the roles of banks. In Germany, government oversight 
in the financial sector remained strong. Within this regulated environment, banks began to take on 
greater responsibilities in the securities markets. An influential factor in this development is the legal 
nature of German securities. From the 19th century onward, German law treated most securities as 
negotiable instruments (as a species of “wertpapier”), allowing banks to take true deposit of 
securities for their clients. As a true depositary of securities, the role of banks in the securities 
industry grew, taking on an increasingly central function as transactional intermediaries in the 
purchase, sale and holding of securities. German banks (characterised as unitary for allowing 
commercial and investment banking activities within a single banking entity, as well as for their high 
degree of operational centralisation) were able to become members of stock exchanges, and later 
played a decisive role in the immobilisation process.55 
In England, due to the use of registered securities, the transfer and holding of securities was 
facilitated by issuers through their own (or their agents’) securities registers, and the overall 
regulatory regime remained one of private enforcement. This entrenched a stricter division of 
functions between the broker-jobber-exchange complex and the banking sector – it was neither 
necessary nor permitted for banks to become members of the English securities exchanges.56 
As a result, the activities of a number of German banking institutions included not only traditional 
banking operations, but stretched across the entire spectrum of financial services, including the 
promotion, deposit, and trading of securities. This remains the case in Germany today.57 In contrast, 
the result in England was that banks clustered in London to foster special relations with brokers and 
other intermediaries, reducing their transaction costs as clients rather than functionaries within the 
securities industry. This produced the heavily specialised branches of the securities industry familiar 
to the Anglo-American market today, including the division between investment banks, stockbrokers 
and commercial banks.58 Until very recently, South Africa followed this latter trend, though today 
 
 
55   Micheler (2007) LQR 274-276. See also Chapter 3, § 3 2 1 1.  
56  Michie The Global Securities Market 137 and 139, and, generally, further also Y Cassis, GD Feldman & U Olsson 
(eds) The Evolution of Financial 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57   See Chapter 3, § 3 2 1 1. 
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many of its largest banks pursue an “integrated financial services” strategy, offering transactional, 
lending, investment and insurance products and services across the retail, commercial and 
investment banking sectors. 
Second, as shown below, the different operational structures of German and British banks also 
influenced the manner in which debt securities were utilised by banks, causing a divergence in the 
demand and the market size for these instruments. Pre-20th century securities markets were small 
and homogeneous, and traditional banking greatly overshadowed securities in the overall capital 
market. In these earlier capital markets (before securities’ meteoric rise to financial centrality began 
to emerge in the late 19th century) fixed-income securities, due to their liquidity and government-
backed stability, served a different purpose. Just as equity securities were primarily used by a few 
elite capitalists to gain and entrench access to a finite number of lucrative projects, in this earlier 
financial era debt securities were mainly employed by the banking sector as a temporary locus for 
idle capital balances. 
As a means of investment, debt securities in the 18th and 19th centuries had some long-term 
investors, but their prime function at the time was far more short-term. Banks’ trade credit would 
typically be tied up in their clients’ trading stock, making it illiquid. Yet savings depositors and users 
of credit facilities needed their money to be accessible at will, meaning banks were required to 
maintain a large buffer of idle funds so as to be able to handle fluctuation in withdrawals. This informs 
the mitigation of so-called “funding liquidity risk”.59 
Due to the ease with which debt securities could be bought, sold, or even leveraged (through 
increasingly advanced trading techniques at these exchanges) over the short run, merchants and 
banks found that employing these balances in securities markets provided a profitable short-run 
return at little risk. Securities markets were already highly liquid, which guaranteed quick and easy 
access to those funds if and when required. In this way the securities markets’ primary function at 
this time was short-term idle fund deployment, rather than portfolio gains through medium- and long-
term investment. In this way debt securities were most important to the money market, easing the 
credit supply, lowering interest rates and stabilising the banking system.60 The practice has remained 
an important function of the bond market to this day, although no longer its only function. 
However, specific responses to funding liquidity risk (and maintaining the capital required by 
fractional reserve rates) were not transnationally uniform. Both the scope of this problem and the 
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type of solution adopted was largely determined by the operational character of the banking system 
in place.  
Countries with unitary banking systems allow both commercial and investment banking operations 
to be housed in a single bank (examples include Germany or early USA). The diverse operations of 
unitary banks are centrally managed, both vertically and horizontally more integrated, and quite 
simply bigger. Consequently, within the more centralised structure of these banks, the issue of 
internally balancing illiquid longer-term trade credit with the demand for overdraft facilities and 
consumer deposit withdrawals is more complex. Yet scope cuts both ways, and within these banks 
there is a larger amount of funds available (specifically in the investment banking component). 
Therefore, to curb funding liquidity risk, a greater amount of non-depository capital is held in 
securities markets by the banks’ investment arms.61 During the 18th and 19th century this came to 
define the role of securities in countries with unitary banking systems. The portfolio positions held by 
the banking sector in the securities market moved in step to the supply and demand for withdrawals 
and deposits. This increased the demand for debt securities, contributed to a faster turnover in 
securities markets, and greatly stabilised the money markets.  
In contrast are countries (for example Britain and, by extension, South Africa) where commercial 
and investment banking activities were conducted by separate entities, or at least where Chinese 
walls within a banking group structure were maintained more strictly. As a point of departure these 
banks operated without the benefits of an investment banking component, and are also unable to 
place idle balances in securities markets without the use of an intermediary service provider such as 
a broker. Further, these banks use a more localised, essentially modular, “branch-banking” system, 
with each subordinate branch operating more autonomously, self-sufficiently, and carrying more 
responsibility for keeping its own deposits and loans balanced. Historically, therefore, this greatly 
reduced the complexity of balancing the bank’s overall deposits and loans (as well as maintaining 
the fractional reserve rate), as branches remained to a degree insulated from one another, and the 
bank more insulated from the failure of individual branches. With funding liquidity risk spread in this 
manner, it lessened the need for a large (centralised) fund of idle capital, dampening the demand 
for fixed-income debt securities in which to employ it.62 
The result is a historically lower overall demand for debt securities in countries with this kind of 
system. In 18th and 19th century England most debt securities were taken up by the English public 
and foreign investors, and held, and periodically restructured by quasi-public institutions such as the 
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Bank of England to improve government liquidity. This also partially explains the uniquely marginal 
role of debt instruments in the early South African capital market, where branch-banking, equity and 
an abundance of gold adequately met the needs of its early capitalists and government.63 Over time 
this has changed, but these now seemingly anachronistic features of the South African banking 
environment had a marked influence on the market’s composition and dynamics, and therefore on 
its development. 
 
2 2 3  The character of English securities regulation  
The English approach to securities regulation is largely characterised by private enforcement, with 
an emphasis on intra-industry oversight, and with minimal interference from the executive 
government (and to a lesser degree from the legislature). These features are also a product of a 
number of historical factors, and the role of government in the regulation of securities and securities 
markets is thus limited. An analogous position exists in the field of corporate governance. Here (1) 
South Africa has also been subjected to comparably strong English influence,64 and (2) most of the 
regulatory substance lies beyond the black letter law, yet in limited instances can be co-opted into 
the black letter law via legal rules which have explicit and open-ended normative policy content. This, 
in limited instances, has allowed such so-called “soft law” principles to become directly actionable 
as elements of a formal cause of action.65 Again this trend appears today to be steadily reversing, 
but that does not impact the analysis undertaken here. 
The post-Cromwellian parliamentary dispensation in England effected a lasting political and 
economic stability not necessarily exhibited by its then contemporary Continental neighbours. As a 
consequence, England’s debts (at last sufficiently distinct from the unpredictable, default-prone 
nobles’ and monarchs’ more feudal debts that preceded them) were perceived as inherently less 
risk-prone, and more reliable.66 This led to a broadening and deepening of English securities markets 
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as it attracted a greater multitude of risk-averse investors, who found the new levels of risk in the 
market more acceptable than the less stable European environment.  
Unfortunately, this early market growth occurred whilst a proper understanding of securities markets 
had not yet fully developed. Growth from capital inflows continued into the 18th century, finally 
resulting in an over-expansion leading up to 1720. At this stage, the actions of an overly-sanguine 
market, ambitious financial institutions, and a laissez-faire government approach caused what is 
commonly referred to as the “South Sea Bubble”. It must be noted here that the number of shares 
trading on the London market before the South Sea-driven collapse of the market was, relative to 
historical levels, high. This should not be seen as an indication of the overall debt-equity 
configuration of securities markets of this era, as debt securities remained by far the most 
prevalent.67  
In response to what was correctly identified as an unsustainably overheated financial sector, 
Parliament legislated the Bubble Act of 1720. It was a poor solution. The Act operated to make new 
incorporation very difficult, and allowed the prosecution of companies using old, “shelf” charters 
whose company purposes did not match the character of actual operations.68 Ironically, the Act was 
rarely enforced during its operative lifetime.69 Ultimately, the effect was a century-long securities and 
company-formation slump.70 At the heart of the problem was a combination of three interdependent 
causes leading cumulatively to the modern English market’s first failure. First, there existed an 
overly-cosy and naïve financial relationship between big business and government.71 Second, large-
scale informational defects in the market caused ruthless and widespread price-manipulation and 
fraud.72 Third, unscrupulous traders played a large part in fuelling the fire of speculation, to the 
investing public’s detriment.73 The Bubble Act addressed none of this. 
Other early legislative interventions around the turn of the 18th century also attempted to put in place 
rudimentary but more lasting market safeguards. For example, jobbers and brokers had to sign oaths 
to avoid conflicts of interest, practice their trade “fairly and honestly”, as well as obtain proper 
licencing; there was also the establishment and appointment of an oversight committee by prominent 
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public functionaries of London.74 Following the failure of the York Buildings company – one of the 
only companies to have survived the South Sea Bubble crash75 – in 1734, the government outlawed 
options trading, but via a loophole comparable margin-based trading slipped by unsanctioned. These 
seem to be the only examples of overt government intervention into securities trading practices. 
The primary insight from statutory measures such as these (and indeed the Bubble Act itself) seems 
to be that the activities of the securities industry were in principle approved of by Parliament,76 but 
not well understood. The effect of these types of laws – ostensibly to rid the market of abusive 
practices – was slight, coupled with unintended consequences that were often evidently detrimental. 
Additionally, the strict institutionally entrenched compartmentalisation of the various role-players in 
securities markets of today were virtually non-existent. The impression is that the government of the 
time had neither the understanding, capacity nor willingness to make the necessary changes to its 
corporate and financial law, or to call into being a regulatory agency with the powers necessary to 
curb abuses effectively in the market. 
From this point forward, it becomes clear that the English government took what seems to have been 
a strongly anti-interventionist position. This left the market’s stability in the hands of the private 
sector. In reality the relationship between the wealthy business elite and the British government was 
never quite at arms-length. Thus, while regulation was officially eschewed by policy-makers, indirect 
and informal channels of oversight within the inner-circles of the upper class remained. Nonetheless 
the market was, in principle, left mainly to its own devices.77 In sum, the English government’s view 
at the time seems to have been that it lacked the capacity and ability to actively regulate securities 
markets, and continued to allow this function to be fulfilled through alignment of private and public 
interests in a more informal way.78 
By the 1770s the market for debt and even select companies’ equity was recovering. Over time, as 
default-risk began steadily to abate, trade in select state debt instruments, as well as the equities of 
the Bank of England, the East India Company and a few others began to reinvigorate the English 
securities market. 79  Policy thinking shifted even further towards benign apathy on the part of 
government. The relatively safe debt securities and a small number of quasi-public monopolies’ 
equity dominated the securities market. This strengthened the view that informally supervised self-
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regulation, from a cost-benefit perspective, was a better trade-off than official oversight. Market 
players were largely left to determine the rules of play via private enforcement at and amongst the 
exchanges.80 The market was given a freedom that allowed it to pursue the further sophistication of 
its practices and techniques virtually unencumbered.81 Strong, adaptable markets resulted from this 
policy approach, and the regulatory cost-benefit analysis of the time appears, with the benefit of 
hindsight, to have been correct.82 
From the crisis of 1720 to the mid-19th century, government’s attitude toward the economy, corporate 
affairs, and securities markets had also undergone a more general structural change. Much of this 
is still evident today. The number of “companies” – in the more modern sense – had increased 
dramatically, and the scale and scope of activities had greatly diversified. Mercantilist thinking, which 
perceived the corporate form as an instrument or agent of national geographic objectives, was on 
the wane; conversely, liberalism and a laissez-faire approach to commercial activity (riding largely 
on the wave of the Industrial Revolution) was on the wax.83 
The British securities market was becoming increasingly refined and efficient, free from government 
intervention. The one area in which the British government did exert considerable influence was in 
setting standards for financial reporting and disclosures by companies, which still remains a core 
component of securities regulation today. As the capital-intensive economic expansion raged on, the 
need for higher quality information began to grow. The government responded by implementing 
standards for the railroad, gas and electricity industries in 1868, 1871 and 1882 respectively.84 
Finally, the Companies Act of 190085 mandated that all registered companies have auditor-approved 
statements, and the substantive shortcomings within the reporting standards themselves were all 
but remedied by 1929.86 
In this way it was the rapidly progressing company law legislation of the 19th century that took up the 
mantle of regulating the risk inherent in securities, and did so mainly through financial reporting and 
disclosure. Nevertheless, improved disclosure had limited effect – market imperfections, risk, and 
informational bias continued to support the preference for debt securities until well into the 20th 
century, including in the ever expanding railroad and canal (“public infrastructure”) sector.87 It is 
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almost unnecessary to note that the attainment of limited liability for incorporated entities during the 
latter half of the 19th century also greatly impacted the financial markets through increasing the ability 
of corporations’ to leverage their capital, and increasing the number of entities which could do so.  
By the end of the 19th century and beginning of the 20th, a more important structural fissure in 
securities regulation emerged – between the UK and the United States (by this time a major equities 
market). Unsurprisingly, it was the result of another – arguably the greatest – market disruption: the 
Great Crash of 1929. The speculative bubble in equity holdings that had steadily been building during 
the early 20th century finally burst in 1929, triggering a massive US market collapse and lasting 
subsequent economic depression which spread across the globe. 
In response to the crash, the US federal government fundamentally changed the way their securities 
markets were regulated. Federal securities legislation was put in place – the Securities Act of 1933 
and the Securities Exchange Act of 193488 – establishing a tripartite system of oversight between 
the Securities Exchange Commission (founded for this very purpose under the executive branch of 
government), Congress, and various branches of professionals in the securities industry. By putting 
the executive and legislative tiers of government close to the centre of its securities regulation, the 
federal government had made active engagement with administrative law a key aspect of securities 
law. There is no doubt these measures increased safeguards and addressed key areas of risk in the 
market. However, from an economic standpoint, they had also increased monitoring costs, raised 
the cost and complexity of compliance, and created a number of barriers to entry and exit, which 
limited the efficiency of their markets.89 
These measures had a lasting influence on the global approach to how the securities industry should 
be regulated, despite the fact that few jurisdictions directly adopted this model. Most importantly, the 
US authorities identified that the ties between companies and their shareholders, as well as the 
division of responsibilities and duties between the various agency or other relationships in the 
securities trade are crucial to its stability.90 In so doing, they strongly endorsed the theoretical view 
of the firm (and markets) developed by A Berle and G Means in their The Modern Corporation and 
Private Property.91  The Glass-Steagall Act 92  also, until its effective repeal in 1999, definitively 
uncoupled the investment banking sector operating in the securities markets from its commercial 
banking counterpart, leading the US away from a more unitary style of banking. 
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In contrast, during the first third of the 20th century the British shared neither the economic growth 
nor consequent fever of equities speculation experienced in the US – war debt, currency issues, 
greater conservatism regarding equity securities, and other factors allowed them to avoid a 
comparable speculation-driven share bubble. When the Crash and the resulting Depression spilled 
over into the international market, Britain was not affected as severely. Furthermore, whereas the 
United States pioneered the shift towards increasingly widely-held shareholding and a more 
entrenched and pronounced separation between shareholders and managers (so-called managerial 
capitalism), the UK did not follow suit and British capital (and wealth) continued to stay more 
private.93 As a result, the contagion in financial markets had a less dramatic effect on the overall 
British economy. 
As in the past, Britain did not involve the legislature or the executive government in market regulation 
to any significant extent. Until quite recently, it continued on much the same path as before – private 
enforcement, “trusted-peer’” monitoring, stringent financial reporting standards, and professional 
associations.94 
 
2 3  A history of the South African securities market 
As should already be clear, the character of the South African securities market, its instruments, and 
its regulation is well described as inherited. 
The emergence and development of modern securities and their marketplace remained a 
phenomenon contained within Europe and the British Isles until these markets were (1) sufficiently 
distinguished from the rest of the financial industry, and (2) adequately advanced to have begun 
contributing meaningfully to the overall economies of their respective countries. Thereafter, around 
the mid-19th century, securities began to spread elsewhere, and reached South Africa. 
The discovery of South Africa’s rich mineral resources in the mid-to-late 1800s coincided with this 
global expansion of securities markets beyond Europe.95 The capital intensive nature of mining 
activities as well as the aptly speculative nature of prospecting itself proved a perfect match for 
financing by means of securities. The environment was particularly well suited for equities. Moreover, 
as South Africa was at that time under British control, the methodology (i.e. techniques, practices, 
and commercial as well as legal approach) used to implement these corporate financing techniques 
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was principally influenced by that of England. In this union of securities, mining, and essentially 
English principles lies the origin of the securities market in South Africa, as well as an explanation 
of many aspects of the past and present regulatory landscape in the country. 
 
2 3 1  The early years  
In 18th century Europe and England there were still relatively few incorporated public companies 
(mostly universities, utilities, local governments and quasi-private commercial enterprises), and far 
fewer still operating in the Cape. Yet there was some local commercial activity of this nature.  
The Council of Seventeen issued charters for the Geoctroyeerde Societyt de Mynwerken Aan de 
Simonsberg in 174396 and the Bank van Leening in 1793.97 A decade later, with the incorporation of 
the Geoctroyeerde Africaansche Visscherij Societeit,98 the first opportunity arose for those in the 
Cape to invest in the stock of a commercial enterprise. Thereafter Cape companies began to grow 
in number. The Cape of Good Hope Savings Society, the South African Association for the 
Administration and Settlement of Estates, and the Board of Executors were among the first to come 
into being via ordinance. 99  With these developments the idea of joint-stock operations and 
investment became increasingly familiar to the people of the Cape.100 
Trading in securities was seen locally from the 18th century onwards, taking place in informal 
marketplaces.101 This seems to resemble the development of bourses in 17th century Europe,102 
operating as places where traders could meet and conclude a multitude of commercial transactions 
(including the purchase and sale of commodities, money market instruments, securities and even 
goods). In 1782, the Stellenbosch Landdrost made public a proclamation dealing with the yearly 
return of the “Effekten deezer Colonie”. This indicates a negotiable government debt security – an 
effekten103 – establishing that debt securities were also in use at that time.   
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Such trading was formalised in 1817 with the establishment of the Cape Town Commercial 
Exchange, but the exchange retained the multidimensional character of an informal marketplace.104 
At the Exchange, securities included both debt and equity. In addition to stock available in a small 
number of incorporated enterprises, the Colonial Treasury’s debentures (or rather effecten) were 
also found at the marketplace.105 
As the practice of discounting became better understood debt instruments came to be seen as ideal 
interim investments for idle capital106 and, together with the rise of equity instruments, the securities-
component of this marketplace gradually acquired a character of its own. This mirrors earlier English 
developments.107 
By the 1850s, individuals dealing in securities had spread all over the Cape colony (a far larger area 
than the Western Cape or its predecessor the Cape province), yet equity securities gradually grew 
to become more popular than debt instruments.108 Limited liability reached the Cape at the start of 
the 1860s, with other areas of today’s South Africa following suit before 1900.109 A wave of new 
incorporations (freed from the need for legislative intervention to obtain charters) resulted, 110 
increasing the predominance of equity. This has remained a definitive feature of the South African 
securities market. Even as late as 1914 government debt instruments totalled only 1,2% of the total 
national assets of the then Union of South Africa.111 
However, debt securities did not fall into disuse. In what was then known as the Transvaal area, 
there is notable evidence that debt securities remained a fixture of the securities market. One of the 
provisions found in the Articles of Association of the Netherlands Afrikaans Company (formed to 
promote the South African Republic in various ways), reads:112 
“The Company is forbidden to speculate in securities or Bills of Exchange, or to lend money without security 
to public authorities or to individuals, and is obliged to invest all available money effectively and safely.” 
This could suggest the Company was prevented, inter alia, from subscribing to any unsecured debt 
instruments issued in the public sphere. Further, it is recorded that the infamous Drift Crisis of the 
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mid-1890s not only affected the price of gilt-edged “Chartered” shares (reacting to the possibility of 
a South African Federation), but also caused an additional subscription to be issued seeing as 
“interest on the Matabele War debentures would fall due at the New Year”. 113  Clearly public 
authorities (such as municipalities and governments) were making use of debt instruments to finance 
expenditures, including armed conflict.  
Similar observations can be made in the field of commercial debt securities. In 1895 the Cape 
legislated an act entitled the Company Debenture Act 43 of 1895,114 the stated purpose of which 
was “[t]o Provide for Creation and Registration of Preferential Debentures in certain cases by 
Registered Companies acting under the authority of Acts of Parliament”.115 Furthermore, funding for 
the Witwatersrand Club and Exchange Company (founded by Cecil John Rhodes, and the precursor 
to the JSE) was obtained by issuing a prospectus in 1887 offering a total of 3 500 £1 debentures, 
although the offer for subscription ultimately failed for lack of interest.116  
It would appear to be certain that the use of debt securities in the commercial sphere was not 
unknown to the businessmen of South Africa during the 19th century. By 1926, one authority states 
that:117  
“[t]he most usual form of borrowing by a company is on debentures.”  
Overall, a picture begins to emerge of these early domestic markets in which debt securities played 
a significant, although secondary, role. The state of the law also supports this conclusion. 
Developments such as publicity requirements (via proclamation) regarding government debt 
securities,118 as well as the promulgation of legislation dealing with company debentures, show that 
debt instruments were important enough to merit direct legal attention.  
Despite this it was equity, trading within and outside exchange centres, that dominated the market. 
Why? The answer lies in the forces driving the development of formal securities markets, the capital-
intensive nature of industries at the forefront of early corporate finance by means of securities, the 
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The establishment of a formal, institutional securities market occurred towards the end of the 19th 
century, driven exclusively by securities in the mining industry, and its concomitant need for large 
scale (railway) transport infrastructure. What differentiated these mining-oriented exchanges from 
their predecessors was an exclusive focus on securities only, and equities specifically, allowing them 
to transition from commercial exchanges to securities exchanges. Specialist mining exchanges 
sprung up around mineral discoveries across the country.119 Moreover, via mining and railways, 
South Africa gained access to the progress and resources of the international capital market.120 
The modernisation of the South African securities industry and the emergence of a modern-looking 
securities exchange121 started with diamonds in Kimberly in the early 1880s. The Kimberley Royal 
Stock Exchange, successor to a short-lived predecessor,122 is seen as the first structured, prolonged 
instance of securities (read: shares) trading in the country.123 Others followed, including exchanges 
in Klerksdorp, Potchefstroom, Pietermaritzburg, Durban and Cape Town. Yet the latter group’s mix 
of trading shares, mining claims, goods, or even bills of exchange serve as evidence of their more 
prototypical nature,124 more closely resembling the Cape Town Commercial Exchange than a true 
securities exchange. 
The discovery of gold followed the same pattern, and exchanges proliferated.125 Ultimately the 
Witwatersrand, as the epicentre of the gold mining boom, became the epicentre of securities trading. 
In 1888, a year after its inception on 8 November 1887,126 the “Exchange and Chambers Company” 
counted 600 members, and by the end of its second year had virtually no rivals.127 It would later be 
known as the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. However, the output of the mining firms during the 
1880s did not justify the volume of capital they were attracting.128 It appears bullish sentiment in 
London,129 rather than underlying value, was the ultimate impetus for a modern securities market 
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infrastructure in South Africa.130 Before then, for most of the 1880s, South African mining capitalists 
took recourse to the London capital market for funding, rather than finding it closer to home.131 
By 1895, the JSE had become the country’s premier exchange. A second mining stock boom meant 
the JSE’s market capitalisation stood at £103m in mid-1895. 132  It successfully attracted 
Johannesburg’s brokers;133 strategically aligned itself with a vast international network of mining 
exchanges essentially all trading the same shares; dominated its rivals not only in the north but also 
in the Cape; and had even begun listing non-mining companies on its board.134 In 1897, South 
African Breweries listed on the JSE – the first non-mining company to do so, and the only such 
company until 1910.135 Importantly, as the JSE started upon its own internal processes of refinement, 
the first set of “rules” for the listing of companies emerged late in 1889 – yet within them no mention 
is made of debt securities.136  
In Britain, it is clear that the amount of securities in overall circulation exceeded the amount of 
securities traded on exchange platforms.137 The same can be said of South Africa’s securities 
market,138 and although not traded on the JSE, securities at large certainly included debt instruments 
(public, quasi-public and commercial). 
The South African securities environment remained unstable and largely speculative throughout the 
late 19th and early 20th century.139 The first “boom” on the JSE occurred between 1888 and 1889, 
and was essentially driven by demand-side hubris, with little or no relation to the underlying value of 
securities or their issuers. It was, predictably, followed by a slump.140 Margin trading, manipulation 
of information, and large-scale unchecked speculation caused a high degree of volatility, with large 
gains and losses. Some of the economic damage caused by the price-amplitudes of these 
completely unregulated markets was, however, curbed by universal adoption of limited liability 
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legislation between 1861 and 1892.141 Freely available limited liability had the effect of insulating 
investors and businessmen from the full impact of losses through their companies. 
It is this volatility of equity market prices which ultimately accounts for the lack of trade in debt 
securities, and their absence on exchanges. Increased price volatility implies increased scalability 
of gains, but also of losses. In the wildly speculative, immature, and overly-optimistic South African 
securities markets of the late 19th century it made no sense to trade in debt-based instruments, as 
they are specifically used to immunise portfolios to heavily cyclical movements and risk. The 
collective cognisance of local investors had no memory of ruinous financial events such as those 
experienced by Europe and Britain in the long-term development of securities markets, and also had 
no historically entrenched preference for debt.142 
Nonetheless, what is vital is that by 1900 South Africa had begun to develop, on the back of the 
international expansion of securities, a market infrastructure of its own, and assimilated rather 
quickly most of the advances that had taken Britain and Europe hundreds of years to achieve. With 
this came debentures as a form of corporate borrowing. Government appears also to have co-opted 
debt securities into their borrowing patterns even earlier. 
Yet, the secondary market for debt securities remained obscure and small. This is mainly due to 
money market conditions143  and the frenzied pursuance of the scalable gains characteristic of 
equities. Thus while certainly not absent from South Africa, debt was not actively traded. This 
remained the case until local and global monetary and other macroeconomic policy shifts of the 
1970s and 1980s caused trading in debt securities to become as attractive as holding them. 
 
2 3 2  Securities in the 20th century 
A few figures speak volumes about the state of local securities markets in the 20th century. In the 
1912-1914 period, securities made up 17,6% of South Africa’s national assets – of that amount 
commercial equity securities stood at 16,4%, commercial bonds at 0%, and government bonds 
totalled 1,2%. The same figures for 1927-1930 were 12%, 0%, and 7,3% respectively, totalling 
19,3%; and during 1937-1940, stood at 17,5%, 0%, and 7,2% respectively, and 24,7% in sum.144 
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Yet by 1984, holdings in government debt securities (including those of central government, public 
corporations and local authorities) equalled 50% of the country’s GDP.145 
This shows the overall market as equity-dominated, growing, and one in which the bond and 
debenture (or rather debt security) component was initially negligibly small.146 This is largely due to 
(1) the almost exclusive presence of mining and some infrastructure companies in the securities 
market of the time; (2) the perceived volatility-profit dynamics seen at the time as the raison d'être 
for exchanges, and (3) branch-banking and the state of the South African money market as mirroring 
that of England.147  
Furthermore, during wartime, gold was a crucial global resource. Consequently, the Witwatersrand 
area had no trouble finding the capital to mine and export it during the conflict of 1914-1918.148 Thus 
the Union – rich in gold – had no need to finance its contribution to the Great War through debt, and 
was in fact experiencing strong capital inflows. This must also have been true of funding the other 
expenditures of the Union. With large reserves of gold and platinum,149 the government would have 
had little need to issue bonds and debentures to augment the state’s tax-revenue both in and outside 
of wartime. 
Nonetheless, whilst the focus of the Exchange remained the raising of capital through, and 
speculation in, the shares of mining operations there is evidence that the scope of its activities in 
terms of “stock” included inter alia “municipal and water loans”.150 Thus gilt-edged (government debt) 
securities had found their way onto the JSE. “Debenture stock” was also likely to have been available 
on the exchange – denoting a “proprietary interest” in a debenture scheme.151 By this time, the 
commercial phrase “stocks and shares” at least had the potential to include, and did include, a few 
debt securities.152 
Internationally, securities markets experienced a quantum leap in the first three decades of the 20th 
century. Global consensus on economic (monetary) policy gravitated towards the gold standard, and 
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exchange-rate fluctuations disappeared along with consequent currency volatility risk. Currency 
values converged, so that securities became transnationally tradable and volumes escalated 
dramatically.153The telecommunications revolution vastly reduced temporal gaps between markets, 
and information flowed seamlessly between financial centres such as Paris, New York, London and 
Johannesburg. Short-term arbitrage-seeking between these markets became a specialist branch 
amongst secondary market professionals.154 In sum, capital mobility (due to the monetary policy of 
the gold standard era) coupled with near-instant communication and resultant marketability (via the 
telecommunications revolution) desegregated the world’s securities markets on a scale 
unimaginable in comparison to what preceded it.155 
However, the long-term effects of the Great Crash of 1929 and other economic and political variables 
ultimately caused the UK and other Commonwealth members to unpeg their currencies from gold in 
1931. South Africa’s refusal to follow suit until late in 1932 depressed its economy and securities 
trade severely. Once it capitulated, however, money flooded back into South Africa at high volumes, 
the currency value rebounded, confidence returned, and banks regained stability. By mid-1933, the 
JSE’s market capitalisation (still consisting mainly of mining and financial shares) stood at £357m.156 
A period of general domestic stability and prosperity followed,157 despite a global period of recession. 
During the Second World War gold did not have the same priority status as during WWI. However, 
for South Africa this was offset by a huge expansion of the industrial sector,158 and a number of 
significant mining discoveries that upheld the overall strength of the share markets. South Africa 
experienced little post-War hangover – in fact 1946 was an unparalleled success for the JSE,159 and 
by June the JSE’s market capitalisation had increased by £1 505m, to total £1 728m.160  
In 1947, the Union passed the Stock Exchanges Control Act, the first piece of legislation focused on 
secondary market (exchange) regulation.161 In 1953, three government bodies (the National Finance 
Corporation, the SA Reserve Bank and the Public Debt Commission) decided to make use of brokers 
in matters of government, municipal and parastatal “stocks”.162 The majority of these stocks would 
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have been debt securities – i.e. “gilt-edged securities” or “gilts”. This arguably represents the start of 
an increase in the prominence of debt securities in the domestic market. 
The origin of the term “gilt-edged” is thought to come from the first bonds issued by the Bank of 
England shortly after its formation (which had on the edge of their scripts a golden leaf) and the term 
gilt-edged securities is the official designation of the bonds of the United Kingdom’s government.163 
The market for gilts in South Africa (whether within the JSE or at large) was synonymous with the 
market for South African government or other public debt securities, which by 1940 already made 
up at least 7,2% of South African national assets.164 In 1958, the Treasury issued, for the first time, 
three-month Treasury Bills – the first local money market securities. In response the JSE gave the 
Treasury its full support in improving the debt sector of the securities market.165  
The extreme volatility and naiveté that had characterised the earlier securities market had abated by 
the 1960s, and by the mid-60s another industrial boom was evident.166 A decade later, the JSE 
decided to formalise its gilt market. At that stage, the economy and equity markets were 
depressed,167 and only a small amount of the gilts in overall circulation were traded within the 
Exchange.168 The pervading view of investors and brokers at the time remained that gilts were to be 
bought when issued, and held until maturity.169 Then, quite suddenly, the bond market ignited:170 
“The rise in turnover from trading on the JSE in gilts – Government, municipal and corporation stocks – is 
dramatically illustrated by the annual turnovers since 1975. The year-end figure then was R1,3 million. Two 
years later it had jumped to R20 million and by 1979 it had reached R130,96 million. In 1982 it took off for 
the stratosphere with R1,27 billion, and in 1985 it notched up to R1,62 billion. But this is only part of the 
picture because a good deal of trading in gilts takes place outside the exchange.” 
The reasoning behind the move to a separate gilts trading floor instead of merely continuing with the 
informal trading of gilts by the few traders who were interested, was the potential of an active 
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n 4. 
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secondary market, hence the focus on turnover. More active trading, the reasoning goes, had the 
potential of adding portfolio value via intensified buyer-seller trading activity.171 
The macro-economic consequences of the oil price shocks and the collapse of the Bretton-Woods 
exchange-rate dispensation during the 1970s meant that instruments with locked-in interest rates 
(primarily bonds and money market securities) became useful tools in active portfolio management, 
increasing the velocity at which they were traded. Domestically, the South African economy was 
increasingly isolated by Apartheid-driven sanctions, and the government’s budget deficits were 
steadily ballooning. This bolstered the local bond market, as the state turned to gilt-edged securities 
to augment its increasingly insufficient tax revenue. 
By the end of the decade, there were 764 listed “fixed income securities”, just 89 less than listed 
equity securities.172 FR Malan notes that:173 
“[t]he most important securities dealt in on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange are shares, debentures, and 
the so-called “gilts”, i.e. securities issued by the state, local authorities and public bodies.” 
The gilts trading floor itself was opened in 1980, and the high prime-rate environment that 
characterised South Africa in the 1980s guaranteed high trade velocity.174 By 1982, the JSE’s 
turnover in gilt-edged (state) securities exceeded turnover in equities,175 in line with the sudden 
explosion of the gilt-market discussed above. In 1983, JSE gilts were trading at a total market volume 
of R22bn (three times the 1982 nominal amount and around the same as the total market capital of 
the JSE of 1968), with its own index.176  
However, the South African market for commercial debt securities was smaller and less active. 
Although some of these non-sovereign securities had also come to be traded on the JSE, they traded 
on the equities floor. Between 1984 and 1989, the major companies in South Africa raised their 
capital at an equity-versus-debt ratio of 9,6:1, and by 1989 listed corporate bonds made up only 
R2,4bn compared to the JSE’s R96bn in gilt securities.177 The latter also only represented roughly a 
third of the JSE’s total market capitalisation at the time, indicating equities returned to predominance.  
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Far more importantly, the majority of South African debt securities traded (or were merely held) 
outside of the formal exchange platform – i.e. “over-the-counter” or “OTC”. 178  Outside of the 
exchange environment, other specialist institutions began to emerge. With the exception of gilts 
(then gaining significant traction on the JSE) 179  debt securities were held and traded through 
commercial or merchant banks, institutional investors and other institutions such as building 
societies and discount houses,180 as well as the National Finance Corporation;181 some were also 
informally traded amongst individuals. By the mid-1980s, most government debt was held by the 
public sector and financial institutions (excluding commercial, or “monetary” banks, who held far 
less).182  
From the 1980s to the turn of the century, the market began to outgrow some of these institutions. 
For instance, the Deposit-Taking Institutions Act183 put an end to both building societies and discount 
houses as independently operating financial intermediaries. This also firmly separated deposit-taking 
institutions from “contractual savings institutions” such as long-term insurers. As a result, banks 
began to alter their business model, moving from an interest- to a fee-centric approach. This led to 
reliance on new financial techniques such as asset securitisation and the use of call bonds 
(redeemable at the behest of the issuer) in order to keep book debts liquid, or move them off-book 
entirely. Debt securities are, of course, key to the process of securitisation. 
During the late 1980s and 1990s, the South African financial markets underwent a period of 
substantial regulatory reform and institutional change. In 1987, the supervision of banking activities 
was transferred from the Department of Finance (today the National Treasury) to the South African 
Reserve Bank. 184  In 1989, following the recommendations of the Stals/Jacobs Report, 185  the 
Financial Markets Control Act186 (FMCA) was passed, enabling the creation (through licencing) of 
formal secondary markets – i.e. exchanges – other than those contemplated in the Stock Exchanges 
 
 
178  Davies & Firer (1992) Investment Analysts Journal 41 – cf. also PW Davey Role of Corporate Bonds in South Africa 
(1990) (unpublished MBA research report); Commission of Inquiry into the Monetary System and Monetary Policy 
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181   While it was still in existence. See R.P. 70/1984 para 1.3, and generally Chapter 2 – highlighting Treasury (money 
market) securities, and where Table 2.1 is particularly useful for a breakdown of Treasury securities holdings; and 
Chapter 3 for the position on public debt securities, where Table 3.1 is similarly useful.   
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Control Act.187 This was followed in 1990 by the Financial Services Board Act,188 which in conjunction 
with subsequent legislation gave rise to the Financial Services Board. The FSB has emerged as the 
chief supervisory body for all financial markets in South Africa. 
These reforms enabled, in 1989, the formation of the voluntary Bond Market Association, which was 
at that stage operated as an exchange exempted in terms of the FMCA. In 1996 the Association 
became annually licenced by the FSB under section 7 of the aforementioned Act, and the Bond 
Exchange of South Africa (BESA) was born. Together with the JSE (licenced under the Stock 
Exchanges Control Act) and the South African Futures Exchange (“Safex”; also licenced under the 
Financial Markets Control Act in 1990), BESA was the third formal exchange operative in modern 
South Africa. Its members included banks, brokers, certain issuers, and other intermediaries.189 It 
should be noted, however, that futures (and forward contracts in general) are not considered 
securities – thus whilst Safex remained a third exchange, it was not a securities exchange.  
The Bond Exchange formalised the BMA’s (exempted) OTC Bond Market. The vast majority of the 
JSE’s government and commercial debt securities were moved to BESA. Before this the JSE’s 
corporate bonds did not share the separate trading floor for gilts, and those few that were traded at 
the JSE had traded on the main (equities) floor. The annual turnover of BESA in 1996 amounted to 
R3 045bn compared to the BMA’s R1 821bn in 1994.190 
In 1999, under this legislative framework, the JSE and four large banks established STRATE, a 
central securities depository project for the dematerialisation of the JSE’s equity securities. 191 
Thereafter, listed equities traded in uncertificated form, whilst debt securities at BESA remained 
certificated. In 2003, BESA’s clearing and settlement house (UNEXcor) as well as Central Depository 
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Committee of its board (i.e. controlling body).” 




Ltd192 merged with STRATE Limited, to form Strate Limited.193 In 2004, the Securities Services Act194 
consolidated the Stock Exchanges Control Act, the FMCA, the Insider Trading Act,195 and the 
Custody and Administration of Securities Act.196 This change was widely perceived as allowing for 
the dematerialisation of debt securities, and trade at BESA became increasingly uncertificated.  
By 2007, BESA was highly ranked internationally both in terms of listings and value – 907 
instruments listed at a nominal value of R780bn. Government bonds accounted for 56,43%, 
parastatals’ debt securities 10,29%, financial companies 10,43%, special purpose vehicles 17,97% 
and “others” 4,88%. Commercial debt securities listed on BESA rose in value from R49bn in 2002 
to R208bn by 2006.197 
Safex and BESA were acquired by the JSE in 2004 and 2009 respectively; thus ending the brief 
divergence of exchanges occurring after these statutory and regulatory changes. BESA now exists 
within the JSE as the “Debt Market” or the “Interest Rate Market”. Over 50% of the roughly 1 600 
listed debt instruments (representing approximately R1,8 trillion in value) originated in the public 
sphere, and represent around 90% of the liquidity in the market.198 Nonetheless, corporate debt 
securities kept increasing in value from R498bn in 2007 to R1 104bn in 2013.199  
Finally, in terms of the make-up of the market, at present:200 
“Strate is the central securities depository for all uncertificated securities listed on the JSE Securities 
Exchange…Recently Granite Central Securities Depository (Pty) Ltd was granted a conditional licence for 
bonds and money market instruments, but it remains to be seen whether it will develop into a material role 
player. 
… 
The following entities have recently been granted licence to operate the respective exchanges in South 
Africa: ZAR X (Pty) Ltd to operate a new exchange called ‘ZAR X’; 4 Africa Exchange (Pty) Ltd to operate 
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a new ‘4AX’ exchange and A2X Proprietary Limited to operate the ‘A2X’ exchange for ‘cash equities’, but 
their rules and listings requirements are not covered in these notes as it remains to be seen whether they 
will become material players. 
… 
Strate…is affiliated and partnered with various international organisations including the Africa and Middle 
East Depositories Association and the Americas’ Central Securities Depositories Association. Strate is also 
a clearing house.” 
As has been shown, once debt securities in the more modern sense had developed from their proto-
security predecessors, the constitution and operation of more sophisticated securities markets was 
enabled. This, in turn, allowed markets to find additional uses for debt and equity securities in these 
markets (as seen most prominently in securities’ collateral and securitisation functions).  
Having emerged first on the Continent and thereafter undergoing considerable refinement 
(especially in England), the colonial era eventually brought these markets and their instruments to 
South Africa. This accounts for the (predominantly) English influence on the South African securities 
system and most importantly: (1) its regulatory approach; (2) the manner in which the role and 
structure of the banking system impacts the domestic development of securities markets; and (3) 
the legal origins of registered securities, which dominate South Africa’s financial system. Finally, 
along with South Africa’s political advancement into independence and finally legitimate democracy, 
its securities markets broadened, deepened and grew in sophistication, so that today a large, well-





3  Historic legal developments ......................................................................................... 60 
3 1  The company security: changes in function and form ..................................................... 60 
3 1 1  The Company Debenture Act of 1895 and Companies Act of 1926 ....................... 63 
3 1 1 1 The Company Debenture Act of 1895 ............................................................... 64 
3 1 1 2  The Companies Act of 1926 .............................................................................. 70 
3 1 2  Concrete policy shifts leading up to the Companies Act of 1973 ............................ 81 
3 1 3  The beginnings of a conceptual shift: the post-1973 dispensation ......................... 87 
3 1 3 1 The contributions of the Van Wyk de Vries Commission ............................... 87 
3 1 3 2 The 1973 Act and the ascendancy of the securities concept ........................ 94 
3 1 3 3 The securities concept in the 1973 Act: appropriate and effective? ........... 100 
3 2  Relevant legal developments in the securities-market environment ............................. 107 
3 2 1  The international emergence of physical deposit of securities .............................. 109 
3 2 1 1 Bearer Securities – Germany and the USA .................................................... 110 
3 2 1 2 Evidentiary certification – England and South Africa ................................... 115 
3 2 2  Centralised, statutory immobilisation in South Africa ............................................ 122 
3 2 3  Dematerialisation in South Africa .......................................................................... 126 
3 2 2 1 Dematerialisation in principle: s 91A and STRATE ....................................... 127 
3 2 2 2 The subsequent dematerialisation of debt securities .................................. 130 
 
3  Historic legal developments 
Three key themes, all inter-related, are central to this discussion. The first is the marked influence 
of South African company law on the overall legal position regarding registered securities, and 
therefore all species of debt securities. This, for reasons which will become clear, is despite the 
relative unimportance of company debt securities in the marketplace. The second is the profound 
impact of English law on the South African legal position in these areas. Third is the ascendancy of 
the “securities concept” as a legal signifier, particularly in the various legislative interventions during 
the 20th century, culminating in the total dematerialisation of exchange-traded securities and the 
(effective) erasure of the “debenture” concept in the Companies Act of 2008.   
 
3 1  The company security: changes in function and form  
From the preceding chapter, it is clear that the volume of debt securities in South Africa has been 
historically depressed, and further that debt securities originating in the public sphere (such as those 




commercial debt securities.1 Based on this observation, as well as other insights from the preceding 
general history, this chapter presents a deeper analysis of the concomitant legal history of debt 
securities in South Africa.  
All registered securities (whether issued by the state, quasi-public entities or companies) tend to 
look alike and function in a similar manner, and such differences as there are can be dismissed as 
largely immaterial. Furthermore, the law regarding company securities appears to have been the 
most sophisticated, refined and comprehensive (although by no means perfect). Most importantly, 
the current state of the law regarding securities has largely converged on what has emerged from 
the law on company securities.2 
The influence of English law is also central to understanding the development of this area of South 
African law.3 After the turn of the 19th century the Cape fell permanently under English control. In so 
far as there existed at the time a Roman-Dutch law it was kept as the Cape’s common law, with the 
reception of English procedural principles4 as well as selected substantive law matters.5 The English 
influence on substantive law is particularly apparent in the field of commercial law, and specifically 
company law.6 The English company law revolution of the 19th century,7 culminating in the sudden 
and widespread availability of the incorporated form and limited liability (most notably through the 
Joint Stock Companies Act of 1856) had a marked impact on the statutory position of South African 
company law, and also on the proliferation of commercial securities.8 
 
 
1   Historically, government borrowing was authorised and regulated through a combination of its own prerogative, 
statute, and delegated legislation; the borrowing of quasi-public entities such as the Treasury or Eskom was 
traditionally governed by statute – see for example FR Malan Collective Securities Depositories (1984) 140-146.  
2   This idea will be further developed below in § 3 2, but see also Chapter 4, § 4 1 1. 
3   This is due to the marked influence of the English legal and institutional approach to financial markets on the South 
African financial system, which has already been noted in Chapter 2, § 2 2 and § 2 3 1. 
4  See for example PJ Schwikkard & E Van der Merwe Principles of Evidence (2012) 1-18 for a helpful account of this 
development in the law of evidence, or WLR de Vos Grondslae van die Siviele Prosesreg LLD thesis Rand Afrikaans 
University [now University of Johannesburg] (1988) 174 and generally 159-174 for the development of the South 
African law of civil procedure, and JJ Joubert Criminal Procedure 11 ed (2014) 24 for the same regarding criminal 
procedure.  
5   See generally R Zimmerman & D Visser “Introduction – South African Law as a Mixed Legal System” and E Fagan 
“Roman-Dutch Law in its South African Historical Context” in R Zimmerman & D Visser Southern Cross: Civil and 
Common Law in South Africa (1996) for an excellent exposition of South Africa’s civilian and common law mixed 
legal heritage.  
6  E De la Rey “Aspekte van die vroeë maatskappyereg: ’n vergelykende oorsig” (1986) Codicillus 4 9. 
7  See Chapter 2, notably at § 2 1, § 2 2 & § 2 3 1.  
8  JT Pretorius, PA Delport, M Havenga & M Vermaas, Hahlo’s South African Company Law Through the Cases 6 ed 




Naturally, English company law principles exerted the strongest influence in the Cape,9 which in turn 
strongly influenced the other areas.10 The Colony passed the Joint Stock Companies Limited Liability 
Act 23 of 1861 on 14 August, essentially an act entirely based on its torch-bearing English 
counterpart. 11  As in England, the Act was incrementally refined in various iterations. Similar 
legislative processes were followed in what was then Natal, the Orange Free State and the South 
African Republic (later the Transvaal Colony) before 1900.12 The Union of South Africa eventually 
legislated a national Companies Act in 1926.13 This process of guided, incremental refinement 
continued for some time until South African company law broke from its slavish adherence to English 
law with the Companies Act 61 of 1973, largely due to the efforts of the Van Wyk De Vries 
Commission.14  
The Company Debenture Act of 1895 and the Companies Act of 1926 both exhibit an approach to 
debt securities that is in many respects fundamentally different to the approach initiated by the 1973 
Companies regime.15 This conceptual shift16 in the legislature’s approach is the result of three 
factors. First is a share-centric development of company law’s securities provisions, predicated on 
the dominance of equity securities in the domestic market. Second is the change in the role of debt 
and equity instruments from primary market fundraising tools (issuers’ tools) to secondary market 
investment instruments (investors’ tools) that occurred over the course of the 20th century.  
Third, and most importantly, is the adoption of the term “securities” as a pivotal concept in the 
statutory framework, reflecting its emergence as a denoting tool for grouping together an extremely 
complex and increasingly multi-dimensional number of financial instruments. As alluded to in 
Chapter 1, the term securities is far from the straight-forward catch-all concept it was intended to be. 
Instead, it appears to evolve over time, and it also functions in a manner that is contextually (and 
from a statutory point of view) purposively variable. This is the focus of Chapter 6.  
The outcome of the inter-related effect of these factors begins to manifest in the Companies Act of 
1973 and culminates in the terms adopted by the 2008 Act. Before 1973, the focus of legislation on 
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10  De La Rey (1986) Codicillus 4; and Pretorius et al, Hahlo’s Company Law 2.  
11  Pretorius et al, Hahlo’s Company Law 1-2; and De Lay Rey (1986) Codicillus 12. 
12  See Pretorius et al, Hahlo’s Company Law 2; and De La Rey (1986) Codicillus 12-14. 
13  The Companies Act 46 of 1926 – based largely on the act in force after 1909 in the Transvaal (itself almost a carbon 
copy of its English contemporary counterpart); see Commission of Enquiry into the Companies Act, R.P. 45/1970 
para 10.03. 
14  Pretorius et al, Hahlo’s Company Law 2; and see below for a detailed treatment of the Commission’s contribution 
to the provisions regarding debt securities.  
15  The Companies Act 61 of 1973 has, of course, been mostly repealed by the now operative Companies Act 71 of 
2008. 




debt securities (what the legislature called “debentures”) was exclusively on the instrument itself, as 
an evidentiary documentary mechanism functioning “around”, and accessory to, the debt. The 1895 
and 1926 Acts therefore focus primarily on arrangements regarding this accessory element. In many 
ways it appears from the pre-1973 approach that, structurally, the object being regulated was 
understood only as the document, as an augmentation of the underlying debt. 
Thereafter, it is treated increasingly as shares are – bundles of rights that are packaged, evidenced 
and transferred in a unique manner, such that the document and the debt form a holistic and tradable 
construct, signified by the legal term “security”. Company law, thus, began to take a more cohesive 
view of the instrument, the document, the interests it signifies, and its commercial environment. This 
is especially true as company and securities exchange law became increasingly integrated, well-
illustrated by the 1973 Act’s transfer arrangements, and most pointedly in the subsequent advent of 
the uncertificated security. 
From the 1973 Act onwards, the document and the instrument are gradually and explicitly conflated, 
and no longer function around the debt as definitively as before. In many instances, the debt and the 
(documentary) instrument are treated as a unitary legal object – a security – so that the instrument 
and the debt co-exist as the constituent elements of a security. This is shown in its grouping of shares 
and debentures17 for certain purposes, often as securities.18 The shift culminates in the 2008 Act, 
where an undifferentiated approach is followed throughout, and the debt and the instrument are 
treated as a single construct, the security, which is at all times the subject of the Act’s provisions.19 
 
3 1 1  The Company Debenture Act of 1895 and Companies Act of 1926 
As a result, the legal position pre-1973 is a valuable source of information regarding (1) the origin of 
certain inherited idiosyncrasies in the current legal framework; (2) the nature of the documentary 
instrument; and (3) how one should approach the common law when looking to bridge gaps between 
 
 
17   For example s 133-140A of the Companies Act of 1973 (“Transfer of Shares and Debentures”), which also serves 
as a testament to the share-centric mindedness of the legislature. Alarmingly nowhere in these sections is mention 
made of the register of debenture-holders or even the term “debenture”; instead a transfer of an “interest in a 
company” (presumably the reference to debentures and other debt securities) must seemingly be entered into the 
members’ register, which patently cannot be correct. The same problems are encountered in the later inserted s 
91A, dealing with uncertificated securities (see § 3 2 3). 
18   Specifically, as per s 134, for s 135-138 & 140 – the transfer of “listed securities”.  
19   See § 3 1 2 and 3 1 3 for a detailed treatment on this topic. Chapter 4, and to lesser degree Chapter 5, will outline 
proposed theoretical ramifications of this shift in terms of the current legal position. Finally Part 2 of this work 




what has subsequently been legislated and what has been left to the residual rules of South African 
law. 
The appropriate point at which to begin to analyse this development is the first Union-wide piece of 
company legislation – the Companies Act of 1926. However, this perspective must be informed by 
a discussion of the contents of the Cape’s Company Debentures Act of 1895. Both Acts feature 
extensive structural and substantive overlap with the prevailing English legislation. Therefore – both 
terminologically and jurisprudentially – what follows below contains many elements of English law 
which in the course of modern South Africa’s legal development were subsequently purged from or 
harmonised with the Roman-Dutch common law. 
 
3 1 1 1 The Company Debenture Act of 1895 
The Company Debenture Act, enacted for the purpose of statutory recognition and control over the 
issue of debentures by joint stock companies in the Cape Colony, is dated 6 August 1895 and 
contains only eight sections. The text is difficult to find, and the relevant sections have been quoted 
as far as necessary, if not slightly excessively.  
The Act, repealed by the Companies Act of 1926,20 contains a number of relevant measures. First 
and foremost, the Act defines debentures as follows:21 
“‘Debenture’ shall mean a deed or document acknowledging indebtedness of a certain sum of money, and 
duly executed in accordance with law and with the provisions of the Memorandum and Articles of 
Association or Trust Deed, if any, of the Company granting or issuing the same.” 
It appears to be the only Act to have provided a substantive definition of debt securities. Without 
being overly semantic, the definition indicated a “debenture” was the document recognising the debt, 
which “ordinarily means a security for money, called, on the face of it, a debenture.”22 This document 
did not embody the debt in a manner comparable to negotiable instruments, nor did it have to be the 




20  Schedule V of the Companies Act of 1926. 
21  Section 1 of the Act [own emphasis]. 
22   M Nathan The Company Law of South Africa 3 ed (1939) 259. See also comments by JC de Wet & JP Yeats Die 
Suid-Afrikaanse Kontraktereg en Handelsreg 2 ed (1953) 483 regarding the difficulty of comprehensively 
circumscribing “debentures” due to their variable content and characteristics.  
23   Levy v Abercorris Slate Company (1887) 37 ChD 260 264, although a document acknowledging a debt may not 




This is further evident from the judgment of Coetzee v Rand Sporting Club,24 where the court 
discussed the meaning of the term “debenture”. The sporting club in question agreed to issue the 
plaintiff 160 (ostensibly unsecured) £10 debentures with interest of 12,5% payable half-yearly, 
stipulating that the holder may, should any interest payments be in arrears for more than one month, 
demand the principal amount (£1 600) and outstanding interest immediately. The redemption date 
is unclear from the facts. The club had yet, at the time of litigation, to deliver the debenture 
documents or pay any interest. The claim was thus for the principal amount and outstanding interest.  
In discussing the term “debenture”, the judgment reads:25 
“I am not aware that the word "debenture" has been defined precisely. BOWEN, L.J., says in English and 
Scottish Mercantile Investment Company v Brunton (1892, 2 QB 700, at page 712): ‘It seems that there are 
three usual forms of debenture...The first is a simple acknowledgment, under seal, of the debt; the second 
an instrument acknowledging the debt, and charging the property of the company with repayment; and the 
third an instrument acknowledging the debt, and charging the property with repayment, and further 
restricting the company from giving any prior charge.’ It does not follow that there may not be other forms, 
but it is not necessary to go into that. I think the word imports an acknowledgment of debt. It is derived from 
debentur, Stroud says it seems to have originated from debentur mihi with which various forms of 
acknowledgment commenced.” 
At this stage in the development of the law, a debenture was simply a specialised form of the 
acknowledgement of debt, which is a well-known and understood legal and commercial tool. 
The court – on the main question of whether the holder could claim the principal and interest without 
first having to sue for delivery of the document or damages for non-delivery – found that the 
agreement within the document had bound the club to its terms at the point where the subscription 
(or allotment) contract was perfected, which also bound the club to provide the physical debenture 
documents to the plaintiff.26  
Therefore consensus on the debt and related performances were bound up in the agreement to 
issue the debentures themselves.27 The court rejected the argument that agreement, between issuer 
and subscriber, to issue debentures was merely a promise to deliver the debentures (a pactum de 
 
 
24  1918 WLD 74. 
25 76-77.  
26  77.  
27   “In the case of debentures, there is a debt due from the company, with no special name, secured or evidenced by 
a document called a debenture.” – Nathan Company Law 259 [own emphasis]. Here the division between the 
underlying juristic engagement and the debenture document, as well as the documentary function of the certificate 
to secure (i.e. provide real security) or merely evidence (in the case of unsecured debentures) the existence of the 




contrahendo).28 That would imply that any person who has agreed to subscribe to, and has paid for, 
debentures would not be in a position to enforce her rights unless the debentures have already been 
delivered, even though according to first principles the underlying juristic engagement (via offer and 
acceptance) has already been concluded once the offer to subscribe to (or, depending on the 
surrounding circumstances, offer to issue)29 debentures has been accepted. 
This approach was unequivocally confirmed by the Appellate Division in Randfontein Estates Gold 
Mining Co Ltd v Custodian of Enemy Property.30 The question was whether certain bearer (i.e. 
payable to bearer, and therefore also negotiable) debentures held by German nationals had by virtue 
of the Treaty of Versailles become the property of the Union.31 The court elucidated the relationship 
between the underlying juristic engagement and the (bearer) debenture itself as follows:32 
“[A] bearer debenture is an acknowledgment of debt in favour of the holder as a creditor of the Company 
for the specified amount with a right to interest therein as stipulated. They both [bearer shares and bearer 
debentures] relate to jura in personam; but in neither case is the document the jus; in both cases the jus is 
the right which is evidenced by the document.” 
If this is the case with bearer debentures (where by virtue of negotiability the ius is even more strictly 
tied to the document)33 it surely must be the case with ordinary debentures. The court established 
that the “debenture” is the evidence of personal rights. Although the debenture’s contents can be 
determinative of such personal rights (as the contract or documentary evidence thereof), the 
debenture is neither necessarily nor always the contract creating those rights.34 This also addresses 
why it can be said that the aim of the legislature, at this stage, was merely to regulate the document 
augmenting the debt.  
Potential subscribers at this time would clearly have been a different breed from those individuals 
“investing” (or rather speculating) in equities. Thus, real security for debenture-debts was centrally 
important – so much so that the real security arrangements seem to be the main impetus behind the 
 
 
28  Coetzee v Rand Sporting Club 1918 WLD 74 76 – as alleged by counsel for the defendant (excipient).  
29   See ES Henochsberg Henochsberg on the Companies Act 2 ed (1963) 229-230; and MS Blackman, RD Jooste, 
GK Everingham, JL Yeats, FHI Cassim & R de la Harpe Commentary on the Companies Act: Volume 1 (RD 8 2011) 
5-241 – 5-242; and on the variable construction of offer and acceptance.  
 See Chapter 4, § 4 2 for a more detailed critical discussion of the Coetzee case and the current legal position 
regarding this issue. 
30  1923 AD 576. 
31  577. 
32  581-582. 
33   DV Cowen & L Gering The Law of Negotiable Instruments in South Africa: Volume 1 5 ed (1985) 26-27 – 
emphasising that there is “no complete merger between” the right and the paper. See also Chapter 1, § 1 1. 




Act.35 The provisions of the Act show that it catered extensively (if not exclusively) for debentures 
“issued under bond”, defined as mortgage bond or deed of hypothecation.36 What follows is a 
section-by-section examination of the Act.37 
Section 2 was the authorising provision, and reads as follows:  
“Any Company acting in accordance with the provision of any law specially relating to such Company, and 
with its Memorandum of Association and Articles, or Trust Deed, if any, may from time to time grant and 
issue debentures and cause the same to be registered under this Act, and such debentures when duly 
registered shall as from the date of such registration operate subject to prior registered rights under and by 
virtue of any bond or debenture theretofore registered, as a first or preferential charge in respect of so much 
of the property of the Company as shall be mentioned and described in such debenture, in accordance with 
the regulations, if any, in that behalf, as bound by way of security for the fulfilment of the obligation 
undertaken by the Company under such debenture.” 
Section 3 catered for the registration and lodging of debentures at the Registrar of Deeds. It provided 
that debentures may be issued in duplicate, which duplicate was to be lodged with the Registrar,38 
and would “bear a stamp as a bond”.39 Despite the company not creating and lodging such a 
duplicate, the position of a debenture holder was such that the holder:40 
“shall be entitled to enforce his rights under such debenture so soon as it shall be issued to him precisely 
as though such debenture had been issued under section three, nor shall any notice of cession of any such 
debenture be required to be given to any person in order to entitle the cessionary to all the rights of the 
cedent.” 
Registration of the duplicate, it seems, would enhance the publicity associated with the debentures, 
but was not mandatory.  
The fact that the Act intervened in the workings of the common law regarding the principles of 
cession (as, under English influence, they were then understood) is evidence that the Act required 
the document to function in a specific, or rather specialised, way. Whilst the principal focus remained 
the workings of the acknowledging document (as something separate from the underlying juristic 
engagement of debt), that document was given special qualities in order for it to function with greater 
 
 
35  See Chapter 2, § 2 3 1, and § 2 3 2. 
36  Section 1.  
37   Surprisingly, there does not seem to be an English equivalent to this statute, and although the term “debenture” 
appears in various statutes, it only begins to receive “frequent” English legislative attention in and after the 
Companies Act of 1900 – see FS Cooper Debentures (1920) 1. 
38  See s 1 of the Act. 
39  Section 3.  




certainty and efficiency. The arrangements for ease of cession are a good example, but the real 
security arrangements at the heart of the Act are where this point is best illustrated. 
Section 5 made it clear that under a single bond, a company was able to issue debentures in series, 
or singly.41 Thus, in the overall scheme of the Act, a company was able to create any number of 
secured debentures under a single bond. These “may be issued from time to time and at different 
dates…yet shall all rank concurrently in preference as from time of registration of the bond”, as long 
as the original unissued debentures under that bond were in the custody of the Registrar of Deeds.42  
It is likely that most debentures were secured,43 and issued under bond, so that: (1) companies 
would register a bond over a portion or the whole of their property; (2) in favour of the future holders 
of a predetermined number of debentures (i.e. a specified class of future persons, and not specific 
persons); (3) which debentures the company would then issue to subscribers (whether directly or 
through the use of a trust vehicle); (4) so that each subscriber, by taking up the offer to subscribe to 
the debentures, effectively loaned the company a specific sum of money with interest, and gained a 
participatory interest in the real security proportionate to their holding of the total number of 
debentures registered under the bond.   
Within this legislative scheme, the “debenture” was the accessory document, and the function of that 
document was to augment an ordinary contractual juristic engagement between a company as 
borrower and person (or institution) as lender in the following ways. First, it allowed a company to 
register real security over a future debt (totalling the amount bonded), in favour of a notional, abstract 
group of future creditors. Second, it allowed the company to borrow – with real security – money in 
piecemeal portions from various creditors up to the stated bonded amount. Third, it arranged for all 
the notional creditors’ claims to rank concurrently from date of registration of such a bond. Fourth, it 
caused each debenture document to be fungible (in the sense that the securities of the same issue 
were virtual equivalents, despite serial numbering), with its corresponding set of obligations 
transferable without notice, but evidenced by paper. 
Moreover, it effectively allowed a lender, as holder of the debenture, to obtain a fractionalised portion 
of the overall preferential claim on the secured property and to enforce such a claim without delivery 
of such property. This is quite significant. It implies that the charge on the property of the company 
 
 
41  See also LP Pyemont “The Companies Bill for the Union of South Africa” (1923) 40 South African Law Journal 389 
395; and De Wet & Yeats Kontraktereg & Handelsreg 485 in the context of the 1926 Act.  
42  Section 5 – the parallel between the custody requirement and the authorised-versus-issued shares distinction is 
instructive. As shares are required to be authorised before they are issued, so are debentures required to be 
registered and on file with the Registrar of Deeds. Both arrangements protect stakeholders regarding the legitimacy 
and consequences of the specialised operation of these respective instruments.  
43   Although the Act seems to allow unsecured debentures, and companies undoubtedly issued such debentures, it is 
highly likely that this occurred less frequently, as such debentures would have been less popular, especially with 




was (from the perspective of the debenture-holder creditor) already perfected at the time of 
liquidation. Furthermore, the “charge” seems to have included “stock-in-trade, chattels, and book 
debts of the company and its future property”.44 In the case of movables and such intangibles serving 
as real security, the Act thus empowered the creation of a true floating charge on the assets of a 
company by means of an issue of debentures. It also determined that, if all the Act’s requirements 
were met, the date at which preference in the queue of (secured) creditors was to be determined 
would be the date of registration of the bond, not the date of issue of the debenture.45 
Therefore, in sum, it seems that a debenture functioned as an accessory documentary mechanism, 
or instrument, operating within the sphere of contractual common law but modified by commercial 
statute, used primarily to reduce the economic transaction costs (before, during, and after the 
transaction; as well as in case of insolvency) incurred by both debtor and creditor in corporate 
borrowing. It followed largely English legal principles to do so. One final observation that must be 
made about this era is that it evidences a pronounced lack of emphasis on the role of the company’s 
register of debenture holders, showing an almost myopic focus on the function of the debenture 
document. This is simply because, until shortly after the turn of the century, it was not yet settled 
whether South African law recognised the English law principles of constructive trust, and 
consequently legal and equitable ownership. Thus the South African role of the register (as it 
emerged during the 20th century) was also a means by which to harmonise, albeit imperfectly, the 
more Roman-Dutch character of private law and the reception of the English law construct of the 
registered security.46 
The Act’s intervention in contemporary principles of cession (which facilitate trading rather than the 
provision of real security) appears less important within its overall scheme. This is the inverse of the 
present legislative focus (which emphasises the transferability of debt securities more than real 
security arrangements), in keeping with the hypothesis of a change in the application of debt 




44   Pyemont Company Law 206; Emmet Company Law 195; Nathan Company Law 260; and De Wet & Yeats 
Kontraktereg & Handelsreg 484 – the context of these authorities is the 1926 Act; however, from the wording of the 
1895 Act, this is equally applicable here. 
45   See Emmet Company Law 194-195 & n 4; as well as Nathan Company Law 260 for a general analysis of the nature 
of the floating charge authorised by the 1926 Act. The date of determination of priority of creditors in the concursus 
creditorum was confirmed in Consolidated Textile Mills v Registrateur van Aktes, Natal 1935 NPD 556. 




3 1 1 2  The Companies Act of 1926 
Armed with an understanding of early case law and the Company Debenture Act, attention can be 
turned to the Companies Act of 1926 (“the Act” in this section). This Act, as a Union-wide statute, 
must be viewed as the true starting point for any legal-historical inquiry as to what these instruments’ 
current legal nature and mechanics are.  
The original version of the Companies Act of 1926 is more detailed than the Cape Debenture Act 
and supports the analysis above. From its long title, it is clear that the Act’s overall purpose was 
largely to “consolidate and amend the laws in force [such as the Company Debenture Act in the 
Cape] in the several provinces of the Union” in matters of company law, making it the point of origin 
for the modern statutory position on debt securities in South Africa. Its primary arrangements 
regarding debentures are found in s 91-94.  
The interpretive significance of its predecessor, the 1895 Act, is illustratively validated by 
Consolidated Textile Mills v Registrateur van Aktes, Natal, a judgment delivered in 1935.47 The court 
had to determine whether the provisions of s 91 of the Companies Act operated to the exclusion of 
the common law relating to a company’s general power to bind its property as security for the issue 
of debentures – i.e. whether the methods prescribed in the section were the only way a company 
could create security for these instruments.48  
The court, on the state of the common law in force in South Africa before the 1926 Act, stated:49 
“It is therefore necessary to consider what were the provisions that were contained in the previous laws of 
the Provinces in regard to the matters which are dealt with by section 91 of the Act. Now with one exception, 
viz., the Cape Act, 43 of 1895, there was not in the laws of the other Provinces any such provision at all. 
The Cape Act of 1892, which was, until its repeal by the Act of 1926, the main Companies Act in that 
Province, has no such provisions. There were none in the Natal Act, in which the word "debenture" does 
not even appear. The Transvaal Act of 1909 does contain provisions dealing with debentures – see sections 
90, 91, 93, 94 and 95 – but nothing in regard to their creation or the types of bonds to be registered in the 
Deeds Office as security for debenture repayments. Nor is there anything of that nature to be found in the 
Free State Laws. Presumably, therefore, the kind of bonds passed by companies to secure the repayment 
of debentures in the Transvaal, Free State and Natal prior to 1926, and in the Cape prior to the passing of 
Act 43 of 1895, would be such bonds as were ordinarily passed by individuals and registered in the ordinary 
way and would bestow rights ordinarily created by such bonds in respect of the property, movable or 
immovable, hypothecated thereunder.” 
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The court concluded that the section does not operate to exclude or limit a company’s inherent or 
common law powers to create real security generally, but does limit such powers in so far as the real 
security serves the issue of debentures.50 Thus the court deemed the procedure found in s 91 as the 
only manner in which a company may create real security for debentures, to the exclusion of other 
arrangements. 
There are various sections in the Act that deal with debentures,51 but the central provisions are in 
sections 91-94. They are found in Chapter III of the Act (“Management and Administration”),52 and 
bear the title “Mortgages and Debentures”. This alone makes it obvious that, although the Act 
allowed for unsecured debentures,53 the relationship between the debt instrument and real security 
was of paramount importance; the contents of the sections confirm this.  
Section 91(1) reads: 
“A company if so authorised by its articles may subject to the provisions of this section, create and issue 
debentures binding as security for the fulfilment of the obligation undertaken by the company thereunder 
so much of the movable or immovable property of the company as described therein.” 
It is clear that the company’s ability to issue debentures flowed from its so-called general borrowing 
powers, if such borrowing was within the scope of its business and for a proper purpose.54 Naturally 
the directors, as the prime conduits of a company’s capacity to act, were charged with “issuing” 
(more accurately: authorising and facilitating the issue of) the debentures, which purportedly would 
vary, at the time between £10 and £100. 55 If issued to the public at large, as with shares, it occurred 
via a prospectus, on which the Act was quite specific.56 
There was no definition of “debenture” in s 229 (the definitions section), it merely stated that 
“debentures” include “debenture stock”. The latter was a slightly simpler scheme, wherein the holder 
of debenture stock holds (i.e. has a proprietary right to; an equitable interest in) a fixed yet divisible 
amount of debt forming part of a larger – single – borrowed sum or fund, which is the overall 
 
 
50  557. 
51  Which appears in the Afrikaans text as “obligasies”.  
52  Section 1 of the Companies Act 46 of 1926. 
53  Pyemont Company Law 205; Emmet Company Law 194; Nathan Company Law 259; and Henochsberg Companies 
276.  
54  Pyemont Company Law 204; Emmet Company Law 193 & 193-194; Nathan Company Law 259; Henochsberg 
Companies 275 & 275-276; and De Wet & Yeats Kontraktereg & Handelsreg 483.  
55  Pyemont Company Law 210 and 204 respectively; Emmet Company Law 193; and De Wet & Yeats Kontraktereg 
& Handelsreg 484. 




debenture stock.57 This was usually achieved using a trust device. Holding debenture stock (as 
opposed to debentures) would imply the holder had, for example, a proprietary interest in 10% of a 
£10 000 loan to the company. This interest was evidenced by a certificate, and most often given 
legal effect through status as a beneficiary of a trust to which the company owed the total amount. 
Such a percentage could be further subdivided and wholly or partially transferred to others, 
contingent on the re-issue of updated debenture stock certificates by the company, also usually 
through the trust. 
“Debenture stock” was not a legal equivalent or in nature similar to debentures. Comparable English 
authority – which at this stage of the legal development was determinative of the South African view58 
– made the fundamentally important observation that:59 
“[t]he word ‘debenture’…denotes a document of a particular kind under the seal of a company. The term 
‘debenture stock,’ on the other hand, does not denote a document of any kind. Debenture stock means the 
debt itself…The common collocation of the words ‘debentures and debenture stock,’ is therefore technically 
inaccurate, although it could hardly be misleading to anyone.”   
The corollary of this statement is that a debenture was not regarded “as the debt itself”, and so the 
position in England (unsurprisingly) mirrored that of South African law in this regard. Debenture stock 
was thus not, as is the case for shares and debentures, issued in units, and was expressed instead 
as a percentage. 
Section 91(1) has been interpreted to authorise the issue of unsecured debentures (“a mere promise 
to pay” conferring the status of an unsecured debtor concurrently with other unsecured debtors at 
winding-up); or secured debentures, to which the latter part of the authorising provision quoted above 
would then apply.60 Using as context the definition in the Company Debenture Act and the English 
position as above, the meaning of “debenture” under this Act remained a written acknowledgment 
of indebtedness. In short, the Act created a special documentary instrument, accessory to an 
 
 
57  Some mention of this is made in Coetzee v Rand Sporting Club [1918] WLD 74, cited by Pyemont Company Law 
205 & n 3 and Emmet Company Law 194 & n 4. Comparatively, see for example in England: FB Palmer Palmer’s 
Company Law 22 ed (1976) Vol 1, para 44-04; New Zealand: J Farrar & S Watson (eds) et al Company and 
Securities Law in New Zealand 2 ed (2013) 634; and Australia: RP Austin & M Ramsay Ford’s Principles of 
Company Law 14 ed (2010) 10.03. 
 On divisibility – debenture stock, as per the above authorities, can be fractionally disposed of by the holder of the 
stock, broadly in keeping with the stock principle as applied to equity, an option which in the above foreign 
jurisdictions is ostensibly not available to holders of debentures, which seem to be unitary and indivisible, even 
today. See also J Benjamin Interests in Securities: A Proprietary Law Analysis of the International Securities 
Markets (2000) 34-35. 
58   This is, to a large degree, still the case – see for example FHI Cassim (ed) et al Contemporary Company Law 
(2012) 230-236, including useful authority cited therein. 
59   Cooper Debentures 7 [own emphasis]. Compare to Nathan Company Law 259 – “The issue of debenture stock is 
not borrowing; it is the sale in consideration of money of the right to receive a perpetual annuity, which may or may 
not be redeemable...”. 




ordinary (contractual) agreement to loan the issuer a fixed sum, which served (1) to standardise and 
regulate the on-going relationship between creditor and company-debtor; and (2) to augment the 
residual rules of contract (and other aspects of the common law). 
As such, the first observation regarding the Act’s effects centres around contractual offer and 
acceptance. The Act’s prospectus requirements (should the company offer debentures to the public) 
determined the validity of offer or acceptance for the valid conclusion of an allotment contract. It 
imposed requirements of both form and substance, depending on the structure of the subscription 
and wording of the prospectus. This directly affected the valid conclusion of the underlying debt 
contract, as allotment is the point at which such a contract will be concluded. However, the legal 
history of the prospectus adds little to the current position and will not be covered here. 
More importantly, the Act’s intervention went far further (than even the Cape debenture legislation) 
by not only (1) dispensing with any notice requirements standing in the way of a cessionary’s 
exercise of his rights,61 and (2) arranging concurrent preference for debenture holders under the 
same real security,62 but also (3) expressly invoking the remedy of specific performance regarding 
contracts to take up or subscribe for debentures.63 Until this point, the prevalent view seems to have 
been that a company would only be able to claim damages from subscribers in breach of the 
allotment contract.64 Thus this last aspect seems to have been principally aimed at securing specific 
performance for the benefit of the issuing company, and the dominant view was that this statutory 
remedy could generally not be used by debenture holders at the other end of the transaction.65  
However, it has essentially been settled in South African law that specific performance is the primary 
remedy in contract law,66 and that cession may take place validly without notice.67  This was clearly 
not yet seen by the legislature as definitively being the case (or as somehow requiring clarification 
by confirmation) – the uncertainty regarding where Roman-Dutch principles end and English law 
 
 
61  Section 91(6).  
62  Section 91(5). 
63  Section 94.  
64   South African Territories v Wallington [1898] App. Ca. 309, a question which was asked but not answered in 
Brereton v Carnarvon Syndicate [1889] 10 N.L.R. 
65   See Pyemont Company Law 226; Emmet Company Law 205; Nathan Company Law 267-268; and Henochsberg 
Companies 283. “Specific performance” also did not include judicially compelling a company to confer upon a holder 
status as preferred creditor where the company did not, as promised, bond its property as real security for the debt. 
Furthermore, where debentures were issued payable in instalments, and the debentures and instalments had 
somehow been forfeited by the subscriber, the company could not avail itself of this remedy. 
66  D Hutchison & C-J Pretorius (eds) The Law of Contract in South Africa (2010) 319; SWJ Van der Merwe, LF Van 
Huyssteen, MFB Reinecke & GF Lubbe Contract: General Principles 4 ed (2012) 327 & 329-332; and GF Lubbe & 
CM Murray Contract: Cases, Materials, Commentary 3 ed (2010) 542. See also S Van der Merwe A comparative 
evaluation of the judicial discretion to refuse specific performance LLD thesis Stellenbosch (2014) for an analysis 
of the broader doctrinal and comparative position regarding specific performance as the primary South African 
contractual remedy. 




influence begins was not yet clear. The statute seemingly catered for problems arising in English, 
rather than modern South African law and viewed currently many of these interventions appear 
redundant.68 
Debentures also often seem to have included a clause which would bar the company from enforcing 
against the cessionary any set-off it had against the cedent. This is significant, as it essentially 
amounted to transfer “free from equities between the company and the original or any intermediate 
holder”,69 or far more importantly: “subject only to equities…between the company and the person 
who is registered holder”.70 This implies that legal title (i.e. registered ownership) could be transferred 
wholly or partially free from any defences and defects that could have stood against the transferor.71 
Whilst this attribute (transfer free from defects in title) has been called “the major privilege of 
negotiability”,72 it alone does not make a documentary record of rights a negotiable instrument. A 
second quality is further required: “simplicity of transfer” – i.e. transfer by physical delivery of the 
document.73 This is why securities which are not payable to bearer are not considered negotiable 
instruments.74 Yet transfer “subject only to equities…between the company and the person who is 
registered holder” does have significant legal consequences. On the spectrum that exists between 
binding oral agreements and fully negotiable instruments, this affects the character of such a 
documentary augmentation, and the relationships it creates. This is especially true in determining 
the kind of properties such a document, functioning at the oblique intersection between the law of 
property and obligations, may have. 
The importance of this theme cannot be overstated and is central to many aspects of this work. 
Concerning equity instruments, an equivalent arrangement is found in s 27 – “[n]o notice of any trust, 
express, implied, or constructive shall be entered on the [share] register or be receivable by the 
 
 
68   This view is echoed in JL Yeats, R de la Harpe, R Jooste, H Stoop, R Cassim, J Seligmann, L Kent, R Bradstreet, 
RC Williams, MF Cassim, E Swanepoel, FHI Cassim & K Jarvis (2018) Commentary on the Companies Act of 2008 
at 2-367: 
 “Section 94 of the 1926 Companies Act provided that a contract with a company to take up and pay for any debentures could 
be enforced by an order for specific performance. This provision was first introduced in England by the 1907 Act. Until then 
the remedy of the company was (unless it had declared that the application money should be forfeited in such a case) in 
damages only. The reason for this was that the intending borrower may obtain its loan elsewhere on the market, and is 
adequately compensated for the lender’s breach of contract by an award of damages. The provision enabling a company to 
obtain specific performance was enacted because the above reasoning does not hold true when a company seeks to raise a 
large loan from a number of subscribers. The provision was not re-enacted in the 1973 Act, because it was thought to be 
‘superfluous’, and has not been re-enacted in the 2008 Act.” [own emphasis] 
69  Pyemont Company Law 215-216.  
70   Emmet Company Law 201 – see § 7 of the model debenture document found therein.  
71   Cowen & Gering Negotiable Instruments 20-21 & 34-35  
72   Standard Bank of SA Ltd v Sham Magazine Centre 1977 (1) SA (AD) 493F. 
73   See Cowen & Gering Negotiable Instruments 24-28, 29-36, and 36-43 – helpful in providing authority for, and an 
explanation of, the “twofold enumeration” of requirements for classification as negotiable instruments. 
74   Union South African Association Ltd v Cohn 1904 TS 733 738; Oakland Nominees (Pty) Ltd v Gelria Mining & 




Registrar”. It is trite that this is a clear borrowing of the wording of English companies legislation. 
This provision has widely been understood to mean that companies only need to perform towards 
registered shareholders, and no-one else. It is important to note that while for shares this was a 
structural feature of the Act applicable to all equity instruments, debentures required the specific 
insertion of the applicable wording into the debenture document.75  
In either case, the effect was the same. Whether through s 27 or the wording of debenture 
documents, this created a unique partition, in a sense, between the powers of registered holdership 
(hinging on the company’s obligation to act exclusively toward the registered holder), and the rights 
of beneficial interest holders of securities (which serve as the patrimonial objects underlying the 
share or debenture). This is inherent in the architecture of all registered securities, but the manner 
in which it is achieved has undergone significant change.76 However, for present purposes it is 
enough to state that it exemplifies the unique (and historically consistent) nature of a debenture on 
the spectrum of documentary augmentation of obligations, especially as being something more than 
a written contract, yet less than a negotiable instrument. 
Most of the attention in the Companies Act was devoted to secured debentures, and the manner in 
which the document, in conjunction with the Act, governed the real security regime. The instrument 
and its real security appear so closely linked that the authors of Pyemont state as follows:77 
“[Debentures] are bonds given by the company and evidence that the company is liable to pay the amount 
specified with interest, and generally charge the payment of it upon the property of the 
company…Debentures are the bonds or deeds which evidence the loan, and, if they purport to give a 
charge, create the security for its repayment.” 
In light of the close relationship between “bonds” as denoting real security and debentures, it is no 
surprise to find terminologically that bonds (i.e. debt securities termed bonds, not the term’s other 
meaning as directly related to real security) and debentures are for legal purposes indistinct. At the 
same time, confusingly, in commercial practice each (usually) indicates different qualities.78 The term 
“bond” connotes a debt security that is ordinarily secured, often longer-term, and often issued at a 
 
 
75   The fact that the nature (or existence) of this partition was contingent on such wording being inserted into the 
debenture document, rather than (as is the case with shares) built into the Act itself, creates some confusion as to 
the operation of other areas of the Act. See § 3 1 2 below for more detail on these ambiguities – for instance, whilst 
s 27 clearly only applies to shares, s 93(2) considers the transfer of debentures to a “nominee” for the purpose of 
keeping alive debentures for re-issue. It is submitted that this is only possible if such wording was used. 
76   The 1973 Act’s similar “execution of a trust” provision (s 104) also only applies to shares, such that until the 2008 
Act (which approaches the beneficial interest holder-nominee relationship through the definitions of the Act, as well 
as in terms of the broad outcomes of Chapters 4 and 5) nominee-holding of debentures appears to have remained 
a function of correctly drafting the debenture documents. As will be seen, this remains true for non-company debt 
securities today. 
77  Pyemont Company Law 204 [own emphasis]. 




discounted value or a premium. In contrast “debenture” ordinarily connotes unsecured, often shorter-
term debt securities, mostly issued at face value.79 
This makes sense of the fact that “bonds” ostensibly enjoy a livelier secondary market trade than 
debentures, despite the fact that they are, in principle, legal equivalents and share essentially the 
same discounted future value and pricing characteristics. In fact debentures were often also issued 
at a discounted value, and/or repayable at a premium.80 It follows that the opaque commercial criteria 
used today to identify a bond in contrast to a debenture are not consistent enough to be of any legal 
value. The emergence of the term “note”, often denoting exactly the same as bond or debenture, 
further muddies the terminological waters. 
The way in which the real security (the bond) and the debenture were linked was not always the 
same. The debenture document itself could create the charge on company assets (a “duly executed”, 
or notarial debenture) or it could stipulate that its holder obtained the real rights in terms of a free-
standing bond (much like was provided for in the Company Debenture Act). In the alternative, the 
bond could be effected by an amalgamation of these two methods,81 presumably where a separate 
mortgage document was attached to a notarial debenture. The 1926 Act also retained the provisions 
empowering the creation of a true floating charge on a companies' movables and certain 
intangibles.82 
A debenture would also ordinarily list the events that activate the bondholder’s security rights, such 
as default, insolvency, liquidation, and so on, as well as an undertaking by the company not to re-
bond the property in a manner that affected the charge created by the debentures.83 
Further, the Act required extensive publicity with regard to debentures. It provided that any secured 
debentures had to be registered in the appropriate deeds registry. Should the debentures bind 
movable property it was to be done under notarial execution, “as if they were notarial bonds”,84 and 
if they bind immovable, or immovable and movable property they were to be registered “by means 
 
 
79  See for example Investopedia “What is the difference between a debenture and a bond?” Investopedia 
<http://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/122414/what-difference-between-debenture-and-bond.asp> 
(accessed 31-01-2021). Also, compare JSE “Bonds” JSE <https://www.jse.co.za/trade/debt-
market/bonds/corporate-bonds> and <https://www.jse.co.za/trade/debt-market/bonds/government-bonds> 
(accessed 31-01-2021) with JSE “Debentures” JSE <https://www.jse.co.za/trade/equity-market/debt-
em/debentures> (accessed 31-01-2021), where the real security distinction is maintained, but not the time period. 
80  Nathan Company Law 263; and Pyemont Company Law 211 – it was, however, illegal to issue debentures at a 
discounted value if also exchangeable for shares at face (or “par”) value.  
81  Pyemont Company Law 205; and Emmet Company Law 194. See also Henochsberg Companies 275; Nathan 
Company Law 263; and De Wet & Yeats Kontraktereg & Handelsreg 484.  
82  Section 91(1) as read with (3), (5) and (6); see also § 3 1 1 1 above. 
83  Pyemont Company Law 206; Emmet Company Law 194-195; and Nathan Company Law 261.  




of a mortgage bond or bonds…hypothecating the property concerned.”85 If debentures were issued 
at a discount, or alongside any commission to underwriters, guarantors, or similar persons, this 
would also have to be displayed in each annual report, including on all balance sheets any amounts 
not written off.86 
This is not to say that a “duly executed” debenture would automatically qualify as a duly executed 
bond in all cases – it depended on the nature of the real security. A true mortgage over immovable 
property would have to be duly executed independently of the debenture in order to bind, effectively, 
a company’s immovable property. This was not the case for notarial bonds over movable property: 
if properly executed, a so-called “notarial debenture” would suffice to bind the company’s movable 
property.87 
The registration in the deeds registry was in addition to registration in the register of debentures 
maintained by the company itself. The company’s register would also include whether the 
debentures were to bearer88 and, if not, the names and addresses of the holders.89 
In light of the fact that secured debentures were registered in the deeds registry, the notion that 
“debenture” in the Act purports to refer to the document and not the debt, begins to make more 
sense. It also becomes clear why, as stated above, the secured debenture itself is a bond. The effect 
of the debenture becomes indistinct from the effect of the superordinate bond under which it was 
issued to the extent of the holder’s rights (i.e. as a fractionalised portion of the overall preferential 
claim on the secured property). Simply, such a debenture became a “mini-bond” and was individually 
registered like an ordinary bond at the Deeds Office.  
As stated, a debenture had an accessory nature, similar to an ordinary mortgage or notarial bond.90 
Principally, when the debt (capital and interest, including any premium) was extinguished, the 
debenture was also redeemed and, logically, any real security arrangements ceased to be of effect. 
Similarly, where the debt was void, the instrument became of no consequence. The Act dealt 
primarily with arrangements regarding this accessory documentary instrument and was inexplicit 
where the repayment of the debt is concerned. It would seem the terms on which a debenture may 
 
 
85  Section 91(3).  
86  Emmet Company Law 197; see also Nathan Company Law 266. 
87  Emmet Company Law 196; Henochsberg Companies 275; and Nathan Company Law 263.  
88  Randfontein Estates Co Ltd v Custodian of Enemy Property 1923 AD 576 – as in Pyemont Company Law 223; and 
Henochsberg Companies 277.  
89  Section 92(1), later amended to ensure clarity on the matter of it being a register of holders, not necessarily owners 
– see Emmet Company Law 202 & 203; and also Henochsberg Companies 281. See also Nathan Company Law 
265 – “though the register is a register of debenture holders, the register is also a register of debentures…”.  




have been redeemed was an issue of contractual freedom between the parties. For instance, the 
company could repay the holder in fixed term “coupon” payments.91 In the alternative, the debt could 
be repayable at the behest of either the holder or the issuer, and could even be “zero-coupon”, 
indicating no regular interest payments, but instead a lump sum payment upon the termination date. 
Premature repayment in full could also be made contingent on specific trigger events. Any 
combination of these methods was, and remains, possible. 
Naturally, the terms of redemption would make provision for other “redemption events” such as 
premature winding up of the company or the company ceasing to be a going concern, and could 
also include, for instance, other trigger-situations such as coupon payments being in arrears,92 the 
disposal or re-mortgage of the real security, or exchange for fully paid up shares (with or without an 
additional payment or set-off).93  
There was also the possibility of secured but irredeemable debentures – which functioned as 
annuities in perpetuity, rather than finite secured or unsecured debenture-lending.94 Whilst the Act 
itself did not mention or recognise perpetual debentures, the issue of debentures is an exercise of 
the company’s innate borrowing powers. It seemed therefore that the issue of such annuities 
required special authorisation in the Memorandum.95 The term perpetuity is slightly misleading, as 
the life span of a company is only truly perpetual in theory, and not in practice. 
Despite the debenture being essentially accessory, the Act contained an interesting intervention in 
the workings of this principle. A company was able to buy back its own debentures, presumably at 
the value of the outstanding obligations towards the holder. Under s 93, secured debentures that 
were bought back would technically be redeemed, but were not necessarily extinguished. Section 
93(1) provided that these debentures could be kept alive so long as the bond remained, and the 
company could re-issue those same debentures without any difference between the new holders’ 
rank amongst the older holders under that bond arrangement.  
This is an important illustration of the operation of the documentary instrument vis-à-vis the debt. 
The unsecured debenture seems to have been fully accessory to the debt-based juristic engagement 
between a creditor-holder and a company-issuer. Yet the secured debenture seemed to be partially 
 
 
91  The permutations of a coupon can vary greatly – some more common examples include: only capital payments 
with all the interest in lump sum in the last coupon, only interest payments with the capital in the last coupon, 
amortised payments including portions of capital and interest. 
92  As seen in Coetzee v Rand Sporting Club 1918 WLD 74 above. 
93  See Pyemont Company Law 206-207 and 214-215; Emmet Company Law 195; Henochsberg Companies 276; and 
De Wet & Yeats Kontraktereg & Handelsreg 484. 
94  Samuel v Jarrah Timber Corporation [1904] App. Ca. 330, as cited in Pyemont Company Law 208 n 2. 




accessory to the debt (in so far as the debt activates the legal subject’s ability to perform juristic acts 
on the basis of the instrument), and partially accessory to the bond (in so far as the bond allowed 
the debenture to be “kept alive” as long as the bond remained operative).  
This allows a further observation. The bond securing a secured debenture was itself also accessory 
to a debt, but could be registered to secure future (or existing and future) debts – thus bonds pre-
registered for the future issue of debentures are to be considered “covering bonds”. 96  The 
legislature’s impression seems to have been that the common law position was, without explicit 
terms to the contrary, that redeemed debentures would automatically also be fully extinguished.97 
Again, whether this reflected the true South African common law at the time, or merely presumed 
that the English position prevailed, is uncertain.  
The overall picture beginning to emerge is one where the legal position regarding corporate debt 
securities allowed great freedom to contract over the terms of the debt underlying a debenture. 
However, the Act gave this accessory instrument far-reaching power. The fact that the debt was 
supplemented by a debenture would affect aspects of the principal obligations, such as offer and 
acceptance, the remedial regime, cessionary principles, and even whether the patrimonial benefits 
and the right to enforce performance vested in different persons. Furthermore, the debenture itself 
made possible the creation of real security in ways not possible at common law and could even be 
recycled in successive rounds of fund-raising using the same bonded property.  
A debenture under the Act of 1926 was not yet a cohesive, multi-dimensional and singular legal 
construct. There was, at one level, a regime of obligations in terms of which both parties had 
contractual rights and duties centred around consensus over the terms of a debt – i.e. the underlying 
juristic engagement. The terms of this engagement were often found in the debenture document, yet 
according to case law the creation of these obligations occurred through the allotment agreement. 
Thus, as far as the operation of the law relating to debentures is concerned, the inclusion of the 
contractual terms on the debenture document itself was merely incidental.  
The Act itself, however, appears to have concerned itself most with determining the effects of the 
accessory documentary instrument – i.e. the debenture. Any alteration of the underlying juristic 
engagement’s residual rules (by virtue of the debenture as effected through the Act), occurred only 
in furtherance of the document’s efficiency. On this second level, the Act provides for an accessory 
instrument which was able not only to modify the regime of its principal obligations, but also able to 
standardise and evidence the parties’ legal relationship, create easily transferable (or convertible) 
 
 
96   Scott & Scott Mortgage and Pledge 6. 
97  Pyemont Company Law 225; Emmet Company Law 204-205; Nathan Company Law 267; and Henochsberg 




patrimonial interests and (perhaps more importantly) easily transferable real security, as well as deal 
smoothly and efficiently with a (potentially vast) multitude of creditors.98 
Lastly, if somewhat counter-intuitively, this further shows that secured and unsecured debentures 
were really two quite different instruments under this dispensation. An unsecured debenture can be 
seen as an accessory instrument manifesting in an evidentiary certificate and a debenture register 
entry. It evidenced that identical borrowing contracts had been concluded in series to a number of 
people at the same time, and brought about slight statutory modifications to the contractual regime.99 
It could also function, if worded correctly, to vest in different legal persons the entitlement to benefits 
and the ability to determine performance.  
A secured debenture, on the other hand, was an instrument (also manifesting in a document and 
register entry) designed to operate as a fractionalised and separately registered portion of a 
superordinate bond (in the “real security” sense), to which it was in essence accessory. As such, it 
was able to function as a smaller, self-contained, and easily transferable mortgage or notarial bond 
(or both), which could be used multiple times under the same bond without being extinguished. When 
tied to a specific creditor-holder (i.e. having been allotted and issued), it also assumed all the 
properties of the unsecured debenture as outlined above, at least until redeemed, after which it could 
be re-issued or retired (extinguished) upon reaching maturity. 
This would seem to elevate the status of secured debentures to instruments fulfilling more than a 
merely evidentiary function. Not only did they need to be validly executed in terms of the Companies 
Act, but also in accordance with the law regarding real security arrangements, in order to create the 
rights they evidence. In a sense, they could be regarded as constitutive documents, as “their valid 
execution is necessary for the initial creation, or bringing into existence, of the separate right [or 
rights] recorded therein, and which (if certain requirements are satisfied) are themselves the source 
of a legal right [or rights] additional to the right [or rights] arising out of an underlying transaction…”.100 
At the very least their valid execution was necessary to create real security rights.  
As constitutive documents, they did not quite go as far as “embodying” the legal rights to such a 
degree that there were special legal consequences to possession and ownership of the document 
itself (unless dealing, of course, with debentures to bearer), but did move in functional terms beyond 
 
 
98  The intervention of a trust vehicle has not been dealt with above, although the Act contains much on this matter – 
it is more appropriate to deal with this matter elsewhere, as the law of trust as well as its uses in the issue of 
securities have undergone significant changes since then, and there is little which a historical analysis can 
contribute.  
99  And therefore distinct from ordinary acknowledgments of indebtedness. 
100  See Cowen Negotiable Instruments 53, and generally 27-28, n 96, n 97, and 52-54. In n 97 – citing Adams v SA 
Motor Industry Employers Association 1981 (3) SA 1189 (AD) 1199-1200 – it is noted that it is possible for an 




merely acknowledging (evidencing) the debt and governing successive cessionaries’ relationship 
with the issuer. The secured debenture instrument of this regime facilitated or created – perhaps 
going as far as to constitute – the real security rights, without which it could not have been so 
arranged.101 
This is why it can be stated that, under this Act’s regime, a secured debenture is a bond – it had 
been made so by the Companies Act, and (in line with the legal position before the Act and illustrated 
by case law) an unsecured debenture was simply a written acknowledgement of debt importing a 
number of statutory consequences. 
This reveals much about the economic function of debentures in the financial system of the time. 
Debentures, much like the trust vehicles they were often administered through, functioned as 
devices for the reduction of transaction and other economic (for example monitoring) costs incurred 
between corporate borrowers and their respective lenders in the course of corporate debt-financing. 
A debenture allowed a company to conclude a great number of uniform borrowing contracts at the 
same time or over a period of time, with a strengthened remedial position, the ability to track its 
creditors through use of a register and certification, and (in most cases) the ease of performing 
towards a specified creditor whose is unable to further divide and distribute his right to determine 
performance. Far more importantly, however, secured debentures allowed the company to take out 
a single bond in favour of an entire class of notional creditors, under which it could conclude such 
standardised (and recyclable) contracts, conferring easily transferable real security on individual 
debenture-holders. 
 
3 1 2  Concrete policy shifts leading up the Companies Act of 1973 
As far as the regulation of the securities market is concerned, it would seem that South Africa, like 
England,102 exhibited a historical preference for minimum direct intervention. What intervention there 
existed was implemented (at least until 1947)103 mainly via company law. The unified South African 
companies regime, having come into being in 1926, remained in essence the same for almost 50 
 
 
101  Here Cowen & Gering assert in n 203 at 53 (using the Randfontein Estates case as authority) that bearer shares 
and debentures are negotiable instruments but are not constitutive documents in South African law. In respectful 
disagreement, this may or may not be so – when the debenture also becomes the real security document (the bond) 
it could very well be characterised as a constitutive document. The relationship between obligations and paper can 
be described as a continuum, and in terms of documentary intangibles on that continuum a secured debenture in 
all likelihood also fulfilled a constitutive function in addition to its evidentiary one. 
102   See Chapter 2, § 2 2 3. 




years thereafter. However, aside from smaller amendments, it was subject to two major policy 
overhauls before developments leading up to 1973 introduced a more fully revised Companies Act.   
The first occurred as a result of the Report of the Company Law Commission of 1935-1936.104 As is 
clear from the Report, there remained, at this stage, a large-scale reliance on the parallel 
developments in English company law. They substantially influenced the outcomes of the Report.105 
The Report further noted that from a policy perspective, much of the reform of company law was 
aimed at improving protective measures for investors and creditors. The contemporary company law 
environment had become increasingly encouraging of the public’s participation in capital formation, 
and one in which new methods, not previously accounted for, were being used to raise funds for 
corporate ventures.106 Not all of these developments were viewed with approval. 
In these matters, the Report stressed the importance and power of publicity as a counter-measure 
against the exploitation of the public – specifically against the risk of value-overstatement or serious 
fraud.107 For potential creditors, the yearly balance sheet (one could probably read into this a broader 
focus on financial reporting in general, which again echoes the contemporary usages in England)108 
was emphasised as a tool by which financial stability109 could be evaluated.110 
Thus a large portion of the Report focused on disclosure (i.e. “publicity”) – specifically the prospectus 
and financial statements.111 While these elements remain material to the regulation of securities at 
large, they are not material to the core question at hand. The Report persisted in its deference to 
private enforcement mechanisms, eschewing the suggestion that the Registrar of Companies ought 
not only to have oversight, but also control over the issue of a prospectus. As stated:112  
“The unavoidable consequence of such a process would be that a prospectus approved by the Registrar 
would be ascribed a kind of government approval or guarantee of legitimacy.”  
The Lansdown Report is also significant because it explicitly recognised the importance of extra-
legal influences on company practices. First and foremost among the influences discussed was the 
 
 
104  U.G. No. 45, 1936 (“the Lansdown Report”).  
105  Paras 5, 6, and 9-11. 
106  Para 12.  
107  Para 13 and also generally in paras 57-82.  
108  See Chapter 2, § 2 2 3. 
109  And implicitly investors’ risk. 
110  U.G. No. 45, 1936 para 13.  
111  Para 48 & n 240 & 242. 




impact of the JSE.113 It is clear that obtaining listing on the JSE was seen as an important objective 
“for most companies…especially the case for mining and finance companies.”114 
The Report noted the rigour of the process of application to the Exchange Committee for listing and 
emphasised that this system was principally based on its counterpart at the London Stock Exchange. 
It ultimately concluded that it was neither appropriate for the Report to inquire as to how the JSE’s 
Committee exercises its powers of oversight, nor necessary to bestow on the JSE any specific 
statutory competencies (or, conversely, exercise any statutory control over it).115 This is direct 
evidence of the laissez-faire, discrete and extra-legal flavour of the formal (exchange) market’s 
regulation, despite explicit recognition of its vital importance in company matters. 
Finally, the Report considered the real security arrangements which made debentures so useful at 
that time.116 In light of the dicta in Consolidated Textile Mills,117 it would seem that a company was 
barred under the original 1926 Act from passing a notarial bond over movables in addition to a 
mortgage bond over immovables, and would have had to, as per the Act, register a mortgage bond 
encompassing both classes of things. The Report recommended altering the Act so that a notarial 
bond and a hypothec could be used to bond movables and immovables separately and respectively 
for the same class of debentures.118 In making more flexible real security arrangements available,  
this recommendation seems to support the idea that debt securities’ primary role was to reduce 
transaction costs of corporate borrowing. 
These are the important policy positions and changes suggested by the Report.119 
The next large-scale intervention is found in the interim and final 1948 Reports of the Commission 
of Inquiry regarding the Amendment of the Companies Act.120 The relatively short Interim Report is 
of little value save to re-iterate the importance of the protection of investors and the influence of 
English company law developments.121  
 
 
113  Paras 15-18. This serves to underscore the value of the JSE as proxy for the securities market in toto. 
114  Para 15 [own translation].  
115  Paras 16 & 18.  
116   See above in § 3 1.  
117  See above, § 3 1 1 1. 
118  U.G. No. 45, 1936 para 208. 
119  Whether these recommendations were implemented, and how, is of less importance here than the policy-thinking 
of the report, and is not dealt with further here. 
120  U.G. 78/48 and U.G. No. 69-1948 respectively (“the Millin Commission” – “interim Report” and “final Report”) [own 
translation]. 




Nonetheless, this interim Report does imply a crucial terminological clarification. It is quite obvious 
that the term “shares” translates into Afrikaans as “aandele”. It would further seem from the Afrikaans 
text of the Report that “stocks” translates into “effekte”, i.e. “…’n reeks [fully paid up] aandele wat in 
‘n bondel saamgevat is…”.122 It seems that in English, the meaning of the term “stock” shifted from 
denoting specifically share- and debenture-stock (in the technical sense)123 to all manner of debt and 
equity securities. It was only later that this wider form of the term stock was replaced by the term 
securities. This is illustrated by the later phasing out of the phrase “stock exchange”, in favour of 
“securities exchange” both in England and domestically. 
Afrikaans, on the other hand, never moved away from the term “effekte”. As evidenced by the 
continued use of the term “effektebeurs”, its meaning simply shifted from denoting (1) stock in the 
technical sense, to (2) its wider meaning, and finally to (3) securities. The divergent commercial 
terminology often found both in English and Afrikaans in their own right, as well as in translation from 
one to the other, causes difficulty when attempting to be legally precise. 
The Final Report of the Commission is slightly meatier and suggested a major overhaul of the Act. 
From the outset the Commission made it very clear that, much like the Lansdown Report, the 
developments in English company law substantially, if not overwhelmingly, influenced the 
Commission’s findings and recommendations.124 Incidentally, between the Lansdown Report and 
the publication of the findings of the Millin Commission, the number of registered companies in the 
Union had grown from 7 852 to around 32 000 – with public companies outnumbering private 
companies more than 3:1.125 
Its first relevant contribution is in the context of prospectus requirements, principally serving to 
regulate so-called “stag” speculators. The common law rules of contractual offer and acceptance 
dictate that a firm offer can be revoked at any time before acceptance.126 Yet the offer contained in 
a prospectus, much like an advertisement, is often (depending on its wording and surrounding 
circumstances)127 construed as an invitation to make an offer. After this preliminary pre-offer, the 
 
 
122  Para 16. 
123   See § 3 1 1 2; and Chapter 2, § 2 3 2. 
124  U.G. No. 62-1948 paras 5-10 – the Committee endeavoured (and in large succeeded) to incorporate as much of 
the English developments as was possible into their recommendations, placing much reliance on the contributions 
of the so-called “Cohen Commission” (the Report of the Committee on Company Law Amendment (1945) Cm 6659) 
which effected a consolidation of the English company law statutory framework in 1947. 
125  Para 13. 
126  See for example Van der Merwe et al Contract 50, § 3.2.3. 




subscriber makes the true offer, and the company communicates true acceptance via notice of 
allotment.128 At this point, a valid contract (of subscription or allotment) has been concluded.129  
So-called “stags” made large offers in the hope of driving up the premium at which shares or 
debentures would be eventually issued, for a profit on disposal. Should such prospects diminish, 
they would rescind these substantial offers, causing administrative chaos for the issuer, and often 
interfering with the latter’s ability to proceed to allotment on the (ultimately incorrect) supposition that 
the offer was fully subscribed. The Commission’s recommendation was to modify the common law 
to make the subscriber’s offer irrevocable for three days.130 
The Commission, following similar developments in England, also discussed the matter of the 
ownership-nominee relationship regarding shares.131 Here the problem was the potential risk of the 
use of nominees for non-legitimate purposes. The problem was addressed by suggesting that the 
relevant Minister be given the authority to investigate the true ownership position regarding 
shares.132 This would seem to be the first expression of South Africa’s regime of disclosure of 
beneficial interest holders. Incidentally, it is unclear what the position of the beneficial interest holder 
(using the term broadly) of a debenture was. Were such a holder not yet in possession of the 
documents, or not yet listed on the register of debenture holders (such as a very recent cessionary) 
the relationship between the registered owner and/or holder of the documents and the beneficial 
interest holder was unclear. 
There did not seem to be any explicit recognition that there can be such a nominee relationship in 
the context of debentures and the extensive registration requirements of secured debentures as well 
as the overall scheme of the Act did not explicitly authorise a nominee-relationship. However, this is 
not strictly necessary. The Randfontein Estates decision makes it clear that the personal right is 
viewed as distinct from the documentary instrument.133 The mere fact that s 27 of the Act – “[t]he 
company shall  not be bound to see to the execution of any trust, whether express, implied, or 
constructive, in respect of any share”134 – only applied to shares does not seem to detract from this 
argument.  
Further evidence for this view is the wording found in examples of so-called company debentures 
published in 1926 and 1940, stating that the company is “bound to pay to [blank] of [blank], or other 
 
 
128  U.G. No. 62-1948 para 81. 
129  Pretorius et al, Hahlo’s Company Law 178. 
130  U.G. No. 62-1948 para 81. 
131  Paras 182-188. 
132  Paras 183 & 187. 
133   As shown in § 3 1 1 1, as well as this section. 




the registered holder thereof [sic]…”135 in conjunction with “[t]he registered holder will be deemed 
exclusively entitled to the benefit of this debenture…” in the terms and conditions typically found on 
the reverse-side of such debentures.136 The current legal position, best illustrated in the terms of 
issue of contemporary sovereign debt securities, seems to put this view beyond dispute.137 However, 
it must be added that other debt instruments may be created without such wording, in which case 
they would not fall within the class of registered securities, and may not even in all cases (as per the 
outcomes of Chapter 6) fall within the class of securities at all.   
This conclusion is further supported by the Report. It suggested extending the powers afforded the 
Minister to investigate any persons with a real financial interest, including matters relating to debt 
securities. The suggested clause 96 (to replace the then current s 96) contained explicit mention of 
debentures.138 
As in the original Act, both the Lansdown Report and the Millin Commission treat shares and 
debentures as interchangeable in their analysis of the broader aspects of corporate finance in the 
Act. An overall impression of increasing confluence of these two instruments by the legislature is 
created. It would seem that (the specific provisions dealing with debentures in sections 91-94 of the 
Act notwithstanding) the policy position on corporate financing through securities is characterised by 
a treatment of debt and equity instruments as equivalents for some purposes in the Act. 
In sum, the policy perspective leading up to the post-1973 companies regime is one of strong alliance 
with English principles, an ad hoc willingness to deal with the repercussions of new (practice-driven) 
issues as and when they arise, and a largely laissez-faire approach to securities markets. Moreover, 
as the securities market became more advanced and active, and debt securities established 
themselves as prominent financing instruments within the market, the popularity and usefulness of 
the stock concept (the precursor to the securities concept) increased. The legislature responded by 
grouping equities and debentures together – as “shares” and "other interests in the company”, but 
never explicitly as “stocks” – for a multitude of purposes. 
More generally, much of the regulation and statutory modification of the common law points to a 
supportive stance in enhancing corporate borrowers’ ability to raise capital, and the market’s ability 
to provide it. This was achieved by further efforts to reduce transaction costs and adjust the 
administrative and remedial efficiency of debt (and equity) securities, specifically as the market 
gradually increased in size and sophistication. While prospectus requirements, financial disclosure 
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and publicity received the most attention, the policy stance of this era still attributed more importance 
to enabling capital raising than to considerations of market integrity. In sum, after the passing of the 
1926 Act, the legal nature of debentures remained unchanged for almost 50 years. 
 
3 1 3  The beginnings of a conceptual shift: the post-1973 dispensation 
Beyond the Millin Commission’s Final Report, South Africa’s company law and policy stance 
remained mainly unaltered for more than two further decades. Despite having become a republic in 
1961, strong adherence to English law in company law matters persisted. 139  It was only 
approximately 13 years after the Republic’s inception that the:140 
“Companies Act 61 of 1973 (“the Act”), result of the labours of the Van Wyk De Vries 
Commission...effectively cut the umbilical cord between English and South African company law.”  
This, of course, does not imply that South African company law does not still share much of its 
maternal jurisdiction’s genetic traits. 
 
3 1 3 1 The contributions of the Van Wyk de Vries Commission 
The Commission of Enquiry into the Companies Act (“the Commission”)141 preceded the next and 
by far most significant policy event before the passing of the current Companies Act. 142  The 
Commission’s recommendations and resulting Act amount to much more than the consequence of 
a political impetus to separate the South African commercial legal framework from English law. The 
1926 Act had undergone significant changes, and its internal structure was becoming incoherent. It 
had retained much of the structural form of its predecessor in the Transvaal (which by 1926 was 
itself already somewhat antiquated). Despite amendments in 1939,143 1942, 1946, 1950, and 1951, 
as well as 1952,144 there had been no statutory consolidation of these amendments (as there had 
 
 
139  Having entrenched fundamental legal constructs such as transferability of interests, limited liability, freely available 
corporate personality, nominees, holders’ registries, and even modern debt securities themselves, to name a few.   
140  Pretorius et al Hahlo’s Company Law (1999) 2. 
141  R.P 45/1970. 
142  71 of 2008. 
143  The result of the Lansdown Commission as discussed above in § 3 1 2. 
144  The last mentioned served, belatedly, to implement the recommendations of the Millin Commission as discussed 




been throughout the development of English company legislation), resulting in an urgent need for 
structural reform over and above any substantive overhaul.145 
From a policy perspective, the Commission’s approach was wary (although not dismissive) of 
English developments. It specifically cited the work of England’s Jenkins Committee146 as useful but 
not decisive, noting that “[the] past decades have witnessed the emergence of differences between 
company activities and their underlying concepts in the respective countries.” As such, the problem 
that “our legislation has in certain respects equated the nature and functions of institutions and 
functionaries in England with institutions and functionaries in South Africa, from which they vastly 
differ...” forms a crucial part of the Committee’s perspective on the state of company law in South 
Africa at the time.147 
It has already been shown that South African commercial (and securities market) activities 
underwent a period of substantial growth and development after the Second World War.148 The 
Commission recognised this explicitly,149 noting specifically large-scale growth in the number of 
registered companies.150 From this, a correlative rise in the number of debt and equity instruments 
issued for the purposes of corporate finance would not be an unreasonable inference to make. 
Against this background, the Commission’s terms of reference (or, in plainer language, its ambit and 
objectives) included – as with the Millin Commission before it – the explicit recognition of (1) investor 
protection, and (2) the public interest in matters of company financing. These two principles 
presumably overlap to some degree and are widely viewed as fundamental to securities 
regulation.151  
A high degree of importance was also attached to the avoidance of unnecessary regulatory conflict 
between South African company law and that of other jurisdictions. The UK, other Commonwealth 
countries, the USA, and the Continent (specifically the European Economic Community) are 
mentioned by name. Further, the Commission regarded cognisance of the rules and requirements 
of stock exchanges as particularly important for the harmonisation and alignment of the South African 
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legal dispensation with these jurisdictions,152 specifically against the backdrop of an increasingly 
globalised international securities marketplace.  
Nonetheless, the character of the South African regulatory context was left largely unchanged, and 
the Commission’s approach to the role of government remained a tempered one. The 
recommendations regarding the functions of the Registrar appositely illustrate this. According to the 
Report, “powers of control over companies” did not, and should not, vest in this functionary. Further, 
the Office of the Registrar was definitively not regarded as analogous or equivalent to a regulatory 
body such as the United States’ SEC.153 A perfect summation of the Commission’s position is found 
in the statement that “any control over company activity by the State should be confined to the 
exigencies of public interest.”154  
With this as background, the Commission addressed the content of the proposed legislation.  
It has already been observed that a partial, implicit conflation of shares and debentures for a number 
of purposes is evident in the 1926 Act. However, from the 1973 Act onwards, this is explicitly done 
through the use of the securities concept to regulate these instruments as equivalents in certain 
instances, further entrenching this tendency. 155  An important first step in this trend is the 
Commission’s noteworthy recommendation of a partial integration of pre-existing stock exchange 
law by insertion into the draft Bill. This scheme of integration has become one of the definitive 
aspects of the relationship between company law and securities law. 
Specifically, the recommendation dealt with the transfer of listed securities, where a specialist piece 
of regulatory legislation was already in place. In detail, the Commission proposed156 that “all the 
provisions of the Securities Transfer Act except those of a purely fiscal nature, be incorporated into 
the Companies Act”.157 At the time, this was motivated by (1) the fact that the Commission viewed 
the transfer of shares fundamentally as a company law matter; (2) the risk of the fragmentation of 
company law into specialised discrete pieces of legislation, with potentially conflicting objectives; (3) 
 
 
152  Para 12.03. 
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155   See § 3 1 2. 
156   For the Commission’s position, see R.P. 45/1970 para 35.06 & recommendation (58) [own emphasis].  
157  The Act is 69 of 1965, and the definition read:  
“‘security' means any fully paid up share, stock, debenture, debenture stock, loan stock, unit in a unit portfolio or other security, 
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in the said list”.  
  It must be noted that almost immediately after the passage of the new Act, s 134 (“Definitions for the purpose of 
transfer of listed securities”) was amended by Act 76 of 1974, so that the operative definition came from s 1 of the 




an opposition to trends in other jurisdictions moving all share-related matters out of the purview of 
company law; and (4) the fact that South Africa had (and presumably would continue to have) only 
one stock exchange.158 
It could well be that these concerns were afforded too much weight. However, regardless of its 
merits, the Commission’s chosen response caused its own issues. The stock exchange law159 in 
force at this time was mainly, if not exclusively, concerned with equities. This perfectly accords with 
the zeitgeist, emanating from the composition of the domestic securities market. Nonetheless the 
law as it stood did contain a broader securities concept,160 framed (1) in far wider terms than equities 
alone, and (2) slightly differently in each Act dealing with securities. In grafting listed securities’ 
transfer arrangements from the Securities Transfer Act 161  onto company law, the proposed 
companies legislation would assimilate the securities concept associated with the Act from which it 
was incorporated.162 Two observations regarding this process show that its unqualified, unrefined 
assimilation into company law held the potential to be problematic.163 
First, stock exchange legislation did not in principle or by definition distinguish between debt 
instruments and equity instruments, treating them both merely as “securities”. Over and above its 
implicit focus on equities, the Commission’s efforts are explicitly directed at the transfer of shares in 
company law.164 As a result of using the securities concept, all legal rules hinging on this concept 
(intended primarily for share transactions) would be equally applicable to debt securities, without 
due consideration of the differences between the two types of securities, or any unintended 
consequences this may have. This first issue may be termed a share-centricity in the use of, and 
approach to, the securities concept at this stage in the development of the law. 
Second, discrete pieces of legislation rarely share the same subject-matter, objectives or policy 
foundations. Even if two statutes deal, for instance, with the same legal phenomenon (for example 
financial instruments), they are unlikely to deal with the same aspects of that phenomenon. They will 
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159   Including most notably the Stock Exchange Control Act and the Securities Transfer Act 69 of 1965. 
160   “Securities” as a general concept exists, of course, separately from any given statute. However, as a legal term, as 
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161  69 of 1965. Again, as noted above, shortly thereafter the referenced definition changed to the one from the Stock 
Exchanges Control Act. 
162  As evidenced in s 134-140 of the final Act, as well as s 91A & 140A, which were added later.  
163  These problems will be dealt with in more detail in the next section, mainly in terms of the 1973 Act itself. 




inevitably be enacted for different reasons, deal with different aspects of law and reality, and be 
shaped by different policy considerations. In other words, they will be purposively different, and the 
constructs they may share (for instance the security concept) must be approached in teleologically 
distinct ways. For that reason, they will also often define shared terms, such as “securities”, slightly 
differently. On the other hand, a Bill or an Act which assimilates a concept from another piece of 
legislation without qualification or refinement does so not only in its word but also in its spirit, because 
jurists typically turn to the original legislation, and related judicial and academic authority, for 
interpretive guidance. This runs a number of risks, including definitional ambit risk,165 drafting risk,166 
interpretive risk,167 and conceptual risk.168 This second issue may be broadly termed purposive 
incongruity. 
In the present context – the transfer of listed securities – the securities concept was nominally and 
enumeratively defined (i.e. with reference to a list of the names of all the instruments to be 
considered securities for the purposes of the Act) in both in the Securities Transfer Act and thereafter 
the Stock Exchanges Control Act. Yet even a comparison of the definitions of the latter two Acts 
shows notable differences. 169  The materialisation of the risks posed by share-centricity and 
purposive incongruity is dealt with in the next section. 
A second notable aspect of the Report is the role of the JSE in matters of regulation and oversight. 
This function is endorsed by the Commission in several areas within its report. In the Supplementary 
Report and Draft Bill170 it is stated that the stock exchange serves as a valuable mechanism through 
 
 
165   The definition may be appropriate in its original context but is too wide or narrow in this secondary context, and the 
definition may rely on pronouncements by a duly empowered functionary, which may change over time. A perfect 
example is found in the definition of “securities” in the Securities Transfer Act, which includes a reference to s 9 of 
the Stock Exchange Control Act as it then was, wherein the “committee of a licensed exchange” was empowered 
to keep a list “of the stocks and shares which may be dealt in on the stock exchange”. This list was, no doubt, 
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use in the Bill and the first version of the Act (were it not amended in 1974 to refer to the definition of the then-
operative Stock Exchanges Control Act, as has been noted). 
166   For instance the concept may change through amendment in its original context, for reasons that may not 
necessarily apply to its secondary context, or an amendment of its secondary context may not take into 
consideration the full implications that the original definition has for that amendment – as is argued in § 3 2, this is 
the case with s 91A. 
167   Similar to drafting problems, it may lead to subsequent interpretive issues – for example, as the context of the 
originating legislation changes, the interpretation of the concept may change, importing this change into the 
assimilating legislation when it may not be appropriate. Alternatively, the secondary context may shift, but a 
corresponding and necessary change in the interpretation of the concept may not be possible as its interpretation 
is bound to the interpretative views on the originating legislation.  
168   Quite simply that the version of the concept found in the originating legislation is not conceptually appropriate and 
requires instead a new, more precisely and appropriately formulated a version of its own. For instance, Act A 
(dealing with road traffic) may choose to define “transportation vehicle” widely, including bicycles, skateboards and 
motorised vehicles. Act B (dealing with the manufacturing standards of transportation vehicles) may import this 
definition, and inappropriately subject non-motorised vehicles, such as bicycles, to the same stringent 
manufacturing standards of their motorised counterparts without a sound policy-basis to do so. Instead, Act B should 
provide its own, more refined definition which only refers to motorised vehicles.  
169   See s 1 of both Acts as well as s 9 of the original unamended Stock Exchanges Control Act of 1947. 




which the contents of a Companies Act can be enforced.171 The Commission again stresses that the 
law relating to companies and the rules and requirements of the stock exchange must as far as 
possible be harmonised.172 Protecting the general populace as current, notional, and prospective 
investors is a crucial point of intersection between securities and company regulation.173  
Before 2004,174 the JSE wielded more than administrative power, and was central to the regulation 
of securities – even in the enforcement of aspects of the companies regime. Even after the Securities 
Services Act handed regulatory power to the Financial Services Board (which has now become the 
Financial Sector Conduct Authority, or the “FSCA”), this did not change the regulatory reality 
substantially. The FSB traditionally devolved most of its regulatory power back to the JSE. Thus, the 
JSE is regarded as a self-regulatory organisation (“SRO”) which was accountable to, but to a far 
lesser extent regulated by, the FSB itself. More recently the Financial Sector Regulation Act and the 
introduction of a twin peaks model of prudential and conduct authorities appears to have made the 
regulatory role of the FSCA far stronger.175 
Turning finally to debentures themselves, it is noteworthy that neither the Commission’s Final Report 
nor its Supplementary Report contains any special section dealing with debentures. The suggested 
changes to the legal framework governing these instruments are taken up in the Draft Bill section of 
the latter. The draft itself contains perfunctory glossary notes on some of the proposed changes. 
Despite this lack of attention, the Commission states that:176 
“[t]he drafting of the provisions has been revised considerably; it seems to be a part of the Act which has 
been somewhat neglected but it has gained greater importance in light of the present prevalence of issues 
of debentures and notes.”  
The Commission did not move away from the 1926 Act’s approach of prescribing the procedures by 
which the different bonds were to be registered. However, these were slightly simplified, and the 
pledge of incorporeal rights was included in the list of recognised forms of real security that 
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debentures could be backed by.177 The recording of such pledges in the company’s internal register 
of bonds was also concomitantly addressed.178 
As far as certification and transfer is concerned, the most important suggested changes were as 
follows. The “terms of the debenture”179 had to be stated on the debenture certificate, and the 
certificate should be signed in the same manner as a share certificate.180 The transfer of debentures 
without a “valid instrument of transfer” was prohibited,181 and the recommendations made explicit 
that the certificate served as evidence of title.182  
That these arrangements were foremost in the Commission’s mind demonstrates a gradual shift in 
perspective towards the importance of the transfer arrangements regarding debt (and equity) 
instruments. This is in contrast to the historical focus on real security arrangements. The attention 
afforded to the transfer of securities reflects the changing role of debt securities, steadily becoming 
more important as trading and investment instruments, over and above their traditional function of 
reducing transaction costs in corporate borrowing schemes. Additionally, the above further illustrates 
the observation that debentures and equities were viewed as separate but equal (as securities) not 
only for the purposes of securities and exchange law, but also company law.  
Following this thinking, the Commission’s most pivotal recommendation regarding debt securities 
was the suggestion of a new definition (as the old Act did not contain one) for a debenture. This 
definition, close to the contemporary definition in English company law legislation,183 read: 
“‘Debenture’ includes debenture stock, bonds, notes, and any other securities or debt securities of a 
company, whether secured or not.” 
The last section of the definition, dealing with real security, is the least important. Whilst the 
Commission stated that explicitly qualifying debentures with the terms “secured” or “unsecured” was 
of some significance,184 this aspect of the suggested provision was not kept on in the final draft. To 
 
 
177  Paras 91 & 92. This was, most likely, in response to the growing importance of securities’ collateral function in the 
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understand the impact of the change the definition brought about, regard must be had to the resultant 
Act185 itself.  
 
3 1 3 2 The 1973 Act and the ascendancy of the securities concept 
The 1973 Act, widely regarded as an excellent piece of legislation, explicitly introduced the securities 
concept into company law. It did so in two ways: first through the use of a general securities concept 
(for instance in s 1’s definition of debenture); second by incorporating the specific securities concept 
found in s 1 of the Stock Exchanges Control Act 7 of 1947 (specifically into s 134 and later s 91A 
and 440A). 
In the preceding section it was argued that the risks of share-centricity and (in cases where a 
securities definition is assimilated from one act into another) purposive incongruity have the potential 
to limit the efficacy of an act. As will become clear throughout this section and the next, a third 
overarching risk can also be identified. In short, it is caused by a disconcerting lack of legal certainty 
regarding the precise legal meaning of the word securities.  
Distinguishing securities from other financial instruments is premised upon the ability to classify (and 
thereby identify) particular instruments as securities or not. Uncertainty regarding the legal meaning 
of the term securities makes it difficult to make this classification consistently, which has a number 
of adverse consequences. First, many legal rules apply based on whether an instrument is a security 
or not. Inconsistent classification can lead to incorrect identification, which may cause the law to be 
applied inappropriately or ineffectively in certain (hard) cases. Second, this kind of legal uncertainty 
increases both compliance costs and risks, with commercial inefficiency and a possible chilling effect 
in financial innovation as consequence. Third, legal uncertainty also hampers regulators’ capabilities 
to effectively intervene where necessary. The consequences of this uncertainty will be referred to as 
“application risk”. 
In this section the ascendancy of the securities concept as the primary determinant for the 
classification of companies’ debt instruments will be outlined. Having done so, its appropriateness 
and effectiveness can be discussed. That is the topic of the next section, which includes a discussion 
of these three identified categories of risk. With the exception of the provisions dealing with 
uncertificated securities (or unless indicated otherwise) the most recent version of the 1973 Act will 
be referred to. 
 
 




To understand why the securities concept had become fundamental to debentures in the 1973 Act, 
the Act’s definition must be properly understood. The definition of “debenture” in the Act (virtually 
identical to the contemporary English equivalent) read:186 
“'debenture' includes debenture stock, debenture bonds and any other securities of a company, whether 
constituting a charge on the assets of the company or not…” 
As is clear, the legislated definition was very similar to the definition suggested by the Committee. It 
followed the 1926 Act in using an “includes…” formulation. Thus it can be characterised as both 
nominal (referring to already established instruments by name) and enumerative (listing a number 
of these established instruments), rather than substantive (in the sense of providing abstract 
characteristics or guidelines to test a given instrument against, of which an excellent example is the 
definition of “derivatives” in s 1 of the Financial Markets Act).187 
However, the definitional similarities between the two regimes end there. The key to this observation 
is the phrase “any other securities”, which represents a major (perhaps unconscious) shift in the 
legislature’s approach. Yet the significance of this shift is not obvious at first glance. 
The 1926 Act’s definition did not make use of the word securities. Instead, it relied on case law, as 
informed by the definition of the repealed Company Debentures Act, for its (limited) substantive 
content, founded centrally on the notion of a “written acknowledgement of debt”.188 The 1973 Act, on 
the other hand, utilised the securities concept to demarcate (or circumscribe) the limits of what may 
or may not be considered debentures for its purposes. For this reason, under the new regime, it is 
argued that being a security had become the foundational attribute of a debenture. Why? 
The Act did not define the securities concept save in s 134 (for the purposes of s 135-138 and 140 
– “listed shares or interests”; and later also in s 91A and s 440A) where it incorporated the definition 
in the Stock Exchanges Control Act.189 The latter Act, as amended by the Stock Exchange Control 
Amendment Act,190 defined “securities” in s 1 as follows: 
“‘securities’ includes stocks, shares, debentures (whether issued by the State or a company having a share 
capital or any other body corporate or association of persons), notes, units of stock issued in place of 
shares, and options on stocks or shares or on such debentures, notes or units, and rights thereto, but does 
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not include [shares in a private company and stocks or shares, or options on them, in a public company 
with restrictions on transfer]…” 
This very specific (incorporated) definition was obviously of very limited application within the overall 
framework of the Companies Act, dealing only with the transfer of listed securities. This singular 
exception notwithstanding, one can return to the s 1 definition of “debenture” and make the following 
observation. In order to know whether a given borrowing contract was in fact a debenture for the 
purposes of the Act, some meaning would at least have to be given to (1) “debenture stock”, (2) 
“debenture bonds”, and (3) “any other securities of a company”. Each of these will be considered in 
turn. 
“Debenture stock” is not problematic. Debenture stock is not in essence as similar to debentures as 
the naming convention makes it appear.191 Here an issuing company would create a single debt in 
favour of a special purpose vehicle (almost always a trust) and issue debenture stock certificates to 
the ultimate holders of the stock. Thus, the holders of these certificates would become jointly 
participating creditors in the entirety of the stock (the loan), proportional to the amount of stock taken 
up. It follows that unlike debenture holders, debenture stock holders did not receive independent 
and individualised rights against the company. The company undertook to perform toward the trustee 
or trustees, which also reduced the holders’ remedial options, as indirect participants to the loan, to 
bringing action in furtherance of their interests against such trustees rather than the company.192 
In the case of “debenture bonds”, the problem is limited. Before the inclusion of s 91A, s 96(1) of the 
Act made it clear that all debentures – like shares – must have certificates. The import of the term 
debenture bond, however, specifically implied real security. The Act (in form and function similar to 
its predecessor) prescribed in detail how to effect such security and what its consequences would 
be193 – therefore the logic of the 1926 regime as set out above presumably still applied. Nonetheless, 
for such a borrowing contract to have been considered a debenture bond, and not merely a secured 
loan, it would still have to be established that the underlying contract was a secured debenture issued 
to the special purpose vehicle. 
This neatly narrows down the issue to the meaning of “debenture” under the 1973 Act. Under the 
previous Act, the contents of the term debenture was left to the common law – a written 
acknowledgement of indebtedness in the form of a certificate received upon allotment, coupled with 
entry on a register.194 It could be secured, and executed under a bond (singular or composite, 
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depending on the nature of the property over which the bond operated – movable, immovable, or 
both) in accordance with the Act’s arrangements for such execution. As shown above,195 this would 
activate certain statutory consequences. It could also be unsecured, but by virtue of being certificated 
as a debenture would also activate certain statutory consequences. Had this changed with the 
passage of the Companies Act of 1973? 
Blackman et al, on the 1973 Act, describe a debenture as “a written acknowledgement of debt, 
irrespective of its form, executed by the company, which may (but need not) include terms providing 
for the indebtedness to be secured by a charge over the property of the company.”196 As a unique 
type of creditor, the terms on which the debt security had been issued, in conjunction with applicable 
statutory provisions (such as the Companies Act), determined the holder’s rights.197 
Yet the core question is not descriptive, it is classificatory. The Blackman description could just as 
easily describe an ordinary written contract of debt, were it not evidently set out in the context of 
debentures. Which company borrowing contracts could be classified as debentures, and which not? 
The answer lies in the plenary, catchall part of the provision – “any other securities”. To understand 
this, it must be read in conjunction with the word “includes”. When so read, the definition had three 
fundamental implications. 
First, it indicated that the list was not intended to be a numerus clausus. This was a sound policy 
position, in keeping with the fact that company law must always reckon with rapid and innovative 
developments in the realm of finance and financial instruments. Second, “other securities” strongly 
appears to require a eiusdem generis interpretation.198 This means that in order to be classified as 
a debenture, the instrument in question at least had to be founded upon a debtor-creditor relationship 
between the company and the counter-party. Third, and most importantly, by stating that “‘debenture’ 
includes...[financial instrument A], [financial instrument B]…and any other securities”, an implicit 
circumscription of what could and could not be a debenture was built into the Act. The logic is as 
follows. First, “other” implied that financial instruments A and B were also securities. Second, any 
debt instrument other than A or B that was also classifiable as a security, was inherently a debenture. 
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Thus, all debentures were considered securities, but far more crucially all debt securities would have 
to be considered debentures.199 This is uncontentious, as the word “other” demonstrates that all the 
named instruments were viewed as securities inherently. Conversely, if a debt instrument or 
borrowing contract was not a security, it could not be a debenture for the purposes of the 1973 Act. 
The implicit circumscription (and thus limitation) of the meaning of debenture therefore had to be 
determined by the meaning of a “security”. It cannot be the other way around – as debenture was 
the term being defined, it cannot function to describe any aspect of its own definition without the logic 
of the definition becoming circular. 
These three implications can be summed up as follows: any contractual arrangement could be 
classified as a debenture, if: (1) its essence was the incurrence of debt by the company, and (2) the 
arrangement created a legal interest held by the counter-party and effective against the company 
which was also (classifiable as) a security. 
However it is important to note that, contrary to this conclusion, Blackman et al state that “[the 
statutory definition of debenture], then, is not a definition of ‘debenture’, rather it assumes that 
‘debenture’ has an ordinary meaning, and merely extends or confirms that meaning to include 
debenture stock, debenture bonds and any other securities of the company…”.200 
With respect to the authors, debenture may have had a semblance of an ordinary meaning, but that 
meaning was definitely neither certain nor ascertainable. This remains the case. Furthermore, the 
commercial reality ascribes little to no importance to the term. The current Companies Act has 
replaced it with “debt instrument”, and the securities markets of today deal overwhelmingly in bonds 
and notes, not in debentures. Lastly, the ordinary meaning of debenture is not, as proposed in the 
above construction of the definition, pivotal in any way. This leads to a more fundamental 
terminological point regarding the importance of the securities concept vis-à-vis the debenture 
concept. 
Whatever terminology is decided upon by the law, it must not be forgotten that at its core, the law is 
an abstraction of reality, seeking to bring that reality to order.201 In this way, one manner in which to 
 
 
199   A Milne, C Nathan, KL Smith & PM Meskin in Henochsberg on the Companies Act 61 of 1973 3 ed (1975) argue at 
218 that a “security” generally refers to an asset, and that – since a debenture constitutes a liability from the 
company’s perspective – it generally means a “secured obligation” viewed from the perspective of the holder. 
However they further argue that since debentures can also be unsecured, it is more likely that security merely refers 
to “…what is included in the term debenture [which] would also have its general meaning of an acknowledgement 
of debt”. In other words, the term security really means any type of debenture, usually one which is secured. This, 
clearly, is a circular argument, and does not account for the points raised below. See also Blackman et al 
Commentary 5-328, n 4.  
200  Blackman et al Commentary 5-326. This is similar to the problem encountered in A Milne et al Henochsberg 1973 
218, as above. 
201  See for instance a very useful, if slightly simplified, exposition of this in L Du Plessis An Introduction to Law 3 ed 




describe the problem may be as follows. The law uses abstract signifiers (words) to describe the 
concrete aspects of reality it wishes to regulate – the signified. The function of a signifier in this 
context is to serve as an “interface”202 between the law and reality, facilitating the former’s application 
to the latter. 
The term debenture appears, now, to be a weak signifier with which to legally regulate the 
commercial phenomena it seeks to signify, whilst security represents a stronger, more robust 
signifier and therefore interface. This is increasingly reflected in the terminology of the 1973 Act and 
even more so the 2008 Companies Act.203 In interpreting these Acts, understanding the meaning of 
the signifier “securities” very precisely is the only means by which to deal with the applicable statutory 
definitions and their consequences, with any acceptable degree of legal certainty. Although nothing 
fundamental turns on this theoretical framing of the problem, it is a helpful way in which to understand 
the terminology problem as a key issue in securities law.204 
The “beginnings of a conceptual shift” proposed above is that, at least from a legal perspective, the 
change in terminology brought about a deeper change in the foundational attributes of a debenture. 
This may have been because, commercially, this change had already begun emerging organically. 
As seen, under the previous regime a debenture’s prime attribute was that it was a written 
acknowledgement of indebtedness – i.e. a separate documentary instrument, accessory to the debt 
and imbued with its own unique statutory consequences. Under the new regime the operative word 
remained “debenture”, but its meaning had been altered.  
The insertion of the (undefined) term “securities” as the pivotal definitional element of the definition 
of a debenture meant that from this point forward a debenture was, in fact, any company debt 
security. This shift had a profound impact on the legal nature of a debenture. The securities concept 
denoted (and still denotes) a more a holistic construct than the pre-1973 debenture concept. It 
includes both the formal instrument dimension of certification and registration of holdership and the 
substantive patrimonial dimension of the underlying contractual rights. It is thus argued that the legal 
 
 
202  The term interface is defined by the Oxford Dictionary as “[a] point where two systems, subjects, organizations, etc. 
meet and interact, [for example] ‘the interface between accountancy and the law’…” – Oxford Dictionary “Interface” 
<www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/interface> (accessed 25-01-2021).  
Here the first system in question is the reality of the financial system, whereas the second is the abstracted system 
of law and regulation of that first system. 
203  Explicit recognition of this is found specifically in s 43 of the 2008 Companies Act, reading “‘debt instrument’ – 
includes  any securities other than the shares of the company, irrespective of whether or not issued in terms of a 
security document…” whilst “[a] “security document” includes any document by which a debt instrument is offered 
or proposed to be offered, embodying the terms and conditions of the debt instrument including, but not limited to, 
a trust deed or certificate” [own emphasis], bringing this conceptual shift to full fruition.  




meaning of debenture and the legal meaning of debt security were not exactly the same, with the 
latter signifying not only the accessory (then documentary) instrument but also the debt itself.205 
As soon as the attribute of being securities became foundational, the historic understanding of 
debentures as separate and accessory documentary instruments founded upon a debt needed to 
be discarded in favour of a conceptually integrated view of debentures, where the debt and the 
instrument are conflated into a single financial product. The meaning of debenture was changing, 
and this process culminates in the effective removal of the word as an operative term by s 43 the 
2008 Act. In this new regime, the securities concept claims full primacy. 
 
3 1 3 3 The securities concept in the 1973 Act: appropriate and effective? 
The previous section demonstrates the ascendancy of the securities concept in company law, shows 
its centrality to classifying (and thereby identifying) company debt securities, and illustrates the 
impact of this on the meaning, and nature, of a debenture under the 1973 Act. This section deals 
with the appropriateness and effectiveness of the legislature’s use of the concept.  
From a legal-historical perspective, the securities concept seems to be a product of commerce. Its 
inception lies in the development of sophisticated exchanges, whose increasing importance 
gradually redefined the terms, concepts and practices of corporate and government finance. Most 
importantly, the exchange and trading industry began increasingly to rely on the term securities to 
refer to a number of the various financial instruments in use at that time. This was an international 
trend, with the USA, the UK, and the Continent leading from the front, and South Africa following 
suit.206 
This terminological shift207 had a profound impact on the domestic legislature’s approach to stock 
exchange law, which in turn markedly influenced company law.208 This is despite the more typical 
trend of company law principles exerting influence on securities law. Thus a legal-historic analysis 
of the securities concept must begin with the use of “securities” as a regulatory signifier in exchange- 
and trading-legislation. Then its subsequent emergence in company law as a seemingly free-
standing concept (understood to have inherent substantive meaning) can be addressed. 
 
 
205  See Chapter 4, § 4 2 for a thorough discussion of this issue.  
206   See Chapter 2 – § 2 1, § 2 2 3, § 2 3 1; as well as § 3 1 3 2 above. 
207   See § 3 1 2, and specially § 3 1 3 1. 




The securities concept is not substantively defined in any legislation, past or present.209 There is 
also no body of common law (or statutory common law) on which to draw for a methodology for 
classifying and identifying securities, or with which to differentiate in all instances securities from 
other financial instruments or products. This dearth of jurisprudence is addressed more directly and 
in more detail in the following (analytical-systemic) three chapters. 
However, a lack of jurisprudence does not automatically imply that the legal regime is inadequate. 
Therefore a critique of the then-contemporary legal use of this concept in company law must be 
broken down into three questions: (1) was the use of a nominal, enumerative definitional approach 
to securities appropriate and effective in its originating context, i.e. exchange- and trading-
legislation?; (2) did the concept develop any substantive content through such use?; and (3) was the 
subsequent integration of the concept into company law equally appropriate and effective? These 
questions can be answered with relative ease.  
The first question rests on the success of the Stock Exchanges Control Act. The answer is certainly 
in the affirmative, for a number of reasons. First, as stated, the term securities originated in 
commercial practice as a means with which to group the various debt and equity instruments that 
traded on the world’s prominent exchanges. For the (predominantly private and peer-based) 
regulation of trading and exchange activities, the exchange platform and its actors were quite 
obviously of primary concern. For these role-players, it was more important to be able to refer to 
traded instruments as distinct from non-traded instruments or instruments that traded elsewhere. 
Internally distinguishing debt from equity was not needed, and a blanket approach sufficed, 
specifically after the JSE began to develop specific trading infrastructure for debt securities. Thus, 
to have used the same term to group those instruments for the purpose of regulating such 
commercial practices was a sound and logical point of departure. 
It follows that from the perspective of stock exchange law, there was no need to differentiate debt 
securities from equities. A bird’s eye view of the architecture of the Stock Exchanges Control Act 
(and even the consolidated Securities Services Act of 2004) confirms this. Exchange-traded 
instruments shared the same market players (such as brokers and underwriters), the same method 
of transfer (delivery in quasi-negotiable form, together with a “valid instrument of transfer”),210 broadly 
similar trading methods, and the same trading infrastructure (including, even for a short time after 
the passage of the 1973 Companies Act, the same trading-floor).211 Also, whilst it could be argued 
that the risks inherent in these instruments were not similarly analogous, this is a function of the 
instrument and not the exchange, and thus does not detract from the argument. Hence, to refer to 
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them as one group of separate-but-equal instruments in this context remained entirely appropriate 
and effective for the regulatory outcomes of the Act.  
Second, domestically, there was only one exchange at this stage – the JSE. As evidenced by the 
Van Wyk-De Vries Report, this was not perceived as likely to change. The JSE was primarily self-
regulated,212 controlling and exercising near-sole oversight over what was listed, and how.213 It is not 
surprising, therefore, to find that a reading of the Stock Exchanges Control Act also confirms that it 
was enacted to enhance, rather than to curb or oversee, the JSE’s regulatory powers. Within this 
relationship between government and the JSE, there was no need for Parliament to dictate to the 
JSE what could and could not be considered a security – the latter (as the prime regulator) was in a 
far better position to do this through its own processes.  
Here something further must also be said of the nature of the JSE. It is established that the JSE is 
not a statutory body, merely one operating under a statutory licence, much like a bank or an 
insurance company.214 In the pre-Constitutional, common law system of administrative law the courts 
were afforded limited powers of review, and the JSE’s regulatory actions were reviewable on the 
basis of two specific grounds.  
First were grounds built into the Stock Exchange Control Act itself, such as in s 10(3).215 Second, a 
number of rulings216 had confirmed a general principle that certain technically non-public bodies or 
associations were subject to administrative law principles because they operate in the public interest. 
On the basis of a concomitant public duty, their conduct could be reviewable in terms of 
administrative law. The JSE is such a body. 217  This second basis for review included “gross 
irregularity or clear illegality in the performance of a duty imposed by the Legislature”.218 As an aside, 
the current post-Constitutional regime under the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act219 provides 
for a more general, expansive and accessible framework for administrative review of bodies or 
 
 
212   See Chapter 2,  § 2 2 3, and § 2 3.  
213   Thus, the JSE determined through listing a certain investment instrument that it is in fact a security. The definition 
of security found in the Stock Exchanges Control Act of 1947 makes reference to s 9(1)(a) of the Act, which allowed 
a licensed exchange to make administrative determinations as to listing of instruments, which would then be 
considered securities as per the definition in s 1. 
 Currently, although s 1 v. “securities” of the Financial Markets Act 19 of 2012 provides exchanges with less 
administrative leeway, the registrar may still in terms of ss (d) make determinations classifying instruments similar 
to those found in the rest of the definition as “securities” for the purposes of the Act. 
214   Herbert Porter and Co Ltd and Another v Johannesburg Stock Exchange 1974 (4) SA 781 (W) 791B-G. 
215   See the discussion in Dawnlaan Beleggings (Edms) Bpk. v Johannesburg Stock Exchange and Others 1983 (3) 
SA 344 (W) 361A-D.  
216   Most notably Johannesburg Consolidated Investment Co v Johannesburg Town Council 1903 TS 111, specifically 
at 115; and Loxton v Kenhardt Liquor Licensing Board 1942 AD 275, specifically at 309. 
217   Dawnlaan Beleggings (Edms) Bpk. v Johannesburg Stock Exchange and Others 1983 (3) SA 344 (W) 361E-365B. 
218   363A-G. 




associations operating in the public interest. Thus, the JSE was, and remains, at least subject to 
some administrative law oversight (which would not be the case for an ordinary public company), 
further contributing to the effectiveness and stability of the now increasingly stringent regulatory 
paradigm. 
Third, this nominal and enumerative approach was contingent upon the ability, in cases of dispute 
or uncertainty, to identify a particular instrument as being one of those listed in the definition in the 
Stock Exchanges Control Act (i.e. as being part of the class “securities”) through consulting other 
sources. The Act’s definition relied on other subsidiary definitions (of the instruments named) from 
other areas of law or from commercial practice itself. In the case of equities, for instance, the 
Companies Act of 1973 described shares in adequate substantive terms, and the common law and 
academic authorities were also clear and comprehensive.220  
For debentures, this was not the case. Yet, crucially, it was not of much consequence until the late 
1980s. The securities market was still overwhelmingly dominated by equities and options. Modern 
financial instruments, such as hybrid securities, swaps or the asset-backed securities created 
through securitisation techniques were not yet in use. Thus, for practical reasons the inability to 
similarly identify debt securities with acceptable accuracy through recourse to other sources 
remained an unexplored issue.   
In conclusion, the answer to this first question is that the use of the securities concept, despite the 
legal uncertainty regarding debentures and perhaps other similar financial instruments, was in all 
likelihood both appropriate and effective in the stock exchange context.  
The second question is whether the concept, having found its way into law, developed any 
meaningful substantive content. The short answer is that it had not. It is trite to state that a share is 
a security. The issue of whether options to take up these securities are themselves securities is left 
for Chapter 6. As has become clear from the above, debentures are certainly also securities. 
However, it appears to be more appropriate to use the term “debt security” and do away with the 
older and weaker signifiers such as “debenture” or “bond”. When considering hybrid and other 
financial instruments such as futures, swaps, or other derivatives, the issue becomes more complex, 
and this issue again falls to Chapter 6 to deal with in detail. 
It suffices to say here that other than the nominal and enumerative definitions found in statute (which 
may serve as guidelines but do not present bright lines) there is, historically, a total lack of 
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supplementary jurisprudence, in terms of both rulings and academic attention, on the securities 
concept in South African law. This is not to say that, once all aspects of the domestic law that deal 
with securities are coherently viewed together, such a jurisprudence cannot be found – merely that 
where it is currently implicit, it must be abstracted and made explicit.221  
The answers to the first and second questions posed above yield two important observations. First, 
it becomes evident that the securities concept can be further differentiated into: (1) a broad, free-
standing securities concept, with little critical legal thinking behind it; and (2) a narrow, legislated 
securities concept, reoccurring in a slightly different form in each act which uses it. By way of 
example, the 1973 Companies Act utilised the broad securities concept in its definition of debenture 
in s 1, but used the Stock Exchanges Control Act’s iteration (or version) of the narrow securities 
concept in s 134, and later in s 91A and 440A. Second, it can be argued that different risks arise in 
the different uses of the concept. When the legislature (which already historically evidences a 
pronounced share-centricity in its approach) uses the broad securities concept, it incurs uncertainty-
driven application risk; when it borrows a narrow securities concept from another Act, it risks 
purposive incongruity.222 
This provides an implicit answer to the third question. By substituting, in function although not form, 
the old debenture concept with the (debt) securities concept as the central construct in the 
Companies Act, the law’s terminology began to mirror more closely that of the commercial reality.223 
This was a desirable policy shift, and in principle it could have been both effective and appropriate 
to phase in the securities concept. 
However, in not providing its own substantive contribution to the concept in s 1 (relying rather on the 
broad securities concept), the legislature incurred a marked degree of application risk as outlined 
above.224 Further, in relying on a narrow securities concept from another piece of legislation in s 134 
and later s 91A and s 440A, it risked purposive incongruity. Additionally, share-centricity in the use 
of the term securities within the overall scheme of the Act (to deal with shares and debentures equally 
for a number of different purposes) risked neglecting some important differences between debt and 
equity securities. Yet, to the credit of the legal and commercial minds of the era, the Act presented 
no material problems in practice.  
 
 
221   Which, as stated in Chapter 1, is one of the principle aims of this dissertation.   
222   See above at § 3 1 3 1. 
223   The strength of this approach, however, lies (1) in a robust and accurate legal understanding of the securities 
concept, and (2) adequate differentiation of debt, equity and other securities in certain of the current Companies 
Act’s provisions. While the second point (amendment of the Companies Act of 2008) is beyond the scope of this 
work, Chapter 6 (developing such a securities concept) is devoted to illustrating the first point. 




In this light, despite these risks, was the approach of the 1973 Act to the securities concept 
nevertheless “effective and appropriate”? From the obvious lack of legal critique or contention it 
seems the approach was effective. However, from the above, three reasons emerge showing it may 
not have been entirely appropriate.  
The first is policy-oriented. It could not have been the intention of the legislature that the name by 
which a financial instrument is referred to should determine whether a particular set of legal principles 
apply or not. This would have allowed unscrupulous companies to circumvent regulation in terms of 
the Act by, for instance, issuing a high-volume of smaller documentary loans (secured or unsecured) 
in series and simply naming them something else. Conversely, companies could create a contract 
or instrument which is not inherently a security from a substantive perspective, and give it the status 
and legitimacy (and therefore allure) of a security simply by naming it one,225 though this would of 
course come with a number of costs due to the application of regulation to it as a security. The first 
problem – issuance of an instrument that is substantively a security but may not be regulated as 
such because it is not called a security – seems the more potentially pernicious. 
Further, it would imply an unacceptable level of legal uncertainty to both lenders and corporate 
borrowers, the principal negative outcome of which would be a chilling effect on financial innovation 
as a result of increased compliance costs and risks. Moreover, regulators could find themselves 
unable to implement appropriate regulatory measures for new financial instruments that may have 
some but not all of the qualities of debentures or other known debt securities. A good hypothetical 
example is a swap of which holdership of both the fixed and variable legs are contingent on register 
entry, limiting enforcement of both contractual positions to the registered holder despite any cessions 
of the underlying beneficial interest. Lastly, the law would potentially be unable to offer 
comprehensive protection to investors outside of the formal exchange marketplace, where debt 
securities are quite prevalent. 
The second reason is the potentially detrimental influence on subsequent legislation. After the 
establishment of the post-1973 regime, laws such as the Securities Services Act or the Insider 
Trading Act226 had to be drafted so as to be in harmony with this dispensation. This is so with all 
interrelated legislation. Case law from 1973 onwards also began to develop a sophisticated 
understanding and interpretation of the Act. The same applies to academic commentary. Such laws, 
 
 
225   The instinctive rebuttal to this contention, of course, is plus valet quod agitur quam quod simulate concipitur (of 
which non quod dictum est sed quod factum est inspicitur is another variation) – the law gives effect not to what is 
said to have been to be done, but what has manifestly been done. However, how is the law to determine what 
“manifestly has been done” where there are no substantive guidelines, a set of first principles or bright lines for it to 
resort to? This is also linked to the observations on uncertainties surrounding the meaning of debenture as a legal 
signifier, made above in § 3 1 3 2. 




case law, commentary and associated emergent legal principles have in many instances outlived 
the 1973 regime, remaining relevant and exerting much influence on the Companies Act of 2008. 
Thus it can be said that the 1973 approach continues to influence the current companies regime. 
Most importantly, it certainly had an influence on its inception and drafting. The most salient example 
of this is the current Act’s wording in s 43(1)(a)(i) (“debt instrument…includes any securities other 
than…shares”). It can be subject to much of the same criticism levelled at the 1973 Act here. It 
makes far more sense to refer rather to “debt securities”, because securities remains the pivotal 
classificatory and identificatory concept.227 Yet without a substantive definition, the same problems 
persist. Also, an undifferentiated approach to debt and equity instruments is evidenced by some of 
the provisions.228 
Third, the financial environment has changed. The recent and rapid developments in the financial 
marketplace highlight that an absence of problems in the past does not imply a lack of latent issues 
in principle. Debt securities now occupy a far more prominent position in the overall securities 
industry, and are crucial, for instance, to securitisation techniques, and are still (despite, or perhaps 
because of, the lessons learnt during the 2008 financial crisis and subsequent Great Recession) 
used by a large number of institutions essential to the financial system. Financial innovation and new 
emergent types of financial instruments are also more prevalent, as is market volatility. Thus strong, 
adaptable and robust legal regulation has become far more necessary than before; conversely, 
classificatory uncertainty holds more risks for the accurate and appropriate application of the law 
than in the past. The current developments in terms of the South African sovereign (and 
consequently other macro-prudentially important domestic financial institutions’) credit ratings also 
means their importance is likely to increase, as they similarly did during the 1980s.  
In conclusion, a lack of historical legal development regarding the securities concept (despite its 
central importance) is readily apparent from the above analysis. Presumably, the securities concept 
is in fact objectively ascertainable. Simply, it appears to refer to a general class of incorporeal229 
financial “instruments”,230 each usually comprised of a bundle of personal rights, the totality of which 
constitutes movable property and is regarded as a patrimonial asset, and which mostly involves a 
register which determines the manner in which rights and duties are administered and exercised. 
 
 
227  See Chapter 6.  
228  Of which the use of the term security in s 44 & 45 (financial assistance), despite the sections having little to no 
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Yet there is no jurisprudence with which, practically, to make an informed classificatory decision 
when confronted with an ambiguous factual matrix.  
This is the key unintended consequence of the conceptual shift argued to have materialised post-
1973. Although use of the securities concept is the correct approach, by virtue of history it creates 
far more legal issues than was (and perhaps still is) realised. The broad securities concept was – in 
principle rather than practice – too uncertain to function in the intended manner. Also, many of the 
differences between debt and equity were elided by the 1973 Act’s share-centric provisions and, as 
will be shown in Part 2 of this work, the current companies regime’s use of the securities concept 
has only exacerbated this problem. 
Further, use of a narrow securities concept (the Stock Exchanges Control Act and its successors’ 
iterations) in company law held the potential, due to purposive incongruity,231 for inappropriate 
legislative outcomes. For instance, in the following section it will be shown that one of the most 
tangible (and illustrative) outcomes of this phenomenon was an unnecessary delay in the 
dematerialisation of debt securities of almost ten years relative to the dematerialisation of equities, 
and almost fifteen years in the case of money market securities.232 
However, most fundamental is the problem of classification and identification, and the contingent 
ability to apply the appropriate legal rules to the appropriate financial instruments. This problem of 
application risk has been inherited by the current companies regime and must be clarified: the 
uncertainty regarding the content of the broader securities concept, despite its prevalence in the 
2008 Act, is at the core of this problem. This is dealt with in detail in Chapter 6. 
 
3 2  Relevant legal developments in the securities-market environment 
At the start of this Chapter, it was stated that: 
“the current state of the law regarding securities has largely converged on what has emerged from the law 
on company securities…” 
Nonetheless, there is a little more to it than that. A material portion of the law of securities lies beyond 
company law. Much of this, in turn, is centred around securities market-mechanisms and financial 
institutions (Strate Ltd and the JSE are good examples of both). It is the legal aspects of this latter 
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category (market mechanisms and institutions) that have thus far been referred to as stock exchange 
law, but is better referred to as securities exchange law.  
Within this area of law and practice there are two historical features which contribute significantly to 
a better current understanding of the legal nature and operation of debt securities in South Africa. 
First are the structural features of the secondary market before the advent of uncertificated 
securities, and particularly the emergence of collective deposit. Second is the origin and 
implementation of uncertificated (registered) securities, as de-certification affects the general 
operation of the law surrounding debt securities. 
As seen in the last Chapter, during the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s, the South African 
financial marketplace underwent a significant process of legal and institutional rationalisation. This 
was partly a function of international trends, but also largely due to a high inflationary domestic 
environment,233 calling for systemic financial adaptation. Specifically, the role of merchant banks and 
investment firms as an institutional intermediary between the market and the public at large became 
more important, filling the gap left by other deposit-taking institutions (such as building societies) 
rendered defunct by the regulatory shake-ups. In fact, the role of the banking industry in the domestic 
financial sector has defied international trends and “the large banks…actually increased their share 
of financial intermediation”234 and have increasingly expanded their offerings far beyond traditional 
banking products to move towards a more integrated financial services offering model. 
This process of macroeconomic and institutional change brought with it significant legal change that 
affected, and continues to affect, the nature of debt securities. A second major, and international, 
trend during this period is the exponential growth in securities trading volumes. This necessitated 
significant structural changes to the way in which securities were transferred. These developments 
begin with the emergence of collective custody of security certificates and – at least as far as 
registered securities are concerned – end with the dematerialisation of securities.  
Lastly, it is important to note that what follows is intended to reflect the views of then-contemporary 
authorities on the law as it stood and as it changed. Thus, unless the context explicitly indicates 
otherwise, it does not reflect the law of today, as this is neither necessary nor contributory to the 
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3 2 1  The international emergence of physical deposit of securities  
Collective securities depositories have been an international phenomenon since the early 19th 
century. They are fundamental to easing the administrative burden of “clearing and settling” (i.e. 
effecting) the purchase and sale of securities in an environment of increasingly high transactional 
volume and velocity, as well as complex intermediation. Collective deposits rose to prominence 
during the second half of the 20th century, as the volume of securities began to strain the existing 
trading infrastructure. This was made especially acute by the integral role of paper (“scrip”) in each 
transaction. This has been referred to as the “paper crunch” or “paper avalanche” which started to 
gain attention in the 1960s,235 and by 1990 led to the JSE’s pursuit of a “scrip bank” and the 
subsequent immobilisation-dematerialisation process.236  
It was observed in Chapter 1 that although securities can be grouped using a variety of metrics, the 
most analytically useful distinction is between registered and bearer securities. Different jurisdictions 
have a different mix of these securities, but typically one form exerts primacy over the other. This 
had a profound impact on the solutions to the problems of paper-based trading. The seeming 
convergence on dematerialised securities trading via electronic ledger entries began in jurisdictions 
where bearer securities dominated the trading market. As a result of these securities’ corporeal 
properties they could be deposited with intermediary – or rather depository – institutions, who would 
evidence depositors’ holdings via book entry (signifying the economic equivalent of the deposited 
bearer securities). This “pooling” of physically certificated securities at a central transactional 
intermediary is better known as the immobilisation of securities. Using immobilisation, trading, and 
specifically its clearing and settlement operations, could be done faster and more efficiently. 
The problem in registered securities-dominated trading markets was that securities, being 
incorporeal, could not be so deposited in the strict sense. Nonetheless, these securities’ architecture 
allows registered and beneficial holdership to be split, so that a holder of the former may become 
the nominee of the holder of the latter. Using this property, these registered securities-oriented 
jurisdictions were able to simulate the effects of true collective deposit. The main thrust of legal 
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3 2 1 1 Bearer Securities – Germany and the USA  
In jurisdictions where traded securities are primarily “to bearer”, and thus as a point of departure 
negotiable, the right “follows” the paper. Therefore, they were treated as corporeal movables. This 
did not allow, doctrinally speaking, for the elimination or substitution of paper in the transactional 
process, as transfer of ownership would be contingent, at least, on physical delivery (traditio) of the 
document. 
The solution was to pool securities collectively in the safe custody of transactional intermediaries, 
where accounts held at these intermediaries (or accounts held between different intermediaries – 
often by intermediaries of intermediaries) could be debited and credited to represent changes in 
ownership. In this manner, delivery became notional, and the securities remained in one place whilst 
an entitlement to their patrimonial value was reflected by book-entry. 
In collective deposit, securities of the same issue were treated as fungibles within each depository 
(serial numbering, if present, notwithstanding), and the individual owners obtained a right equivalent 
to, or actual, co-ownership in that class of securities in the overall collective depository. Such 
depositories may be referred to as “true” collective securities depositories, as the corporeal thing 
was physically and legally deposited. Jurisdictions with this system included Germany, the 
Netherlands, and the USA. The first and last mentioned will be dealt with in some additional detail 
to illustrate the nature of such a system. 
In Germany, securities were typically Wertpapier and thus inherently negotiable.237 Most securities 
were held in bearer form – Inhaberwertpapier.238 Governed by the provisions of the Depotgestez 
(“DepoG”)239 in conjunction with banking and general securities law,240 deposit rested on a number 
of specific intermediary relationships. Physical securities were deposited by the owner, or by a broker 
on the owner’s behalf, with a bank (“depotbank” or depository bank). This deposit was evidenced by 
book-entry, and the securities were placed in the bank’s collective depositories. Occasionally, the 
process would end here (this type of deposit was referred to as “Haussammelverwahrung”), but most 
often it did not. 
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Depositories 9, 10 & n 34;  
239   The Gesetz über die Verwahrung und Anschaffung von Wertpapieren 1937, enacted on the impetus of the work of 
Georg Opitz and Hans Schultz on constructive possession in the form of book entry when securities were so 
deposited – E Micheler “English and German securities law: a thesis in doctrinal path dependence” (2007) 123 Law 
Quarterly Review 251. 
240   See for example s 16 of the Wechselgesetz for protection of bona fide purchasers of bearer instruments, or s 1(1) 
and (2) of the Kreditwasengesetz for the classification of, for example, the administration of securities as “banking 
transactions” – as in Malan Collective Securities Depositories 11 as well as M Vermaas Aspekte van die 




Thereafter, a bank usually deposited the securities with its depository – a Wertpapiersammelbank, 
of which there were seven by the mid-1980s.241These Wertpapiersammelbanke (or Kassenvereine) 
were specialist central securities depositories with whom only other banks were allowed to hold 
accounts (rather than brokers or members of the public). Here securities would be re-deposited by 
the depository banks (this type of deposit was referred to as “Drittsammelverwahrung”). At the 
Wertpapiersammelbank the depotbank’s deposits were similarly evidenced by book-entry,242 and the 
legal relationship existing between the two types of banks was one of mandatory trust, or 
Ermächtigungstreuhand.243 A depotbank’s relationship with the true owners was also seen as that 
of mandatary.244 
The German system was premised on depositors’ proportional entitlement in the collective body of 
that type of security 245  held by the Wertpapiersammelbank, 246  and evidenced by book entries 
maintained between banks. To address criticism that the system had to some degree transformed 
the Wertpapier into a Wertrecht, the DepotG facilitated the replacement of the individual certificates 
at the Wertpapiersammelbank with deposit of a “global certificate” (“Sammelurkunde”). 247  This 
certificate consolidated all the similar securities (i.e. those considered fungible inter se) into a single 
certificate. Nonetheless the individual securities holders were, in certain circumstances, allowed to 
demand an individuated certificate, necessitating the issue of a new, amended global certificate.248 
In this regard E Micheler also provides some useful background:249 
“In the context of German and Austrian legal doctrine, securities certificates perform two important 
functions. The first is that upon acquisition of possession to the securities certificate the buyer becomes the 
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owner of bearer securities. The second is to provide for a legal explanation of the rules protecting the buyer 
against adverse claims arising out of unauthorised transfers. 
… 
[For that reason]…German and Austrian service providers adopted a solution that maintained securities 
certificates because securities were deposited with central depositories. Many years earlier, in 1850, the 
banks in Berlin had established a financial intermediary called the ‘Kassenverein’ which facilitated money 
transfers between its members. Over time, the Kassenverein was also employed by banks to deposit 
securities they held in their own name. During the post-war crisis, the banks decided also to deposit client 
securities centrally with the Kassenverein and in order to save cost, the securities were to be kept on an 
unallocated basis. The Kassenverein was to keep records of the entitlements attributed to each of the 
banks, who in turn kept records of client entitlements. The securities were to be held by the Kassenverein 
as a bailee albeit with the name of the client owner being undisclosed to them. The identity of the client 
was, however, ascertainable through the depositing bank.  
In 1925, the banks in Berlin approached their clients, asking them to approve of the new arrangement 
allowing banks to transfer client securities to the Kassenverein and agreeing for the securities to be kept 
there on an unallocated basis… 
Banks in Frankfurt am Main, Dresden, Essen and Stuttgart followed the example of the banks in Berlin and 
created their own central depositories…The result was that a handful of regional depositories held a 
significant proportion of securities in Germany, linked with each other through accounts. Each depository 
serviced the banks and clients linked to it by acting as a central depository for securities physically located 
with it but also by acting as an intermediary for securities kept with any of the other depositories. When 
securities were transferred, they no longer had to be physically moved; rather, they were transferred 
through book entry.” 
Transfer of securities was facilitated by two sets of contractual relationships. The first was between 
the depositors (i.e. sellers and buyers, or in more limited instances brokers not operating within the 
banks) and their depository banks (as mandatories), and the second between the depotbanks and 
the Wertpapiersammelbank (also as mandatories). On instruction, the seller’s bank would (1) debit 
the seller’s account, and (2) sell the securities to the buyer’s bank. This intermediary sale would be 
effected by a debiting and crediting of the selling and buying banks’ accounts at the 
Wertpapiersammelbank. The buyer’s bank would gain a fleeting co-entitlement until it credited the 
account of the buyer, after which the buyer would be in a position of co-entitlement identical to that 
of the seller before the transaction.250 The inter partes relationships between the owners and further 
intermediaries, such as extra-bank brokers, have no bearing on the transactional mechanics of the 
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collective depository or depositories in question. The Dutch, Austrian, Swiss and Japanese systems 
followed this type of model,251 and in Germany today most non-equity securities remain, at least by 
way of legal fiction, to bearer despite having been dematerialised.252 
In the USA a similar system prevailed. This is despite the fact that its securities law emerged (much 
like South Africa) from an English law paradigm, with a corresponding prevalence of registered 
securities. Why? Briefly, after passing of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act of 1909, trading market 
securities were seemingly regarded as negotiable instruments, and were in certain circumstances 
treated as such by the courts even earlier.253  The crisis of increasing volumes of paper was 
particularly acute in the United States.  
By 1977 section 8-102(1) of the Uniform Civil Code was amended to provide for uncertificated 
(capital market) securities, despite the doctrinal contradiction of a paperless negotiable instrument 
– much like the case of German government securities as above. The amendment placed the 
responsibility of maintaining the records of uncertificated “ownership”, or rather entitlement, with the 
issuers of such securities.254 In this way American collective securities depositories also immobilised 
securities in collective custody. There emerged four major collective securities depositories – the 
Deposit Trust Company, the Pacific Securities Depository Trust Company, and the Midwest 
Securities Trust Company,255 and later the Federal Reserve Board.256  
Immobilised but certificated securities were held in the name of the nominees – a nominee typically 
being either a subsidiary of the depository, the owner’s broker, or a broker’s nominee. The beneficial 
owner of the securities remained co-beneficial interest holder in the fungible bulk of that class of 
securities in physical deposit. The owner would entrust the securities to a broker or a bank for safe 
custody. The bank or broker would have an account with a collective securities depository and 
deposit the securities with the latter, which would credit the depositor’s account.257 
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With the advent of uncertificated securities, it became slightly more complex. Here the issuing 
company remained responsible for keeping a record of ownership and transfer by registration 
(replacing the certificated security with the issuer’s register entry), and the company had to allow the 
registered owner to exercise all rights conferred by the security. The holding of these securities was 
effected through the issuer registering a “clearing corporation” or “custodian bank” in its securities 
register, while the true owner of the security held an account with the latter (acting as that owner’s 
nominee). When held through the existing system of collective deposit, the collective securities 
depositories fulfilled this role.258 If held in this way, the true negotiability of the (intangible) register 
entry is doubtful, as each individual’s interest appears not to meet all of the criteria of negotiability. 
It would seem that “negotiability” in this context was more simulated than real – a fiction functioning 
to overcome certain doctrinal inconsistencies in order, for example, to protect bona fide acquirers or 
to allow simple real security arrangements.259 
In order to transfer securities between participants of collective securities depositories, section 8-
320 of the UCC stipulated that transfer of ownership could occur by debiting and crediting of buyers’ 
and sellers’ accounts on instruction. This dispensed with the need for delivery of a certificate or 
change in the register of the issuer – the collective securities depository itself held the certificate or 
was registered as nominee owner, and reflected the true state of affairs by book-entry alone.260 
However, the federal-level UCC has never been the default or generally applicable law – thus 
individual states could chose to adopt these provisions of the UCC. The more important point here 
is that these amendments made immobilisation and dematerialisation legally possible, and this 
seems to embody what was considered best practice in the US. 
The importance of these developments in bearer-oriented jurisdictions is not to be underestimated. 
Owing to the fact that such securities had a (at least putative) corporeal character, the physical 
deposit of these securities, in order to facilitate transfer by book entry, was a readily available and 
very effective solution. Having successfully adopted this solution to the problem of paper, it would 
appear that these jurisdictions’ advancements began to exert influence on registered securities-
oriented jurisdictions facing similar challenges. However, without corporeality, “true” deposit was not 
possible, and creative solutions were required to simulate the advantages of deposit. Herein lies the 
foundational aspects of much of South Africa’s current securities depository dispensation, and the 
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legal adaptations necessary to implement this solution is the focus of what follows, and largely 
supports the more theoretical outcomes in the context of uncertificated securities of Chapter 5. 
 
3 2 1 2 Evidentiary certification – England & South Africa  
In stark contrast to jurisdictions where the securities certificate embodies its rights, is the system of 
England, as superficially received in South African law.261 These jurisdictions’ markets, in their 
modern form, are dominated by registered securities. Certificates serve a merely evidentiary purpose 
and there is no “indefensible nexus” between a physical paper certificate as record of holdership on 
the one hand and (actual holdership of) the rights underlying these securities on the other. This is 
the essence of the registered security, for which:262 
“certificates merely represent the registered securities. Certificates do not constitute the securities, and a 
person does not automatically acquire legal ownership of the security by having possession of the 
certificate.” 
For this reason they are treated as movable, incorporeal property, or in the parlance of English law, 
choses in action.263 
The “instrumentality” (i.e. the physical manifestation of) of registered securities is vastly different to 
that of the bearer securities discussed above. Two points are of importance in this regard. First, 
certificated registered securities have a dual instrumentality: physical certification serving as prima 
facie evidence of registered holdership of the security, and physical entry on the securities register 
facilitating the exercise of the rights of such a registered holder (together conferring “legal title”). 
Second, registered holdership itself is not necessarily determinative of holdership of the patrimony 
associated with a particular security, as a handing over of this (dual) instrument from one person to 
another does not automatically cause a transfer of the beneficial interest underlying the security. In 
direct contrast to bearer securities, one can say that the paper follows the right.  
Where a security is the sum of a collection of personal rights without a corporeal dimension in the 
legal sense, there can be no true deposit, and therefore no true collective securities depositories. 
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Thus, subject to very few exceptions, England and South Africa implemented collective “deposit” in 
name only.264 
England will be discussed first. The above doctrinal state of affairs fed into the traditional process of 
the transfer of securities on the London Stock Exchange (“LSE”).265 Under the English system 
(described as it was viewed during the emergence of collective deposit), brokers would deal directly 
with clients. Brokers, in turn, transacted with jobbers to complete a transfer.266 Both functionaries 
acted in different capacities, but were all members of the Exchange. On instruction, a broker 
concluded a sale with a jobber – who would pay for and take up the shares by registered transfer 
and transact with another jobber, or directly with another broker to sell the shares to the eventual 
buyer.267 This, of course, required a number of registered transfers along with large amounts of paper 
work. The transfer of equitable (i.e. beneficial) ownership interests would then, typically, follow a 
similar route. 
The LSE experienced great increases in trading volumes already in the 1960s, escalating rapidly 
during the late 1980s, and culminating in widespread administrative problems in the aftermath of the 
1987 crash. 268  The first radical policy-shift occurred in 1979 when the Exchange introduced 
Talisman, a computerised clearing and settlement platform.269 Talisman made use of SEPON, a 
nominee company of the LSE. Companies, through the operation of an amendment to s 80(1) of the 
Companies Act 1948 in conjunction with s 1 of the Stock Exchange (Completion of Bargains) Act 
1976 were exempted from issuing certificates to a “stock exchange nominee company” such as 
SEPON. SEPON held an account for every company listed on the LSE and had only to issue new 
certificates to the eventual (registered) transferee.270  
Thus transfers of securities could be effected through a transfer by the seller to SEPON, and a 
transfer by SEPON to the purchaser, without the company having to issue certificates to SEPON as 
intermediary.271 The necessary intermediate transfers – from seller’s broker to jobber, perhaps to 
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another jobber, and then to the buyer’s broker – were all contractual, and effected by electronic book 
entry via SEPON.272 
SEPON, as a “bare trustee”, would gain a very brief legal title (i.e. registered ownership) of the shares 
without the issue of a certificate, and the true owners of the securities (in a simple transaction: seller, 
selling broker, jobber, buying broker, buyer) held a proportional co-ownership in the overall pool of 
that particular class of securities at SEPON. The distinction between jobbers and brokers was 
phased out in the mid-1980s, and the roles merged.273 Securities of the same kind, once deposited 
at the Settlement Centre with SEPON as nominee, are treated as fungibles or quasi-fungibles, 
facilitating co-ownership.274 Through this system, the LSE utilised certain elements of the collective 
securities depository system to implement an electronic clearing and settlement platform; however, 
it did (and could) not effect collective deposit in the true sense, which was in any event not necessary 
under the English regime. 
Talisman, as clearing and settlement system, facilitated the transfer of securities without the 
interceding transfer, registration, and destruction and re-issue of certificates for the various 
intermediaries, replacing the evidentiary function of the certificate with an entry in a central registry 
of issuers (SEPON under Talisman). This registry evidences holdings of securities by each issuer 
(replacing the issuers’ registers in this limited capacity) and uses book-entry to reflect changes in 
ownership of shares. Whilst it was not a true collective securities depository, it gave brokers the 
advantages of a depository via book entry and dispensed with certification during the clearing and 
settlement stages of trading.275  
At the same time, this did not amount to total dematerialisation either – it merely de-certificated the 
evidencing of legal title when held by exchange intermediaries.  
The Central Gilts Office came into operation in October 1986, and fulfilled the same function as 
SEPON for government debt securities.276 Later, the failed project Taurus and its successor Crest 
would make provision for the ownership and transfer of fully uncertificated listed securities, and 
remove paper from the equation entirely.277 Crest fulfilled the clearing and settlement function of the 
old system electronically, as well as becoming, for legal purposes, the maintainer of the securities 
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register of the issuers of listed securities, much like STRATE Limited, and eventually Strate Ltd,278 
as described below.  
This leads to a slightly more detailed discussion of the evolving position in South Africa. Here, 
implementation of collective deposit began in the same way. Initially security certificates were 
deposited into the custody of intermediary functionaries, who replaced the original holders on the 
securities register, acting as collective nominees for the true beneficial holders. Thereafter, 
legislation was promulgated to formalise and regulate this notional immobilisation (of listed securities 
only), reducing the administrative burden of paper-based trading at the JSE.279 After listed shares 
and later debt securities were properly dematerialised, and exchange platforms were consolidated, 
Strate Ltd functioned for the most part as South Africa’s sole central securities “depository”.280 A 
depositary in name only, it functions on the one hand as a clearing and settlement platform, and on 
the other as the keeper of a centralised ledger of holdings of dematerialised securities, with its 
participants maintaining sub-registers (reconciled daily with Strate’s ledger).281 
Before the remainder of this chapter can properly discuss the legislative process that led to the true 
dematerialisation of South African securities, a brief description of the South African paper-trading 
system and pre-statutory immobilisation is required. Such a discussion is also necessary for a proper 
account of certain facets of the current legal position, as well as certain theoretical conclusions – this 
is presented mainly in Chapters 4 and 5.  
In South African law, a certificate similarly fulfils a mere evidentiary function, and securities are 
considered incorporeal movable property.282  Like the English system (1) there can be no true 
collective deposit, because incorporeal things cannot be deposited, and (2) the evolution of a central 
securities depository in this context is a misnomer for the emergence of a system for the transfer 
and ownership of securities in uncertificated form, with a central securities “depository” to facilitate 
this. Thus, it becomes clear that statutory intervention was inevitable. Before this occurred, a less 
refined form of collective deposit emerged more organically, with banks and brokers as the central 
depositary intermediaries. However, first a brief discussion of the trading system that preceded this 
development is necessary. 
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At the JSE, and generally in South Africa, there is no distinction between brokers and jobbers, and 
over time South African law has come to regard the nature of the legal relationship between client 
and broker as that of mandatary, rather than agent.283 The client’s instruction is to buy a type of 
security in a certain number, and in this context securities were “fungible by agreement”.284 Central 
to transactions was “good delivery”,285 which required the securities be delivered in “negotiable form” 
(i.e. with all the blank transfer and other documents necessary to effect a change in registered 
ownership). In most cases, the broker would fill out these forms to ensure the final purchaser is put 
in a position to become both beneficial and potentially registered owner.  
However, as securities are bundles of personal rights, cession (a real agreement) had to occur to 
give effect to the transfer of the underlying bundle of rights – the beneficial interest.286 In most cases, 
it was accepted that sellers provide their brokers with the necessary documentation with an animus 
transferendi “to whom it may concern”.287 As per the ordinary requirements for a valid cession, the 
object of the cession would have to be agreed upon, as well as be at least ascertainable if not 
certain.288 
Thus, a transfer could only be valid (1) once the securities were identified, so that (2) the rights being 
ceded could be ascertained. At this time the animus transferendi would be correspondingly matched 
by an appropriately informed animus accipiendi, and the cession perfected.289 This concept was 
taken up in the term “appropriated”.290 Here the certificates played a cardinal role, facilitating the 
ascertainment which perfected the cession. This also illustrates that certificates are not only 
evidence of ownership, but also evidence of the content (i.e. the beneficial interest) of the securities. 
This explains why delivery of the evidentiary securities certificate had to, in principle, accompany the 
delivery of the valid instrument of transfer. 
Whilst this may seem to have been a questionable position (confusing the concept of ascertainability 
with ascertainment itself), it was not. First, the cession was “to whom it may concern” in an 
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environment where the causa for the cession (the mandate or sale agreement or both) was not 
always able to fulfil the function of informing the cessionary exactly what the beneficial interest (i.e. 
the object of the cession) is. 
Second, this type of transaction was usually characterised by a fleeting interceding cession between 
the seller and the seller’s broker. The broker often accepted the securities with animus accipiendi, 
and therefore herself acquired the beneficial interest, without registered ownership, prior to transfer 
to the buyer or buyer’s broker. The seller’s broker then had to effect a second cession, along with 
registered transfer, to complete the overall transfer.291 The securities remained the property of the 
seller’s broker, as the client’s mandatary, until they were appropriated to the buying client or her 
broker. Registered ownership was usually, during these intermediary juristic acts, either in the name 
of the broker’s nominee, or remained with the selling client until the transfer was complete and the 
issuer (upon receipt of the instrument of transfer) issued new certificates.292 
During this period it is clear that beneficial interest and registered ownership did not necessarily 
travel along the same path in exchange transactions. Furthermore, the clearing house of the 
exchange functioned (via a constellation of clearing house agreements) as an agent for brokers, 
facilitating clearing and settlement of exchange transactions, and “…[regulating] the multilateral set-
off of debts between participants…” – i.e. brokers and their nominees.293 The principal legal role-
players remained brokers, their nominees and clients. 
In this light, the discussion turns to the earlier, more organic, emergence of collective deposit. Before 
the passing of the Custody and Administration of Securities Act,294 s 2C(1) of the Stock Exchanges 
Control Act295 allowed listed securities to be “deposited” with: stockbrokers (who in terms of the JSE 
Rules had to deposit them in a safe custody account at a bank); banks in terms of the Banks Act;296 
pursuant to unit trust schemes; and with attorneys, auditors, accountants or persons so designated 
by the Registrar of Financial Institutions, and later the Minister of Finance.297 
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The focus here will be on the first two instances of deposit, as banks and brokers emerged as the 
primary depositories of securities.298 Obviously it must be kept in mind that whilst the terms “deposit” 
and “safe custody” will be used, this is technically inappropriate – not only can incorporeal property 
not be deposited, but the deposit of a thing for return of a similar surrogate is also not true deposit.299 
The process was, in reality, two separate acts: the deposit of the physical securities certificates 
(mere paper without value) for safe-keeping, and the appointment of the broker or bank as 
mandatary, to administer and hold the securities in safe custody. 300  Further, the securities so 
deposited would ordinarily be held in the name of the depository’s nominee.301 The term “administer” 
included management of the investments (or the entire portfolio) so deposited,302 implying the non-
discretionary exercise of registered rights such as voting on behalf of, and on instruction from, the 
beneficial interest holder; or the discretionary management of the investors’ interests.  
Where given to a broker, the broker would issue a receipt and mark the certificates to facilitate 
identification of the beneficial interest holder, and re-deposit those certificates at a bank.303 Where 
given to a bank directly for administration and custody, the securities would be held and administered 
in the owner’s name, or bank nominee’s name, or in trust, but in all cases constituting “trust property 
as defined in the Financial Institutions (Investment of Funds) Act 39 of 1984”.304 When in formal trust, 
beneficial ownership vested in the trust estate, but neither holding in trust nor holding pursuant to a 
unit trust scheme will be discussed further in this section. When in the nominee’s name, the depositor 
remained the beneficial interest holder.305 
Further complicating the matter was the use of global certificates, evidencing the holdings of multiple 
beneficial interest holders. Where there was additional evidentiary documentation (such as in the 
case of brokers, who were required to attach a slip to the certificate evidencing the holders’ names), 
the position remained the same. However, where this was not the case, appropriation could not take 
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place because individual beneficial interest holders could not be identified.306 This was especially 
true where transfers occur within a single block, or global, certificate.  
This implies that beneficial interest holders were in all likelihood co-holders of the “fungible bulk” of 
beneficial interests so “deposited” (the global body of similar rights evidenced by the single 
certificate), or similar certificates collectively deposited.307 This not only slightly altered the nature of 
the beneficial interest, it also affected the remedial position: there could be no individual declaratory 
orders or quasi-rei vindicatio available to individual investors.308 Real security arrangements and 
pledge became equally complex. The main advantage (and goal) of this dispensation, however, was 
that banks and brokers with large volumes of securities on deposit were able to effect transfers with 
less administrative effort and paperwork, saving costs and providing investors with greater 
transactional safety.309 However, to settle matters legally, legislative intervention was implemented. 
 
3 2 2  Centralised, statutory immobilisation in South Africa 
As is clear from authorities cited, the legal developments leading up to dematerialisation are well 
documented. What follows in this section and the next functions as a critical précis of that legal 
history, highlighting certain key aspects necessary for further theoretical analysis in the rest of this 
work, especially in Chapter 5 and its consequences for the some of the outcomes of Part 2. 
In 1992 the legislature enacted the Safe Deposit of Securities Act, later known as the Custody and 
Administration of Securities Act.310 This Act, from its definitional section, clearly only applied to listed 
securities,311 and operated in conjunction with the Stock Exchanges Control Act. The Act functioned 
(1) to rationalise contentious aspects of the law of deposit where securities were concerned;312 and 
(2) to facilitate the transfer of securities by book-entry via a central securities depository. It ushered 
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in a brief period of statutory immobilisation of securities (in the putative English-South African legal 
sense), ending with the dematerialisation of listed shares in 1998, and of debt securities and money 
market instruments from 2004 and 2009 respectively.313  
Despite the organic development of a rudimentary system of collective deposit, structural features 
such as a lack of integration and co-ordination between the JSE’s South African Settlement House 
(“SASH”) and depository institutions, as well as amongst depository institutions themselves, was 
hampering the effectiveness of the market.314 The Act introduced the concept of a central securities 
depository to South Africa (i.e. a “scrip bank”) and co-ordinated the re-deposit of securities by various 
custodial depository institutions (still mainly brokers and banks) at such a central securities 
depository.315 The Act achieved a truer form of immobilisation – the collective and central custody of 
securities and uniformly operationalised transfer, encumbrance and pledge by book-entry rather than 
the moving of paper and the issue of new or amended certificates. Nonetheless, it remained 
empowering legislation: a voluntary, structured alternative not only to non-statutory collective 
deposit,316 but also to paper-based trading. 
The Act allowed a depository intermediary (such as a bank or broker) to re-deposit the securities at 
a central securities depository, holding these securities collectively or separately. Securities of the 
same type and issue have the same value and rights-content, forming a fungible bulk of which the 
beneficial interest holder would then by operation of the statute obtain co-ownership (including any 
limitations on the rights existing pre-deposit) proportionate to what was deposited. This was reflected 
by book-entry at the depository institution, whose deposits at the central securities depository were 
reflected through further book-entry by the latter.  
The co-ownership construction had a number of advantages. First, it allowed a beneficial interest 
holder to encumber and pledge her securities, whereas a mere personal right to delivery of similar 
securities would not. Second, the beneficial interest holder, as co-owner, was protected from the 
insolvency of the depository institutions or the central securities depository. Third, the risk of false or 
incorrectly delivered certificates was spread amongst depositors. The Act further created an 
indemnity in favour of the depository institutions and the central depository, protecting them from 
liability flowing from (1) the unlawful deposit of securities, and (2) scenarios where the stipulated 
beneficial interest holder-depositor was not, in reality, the holder of the rights associated with the 
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deposited securities.317 However, the Act did not specifically address security of transfer, and made 
no material changes to the legal position of a bona fide acquirer. 
In terms of the Act, only member-depository institutions were empowered to re-deposit and transact 
with the central securities depository (beneficial interest holders had no direct relationship with the 
central depository), and all securities so deposited had to be registered in the name of the central 
depository or its nominee (which was required to be a full subsidiary). The fungible bulk of each type 
of security could not be effectively immobilised and transferred by book-entry unless the central 
depository, or one of its nominees, was the registered holder of the securities.318  
In order to protect investors, the depository institutions issued to each a supplementary certificate 
serving as prima facie evidence of such (beneficial) co-ownership.319 The beneficial interest holder 
of any securities was entitled – particularly in light of the unavailability, by virtue of the co-ownership 
construct, of a quasi-rei vindicatio or declaratory order – to delivery of individual certificates 
equivalent to her deposits.320 
Typically, the depository institution would hand over the securities in “negotiable form”321 to the 
central securities depository, which would send it to the issuer for certification and registration in the 
name of the central depository or its nominee. The deposited securities were credited to the account 
of the depositor (either end-investor or her representative intermediary, such as a broker), and 
transfer was effected by book-entries at the central securities depository as nominee, reflected by 
corresponding book-entry at the depository institutions. The certificate and, more abstractly, register 
entry, remained immobilised.322  
Transfer was primarily governed by s 5: 
“Transfer of securities or of an interest in securities held by a depositary institution shall be effected in terms 
of the rules of a central securities depository by entry in the securities accounts of the transferor and the 
transferee with the depositary institution or institutions concerned.” 
In this way transfer could finally be effected by book-entry alone, with no other formal requirements 
and no physical delivery of any evidentiary documents (although after the transfer the depository 
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institutions may have revoked old and issued new certificates, if necessary). The central securities 
depository accounted for the deposits of depository institutions by internal book-entry, and the latter 
similarly accounted for the holdings of their clients. To effect transfer the participant or participants 
(if they were different depository institutions) of the transferor and transferee effected transfer by 
book-entry, and the central securities depository (holding the certificates and being the nominee) 
effected an internal book-entry to reflect this. Naturally this presupposed a certain co-operation and 
communication between the various intermediaries.323 
Thus the Act created a system of transfer by book-entry through what effectively amounts to the 
immobilisation of the dual instrument of registered holdership (i.e. certification and entry in the 
securities register), bringing it into line with the practices of other jurisdictions, and greatly reducing 
the administrative and paper-based burden of high transactional volumes on the Exchange.324 The 
central securities depository could also in principle handle clearing and settlement.325 At that stage, 
there was only one central securities depository – Central Depository Ltd – and a number of 
participating depository institutions (mainly banking institutions, including the Reserve Bank).326 Yet 
the Act did, in principle, make provision for more than one central securities depository, as well as a 
variety of structures for such a depository. 
Nonetheless in practice the single-depository system prevailed and Strate Limited, having eventually 
replaced or absorbed SASH, UNEXcor, Central Depository Ltd and STRATE Ltd,327 remained the 
only central securities depository in South Africa. Yet at this stage, the Act’s provisions remained 
empowering and “opt-in”, and large volumes of securities were still held and traded on the paper-
based system.328 
What this section shows is that the immobilisation of debt and equity securities’ certificates, driven 
by adaptations in the secondary market, illustrates a gradual (but to later legal development crucially 
important) shift in the legal role of the “instrument” dimension of securities as certificate coupled with 
register entry. Even before statutory intervention, legal policy was moving away from the primacy of 
the certificate (1) as a means through which the registered owner (as potentially distinct from the 
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beneficial interest holder as per s 104 of the Companies Act of 1973) was able, practically,329 to 
exercise her rights, and (2) as prima facie evidence of legal title. Issuers’ securities registers 
thereafter began to become the main mechanism through which efficient trading was facilitated, with 
intermediaries (as registered owners) effecting the holding and transfer of immobilised securities.  
Other evidentiary documentation was issued to beneficial interest holders to augment the 
immobilised and often globalised certificates. Via contractual, mandatory, agency, and nominee 
relationships with (and between) the various intermediaries, beneficial interest holders were able to 
enjoy the rights their securities afforded them without use or possession of the certificate or entry in 
the register. Statutory recognition and regulation of central depositories through the Safe Deposit of 
Securities Act intensified this policy shift, which was taken to its logical conclusion thereafter through 
dematerialisation. 
 
3 2 3  Dematerialisation in South Africa   
The final step in the modernising of South Africa’s listed secondary market occurred in 1998 through 
the passing of two Acts. The Custody and Administration of Securities Act330 amended much of the 
contents (and the title) of the Safe Deposit of Securities Act, most importantly incorporating into it 
provisions for uncertificated securities and enabling a system of participant sub-registers.331 The 
Companies Second Amendment Act332 introduced s 91A to the Companies Act of 1973 – dealing 
with uncertificated securities. Together, these Acts introduced uncertificated securities to South 
African law, using the existing framework of central deposit to implement the system. 
The Stock Exchanges Control Act, the Custody and Administration of Securities Act and others were 
eventually consolidated into the Securities Services Act,333 which was later (after the passage of the 
current Companies Act and the impact of the 2009 financial crisis) replaced by the Financial Markets 
Act.334 In this way, the South African securities market was brought in line with a broader consensus 
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advocated by Lord Richardson’s “Group of Thirty” reports335 regarding efficiency, risk and paper-
based problems in international securities market practices. 
However, not all securities were simultaneously dematerialised, and it was only after the passing of 
the Securities Services Act that it was generally thought possible to dematerialise registered debt 
securities.336 Until the merger of UNEXCor and Central Depository Ltd with STRATE in 2003,337 debt 
securities trading on BESA remained immobilised with Central Securities Depository Ltd, and only 
began to be dematerialised after the passing of the Securities Services Act in 2004, via Strate. It will 
be shown below, in furtherance of the argument of a pronounced share-centricity in the approach of 
the legislature, that this occurred despite the fact that company debt securities were in all likelihood 
capable of dematerialisation at the same time as equities.  
Lastly, certain money market instruments are subject to exchange trade, and therefore in a sense 
should be seen, rather, as money market securities. As will be shown, these money market securities 
were only dematerialised in 2009. 
 
3 2 2 1 Dematerialisation in principle: s 91A & STRATE 
In principle, Act 38 of 1998 (in conjunction with s 91A of the Companies Act) facilitated a system 
whereby all listed securities could be centrally deposited, whether in certificated or uncertificated 
form. By amending the Safe Deposit of Securities Act, it retained the empowering character of the 
legislation, as well as continuing to make provision for more than one central securities depository 
and for physical deposit of certificates as well as dematerialisation.338 Thus the legislation made 
allowance for a parallel system of certificated and uncertificated collective and central deposit 
through various collective securities depository “participants” (i.e. intermediary depository institutions 
approved by the Registrar and accepted by the central securities depository). 
The practical realisation of dematerialisation supports this although, as argued below, doing so on 
incorrect legal grounds. The JSE did not implement parallel forms of deposit, and the STRATE 
project,339 initiated for the dematerialisation of shares, would make allowance only for uncertificated 
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securities on the JSE,340 or any other exchange making use of its services. Thus, on the JSE only 
equity securities were dematerialised. BESA, on the other hand, retained the services of Central 
Securities Depository Ltd (until the former and BESA’s clearing and settlement house UNEXCor 
merged with STRATE Ltd to form Strate Limited in 2003) and only after the Securities Services Act 
was passed did it, via Strate, begin to dematerialise its securities.341 
The newly inserted s 91A of the Companies Act was the centre-piece of dematerialisation. It applied 
only to “securities as defined in s 1 of the Stock Exchanges Control Act of 1985”, which in both letter 
and spirit includes debt securities.342 In essence, the provisions in the Companies Act dealing with 
the issue of certificates after allotment or transfer, the role of the instrument of transfer,343 as well as 
provisions regarding the register of members344 needed to be amended. This was because, within 
the existing framework of central deposit, dematerialisation required (among other more 
administrative or operational matters) three fundamental changes.345 
The first was the replacement or augmentation of companies’ registers of members as per s 105 
(and, as discussed below, potentially also the register of debenture holders as per s 128) and 
securities transfer arrangements as per s 133, to make allowance for securities held in uncertificated 
form. For dematerialised securities, the book-entries of the depository institutions who were 
participants to a central securities depository, along with those of the central depository itself, would 
fulfil the function of (i.e. “become”) the issuers’ securities register. This was to ensure that a number 
of affected provisions in the Companies Act would remain workable and operative, for example 
ensuring that holders of dematerialised securities could remain members of the company in terms 
of s 103. 
Yet, mainly as a result of the share-centricity of the Act, this was only partially achieved. Section 91A 
fell under the sub-heading “Shares (s 91-91A)”. Subsection (3)(b) & (c) vested in participants the 
responsibility to maintain a “subregister”.346  The subregister would from part of the company’s 
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members’ register and contain the same details as required by sections 105 and 133, whilst ss (4)(d) 
nullified the application of s 133 to uncertificated securities.  
Crucially, the new section was silent on the matter of the register of debentures as required by s 
128. Moreover, in Act 38 of 1998 “‘uncertificated securities’…means uncertificated securities as 
defined in section 91 of the Companies Act…”, which made s 91A the operative provision. As is 
clear, apart from the definition of securities, no arrangements for the dematerialisation of debt 
securities were made. As discussed, the dominant view at the time was that debt securities could 
not be dematerialised. These securities, as well as government securities (including money market 
securities) not subject to the Companies Act’s provisions, continued to be immobilised until the mid-
2000s for BESA by Central Securities Depository Ltd, and later Strate Ltd, in accordance with this 
view. 
This view may not have been correct.  
First, consider s 91A(c): “'uncertificated securities' means securities as defined in section 1 of the 
Stock Exchanges Control Act…which are by virtue of this section transferable without a written 
instrument and are not evidenced by a certificate” (own emphasis). Thus, s 91A appropriated its 
(operative) definition of securities from the Stock Exchanges Control Act, which included debt 
securities. It further stipulated that (ostensibly any) such “securities” may have been transferred and 
evidenced without any documentary instruments.  
Second, apart from its title and contextual placing in the Companies Act, s 91A made no explicit 
reference to shares, only to securities. 
Third, and most importantly, in terms of s 91A(2), the section applied “(a)…notwithstanding any 
provision to the contrary contained in this Act or in any other law, the common law, an agreement or 
any articles…” and further stated that “(b) [w]here any provision of this Act is not expressly or 
impliedly amended by this section, this Act shall apply in respect of uncertificated securities in the 
same manner as it applies to securities in certificated form.” Fourth, the memorandum to the 
Companies Second Amendment Bill unequivocally provided that “s 91A will apply to uncertificated 
securities and will regulate uncertificated securities notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any 
law, [or] the common law…except to the extent that [the Companies Act’s] provisions are not 
expressly or impliedly amended by s 91A…”. Fifth, nothing in the Custody and Administration of 
Securities Act prevented or seemed to exclude debt securities from the dematerialisation process. 
In keeping with some of the conclusions of § 3 1 3, the share-centric structure of the Act appears to 
have made it difficult to give effect to the full ambit of s 91A, which is the dematerialisation of equity 




the wording of s 91A(2)(b) – a very plausible interpretation of the section seems to suggest that debt 
securities were capable of dematerialisation from the moment s 91A became operative.  
Nothing in Act 38 of 1998 or the Stock Exchanges Control Act prevented listed debt securities from 
being accounted for in depositories’ registers or participants’ subregisters. If so, by virtue of s 
91A(2)(b), holdings of debt securities in the register and subregister could either have been read as 
being part of the register of debenture holders, or could simply have formed part of the members’ 
register, as in the case of dematerialised equities. As is argued in the next section, it seems that the 
more compelling reason for the persistence of the immobilisation of debt securities is a function of 
(1) the systemically risk-averse stance of financial institutions and listed companies in terms of 
compliance with the law, and (2) the relative unimportance of company debt securities in the overall 
composition of the debt market.347 
The second fundamental change to the Act required for the effective implementation of 
dematerialisation was altering the requirement that all securities have physical certificates and that 
they must be transferred by physical instruments of transfer (along with the destruction and issue of 
the old and new certificates respectively). Section 91A, as read with the Custody and Administration 
of Securities Act, effectively implements this change by nullifying these requirements in the 
Companies Act, but (expressly) only in so far as what might be termed “s 91A securities”. This seems 
to have been read to refer to equity securities, but in all probability it could also have been read to 
have “impliedly amended” s 128 of the Act as well. 
Lastly, measures had to be implemented to improve security of transfer - i.e. to protect bona fide 
acquirers of uncertificated securities where a transaction was tainted by some fraud or illegality, as 
well as to shield other market participants from potential abuse.  
 
3 2 2 2 The subsequent dematerialisation of debt securities   
It has been argued above that company debt securities could have been dematerialised from as 
early as 1998 onwards, yet such dematerialisation occurred only gradually after 2004. After the 2003 
merger of UNEXCor and STRATE (into a rebranded Strate Ltd), and the merger of BESA and the 
JSE in 2009, the system was uniform, stable and largely similar to what it is today.  
The Securities Services Act (SSA) defines uncertificated securities in s 29 (Chapter IV – “Custody 
and Administration of Securities”) as follows: “securities that are not evidenced by a certificate or 
written instrument and are transferable by entry without a written instrument”. The SSA continues to 
 
 




recognise that securities may be held in central deposit in certificated or uncertificated form and 
made provision for both dematerialisation and immobilisation.348 Yet its definition of uncertificated 
securities no longer relies on the definition of s 91A of the Companies Act. On the contrary, the SSA 
substitutes the definition of both uncertificated and certificated securities found in s 91A, so as to 
refer to its definition (s 29). Thus the operative definition for uncertificated securities reads 
“uncertificated securities as defined in section 29 of the Securities Services Act, 2004, which are 
entered in the relevant company's register of members as uncertificated securities in terms of 
subsection (3)(a)”.349 
As far as company securities were concerned, s 91A(2) remained in substance unchanged, and no 
overall change to the Companies Act regarding the debenture holders’ register was effected. 
Therefore, whilst making the legal position slightly more explicit, these legislative changes in all 
likelihood did not newly empower the dematerialisation of company debt securities.  The definition 
of “securities” in s 1 of the SSA is materially the same as its predecessor in the Stock Exchanges 
Control Act. The only meaningful change, which seemingly allayed the prior risk-aversion of market 
participants to an interpretation inclusive of debt securities, was the change in operative definition 
from that of the Companies Act to that of the SSA. 
It is in fact more likely that institutional risk appetite was the reason for the delay in the 
dematerialisation of debt securities. The then-prevalent legal view of the ambit of provision for 
dematerialisation was, though contestable, not totally unjustifiable, and the systemic financial risk of 
an interpretation which is somewhat contestable is an understandable incentive to act with caution 
and keep debt securities immobilised. The trading volume and velocity of debt securities (which even 
today remains mainly between large institutional buyers and sellers) also did not present the same 
pressing need for a paperless solution. 
Thereafter, finally, after the passing of the Companies Act of 2008 and the Financial Markets Act of 
2012 as the SSA’s successor (in part a response to the effects of the 2009 financial crisis), the 
secondary market’s legal regime has remained unchanged. By 2012, 98% of all listed debt securities 
had been effectively dematerialised.350 No doubt there are little to no immobilised domestically 
issued securities in today’s market. 
 
 
348   Compare for example s 33(h) and (i); see also Blackman et al Commentary 5-209. 
349   Own emphasis – even after this change, there was still no reference to the register of debentures mandated by s 
128.  
350   Strate “98% of SA’s R1,15 Trillion in Bond Market Assets Now Dematerialised” (08-02-2012) Strate Press Release 
<http://www.strate.co.za/press-release/98-sa%E2%80%99s-r115-trillion-bond-market-assets-now-




Nonetheless the true significance of the SSA was that the dematerialisation of all debt securities was 
achievable, simply because dematerialisation became possible on the basis of the definitional 
schema of the SSA alone and without the need for s 91A. This was particularly important to the 
dematerialisation of non-company securities such as Treasury Bonds or municipal debentures, as 
the above figures illustrate well.  
The last issue that needs to be discussed is the dematerialisation of money market instruments in 
order to make use of some or all of the elements of the trading infrastructure of equities and more 
traditional debt securities. This is in particular relation to the custody and administration of securities 
as provided for by the various iterative versions of South African securities depository legislation. 
These particular money market instruments only began to be issued in dematerialised form in 2009, 
and no existing instruments were subsequently dematerialised.351 These instruments were not listed 
on the Exchange at that time.352 
There are two important aspects to these instruments, which include: commercial paper, shorter-
term Treasury and Reserve Bank debts, or certificates of deposit (negotiable or otherwise – better 
known as “CDs” or “NCDs”). Here two important preliminary points must be made.  
First, many of these instruments were issued to bearer. Accordingly, before the advent of their 
dematerialisation, if it was necessary to integrate any such instrument into the pre-existing market 
trading architecture (specifically the custody and administration, including clearing and settlement, 
services of STRATE and later Strate), it could simply be physically deposited at a central depository, 
and thereafter function as “deposited” registered securities. Those not issued to bearer could be 
dealt with by the depositary system as registered securities ab initio.  
Second, any such money market instruments actually become money market securities. This is 
clearly evident from a number of observations. First, the SSA’s definition of “securities” in s 1 
explicitly excludes money market instruments save for the purposes of Chapter IV of the Act 
(“Custody and Administration of Securities”), where a secondary definitional provision in s 29 
includes these instruments as securities.  
Second, the Explanatory Memorandum on the Financial Markets Bill makes this terminological 
division abundantly clear. Explaining a change from the term “money market instruments” (as used 
in the SSA) with “money market securities” in s 1 v. “securities”, the memorandum states:353 
 
 
351  See Chapter 1, § 1 1. 
352  National Treasury, Explanatory Memorandum on the Financial Markets Bill, 2012 (April 2012) 18. 




“The definition has been amended to correct an error by replacing the reference to money market 
instruments with a reference to money market securities. This is aimed at distinguishing money market 
instruments from money market securities, and to align with the definition of “securities” which expressly 
“excludes money market securities from the definition except for purposes of the custody, administration 
and settlement chapter of the FMA.” 
Further, the exact same change is brought about for s 1 v. “issuers”, together with the following 
commentary:354 
“This definition has been amended to correctly refer to money market securities. The aim is to limit the 
scope of the FMA to money markets securities only.” 
Lastly, and quite usefully, there is the inclusion of a definition in s 1 for “money market securities”, 
on which the memorandum reads:355 
“The purpose of the definition is to clearly define the term as meaning money market instruments that are 
uncertificated securities reflected in an uncertificated securities register.”  
This makes it clear that once a money market instrument is subject to the custody and administration 
mechanisms of the securities market, it comes to be regarded as a security.   
From 2009 onwards, money market securities begun to be issued in dematerialised form. It is unclear 
why this only occurred at this stage. Nevertheless, it does greatly reduce the complexity of the 
analysis in the rest of this work, as all uncertificated securities in South Africa therefore function as 
registered (uncertificated) securities. With this final step all debt securities in South Africa were 
capable of being issued in dematerialised form, and the historic portion of this work ends here. The 
following three chapters, informed by the outcomes of Chapters 2 and 3, deal only with currently 
contemporary issues in forming a theoretical framework which can then be tested against some of 
those issues in Part 2. 
 
 
354  Treasury, Explanatory Memorandum (2012) 13-14. 
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4 Deconstructing the (debt) security 
In keeping with the broader methodological approach outlined in Chapter 1, these three final 
chapters of Part 1 attempt to explain debt securities using an analytical-systemic approach. This 
approach is centred around how the debt security “fits into the overall scheme of private law…” (but 
also in this context commercial law) and is primarily concerned with “‘legal dogmatics’, and…the 
analysis of concepts and their systemisation”.1  
To do so, the result of these chapters must accomplish three things. First it must provide a manner 
in which to identify and give a discrete legal meaning to the securities concept within the broader 
realm of financial instruments. Second it must explain, within the legal system in which these 
securities function, how securities are structured, how they originate, and what the legal dynamics 
between issuer, holders, and third party interest holders are. Third it must enable one to derive from 
this a holistically consistent working theory of the legal nature and dynamics of debt instruments 
specifically. 
In order to solve most of the problems surrounding debt securities, the securities-concept outlined 
in Chapter 3 is the key. As is clear from what follows, the predominant focus of the rest of this work 
is on understanding certain broader legal problems regarding securities at large. This is what 
facilitates a clear exposition of the nature and classification of debt securities in particular. 
 
 




Within the analytic-systemic evaluation, this chapter and the next focus on the second and third 
problems above, looking at financial instruments which are uncontentiously classified, or classifiable, 
as securities. Chapter 6 completes, with the benefit of the outcomes of these two chapters, the 
overall analytical-systemic discussion by dealing with the first above-mentioned problem – 
establishing a methodology through which greater certainty regarding the classification, or 
classifiability, of phenomena as “securities” is achievable. In that regard it must perhaps be noted 
here that Chapter 6 slightly exceeds the scope of the rest of this work, dealing not only with registered 
securities, but also attempting to come to classificatory terms with the broader securities concept as 
found in South African law. 
The term “debt security” (including the more opaque “debt instrument” referred to in the Companies 
Act)2 refers to securities originating from borrower-lender arrangements. Despite this, the more 
cogent distinction is between equity securities and other securities. This is because the latter group 
has one central characteristic in common: the primary, foundational components of the underlying 
legal interest arise contractually.3 Thus, as a point of departure, most conclusions drawn about the 
fundamentals of debt securities ought to apply equally to any registered security. 
Importantly, once a financial arrangement bestows on a particular party or parties a legal interest 
which is classified – or classifiable – as a “security”, the content of that legal interest may expand. 
As a security, the underlying interest also includes other rights and competencies4 which arise 
consequentially. This is because, as a security, the positive law attaches additional content and 
consequences to that legal interest. This chapter will only draw conclusions regarding cases where 
classification is uncontentious and thus any reference to securities’ underlying interest is a reference 
to the (consequentially expanded) totality of rights and other competencies bestowed by securities.  
This chapter will outline the foundations of a general theory of (debt) securities and is primarily 
concerned with the legal nature and form of securities in South African law. However, not all the 
conclusions drawn here are readily transposable to uncertificated securities. Therefore, the following 
chapter will deal, as briefly as is possible, with the requisite adaptations to the foundation laid out 
here, as required to come to a similar understanding of uncertificated securities. 
This chapter consists of three parts. 
 
 
2   See section 43 of the Act, 71 of 2008 (hereafter merely the “Companies Act” or “Companies Act of 2008”).   
3   See § 4 2 below, and Chapter 6, § 6 3 2.  
4  I.e. those benefits or other aspects of the underlying interest which cannot easily or uncontentiously be 
characterised as personal rights in the strict sense. The chosen term, “competency”, is thus meant to encompass 
all other terms such as “entitlement”, “capacity”, “power”, non-subjective “right”, or “privilege”. For example, in the 
context of company securities specifically, “competencies” such as voting “rights” or statutory remedial “rights” 




The first part deals with the underlying structure of securities. Specifically, it focuses on the internal 
architecture of securities and the various legal relationships that are created thereby. It is, in its 
essence, a re-conceptualisation of the traditional legal distinction between so-called registered and 
beneficial “ownership” inherent in the structure of modern South African securities. Primarily, it 
attempts to unify and more accurately describe the principles of the positive law that have coalesced 
around securities, and do so in a way that better harmonises the doctrinal incongruities resulting 
from the imperfect reception of this construct from English law.5  
To that end, it is argued that all securities are comprised of two interdependent, but functionally 
separate,6 legal objects. The first construct is referred to as the “security instrument”. In essence, it 
is a locus for (holdership of) the incidents7 of execution over the underlying interest in a security. It 
typically manifests as entry of the instrument-holder into the securities register and the issue to that 
holder of a security certificate; or, in the case of uncertificated securities, merely electronic register 
entry in the uncertificated securities register. The section argues that the so-called registered rights, 
which accrue to a registered holder of a security, should rather be understood as incidents of 
execution, severed from the totality of the underlying interest in securities. 
Second is what will be called the “security asset”. It generally corresponds with the proprietary 
dimension ascribed by the law to a security – i.e. patrimony as the economic end-benefits of the 
rights and other competencies contained in a security.8 It, in turn, is the locus for (holdership of) the 
incidents which remain after the incidents of execution have been shorn from the underlying interest.  
The second section below discusses the creation of securities, and the meaning of “issue”. It deals 
broadly with how securities come into existence, the foundational importance of an allocation of the 
ability to realise and enforce the benefits of the underlying interest (styled from this point forward as 
“execution”), and also incidentally illustrates the importance of the classificatory problem of Chapter 
6 in the context of contractual securities. The third and final section discusses certain core proprietary 
features of security-holdership, analysing these features through the outcomes of the re-
conceptualisation of securities’ underlying structure. 
 
 
5  See Chapter 3, § 3 1 for a full account of the English law influence on this area of South African law. 
6  As mentioned in Chapter 1, this interdependent separateness is not to be confused with the full separation and 
severability of “registered ownership” and “beneficial ownership” as advocated in JL Yeats, R de la Harpe, R Jooste, 
H Stoop, R Cassim, J Seligmann, L Kent, R Bradstreet, RC Williams, MF Cassim, E Swanepoel, FHI Cassim & K 
Jarvis (2018) Commentary on the Companies Act of 2008. This will become through the totality of this Chapter and 
the next. 
7  See § 4 1 below for an explanation of how the notion of these incidents fits into the overall South African legal 
system.  




In Part 2 of this work, using a functional-policy framework, it remains to be shown that the 
conclusions of this and the following two chapters have demonstrable problem-solving qualities 
which lead to a more cogent and functional statement of the law in its current form.  
 
4 1  A re-conceptualisation of the underlying structure of securities  
Securities are very complex constructs in terms of the law, and the deeper foundational attributes of 
securities appear to have been largely glossed over in past legal research and practice. By 
identifying the commonalities that are exhibited by the broad spectrum of modern securities, one can 
draw together all applicable legal rules and principles, found in various branches of the positive law, 
that deal with those commonalities. From this, a uniform account of the nature and form of securities 
in South African law emerges – one which, because it is in harmony with the underlying structure of 
South Africa’s mixed-law heritage and its Civilian private law, potentially resolves a number of lasting 
legal problems.9 
In South African law, securities have developed over time into a very specific form. This development 
begins with the grouping of shares and certain configurations of debt as securities in the mid- to late-
20th century. It will be argued that the law’s development in this regard has already implicitly 
converged upon an archetype of securities that includes an interdependent set of constructs: the 
security asset and the security instrument.10 
A typical security will contain multiple rights, which is why securities can, at least in South African 
law, be characterised as “bundles” of personal rights. This kind of language was first applied only to 
equities (i.e. shares)11 – but is now justifiably applicable to most modern securities.12 However, even 
this is an over-simplification. First, the underlying interest of which securities are comprised is in fact 
 
 
9   See Part 2 of this work. .  
10   This is, largely, due to the utility of certain attributes of registered securities in the dematerialisation of securities in 
legal systems which are influenced in this regard by English law. See Chapter 3 generally, and § 3 2 for this 
development. More generally, the law also appears to have casuistically assimilated a number of similar (more 
recently emerging) financial instruments into some of its statutory securities concepts – see Chapter 6.  
The traditional notions of registered title and beneficial ownership appear to be have been retained in South African 
company law after that passage of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 – see as best discussed in Yeats et al 
Commentary 2008 2-670 – 2-672, discussing therein also specifically Kruger Investments Group Limited v Nuberry 
Holdings Limited (unreported, WCC case no 14184/15, [2015] ZAWCHC 159, 30 October 2015), Du Plooy NO v 
De Hollandsche Molen Share Block Ltd 2017 (3) SA 274 (WCC), and Monique Investments (Pty) Ltd v 167 Bree 
Street Newtown (Pty) Ltd (unreported, GJ case no 2014/3306, [2015] ZAGPJHC 232, 10 April 2015) as supportive 
of the continued distinction between these two forms of holdership. See also Yeats et al Commentary 2008 at 2-
676. 
11   See for instance PJ Sutherland & AJ Van der Walt “Dispossession of incorporeals or rights – is the mandament van 
spolie the appropriate remedy?” (2003) 15 South African Mercantile Law Journal 95 96 (and various authorities 
cited therein). 
12   “Securities represent bundles of rights against a company” – K Van der Linde & S Lutz “Aspects of the cross-listing 




typically a complex combination of personal rights (created inter partes by issuers and primary 
market acquirers)13 and other rights and competencies that arise consequentially through such a 
legal interest being classified as a security.14 
Second, it appears from the South African positive law that these constituent parts of the underlying 
interest can be subjected to an even deeper analysis. Shortly, personal rights can be described in 
terms of subsidiary incidents, flowing from the so-called two-fold components of the creditor’s 
interest (komponente van die skuldeisersbelang).15 Over and above obligationary content, securities’ 
ex lege competencies (which do not fit easily into a subjective rights paradigm, but certainly create 
at least subjective relationships) can be subjected to a materially similar analysis. 
In order to frame this analysis, and in so doing formulate a point of departure, securities’ place in the 
vast, multi-layered system of positive law must be properly understood. Whilst somewhat abstract, 
this point is crucial to understanding the unique, and unorthodox, legal nature of these assets in the 
South African legal system. In this legal system securities are bundles of personal rights and other 
positive law competencies. It follows that the underlying interest gives rise to complex sets of 
horizontal legal relationships. Most important are those between issuer, asset- and instrument-
holders, but this also includes those arising between these parties and third parties. 
Securities also constitute “property” in their bestowing, inter alia, of personal rights and 
competencies (operative against the issuer) upon their holders. This illustrates that the content of a 
security has a marked subjective rights (somewhat better captured in Afrikaans as 
subjektiefregtelike) dimensionality. Yet the doctrine of subjective rights, and specifically its five-fold 
classification of subjective-right categories, is of very limited use in the analysis of securities. Its 
central weakness lies in its tendency to degrade into conceptualist legal thinking and dogmatics 
(Begriffsjurisprudenz), inadequately accounting for legal phenomena which do not conform to its 
doctrinal contours. 
Nonetheless, the broader paradigm of the doctrine does have a degree of value in formulating a 
point of departure. This value is found in understanding where subjective rights lie within the positive 
law, so that its sphere of influence with reference to securities can be understood in this larger 
system of law. Central to the concept of this so-called system of subjective rights is, for better or 
worse, what it seeks to achieve. Here H Dooyeweerd’s proposition “de beschikkings- en 
genotsbevoegdheid…als noodwendige momenten in ieder subjectief recht, dienen in den zin van 
 
 
13   See § 4 2 below. 
14   See § 4 1 2 and § 4 2. 
15  These being the so-called entitlements of determination and enjoyment (i.e. beskikkings- and genotsbevoegdheid) 
– GF Lubbe “Sessie in securitatem debiti en die komponente van die skuldeisersbelang” (1989) 52 Tydskrif vir 




het ‘juridisch’ wils- en belangenbegrip te worden gevat”16 is a very useful articulation. It reveals that 
the higher order function of subjective rights within the broader legal system is the “ewewigtige 
harmonisering van ’n veelvuldigheid van belange”,17 in so far as they exist horizontally between legal 
subjects. 
This deeper subject-subject legal order which subjective rights aim to bring about is primarily 
premised on the legal subject-object relationship. This is because, as per Dooyeweerd, moments of 
volition and instances of interest amongst legal subjects collide with reference to objects – entities 
or phenomena which have use.18 The reading of the determination and enjoyment (beskikkings- and 
genots-) entitlements into the subject-(useful)object relationship facilitates a delimitation 
(afbakening) of competing social and economic interests and wants, as they arise relative to useful 
objects.19  
Thus the dual-entitlement construct of private law rights is the black-letter, doctrinal product of a 
more abstract (and developmentally dynamic) policy position on the discounting of competing 
horizontal interests, in furtherance of the social order and cohesion. Furthermore, regardless of the 
subjective right in question, this ring-fencing of interests through these dual entitlements must, in this 
light, be seen on some level as operating erga omnes. This is an oft overlooked aspect of the 
discourse surrounding personal rights in particular and is important in the context of securities as 
proprietary, wealth-storing “assets”. 
Nonetheless, it is insufficient to state that the subject-subject dynamic is “so vanselfsprekend van 
die subjektiewe reg as die bestaan van die reg as samelewingsorde”.20 As accurately perceived by 
AJ van der Walt, there are aspects to horizontal legal interactions which do not relate to substantive, 
subjective rights as such, and a recognition of (other) “subjective relationships” is necessary to “offer 
an acceptable explanation of the existence and protection of subjective relationships which are not 
subjective rights”.21 This results in a slightly wider, but better defined, circumscription of the sphere 
 
 
16  Loosely: “[t]he entitlements of determination and enjoyment…as necessary occurrences in every subjective right, 
serve the purpose of capturing [or perhaps better translated as discounting] the will and interest concepts” – H 
Dooyeweerd “Grondproblemen in de leer der rechtspersoonlijkheid” (1937) 98 Themis 199 & 367 409.  
 See also WA Joubert “Die realiteit van die subjektiewe reg en die betekenis van ‘n realistiese begrip daarvan vir die 
privaatreg” (1958) Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 12 (Part 1) & 98 (Part 2), 110 (generally also 
100-111), FJ van Zyl & JD Van der Vyver Inleiding tot die regswetenskap (1982) 412-417, Lubbe (1989) THRHR 
495 & n 59. 
17  I.e. the “equilibrious harmonising of a multitude of interests” – Joubert (1958) THRHR 110. 
18  See § 4 3 2 below, specifically with reference to Van Zyl and Van der Vvyer’s view of the definition of “legal object” 
as dealt with therein. 
19  Joubert (1958) THRHR 104-112 & 114, § F “(2)” and “(3)”. 
20  Joubert (1958) THRHR 114, § F “(1)” 
21  AJ van der Walt “The doctrine of subjective rights: a critical reappraisal from the fringes of property law” (1990) 53 




of the subjective – as “private law rights and relationships”. Consequently, it generates a better 
understanding of the outer-limits, or ambit, of its operative paradigm within the positive law. 
Within the broader framework of the South African law, this sphere of systematised concepts, “geleë 
aan die subjeksy van die reg, staan selfstandig teenoor die reg as norm, maar sy inhoud word deur 
die regsnorme gereguleer…(die regsnorme bepaal nl. die grense van die reghebbende se 
beskikking en genot van sy regsobjek).”22 This statement, in particular the parenthesis, is key to 
understanding the legal nature of securities. Securities are not a phenomenon of “private law rights 
and relationships”. Securities exist, instead, as a consequence of the interaction between private 
law rights and relationships and the objective law. Thus, for the purposes of a juridical model of their 
legal dynamics, one must accept that securities: (1) cannot be adequately accounted for in terms of 
the dual subjective entitlements of determination and enjoyment; and (2) must instead be explained 
within the sphere of interaction between the horizontal, subjective legal order and the objective law 
– i.e. in terms of the legal incidents this interaction gives rise to. 
This statement needs to be briefly unpacked. Securities’ existence is a result of: (1) how legal norms 
determine the boundaries of the determination and enjoyment entitlements of the security-as-
object;23 (2) what legal subjects choose, through juristic acts, to do with those entitlements inter se; 
and (3) the superordinate topography of the objective law (most notably, in the case of securities, 
statutory effects).  
It should be clear that in the case of a personal right, the entitlements of determination and enjoyment 
are the two “components of the creditor’s interest”. However, as a result of those components’ 
interaction with legal subjects and the objective law, they can be said to have a far greater number 
of functionalities. This is what is meant by incidents in this work. This view is not uncontentious. GF 
Lubbe, relying to some extent on TK Pahl,24 appears to support this view, and its simpler two-fold 
construction of the content of personal rights. In opposition to the German law-influenced view of 
personal rights as “’n bondel bevoegdhede”, he states that:25 
“[d]ie feit dat ’n skuldenaar op verskillende wyses deur middel van regshandelinge oor die reg kan beskik, 
beteken nie dat daar ooreenkomstige bevoegdhede is wat deel uitmaak van sy juridiese arsenaal 
nie…[Pahl’s view] is myns insiens te verkies bo ’n benadering wat die beskikkingsbevoedgheid verwar met 
 
 
22  Joubert (1958) THRHR 115, § F “(5)” [own emphasis]. 
23  Or, stated conversely, the limit of the lawful consequences that juristic acts, flowing from holdership of these 
entitlements, can bring about.  
24  TK Pahl Die aanwending van vorderingsregte ter versekering van skulde (1972) 164-166 & 176. 




’n spektrum van regshandelinge wat die regstelsel erken ten einde aan die behoeftes van partye in die 
regsverkeer te voldoen.” 
Yet in a more recent work, Lubbe appears to take a contrasting view. In explaining the right of the 
cessionary and cedent in securitatem debiti on the pledge construction as the right, he states:26 
“There is authority for the view that the cession vests only a limited right in the debtor’s performance, namely 
‘the exclusive right to claim and receive…the amounts owing’, in the cessionary. This enables the 
cessionary to hold rather than own the debtor’s performance and provides a basis for the recognition of a 
real right of pledge in the debtor’s performance for the cessionary. 
[From here on in n 19:] This reflects a construction, adopted and adapted from German precepts…based 
on an analysis of the characteristics of the personal right which forms the subject matter of the security…A 
claim, so it is reasoned, confers on the holder of the right not only the capacity and hence the locus standi 
to exact performance (to collect interest, in the case of a money debt, and capital once the claim has 
matured) but also a variety of other functions, such as the capacity to alienate, waive, novate or renew it, 
to cancel the transaction giving rise to it, to vote or claim a preference where the right carries such a 
privilege, to apply for the debtor’s sequestration, to take advantage of a lien or suretyship, and so forth.” 
The former view is preferred. Firstly, its supporting arguments appear more coherent. Second, and 
more importantly, it is not necessarily incompatible with the latter view. An accurate understanding 
of the paradigmatic ambit of private law rights and relationships reveals that holdership of a claim, 
or set of claims, to performance (i.e. holdership of these two core entitlements or “bevoegdhede”) 
does indeed result in these multitudinous functionalities, but not on the isolated level of the 
subjective, private law (i.e. not as the content of a subjective right). Instead these functions, or rather 
incidents, are a result of the interaction between (1) the twofold content of private law rights, and (2) 
what the contours of the objective law allow legal subjects to do. Most importantly for present 
purposes, that is the level on which they must be understood and analysed: where the holders’ 
relationship to the legal object meets what the objective law does and does not countenance or 
enable in the doings of legal subjects. 
Thus the incidents of holdership of a personal right are not juridically to be found at the level of 
private law rights and relationships. These features reside instead on what can be termed a 
“mezzanine” juridical plane at the intersection between the subjective and objective law – the level 
of the interaction of the former and latter, put in motion by the exercise of legal subjectivity. Because 
this juridical plane is an intersection, its content will depend on both the content of the subjective law 
below it and the objective law above it, as they interact through juristic acts. So it is to be seen, for 
example, that a usufructary may pledge her usus and fructus to third party, but may not dispose of 
 
 




the patrimonial object her rights derive from; conversely the usufruct-giver may dispose of the 
patrimonial object, but not pledge its usus or fructus. These are legal dynamics the doctrine of 
subjective rights cannot, in isolation on its purely horizontal juridical plane, adequately account for.  
Securities are a phenomenon of mercantile or commercial law. The critical feature of this area of law 
is that much of its legal mechanics can be described as arising at this mezzanine juridical intersection 
of legal subjectivity and objectivity. In a sense, mercantile-commercial law exists as a kind of “applied 
private law”, and the qualifier drives the point home. Its emergent black letter content is more fluid 
and less bound by doctrine, constantly being modified by interaction with statute and other emergent 
positive law principles, as well as the commercial reality. Its development is fundamentally reactive. 
In the Dworkinian sense, the black letter results of this process of principle and policy discounting 
are driven by a uniquely commercial policy-mix of norms and imperatives, in which exigency often 
outweighs legal dogmatics. Thus R Goode is undoubtedly correct, first in describing “commercial 
law as the totality of the law’s response to the needs and practices of the mercantile 
community…adapting itself constantly to new business procedures, new instruments, new 
demands”,27 and second in formulating the essence of the “philosophical foundations of commercial 
law” as a constant tension between the courts’ pursuit of fairness and justice (on the one hand), and 
the business community’s expectations of reasonable, predictable, and yet also responsive and 
dynamic legal results within a fundamentally flexible legal environment (on the other).28  
This is the theoretical framework, or point of departure, that is necessary to fully account for 
securities’ legal nature with jurisprudential consistency and integrity. Excessive peering at the purely 
private law rights and relationships dimension of this legal phenomenon hampers, rather than 
improves, the analysis. Similarly, although securities are not purely subjective phenomena of law, 
any analysis would be incomplete without an understanding of the underlying legal interest’s 
subjective rights dimensions.  
A robust and coherent exposition of securities’ operative legal dynamics must be developed with 
reference to these mezzanine juridical effects. Thus, securities can only truly be theoretically 
accounted for in terms of the modalities of their incidents, as these incidents (as interactive 
functionalities of the underlying interest) are what is determinative of their legal nature. 
It is shown below that, as a bundle of rights and competencies, the positive law in certain cases 
takes cognisance of the security holistically, not its individual rights and competencies. This allows 
the sum of its individual incidents – i.e. the global underlying interest – to be split holistically, so that 
 
 
27  R Goode Commercial Law 3 ed (2004) 1204 [own emphasis]. 
28  Goode Commercial Law 1204-1205. Here Goode also cites this tension as the reason commercial law favours 




all incidents related to execution of the rights and other competencies are located in (and held 
through) an “instrument”. This is the abstract vessel (typically manifesting as entry on a securities 
register and the issue of an evidentiary certificate; or entry on an uncertificated securities register) 
to which these aforementioned incidents of execution accrue vis-à-vis its holder. This is also why it 
is described here as a locus for the (holdership of) the incidents of execution of the underlying 
interest. It will be shown that these incidents are derived from an aggregated entitlement of 
determination (beskikkingsbevoegdheid), gleaned from each right and other competency within the 
security but approached as a single, gobal entitlement with reference to the total, “bundled” content 
of that security. 
What remains of the underlying interest is the “asset” component of a security, primarily conferring 
patrimony (but also, or perhaps including, the end benefits of its other competencies) on its holder. 
The asset is a refinement and extension of the notion that “[securities] are movable property”.29 It is 
the totality of patrimonial consequences – i.e. the end economic benefits – of the rights and other 
competencies of a given security, devoid of all incidents of execution operative against the issuer.  
The distinction between the “beneficial interest” and the “registered rights” of shares is not a novel 
concept,30 and merely extending this characterisation to all securities is also not in itself a great leap 
forward. Nevertheless, the re-conceptualising of securities as being, in terms of their incidents, 
structurally dichotomous ab initio does take matters forward. Ultimately, implying that a security 
asset (the refinement and extension of the notion of beneficial interest) and the security instrument 
(the refinement and extension of the notion of registered rights) are separate yet interdependent 
 
 
29   This formulation is found in s 35(1) of the Companies Act of 2008, and does not refer to “securities”, but instead to 
“shares”. However, it is submitted that, being the same confirmation of the common law as was found in this 
provision’s predecessors, the common law principle which it confirms (that a company’s underlying immovable 
assets do not render its securities immovable) applies equally to debt securities as contemplated in s 43, certain 
options as contemplated in s 42, and indeed any securities in such a context. 
30  Although this chapter is to some degree at odds with the exact foundation for the position taken by Yeats et al 
Commentary 2008, the following is useful, at 2-571: 
“Traditionally, it has been the policy of the law that generally, a company only has regard to the registered holder of the 
securities (because the holder was the legal owner under English law) and hence the nominee’s relationship to the company 
is no different from that of a registered holder that owns the rights attaching to the securities. Accordingly, where there is a 
nominee, the company looks only to the nominee and not to the beneficial owner. The traditional position is based on s 104 
of the 1973 Act and its comparable predecessors and the related common-law jurisprudence; however, there is no comparable 
provision in the Act. Further, s 57(1) has somewhat blurred the distinction between ‘registered title’ and ‘beneficial ownership’. 
As a result, there is uncertainty as to the position between the issuer company and a beneficial owner. Nevertheless, it would 
appear from s 56(8) to (11) that generally the separation of registered title and ‘beneficial ownership’ and ‘interests’ in the pre-
existing related jurisprudence continues to have application and this is assumed to be the case for the purposes of these 
notes. This is supported by the recent cases confirming the separation of ownership and registered title and that only the 
registered shareholders are entitled to claim access to information in terms of s 26(1)… This conclusion is supported by the 
decision in Von Siebel v Accentuate Limited [2015] JDR 1182 (GJ), confirming that an undisclosed (in terms of s 56 of the 
Companies Act) asset-holder of uncertificated securities requires a proxy or appointment in terms of s 57(5) in order to attend 
and vote at a shareholders’ meeting].” 
See also Yeats et al Commentary 2008 2-669 – 2-672, specifically stating at 2-672 that “the right to be on the 
securities register continues to be determined distinctly from the ownership of the securities and, by implication, 




legal objects subject to different forms of holdership is merely following this traditional distinction, as 
evidenced by legal developments in the positive law, to a logical and doctrinally sound conclusion. 
Thus, the discussion below will be, to some degree, informed by the doctrine of subjective rights,31 
as this is necessary to understand the architecture (and consequences) of securities’ underlying 
interest on the level of its incident-functionalities. However, it should not go without saying that during 
the analysis the doctrine in isolation quickly, in a sense, breaks down and loses its explanatory value. 
 
4 1 1 Terminological and foundational concepts 
Before a justification and explanation of the security asset and instrument can be made, certain 
foundational and terminological concepts must be set out. 
As stated in Chapter 1, the distinction between securities that are to bearer and those that are 
registered informs the majority of this work. Bearer securities are negotiable instruments, and as 
such their legal nature is fairly clear. These instruments are excluded from the discussion, as the 
truly difficult legal problem is the nature of registered securities. Thus, to reiterate, references to 
“securities” are, unless the context indicates otherwise, references to registered securities.  
Within this narrower focus, a number of deeper preliminary observations are required. As securities 
are built upon personal rights, part of the characterisation of securities as property stems from the 
bundling of rights into an ostensibly single and composite patrimonial object.32 Thus in lay and 
commercial terms, a security is considered a bundle of rights. 
However, in legal terms, this is not entirely accurate. In the beginning of this section, it was put 
forward that securities are comprised rather of a bundle or complex of both personal rights (arising 
from contract, statute or otherwise) and other competencies (usually arising from statute). This idea 
was further developed to show that this results in an even larger number of potential functionalities, 
or incidents.  
 
 
31   As envisaged by Joubert (1958) THRHR 12 et seq & 98 et seq; but see also: L Du Plessis An Introduction to Law 
3 ed (1999) 132-146; and JD van der Vyver “The doctrine of private-law rights” in SA Strauss (ed) Huldigingsbundel 
vir WA Joubert (1988) 201-246. 
32  “Ostensibly” because it is uncertain whether these rights may be “unbundled” and ceded severally. However, this 
work enables a better understanding of limited real rights in securities, which it is submitted is the best way to solve 
this issue as it avoids the problem of separation altogether.  
It would appear as though the characterisation of all securities, and not merely shares, as a “bundle of rights” is 




Examples of true (i.e. personal) rights include the right to receive a proportionate share of the 
declared dividend, or the right to receive repayment of a sum loaned. Competencies is the chosen 
terminology for what are often also referred to as “rights” (in the wider sense), or as “powers”, 
“privileges”, “capacities” or “entitlements”. Examples of these competencies include the competency 
to vote at shareholders’ meetings, the entitlement to demand certain information regarding the 
issuer, or the power under certain circumstances to demand that an issuer reacquire a security at a 
fair market price (i.e. the appraisal right found in s 164 of the Companies Act). 
The rights and competencies that are “bundled” as securities have economic or monetary value. 
This is why securities are considered a specific type of financial asset.33 In strict legal terms, to state 
that something is an asset is to state that it has patrimonial value.34 Real, immaterial property and 
personal rights all have economic or monetary value, and as such constitute patrimony.35  
However, personal rights are unique, as the legal object of the right – i.e. performance – only 
materialises after the right arises or is created. It is undoubtedly correct that “performance which is 
the object of a personal right, in fact, only comes into being once the debtor actually performs…[and] 
because the performance-as-legal-object only becomes a reality once the debtor performs, a 
personal right…is in fact a “claim against a specific debtor to perform”.36 It would appear to follow 
that personal rights are present claims to future performance, it being theoretically irrelevant whether 
the life-span of the claim (extinguished by performance itself)37 lasts nanoseconds or years, or 
envisages once-off or repeated performance. Thus, crucially, the patrimony of a personal right is the 
value of the claim against the performance-debtor, not the value of the performance itself. 
Naturally the value of a personal right will be determined primarily with reference to the true economic 
value of the performance which the claim envisages, but these two values are not necessarily the 
same. This can be illustrated by examining certain factors arising between the creation of the claim 
and the realisation of performance (but ignoring factors arising during and after the realisation of 
performance, circumstances which are well illustrated by the function of the exceptio non adimpleti 
contractus). Examples include the likelihood of performance materialising, or the uncertain quality of 
the performance until it occurs. The effect of these factors on the value of the claim is typically a 
 
 
33   J Benjamin Interests in Securities: A Proprietary Law Analysis of the International Securities Markets (2000) 4 (§ 
1.02) containing also an excellent overview of the etymology of the term securities.  
34   See J Neethling, JM Potgieter & PJ Visser Law of Delict 4 ed (2002) 219-220; M Loubser & R Midgley (eds) The 
Law of Delict in South Africa (2010) 47; Union Governement (Minister of Railways and Harbours) v Warneke 1911 
AD 657 665; or, for a comparative perspective, GL Gretton “Ownership and its objects” (2007) 71 Rabels Zeitschrift 
für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht Bd. 802 832. 
35   Du Plessis Introduction (1999) 145. 
36   Du Plessis Introduction (1999) 144. 
37  On the nature of which it is crucial to take note of the observations on the extinguishing of obligations found in JE 




function of the performance-debtor. In other words, the characteristics (or the state) of the 
performance-debtor primarily determines the present patrimonial value of the claim (i.e. the right), 
functioning as a key predictive factor of the value of the performance to be tendered. 
This facilitates certain observations regarding the rights inherent in securities.38 Securities should be 
characterised as a bundle of claims and other competencies operative against the issuer, who (it is 
implied) is always one person. That person appears also always to be an artificial legal person, 
whether a juristic person such as a company, or a sovereign entity such as a state or municipality. 
Moreover, securities may contain a single right or multiple rights. Corresponding performances are 
similarly variable. Some instances of performance may be once-off, such as acceptance of a 
predetermined offer in a future securities subscription,39 or payment of a monetary equivalent of a 
proportional share in the residual assets of a company.40 It can also be recurring and ascertained 
(such as the fixed income coupon payments found in debt securities) or recurring and ascertainable 
(such as the dividend income of ordinary shares). However, despite this variability, it is common to 
all securities that the objects of their rights are predominantly realised on a future date or series of 
dates, so that the end economic benefits of performance are mainly realised during or at the end of 
the securities’ operative lifetime, or a combination of both.  
It follows from the above that over the lifetime of a security, its patrimonial value rests primarily on 
the value of the claim to any performances not yet realised. The point is that this, in turn, rests as 
much on the true economic value of the performance envisaged as it does on the characteristics or 
state of the performance-debtor. This is why it can be definitively stated that the present value of a 
security (i.e. the value of surviving claim or claims to performance together with, perhaps, a premium 
for its other competencies) is determined not only with regard to the stated value of the promised 
performance, but also as a function of the state of the issuer. For example, the state of a company-
issuer will typically be determined by estimating its discounted future cash flow (or earnings before 
interest, depreciation, tax and amortisation), whilst the state of a sovereign issuer will typically be 
determined by its credit-rating in conjunction with certain forecasted macro-economic variables. 
These are, in fact, among the currently predominant metrics used to evaluate the worth of such 
bundles of claims, speaking to the likelihood and quality of future performances. For this reason it 
should follow, for example, that the credit rating given to a country’s sovereign debt or a bank by a 
rating agency influences the present market value of the debt securities of that state or bank. 
 
 
38   See also Chapter 6, § 6 3 3. 
39   As correlative performance to the right found in an option to subscribe to a future securities issue. There is some 
uncertainty whether an option to take up securities can be a registered security in the true sense. Here it is assumed 
that the answer is in the affirmative, but this issue requires further exploration.  




With this in mind, what is meant by “ownership” and “moveable property” in relation to securities? 
The courts have made it clear that:41 
“'ownership' may, juristically, not be accurate in relation to the rights of the person in whom...shares vest.” 
Further, it has been noted that:42 
“[i]n some instances, however, the registered shareholder may hold the shares as the nominee, i.e. agent, 
of another, generally described as the ‘owner’ or ‘beneficial owner’ of the shares…The term ‘beneficial 
owner’ is, juristically speaking, not wholly accurate, but it is a convenient and well-used label to denote the 
person in whom, as between himself and the registered shareholder, the benefit of the bundle of rights 
constituting the share vests…Although the rights conferred by a debenture on a debenture-holder differ in 
content from those enjoyed by a shareholder, similar considerations apply to the registration of debenture-
holders, the issue of debenture certificates and the holding of a debenture by a nominee.” 
There is also a long-standing and extensive comparative law debate, in Civilian and mixed-heritage 
systems, regarding the precise meaning of ownership more generally.43 Moreover, the ostensible 
proprietary legal consequences (including the problem of ownership) of intangibles as things has its 
own history of contention.44 These issues, originating primarily from logical inconsistencies in the 
Gaian arrangement of things inherited by the Civilian system, are outside the scope of this work. But 
it is also largely unnecessary to deal with them directly, and the final section of this chapter will do 
so only in so far as is necessary. 
With regard to securities specifically, already nearly three and a half decades ago it was noted that:45 
“[t]he reason for this lack of suitable terminology and for the uncertainties encountered in transactions in 
intangibles is simple. The law proceeds from the tangible as the unit of wealth and object of legal 
transactions. This approach, rooted in history and tradition, is no longer valid and leads to uncertainty where 
the highest degree of certainty is required.” 
Ownership in the present context can only mean ownership of rights, rather than ownership as rights. 
Thus the term “ownership” must be treated as an analogy, originating from ordinary speech, because 
 
 
41   Oakland Nominees (Pty) Ltd v Gelria Mining & Investment Co (Pty) Ltd 1976 (1) SA 441 (A) 447H - 453A. 
42   Standard Bank of SA Ltd v Ocean Commodities Inc 1983 (1) SA 276 (A) 289. 
43  See both AM Honoré “Ownership” in AG Guest (ed) Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence (1961) 107 and Gretton (2007) 
RabelZ Bd. 802 for invaluable discussions of these issues, covering a multitude of legal systems and a number of 
leading contentions.  
44  See for instance D Kleyn “Dogmatiese problem rakende die rol van onstoflike sake in die sakereg” (1993) 26(1) De 
Jure 1; AJ Van der Walt “Die mandament van spolie en quasi-besit: Bon Quelle (Edms) Bpk v Munisipaliteit van 
Otavi 1989 (1) SA 508 (A)” (1989) 52 Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 444; Van der Walt & 
Sutherland (2003) SA Merc LJ 95.   




“[i]n ordinary speech we say that we own physical objects, such as cars or buildings, and also that 
we own immaterial things, such as company shares or patents.”46 
Although it has been criticised,47 it is in all likelihood more appropriate to use the term “holdership” 
when dealing with these relationships. GL Gretton, in particular, argues that:48 
“we do not ordinarily say that we ‘own’ a contract or a claim in delict. Even within the field of property law, 
we would not ordinarily say that we ‘own’ a lease or a security over land. For such rights verbs like ‘have’ 
or ‘hold’ seem more natural than ‘own’…It seems to me that ‘have’ is a fundamental legal concept, meaning 
the relation of a person to a right…[although this] in some cases does violence to ordinary speech, which, 
as already mentioned, allows us in at least some types of case to speak of the ‘ownership’ of things which 
are rights rather than physical objects, such as company shares and patents.” 
Thus it is more useful, and more accurate, to speak of beneficial interest holders, as well as the 
rights-, security-, instrument- and asset-holders, and attempt to do away with the term ownership 
altogether.49 This is further expanded upon below in § 4 3 2 below. 
Consider the following comments by the authors in Commentary on the Companies Act of 2008 
(hereafter “Commentary 2008”):50 
“(d) Variable interpretation and use of ‘holder’ 
While ordinarily a ‘shareholder’ and ‘holder’ is a person whose name is entered on the company’s securities 
register with such person having registered title to the relevant securities, sometimes these terms are used 
or interpreted more loosely depending on the context. These terms may be used to refer to, or include, a 
person who is absolutely entitled, as against the company, to be registered in the securities register, or the 
‘holder’ of a beneficial interest (including ‘beneficial owner’) of the relevant securities. For example, the term 
‘holder’ was used in the repealed Securities Regulation Code on Take-overs and Mergers applicable under 
the 1973 Act, and in this context it was defined as meaning ‘the direct or indirect holder of securities’, and 
 
 
46  GL Gretton “Owning rights and things” (1997) 8 Stellenbosch Law Review 176 176. See also LCB Gower, JB 
Cronin, AJ Easson & B Wedderburn Gower's Principles of Modern Company Law 4 ed (1979) 400, as quoted below 
in § 4 3 2. 
47  See for instance P Birks "The Roman concept of dominium and the idea of absolute ownership" (1985) Acta Juridica 
1 26. 
48  Gretton (1997) Stell LR 177. 
49   As is done, for example, in the Companies Act when referring to a beneficial interest holder, or the holder of a share 
(see s 1 “shareholder” and “held” and “holder” in s 56). Unfortunately, to the contrary, the Rules of STRATE Ltd 
seem to use the term “legal owner” to refer to end-holder of the rights (Reg. no 1998/022242/06, last updated as 
per Government Gazette 40188 of 05-08-2016). The same problem is found in the Financial Markets Act 19 of 
2012. 
 See also, for an alternative view, R Rachlitz “Disclosure of ownership in South African company law” (2013) 3 
Stellenbosch Law Review 406. 
50   Yeats et al Commentary 2008 2-586 – 2-587 & 2-588. See also a similar discussion of the meaning of “holder” in 




‘holding’ was regarded as having a corresponding meaning. Based on this definition, and its use in relation 
to a change in control, it was interpreted by the Securities Regulation Panel (the predecessor to the 
Takeover Regulation Panel) as excluding the registered nominee shareholder and including only the 
‘controlling’ holder. Nevertheless, in most instances the term ‘holder’ is interpreted restrictively as a 
reference to the registered holder only, which accords with the general definition of a ‘shareholder’ in s 1. 
… 
The preferred view is that the reference to the ‘registered owner of the shares’ should be read as simply 
the registered holder (i.e. the person with registered title), as registration is not synonymous with ownership 
and our courts have not expressly imported the English ‘dual ownership’ construct.”   
This also serves as another example of the less than adequate state of terminology in the field of 
securities law and the consequent confusion it gives rise to. It is respectfully submitted that, seen 
holistically, the benefits of the terminological framework proposed here outweigh the merits of the 
first position taken above, and so “holder” cannot – without the appropriate qualifier – be read 
narrowly. However, the clarification made in the final paragraph is eminently useful and supports the 
framework of usage outlined here, and it should be expanded also to prefer “beneficial interest 
holders” rather than “beneficial owners”.  
Regardless of terminological preference or accuracy, holdership of securities appears to bestow 
“moveable [incorporeal] property”, which must be given a more precise meaning. 
The law of things as a subdivision of private law51 must be distinguished from property law. Property 
law extends beyond the law of things, and the term property itself accordingly goes further than 
things. It encompasses all forms of patrimony, irrespective of whether it is interpreted as the right to 
a legal object with economic or monetary value (in this case performance), the legal object itself, or 
even as the right as object of another right (such as when securities are pledged). It also extends 
beyond the boundaries of private law itself, having its own distinct public law and immaterial property 
law dimensions as well.52 
Use of the term property in the context of securities is best understood with knowledge of its historical 
context. In Chapter 3, it was stated that the original determination in s 22(1) of the Companies Act 
 
 
51   These subdivisions of the positive law are often over-emphasised, but are more didactic constructs than problem-
solving ones. That having been said, the distinctions themselves are not devoid of legal consequences. For 
example, public law human rights are, generally, not directly actionable in delict (see Loubser & Midgley Delict (31-
34) as they are not capable of direct recognition within the underlying structure of the private law system. They are, 
instead, imported through pre-existing open-ended concepts that already exist within the latter system, the best 
example being their informing the delictual element of wrongfulness.  
52   See PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar, H Mostert & M Van Rooyen Silberberg & Schoeman’s The Law of Property 4 ed 





of 1926, as followed by all subsequent Companies Acts,53 that shares are “moveable property” was 
a mere confirmation of the common law. It primarily ensured that shares, as interests in an 
association that holds immovable property, would not be classified themselves as immovables.54  
However, the concept is slightly more useful than that. In light of all of the above, the “property” in 
question is clearly the patrimony inherent in the rights – i.e. the present (patrimonial) value of the 
claim to the economic end-benefits of outstanding performance. One cannot own this in the strictest 
sense, but the present value of the holder’s claim certainly vests in the estate (or, in the case of a 
juristic person, among the assets) of the securities-holder, and in this way can, and should, be called 
property. 
As will become clear, from this point forward, it will no longer be appropriate to use the term rights-
holder. Instead, reference will be made to “asset-holder” and “instrument-holder” (of the two legal 
objects it is argued securities are comprised of), and if the term “security-holder” is used, it will denote 
a person who is both the asset- and instrument-holder of a particular security.  
To understand the conception of a security as dichotomous, one must look deeper into the nature of 
personal rights. In the English law context of ownership of corporeal things, AM Honoré proposes 
an “account of the standard incidents of ownership, i.e. those legal rights, duties and other incidents 
which apply, in the ordinary case, to a person who has the greatest interest in a thing admitted by a 
mature legal system.”55 Terminologically, “incidents” appears to be a very useful word to describe 
various legal relationships that may arise between legal subjects and objects, and subjects and other 
subjects vis-à-vis an object, by virtue of ownership of a thing. Some of these “standard incidents” 
include: the right to possess, to use, to manage, the right to income and capital, to security, and also 
the incident of “residuarity”. They are styled as the components, or content, of the legal construct of 
ownership, though they need not all simultaneously accrue to the person designated as owner by 
virtue of their existence.56 
South Africa’s view of ownership is more abstract due to its Civilian heritage. It recognises the 
various incidents that flow from ownership, but does not use these incidents to circumscribe 
ownership – rather it posits that ownership’s full content is indeterminate and abstract. 57  Its 
subjective rights dimension has been said to comprise simply of the entitlements of determination 
 
 
53   See s 91 of Act 61 of 1973 and s 35(1) of the Act of 2008. 
54   See MS Blackman, RD Jooste, GK Everingham, JL Yeats, FHI Cassim & R de la Harpe Commentary on the 
Companies Act: Volume 1 (RD 8 2011) 5-168, and Yeats et al Commentary 2008 2-276 & n 10. 
55   Honoré “Ownership” in Oxford Essays 107. 
56   Honoré “Ownership” in Oxford Essays 112-113. 
57  See Chetty v Naidoo 1974 (3) SA 13 (A), Van der Merwe Sakereg 111-112, and AJ van der Walt & GJ Pienaar 




(beskikking) and enjoyment (genot). Nonetheless, that these incidents exist is recognised, including 
that they may manifest in other (limited) real rights and bestowed upon legal subjects who are not 
the owners. 
The question then becomes whether a similar view can be taken of personal rights – i.e. whether 
there are severable incidents of holdership of personal rights. One need look no further than the 
pledge construction of the cession in securitatem debiti to find an affirmative answer. Most South 
African authors agree, after initial criticism,58 that the affirmation of National Bank of South Africa Ltd 
v Cohen’s Trustee 59  in Leyds v Noord-Westelike Koöperatiewe Landboumaatskappy Bpk 60 
entrenched the legitimacy of the pledge construction of a security cession. However, the theoretical 
nature of this pledge remains highly complex and still somewhat contentious. 
Nonetheless this work boths supports and will for its purposes accept that the pledge-style security 
cession is:61 
“based on the idea of a limited cession to the cessionary of a particular component of the cedent’s interest 
in the performance due from the debtor, namely ‘the right to claim and receive…the amounts owing.’” 
This is, of course, implicitly premised on recognition of the so-called components of the creditor’s 
interest (komponente van die skuldeisersbelang) by the positive law.62 Almost three decades ago 
Gerhard Lubbe remarked:63 
“[d]aar is aanduidinge van 'n besef dat die siening van die vorderingsreg as bloot 'n invorderingsreg te eng 
is, en dat herbesinning oor die inhoud van hierdie wesenlike begrip van die privaatreg 'n uitweg uit die 
gewaande dogmatiese impasse rondom hierdie regsfiguur kan bied. Verskeie skrywers is van mening dat 
'n vorderingsverpanding teoreties verklaar kan word deur 'n konstruksie wat verskillende aspekte of 
komponente van die skuldeisersbelang identifiseer en erken dat hulle regtens van mekaar afgeskei kan 
word.” 
Viewing these indications with approval, Lubbe takes the position that a personal right is a composite 
construct. The components of this creditor’s interest appear to be two-fold: (1) the entitlement of 
enjoyment as substantive interest – i.e. the patrimonial value of a claim to reap the economic end-
 
 
58   S Scott The Law of Cession 1980 141 n 18, SWJ Van der Merwe, LF Van Huyssteen, MFB Reinecke & GF Lubbe 
Contract: General Principles 4 ed (2012)1 425-426, Lubbe “Cession” in LAWSA, § 180 & n 1.  
59   1911 AD 235. 
60  1985 (2) SA 769 (A). 
61   Van der Merwe et al Contract 432 & n 379.  
62   Lubbe (1989) THRHR 485.  
63   GF Lubbe “Die verpanding van vorderingsregte en die regsdogmatiek – quo vadis?” (1991) 2 Stellenbosch Law 




benefits of future performance in the interest-holder’s estate, and (2) the entitlement of determination 
as the legal capacity, or power, to realise and enforce the claim to performance through action that 
enables the governing of the patrimonial interest. 64  However, attaching to, or perhaps more 
accurately flowing from, these two components of a personal right as claim are a multitude of 
incidents of holdership of a personal right, so that it:65 
“confers on the holder of the right not only the capacity and hence the locus standi to exact performance 
(to collect interest, in the case of a money debt, and capital once the claim has matured) but also a variety 
of other functions, such as the capacity to alienate, waive, novate or renew it, to cancel the transaction 
giving rise to it, to vote or claim a preference where the right carries such a privilege, to apply for the debtor’s 
sequestration, to take advantage of a lien or suretyship, and so forth.” 
Much like ownership of things, the content of holdership of personal rights is not circumscribed by 
these incidents in South African law, but such incidents are indeed recognised. Understanding more 
precisely how they are recognised requires further refinement of the precise meaning of “incidents”. 
As far as circumscription is concerned, all subjective rights appear to be circumscribed by the 
entitlements of determination and enjoyment. However, it is clear that there are various incidents to 
which these two core entitlements give rise. From the preceding analysis, incidents are more 
accurately defined as functionalities which arise, or flow from, the interaction between: (1) holdership 
of entitlements, operating on the level of private law rights and relationships as between legal 
subjects, and (2) the systemic legal norms and rules on the level of the positive law to which they 
are subjected in legal interaction or interchange (regsverkeer).66 Simply: holdership of these (two) 
entitlements bestows on the holder (many) functionalities, due to what the objective law allows the 
right-holder to do by virtue of her entitlements. These functionalities are the incidents of holdership, 
as they no doubt also are of corporeal ownership. 
Whilst German law tends to view (with some academic dissent) a personal right as the sum of this 
bundle of incidents, this view is not preferred from a South African perspective.67 First, it does 
unnecessary violence to one of the fundamental tenets of the doctrine of subjective rights, namely 
subjective rights as consisting of two core entitlements: determination and enjoyment. Second, the 
 
 
64  Lubbe (1991) Stell LR 144 n 85 – “Myns insiens behels die skuldeisersbelang in 'n vorderingsreg twee afsonderlike 
komponente. Afgesien van die skuldeiser se substantiewe genotsbelang, dws sy belang in die verkryging van die 
skuldenaar se prestasie en die genot daarvan, geniet hy, in elk geval waar sprake is van 'n siviele verbintenis, ook 
die juridiese bevoegdheid om daardie belang deur middel van aksie te realiseer en andersins oor sy genotsbelang 
te beskik.” [own emphasis]. 
65  Lubbe “Cession” in LAWSA § 180 n 19 [own emphasis]. See also S Scott The Law of Cession 2 ed (1991) 240-
242; Malan Collective Securities Depositories 210; NL Joubert Die Regsbetrekkinge by Kredietfaktorering (1986) 
483-484; this also alluded to by Joubert (1958) THRHR 114-115. 
66  See § 4 1 above. 
67  See § 4 1 and with specific reference to Pahl Die aanwending van vorderingsregte 164-166 & 176; Lubbe (1989) 




multitude of juristic acts which a legal subject may perform, and the legal consequences this brings 
about, due to mastery over a personal right, are not an indication of a multitude of different 
entitlements making up a personal right. Instead these are “mezzanine” manifestations of the 
dynamic interaction between private law rights and relationships, and the supra-operative objective 
law. 
The legal dynamics of the pledge construction thus serve to confirm this view, doing so by doctrinal 
necessity. In order to achieve the policy-outcomes desired by a pledge of incorporeal moveable 
property, there is one core requirement. This is the handing over of effective control (“heerskappy”) 
of the pledge object to the pledgee (the method of which varies depending on the nature of the 
pledge object). This is essential to the real agreement as foundation for a real right of pledge.68 
Thus, the most compelling (and it is submitted most authoritative) view of how this is brought about 
is as follows. It first accepts that personal rights consist of two components: the entitlements of 
determination and enjoyment.69 On this basis it posits that through taking a limited cession of the 
latter, the pledgee becomes the only person who can enforce and otherwise realise performance, 
gaining effective juridical control over the claim to the exclusion of the pledgor, whilst the “substantive 
right [i.e. genotsbelang] remains an asset in the estate of the cedent.”70 Why? The entitlement of 
determination confers on its holder the functionalities – i.e. incidents – associated with the execution 
of the claim to performance and its fruits. Thus the determination component of the right serves as 
the legal object of the limited real right that pledge bestows.  
The entitlement of determination over the claim is handed over, because it confers effective factual 
control over its resultant incidents. Handing over control is the core requirement of the real 
agreement. In the absence of a possessory construct for personal rights, what is actually handed 
over to confer the necessary control is the ability to execute the right to the exclusion of others. That 
is the function of ceding the entitlement of determination. The importance of this cannot be 
overstated for what follows. While this doctrinal description is not without controversy, it would be 
difficult to conceive this type of security cession without it, and it is accepted here as correct. 
Crucially, Lubbe also posits that the legitimacy of this view of the nature of personal rights is further 
supported by the structure of shares in company law. He argues that an explanation of the difference 
 
 
68  Lubbe (1989) THRHR 490-492, specifically establishing that this requirement of pledge in the general sense is not 
the handing over of possession, but rather establishing the pledgee’s effective control of the pledge object. It is also 
convincingly argued that, in contrast to corporeal moveables, a second core requirement of publicity is not to be 
overly emphasised. 
69   Lubbe (1989) THRHR 497. Usage in text is: beskikkingsbevoegdheid or opvorderingsbevoegdheid and 
genotsbelang or genotsbevoegdheid, respectively. 
70   Van der Merwe et al Contract (2012) 432 & authorities cited in 382-383. See further Lubbe (1989) THRHR 490-




between registered shareholdership and beneficial interest holdership as a splitting of the 
entitlements of determination and enjoyment (caused by the effect of the share register on the 
issuer’s obligations) presents the most rational and doctrinally sound view of this aspect of shares.71 
This is undoubtedly very close to correct. With certain refinements, and applied to all securities 
equally, this idea forms the foundation of the security asset and instrument dichotomy posited here. 
With this as the basis on which the asset-instrument dichotomy will be drawn, a further issue is 
whether such structural modifications to the totality of the underlying interest (as rights and 
competencies) can be irreversibly effected and made an inherent quality of that security. 
In Smuts v Booyens; Markplaas (Edms) Bpk v Booyens,72 Cameron JA confirmed that a company’s 
memorandum, as a binding covenant between shareholders inter se,73 should be viewed as an 
intrinsic property of the share itself.74 On this basis the court was able to hold that a restriction on 
the right to transfer shares75 is, where it is an aspect of that memorandum, therefore also part of the 
innate characteristics of the share.76 Thus, in casu the applicable right of pre-emption, as a structural 
feature of the share, meant that an inherent quality of the share in question was such that it could 
not be transferred unless there was compliance with relevant provisions in the memorandum.77 The 
use of the term “securities” in s 8(2)(b)(ii)(aa) of the Act of 2008 appears to have extended this 
structural feature to any security issued by a private company. The extent and application of this 
concept of intrinsic restriction, in contrast with an extrinsic contractual one, has also been expressed 
usefully as follows:78 
“[t]he courts refer to the latter intrinsic restrictions as being rights created non-transferable ab initio as an 
‘original incident’ of the rights themselves. However, it is submitted that these need not literally be ‘original’ 
because the restraints can be agreed to by way of an amendment of the rights subsequent to their initial 
‘creation’ and therefore in these notes they are simply referred to as ‘intrinsic restrictions’ (i.e. arising from 
the agreement circumscribing the right, as opposed to a superimposed restriction). It is submitted that, 
 
 
71  Lubbe (1989) THRHR 497-498. See also § 4 3 2 1 below. 
72  2001 (4) SA 15 (A). 
73  See also s 15(6) of the Companies Act of 2008 (enacted after the case was decided).  
74   Smuts v Booyens; Markplaas (Edms) Bpk v Booyens 2001 (4) SA 15 (A) para [14], citing Borland's Trustee v Steel 
Brothers & Co Ltd [1901] Ch 279 288. 
75  Compare this formulation to the 2008 Companies Act, which – in terms of s 8(2)(b)(ii)(aa) – requires that a 
memorandum of a private company “restricts the transferability of its securities” [own emphasis]. Of course, this 
seems not to alter the legal position in a material way, especially as the court interpreted the 1973 Act’s provisions 
to mean that transfer in the global sense (causa, cession, and registered transfer) must be restricted – see Smuts 
paras [8]-[12]. 
76  Para  [17]. 
77  Para [17] – “the right, from its inception, lacks the attribute of transmissibility”, as quoted from LAWSA’s volume on 
cession referenced throughout this section. 




generally, a restriction will be regarded as intrinsic to a right if it is created in the contract that gives rise to 
the right itself, for example, a prohibition against the cession of the rights of a party under an agreement 
which is included in the agreement itself with the purpose of limiting the right. In contrast, generally a 
restriction agreed to between a person holding the right and a third party cannot be regarded as intrinsic to 
the right because the right itself is not affected by such an agreement, which usually amounts to a separate 
contractual undertaking. The latter contractual restriction of a pre-existing right that does not affect the right 
itself is referred to as an ‘extrinsic restriction’ to distinguish it from an ‘intrinsic restriction’.” 
The broader point, however, is that the concept appears to illustrate that structural restrictions may 
be built into the totality of a security’s underlying interest - i.e. restrictions that serve to alter the 
structure of the underlying interest. The judgment seems further to imply that any party into whose 
hands an interest in such a security falls – i.e. the primary market acquirer and any successors – is 
automatically beholden to these structural features. 
How? It is uncontentious to assert that a company’s memorandum forms an inexorable part of the 
overall constitutive arrangement that gives rise to a share. This is further underscored in Cooper 
Boyes NO,79 in citing with approval the seminal English dictum of Borland's Trustee v Steel Brothers 
& Co Ltd:80 
“A share is the interest of a shareholder in the company measured by a sum of money, for the purpose of 
liability in the first place, and of interest in the second, but also consisting of a series of mutual covenants 
entered into by all the shareholders inter se…” 
The core of the ratio in Smuts, also illustrated above, is that aspects of the relationship between 
shareholders inter se, as well as between shareholders and the company, can be made intrinsic to 
the share itself. Another area where this principle is evident is the treatment of “convertible securities” 
in terms of the Companies Act, where:81 
“because the definition of ‘convertible’ only applies to the terms of a security, the option must be part of the 
security (not just an ordinary option) to qualify…Therefore one has to determine whether the security in 
question has the requisite voting rights or contains an option to acquire, or a right of conversion into, 
securities having the requisite voting rights in relation to the particular matter at the particular time. The 
starting point of such an enquiry would clearly be a company’s memorandum of incorporation.” 
In the context of contractual securities (of companies or otherwise), the exact same reasoning 
applies, albeit for different reasons. Here a contractual constitutive arrangement creates the 
underlying interest, similarly to the manner in which a memorandum of incorporation, in conjunction 
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with the act of issue of shares by the directors, creates the underlying interest of a share. The terms 
and conditions of such a contract are incorporated, by reference, into the underlying interest of the 
security itself.82 Thus, by an extension of the reasoning in Smuts, the structural features imposed by 
the acquiring contract are embedded into the security itself. This is also confirmed in common law 
when a pactum de non cedendo is construed as imposing an intrinsic restriction rather than one 
separate from the original source of the obligation,83 as well as in analysing whether options are 
intrinsic or extrinsic to debt securities whose constitutive arrangement does not include the company 
memorandum.84 In sum, whether by means of a memorandum, an acquiring contract, or some 
combination thereof, the totality of the constitutive arrangement giving rise to a security may clearly, 
as per Smuts, “build in” certain restrictions and, crucially, other potential modifications to the 
underlying structure of the rights themselves. 
It must further be asked why this dichotomous construction of securities is necessary in the first 
place. South African company law is largely based on English law, and it appears to have been the 
principal source of best practice in many matters of law relating to securities at large.85 This is 
illustrated by the fact that debt securities emulate, contractually, the arrangements regarding 
exclusive performance towards the registered holder (which originated in company law regarding 
shares).86  However, any reception of English law principles must reckon with the mixed legal 
heritage of the domestic dispensation, none more so than those elements of private law that reflect 
its Civilian lineage. 
English law allows a distinction between beneficial (or equitable) ownership and legal ownership, 
and correspondingly reads a constructive trust into the relationship between registered holder and 
beneficial owner. Neither dual forms of ownership nor a constructive trust is recognised in South 
African law.87 Nonetheless the distinction between registered title and ownership of, at least, shares 
 
 
82  See § 4 2 below. 
83  Yeats et al Commentary 2008 2-874 – 2-875 & numerous authorities in n 489 therein. 
84  Again, regarding the definition of “convertible” in the Companies Act, see Yeats et al Commentary 2008 Int-122 – 
Int-123: 
 “traditionally the terms of a debenture are sometimes set out in the debenture certificate or debenture trust deed and the terms 
of an option constituting a non-share security could be recorded in a written agreement. While there would ordinarily be an 
argument that one is restricted to the intrinsic rights reflected in the memorandum of incorporation, the definition of ‘convertible’ 
makes it clear that options to acquire securities are to be taken into consideration. Where the option is part of the terms of a 
debt instrument, it is often not recorded in the memorandum of incorporation. As stated above, there is a possible argument 
that the introduction to the definition of ‘convertible’ should be interpreted as confining the enquiry to only those options 
provided for in the terms of the relevant security, which would exclude a separate, self-standing option agreement that is not 
itself a security and does not form part of the terms of any security.” 
85   See Chapter 3, § 3 1.  
86   See § 4 2 below. 
87   Lucas' Trustee v Ismail and Amod 1905 TS 239 247-248; Princess Estate and Gold Mining Co Ltd v Registrar of 




has long been recognised.88 The rights underlying securities are traditionally viewed as vesting only 
in the person who holds the so-called beneficial interest.89 In this way:90  
“[b]y approximating registered title and ownership to legal and equitable title respectively, the concept of 
the share as found in English law is at least superficially integrated into the South African legal fabric.” 
The doctrinal incongruity of this “superficial” reception has caused a number of persistent problems. 
The first is the nature of the relationship between registered and beneficial holders. As a point of 
departure, the nominee-beneficial owner relationship has at least been confirmed as one of 
representative agency and not trust (even in term of the less strict or formal domestic meaning as a 
mere fiduciary relationship).91 
However, theoretical problems persist. For instance, this does not clarify issues such as whether in 
terms of a forml, or true, trust the trustee or beneficiary of a trust is beneficial owner of the shares, 
or on what basis the ostensible owner of a share can vindicate her proprietary interest.92 The current 
Companies Act further exacerbates these problems through its own problematic treatment of the 
beneficial interest. More pervasively, it causes the law to ascribe two different legal positions to legal 
problems regarding securities and the use of a nominee – the position in terms of internal relations 
between holders and issuer, and that of external relations (i.e. of third parties).93 
 
 
88   See for instance Farrar's Estate v CIR 1926 TPD 501; Jeffery v Pollak and Freemantle 1938 AD 1 18; West v De 
Villiers 1938 CPD 96 102; Moosa v Lalloo 1956 (2) SA 237 (D); Verrin Trust and Finance Corp (Pty) Ltd v Zeeland 
House (Pty) Ltd 1973 (4) SA 1 (C); Oakland Nominees (Pty) Ltd v Gelria Mining & Investment Co (Pty) Ltd 1976 (1) 
SA 441 (A); Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Ocean Commodities Inc 1983 (1) SA 276 (A). 
89   Blackman et al Commentary 5-169 n 3, 5-170 & 5-172, and A Borrowdale “The transfer of proprietary rights in 
shares: a South African distillation out of English roots” (1985) 18(1) Comparative and International Law Journal of 
Southern Africa 36. This is discussed in the context of shares, but there is no reason why is cannot apply equally 
to contractual securities where the issuer is also bound only to perform to towards the registered holder.   
90   Borrowdale (1985) CILSA 40. See also Yeats et al Commentary 2008 2-802 – 2-803 (together with a number of 
useful examples at 2-809 – 2-810): 
 “It is much harder to explain under South African law how the ownership of the rights (which can be vested in a beneficial 
owner without registered title) can be separated from the corresponding obligations. A full theoretical engagement with this 
issue is beyond the scope of these notes, save to say that, influenced by the English law, our courts appear to have to at 
times reached functionally comparable conclusions…” 
91  See also Chapter 3, with additional analysis in § 4 3 1 below.  
92   See Borrowdale (1985) CILSA 41-43 (discussing specifically Randfontein Estates Ltd v The Master 1909 TS 987) 
and 43-46 (discussing Verrin Trust and Finance Corp (Pty) Ltd v Zeeland House (Pty) Ltd 1973 (4) SA 1 (C) and 
Oakland Nominees (Pty) Ltd v Gelria Mining & Investment Co (Pty) Ltd 1976 (1) SA 441 (A) in relation to one 
another), respectively.  
93   This notion is further elaborated upon below, in § 4 1 3 as well as in § 4 2.  
 See also Verrin Trust and Finance Corp (Pty) Ltd v Zeeland House (Pty) Ltd 1973 (4) SA 1 (C) at 13D-E: 
 “title to be on the register and title to the disputed shares are distinct issues and a Court confronted with an application [for 
rectification] is entitled to confine itself to the former issue and leave the latter, and other related issues, to be debated in a 
separate trial action.” 
Further, see Jeffery v Pollack and Freemantle 1938 AD 1 18-19; Davis v Buffelsfontein Gold Mining Co 1967 (4) 




Thus an understanding of the difference between registered holdership and beneficial interest 
holdership in respect of securities that resolves this legal friction is necessary. Most importantly it 
must accord with the typically Civilian manner in which South African law views property and 
obligations, but which also gives consistent and robust effect to the legislative matrix operative in 
this area of the law, which is strongly influenced by, if not outrightly derivative of, Anglo-American 
law.  
 
4 1 2  Patrimony of securities: the security asset 
From this point forward, the analysis will begin to focus specifically on securities as the result of 
structural features evident in the positive law. In so doing, there will be less emphasis on the 
subjective rights-dimension found within securities (as this paradigm in any event begins to lose its 
explanatory and problem-solving value), in favour of the underlying structure of securities, focusing 
on securities’ incidents. 
It is clear from the above that the law countenances characterising personal rights (and by analogy 
other competencies) as comprised of two foundational (and severable) entitlements. Their 
interaction with the objective law, driven by the exercise of legal subjectivity, allows one further to 
ascribe various legal incidents to these claims. Further, it shows that there is a precedent for 
detachment of the incidents of execution from the other incidents of a claim to performance in the 
pledge in securitatem debiti.  
The notion of the security asset and the security instrument is a further development of this concept. 
The latter is an “instrument” to which accrues all incidents of execution, and what is left of the 
securities’ underlying interest is the security asset, bestowing the remaining incidents which 
correspond to the patrimony inherent to those rights. This section and the next serve to more 
precisely describe the security asset and instrument, as well as some of the more technical aspects 
of holdership. 
Upon issue, securities come into existence. Depending on the security this could be the moment 
when all rights and competencies underlying that security come into effect. Alternatively, as will be 
seen in the second section of this chapter, it could be dies venit (or even cedit and venit) for certain 
existing rights and the coming into existence of others together with the competencies associated 
with the particular security.94 
 
 




However, despite their numerous differences, it is submitted that all securities come into being 
allowing for the ability to “execute” the underlying interest to be held by someone other than the 
beneficial holder. Shares do so inherently, by virtue of arrangements made by company law.95 
Contractual securities arrange this state of affairs primarily in their acquiring agreements, either 
alone (sovereign debt securities are a good example, and this principle holds even if the securities 
in question are non-transferable),96 or in conjunction with statute (such as the Companies Act’s 
securities register in the issue of s 43 debt securities). Lastly, interests in a collective investment 
scheme (ICISs) are variable in nature and will typically achieve this in the manner most appropriate 
to the vehicle of the scheme (such as an open-ended investment company, where shares are used). 
It would be difficult (though, as per Chapter 6, not impossible) even to classify a particular legal 
interest as a traditional South African security if it did not arrange that the holder of the entitlement 
of determination (on the one hand) and patrimony (on the other) of that interest could be different 
persons.97 This is one of the definitive characteristic of securities, and is the result of the impact of 
very specific historical-economic developments 98  on the domestic law. 99  The underlying policy 
considerations that shape this state of affairs are also clear: severing registered ownership from 
beneficial ownership is economically efficient. It lowers the transaction costs of holding, trading, 
encumbering, performing in terms of, and even creating securities, and allows intermediary actors 
(such as brokers or underwriters) and platforms (such as exchanges) to intercede on a collective 
scale. 
Therefore, it is submitted that securities come into existence as two interdependent legal constructs. 
The first is the security instrument, which consists of the incidents of execution of the security – the 
result of an ab initio allocation to the instrument of something corresponding to a global entitlement 
of determination (beskikkingsbevoegdheid) over the totality of the underlying rights. Second is the 
security asset, to which is allocated a global entitlement of enjoyment (genotsbevoegdheid), 
consisting of all incidents which remain after the incidents of execution have been shorn from the 
underlying interest. The asset can thus be characterised as patrimony in the estate of the asset-
holder. Of absolute importance is that, as will be elaborated upon in § 4 3 2, these two constructs 
are separate legal objects, subject to different forms of holdership by different persons. However, 
 
 
95  The interpretive problems of the Companies Act, specifically s 56, are dealt with in this work as they arise, but merit 
further, free-standing analysis. 
96  See below at § 4 2. 
97  See Chapter 6, § 6 3.  
  This point is further strengthened by the law’s treatment of money market instruments, which if issued to bearer 
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98  See Chapter 2.  




these two constructs nonetheless flow from the same underlying set of rights and competencies, 
with both containing a component of each security’s subsidiary rights and other competencies, so 
that they cannot be described as fully separate, but rather as separate but interdependent. 
What the previous section did not address is how the proposed incidents-analysis is of application 
to competencies not easily classifiable as rights. These competencies arise ex lege, and typically by 
operation of statute. They are products of the objective law. The previous section, which outlined 
various such incidents, included the so-called right “to vote or claim a preference where the right 
carries such a privilege”.100 This is undoubtedly a reference to shares, and since the passage of the 
Companies Act of 2008 it can now also refer to company debt securities with voting “rights”. Further, 
if debt securities are issued through a trust, these securities could also confer a comparable 
competency to vote at trust beneficiary meetings. 
To describe these and other competencies as incidents of rights, however, is not correct. Instead, it 
must be understood that these competencies accrue to the security as a whole. In Ben-Tovim v Ben-
Tovim the court stated that “the right to vote is attached to the share itself as an incident of property 
which may be exercised by the shareholder in his or her own interest.”101 Whilst the thrust of the 
point is correct, it is perhaps better served using a term other than incident in this context. Voting as 
well as all other competencies do not serve as the incidents of right-holdership, but as incidents of 
security-holdership, forming part of a bundle of rights and other competencies. These competencies 
reside alongside the security’s rights, rather than flowing from them. If the underlying personal rights 
do not or should not have come into existence, the security cannot come into existence, and thus 
neither can the competencies. Yet the opposite is also true – rights and competencies are linked, 
and the fact that both require the coming into existence of the security shows that each accrues 
separately to the security as a whole. 
Ultimately, the precise nature of these competencies need not be exhaustively examined. It is 
sufficient to state that, typically through statute, the objective law simply causes them to come into 
existence upon issue of a security.102  AJ van der Walt posits “subjective relationships” as an 
“expansion” of the doctrine of subjective rights, specifically in order to explain (inter alia) some of the 
possessory problems related to the mandament van spolie.103 Such a view is equally helpful in 
explaining similar law of things related issues surrounding securities. The nature of these 
competencies seems very similar to these subjective relationships, defined as “[the] relationship 
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between one or more legal subjects and one or more legal objects which has legal effects and 
implications”,104 but which are not subjective rights. By virtue of the nature of personal rights, 
security-holdership creates a set of relationships between the holder and the security, and by 
implication the holder and the issuer. The competencies in question exist as part this set of 
relationships. 
The point need not be pursued to precision here, as the following is clear. First, these competencies 
can accurately be described as elements of security-holdership. Second, their underlying structure 
is, by virtue of securities’ obligation-oriented content, very similar to personal rights, but they are not 
rights in that sense. Third, true personal rights and these competencies are analogous in one specific 
and crucial respect. The holdership of each of these competencies, just as with rights, entails a 
component of determination and component of enjoyment, exercisable against the issuer and 
protectable erga omnes. 
The ability to exercise the competency is not the same as the ability to determine how it is to be 
exercised. It is fairly uncontentious, for instance, to state as a point of departure105 that a registered 
shareholder who is not also the beneficial interest holder of a security is the only person who will be 
recognised by the company, with reference to a specific share, as a voter.106 However, that holder 
cannot autonomously exercise a voting right at a shareholders’ meeting without authorisation and 
instruction from the beneficial holder; she must similarly exercise any remedial competencies arising 
from security-holdership against the issuer in accordance with the beneficial holder’s instructions 
and wishes. As a result, the ability to perform the juristic act of exacting compliance from the issuer 
(as counter-party), and the ability to perform the juristic act of deciding how it is to be exercised, are 
separate entitlements flowing from holdership of the competency. Therefore, each will yield different 
functionalities characterisable as separate incidents. 
Thus, despite being creations of the objective law, their nature results in essentially subjective 
relationships (most obviously between issuer and security-holder), and so there must certainly be 
something analogous to entitlements of determination and enjoyment (beskikkings- and 
genotsbevoegdheid) in being the holder of such a competency. This explains why the capacity to 
exercise a competency can be severed, as a separate entitlement of the competency, from the power 
to decide how that competency is exercised. The former is clearly a power of determination over the 
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competency (the ability to demand compliance by the counter-party in its exercise), and the latter a 
power of enjoyment over the manner of its exercise.  
Perhaps more so than any other feature of securities, these competencies as part of the underlying 
interest (and the treatment of that interest as a holistic whole) show that the security must be 
analysed in terms of holdership of its various incident-functionalities.  
In summary, once issued, securities comprise a complex of underlying rights and other 
competencies. Each of these can be further subdivided into its two constituent entitlements from 
which, in conjunction with the positive law, flow various incidents. A security is the totality of incidents 
of all those rights and competencies. In a sense, all incidents of execution of a security represent 
the formal, supporting, or perhaps even in a certain sense “adjectival”,107 dimension of the legal 
relationships created by security-holdership. The remaining incidents of the underlying rights and 
competencies appear to represent the more substantive, patrimonial dimension of these 
relationships. 
The crux of this and the next section is that these qualities present in a specific, determinable 
structure. Without the English common law concepts of legal ownership, equitable ownership and 
constructive trust, South African law must make use of the “bundle” or “complex” construction. In 
fact, the bundle construct serves as the critical midwife between irreconcilable Civilian and English 
common law principles in this area of law. When the rights and other competencies of a security are 
viewed as a bundle (i.e. as a security comprised of all the incidents of its various underlying rights 
and competencies) the law can be applied to its commonalities. Specifically, it is able to effect the 
holistic severance and re-allocation of certain incidents common to each of the subsidiary rights or 
competencies within the bundle, to the asset and instrument respectively. 
This is what allows one to argue that the structure of a security is dichotomous: the collective 
incidents of execution of the content of the bundle accrue to the security instrument, and what 
remains is the security asset. The instrument and the asset can be held by the same person, or by 
different persons (“ownership of shares in South African law is completely distinct from, although 
frequently co-extensive with, the registered title to shares”, and this applies equally to other 
registered securities).108 Yet these two components come into existence as two distinctly separate, 
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yet interdependent,109 elements of security-holdership ab initio. Indeed they must be regarded as 
separate legal objects if they are to fulfil a function of doctrinal harmonisation.  
The instrument will be further discussed in the following section. The nature of the asset must now 
be more fully described. It is clear that the security asset and its holder are a refinement and 
extension of the traditional notion of beneficial ownership and corresponding beneficial owner.110 
The security instrument, in turn, is an extension and conceptual refinement of the notion of registered 
“rights” and the corresponding registered, or legal, “owner”. 
It is critical to clarify that though the asset and instrument are separate legal objects, they remain 
dichotomous parts of one whole – the security. They are not separate and severable proprietary 
interests linked by mere agency, they are different parts of the same proprietary interest (the 
security), which in turn gives rise to that agency due to its particular proprietary structure. So there 
is not fully separate ownership of each object, nor is there dual ownership of one security – it is 
interdependent holdership of the incidents of the two core entitlements of the interests of which the 
security is comprised. 
As the substantive dimension of security-holdership, the security-asset is the component which 
confers patrimony. Severance of the incidents of execution from the underlying interest does not 
diminish the present patrimonial value of the underlying claims to future performance. It simply 
removes proximate access to that value. This is as true for the simpler pledge construction of the 
cession in securitatem debiti as it is for the analogous, but far more complex, security asset-
instrument dichotomy. 
Foundational to the patrimonial dimension of rights is the incident, analogous to Honoré’s residuarity, 
also known as the “reversionary interest”.111 Even Roman (and Roman-Dutch law):112 
“recognised that dominium (‘the ultimate right, that which has no right behind it’) could be reduced to mere 
bare ownership or nuda proprietas, i.e. ‘ownership stripped of its most valuable incidents’. South African 
[company] law has followed these precedents in allowing a severance of ownership and benefit, but this 
has not been to introduce the concepts of legal and equitable title which find no place in South African law.” 
 
 
109   As each contains subsidiary elements of the same underlying rights and competencies, neither can exist without 
the other.  
110  The wider definition of beneficial interest holder posited in contrast to “beneficial ownership” in Rachlitz (2013) Stell 
LR 412 is a response to the specific provisions of “beneficial interest” in s 1 as read with s 56 of the Companies Act 
of 2008, and whilst a fuller critique of the section and its formulation is required, this does not alter the proposed 
point of departure arrived at above regarding the nature of securities .   
111   See § 4 1 1 above.    
112   Borrowdale (1985) CILSA 36, citing therein (n 2 & 3): WW Buckland A Text-Book of Roman Law from Augustus to 




Whilst clearly neither dominium nor ownership are appropriate to personal rights, this is an equally 
accurate description of the core functionality of reversionary interest (or bare beneficial interest) of 
personal rights. This is simply the present value of the content of the claim or claims (to the economic 
end benefits of all unrealised future performances) as patrimony in the estate (or, in the case of 
juristic persons, the totality of assets) of the asset-holder. In other words, it is the bare substantive 
essence of, or ultimate interest in, the future economic benefits of claims against a performance-
debtor. 
However, there are many other incidents which have little to do with execution. Thus, lacking the 
incidents of execution, the remainder must include at least the various incidents of alienation (a 
personal right-based ius disponendi). It also must include the incident of encumbrance, as it is trite 
that a beneficial interest holder is entitled to cede a security in securitatem debiti. Further, it must 
also include incidents such as usus and usufructus – it has been established that security-holders 
may grant usus, or a usufruct or quasi-usufruct over such securities in favour of third parties.113 By 
virtue of Oakland Nominees (Pty) Ltd v Gelria Mining & Investment Co (Pty) Ltd114 a further possible 
incident may be something analogous to the ius vindicandi.115  
Ultimately, this list is not intended as exhaustive, but rather illustrative. These incidents should not 
be seen as finite and determinate, because (as noted in § 4 1 1 above) the exercise of legal 
subjectivity which gives rise to these incidents is itself fundamentally dynamic. Lastly, the security 
asset also contains the power to decide, including to cause, on the exercise of all competencies that 
arise as part of the underlying interest of an issued security. This power, however, is also in principle 
shorn of its proximate capacity to actually exercise the competency, as this accrues to the security 
instrument as part of the incidents of execution. 
Here it becomes important to note that whilst the incidents of execution do imply a measure of direct 
control over a security, it should be clear that control over the elements of patrimony of the security 
 
 
113  See Cooper v Boyes 1994 (4) SA 521 (C).  
 Crucially, if the security is a share or a perpetuity, the usufruct proper would be the correct construction, but if the 
security is a debt security – and thus consumable – the quasi-usufruct would be more appropriate (through which 
ownership is passed to the quasi-usufructary along with an obligation to return upon termination of the usufruct 
something of equivalent value – see also Cooper as well as § 4 3 2 and § 4 3 2 1 below for more on this issue).  
114   1976 (1) SA 441 (A) 447H.  
115   See also Borrowdale (1985) CILSA 43-46, evaluating Oakland as well as Verrin Trust and Finance Corp (Pty) Ltd 
v Zeeland House (Pty) Ltd 1973 (4) SA 1 (C); and Blackman et al Commentary § 5-172-173 in n 8. 
For the possible application of a spoliation order based on quasi-possession see also Tigon Ltd v Bestyet 
Investments (Pty) Ltd 2001 (4) SA 634 (N). The court’s rationale, based on quasi-possesion, has been justifiably 
and soundly criticised in Van der Walt & Sutherland (2003) SA Merc LJ 95, but in these authors own words at 101 
– “the removal of the name of a member from the register of members is analogous to depriving a person of 
possession of a thing”, and whilst the mandament van spolie is in all likelihood not applicable, there is the option of 





still reside with the asset-holder.116 Thus incidents that result in proximate control over the realisation 
and enforcement of the content of the rights and competencies of a security, as bestowed by the 
security instrument, can be distinguished from incidents such as usus or the ius disponendi, which 
remain functionalities exercisable due to holdership of the security asset. To use specific examples: 
only the instrument-holder has access to the process of compelling the issuer to discharge its 
obligations in an adjudicatory forum (she has control over what might be called the incident of formal 
adjudicatory enforcement); alternatively, only the asset-holder may give a right to the fruits of a 
security to a third party (she has control over the incident of fructus). 
In this way the security asset can be described as conferring, through holdership, all the incidents of 
holdership of the security flowing from its underlying interest, except those that confer formal, 
supporting, or adjectival, elements of the realisation of that interest. This is both the nature and 
positive law basis for postulating the existence and nature of the security asset. 
The final building block is the interrelation between separate asset- and instrument-holders of the 
same security – a secondary interceding relationship of representative agency which arises between 
separate (asset- and instrument-) holders of the same security. It confers upon the asset-holder as 
principal the power to direct the instrument-holder (i.e. agent) upon matters related to the exercise 
the incidents of execution of the security, although the incidents themselves (and thus proximate 
control over the realisation of the content of the rights and competencies) remain solely within the 
capacity of the agent.117 This agency construction is revisited in the final section of this chapter. 
This analysis has largely ignored important differences in the nature of the security asset arising 
where a certificated security is exchanged for an uncertificated security instrument or where a 
security has been issued in uncertificated form, and also contains itself to discussing operative 
dynamics of individual securities. The few, but necessary, deviations from the foundational 
theoretical outcomes of this chapter in the context of uncertificated securities are dealt with fully in 
the following chapter and do not require material qualification here in this regard. 
What remains is to lay out an argument for the nature of the security instrument. It must also be 
shown that these dichotomous components of securities are not created during the lifetime of a 
security (as is the case with a real agreement that serves to split the incidents of rights for the pledge 
construction of the security cession). Instead, it is submitted that the dual structure of the holistic 
complex of rights and other competencies arises ab initio from the moment the security is issued, 
even if the holders of both are the same person. An explanation of the security instrument is more 
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difficult and contentious, as it represents a more radical departure from securities jurisprudence as 
currently viewed. 
 
4 1 3  Execution of the underlying interest: the security instrument 
Much of the exposition necessary to properly describe the security instrument has been done above. 
Yet, more is required before the aim of this section, which is to put forward a cogent argument that 
the security instrument is an existing abstract feature of the positive law, can be achieved. Here 
some preliminary distinctions will begin to be drawn between certificated and uncertificated 
securities, but uncertificated securities are primarily dealt with in the following chapter so that the 
discussion here focuses on understanding and outlining first principles only. 
Again, framing what is currently thought of as the registered rights of a security as a security 
instrument does not represent a re-invention of the theoretical wheel. Instead, it is an attempt to re-
conceptualise the notion of registered rights in a way that: more accurately and robustly reflects that 
state of the law; has explanatory and problem-solving value; and which harmonises the doctrinal 
underpinnings of South Africa’s mixed legal system with the rules interposed by legislative 
interventions and other recent legal developments regarding securities.  
The current position is not satisfactory, and is best articulated (at technically necessary length) as 
follows:118 
“Traditionally, registered title has been regarded as comparable to ‘quasi-possession’ and distinct from the 
beneficial vesting of the rights comprising a share, referred to in these notes as ‘beneficial ownership’…As 
a consequence of the aforegoing, registration as a shareholder has been regarded as distinct from 
beneficial ownership for a long time. Under the 1973 Act, to become a registered shareholder (a member) 
of a company a person had to either be a subscriber to the memorandum of association of the company at 
incorporation or subsequently agree to become a shareholder (member) and be recorded in the register of 
shareholders (members). Consequently, a company was generally required to look only to the persons 
recorded in its register of shareholders (members) and to effectively regard them as the holders of all the 
rights and obligations associated with the relevant shares. Where there is a separation of registered title 
from beneficial ownership, under English law the registered holder is regarded as vested with the rights as 
legal owner in terms of the common law but holding the rights as trustee for the benefit of the relevant 
beneficial owner. In contrast, under South African law the registered holder is regarded as a sui generis 
agent ‘holding’ the rights for the benefit of the beneficial owner. 
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Despite the agency construction applicable to nominees, a person recorded in the register, generally, could 
not be deprived of such registration without the person’s consent or a court order. Hence, registered title 
was regarded as a right in itself, somewhat akin to possession of a corporeal and the general principle was 
that the register of shareholders (members) should not be changed unilaterally by the company or any 
other person, at least where doing so would be contentious.” 
Further:119 
“Even though, under the 1973 Act, our courts stated that a nominee is not a trustee (as is the case under 
English law), but rather a sui generis agent, the courts continued to recognise registered title as a distinct 
proprietary (or at least quasi- proprietary) right in and of itself. For example, the registered title holder was 
entitled to bring actions in his own name and was not required to institute proceedings in the name of the 
beneficial owner when enforcing the rights attaching to the shares; to the contrary, the beneficial owner 
generally has to enforce the rights attaching to the shares as against the company through the registered 
title holder. From this, at least certain rights were regarded as vested in the registered holder as proprietary 
rights and hence registration was recognised as a form of title. 
…Accordingly, the holder of a security continues to have a form of registered title which should continue to 
be recognised as a self-standing proprietary right (this right has been regarded as a form of quasi-
possession)…” 
Though this conceptualisation must be credited for its valiant effort to reconcile the inherent doctrinal 
inconsistencies of the South African adoption of a fundamentally incompatible English construct, it 
cannot be accepted. The notion of registered title as both a right and a form of possession is a 
technically contradictory one, and also does not adequately explain the operative dynamics of the 
instrument – this will become increasingly clear below, in § 4 3. Furthermore, as discussed in more 
detail in the following chapter, it makes it more difficult to come to a satisfactory conclusion on the 
exact manner in which uncertificated securities function. 
As is hoped to be shown, the re-conceptualisation proposed in this work is able to provide an 
explanation which does away with such doctrinal disharmony and legislative uncertainty. It rests on 
the following premises: (1) in this context “title” is not an appropriate legal designation in South 
African law; (2) “ownership” of rights (whilst more appropriate than title) should be framed as 
holdership of rights; (3) under South African law, in contradistinction to English law, there cannot be 
separate but simultaneous holdership of the same legal object; (4) holdership of an intangible object 
is being party to a bi- or multilateral relationship; and (5) the underlying interest of any given security 
bestows a multitude of subsidiary incidents, which are severable as individual sets of relationships. 
The conclusion to be drawn from these premises, without having to substantially rewrite, or reverse, 
 
 




a century of South African company and securities jurisprudence, is that a security is comprised of 
two interdependent legal objects, so that each is indeed capable of separate but simultaneous 
holdership.120 
The first object is, of course, the security asset, which is the locus for (holdership of) the totality of 
all substantive, or patrimonial, elements of the underlying interest. The second, the security 
instrument, is the locus for (holdership of) all incidents of execution of that underlying interest. These 
concepts are foundationally understood through the lens of the dual entitlements of determination 
and enjoyment that are holistically intrinsic to the underlying interest of any security. The instrument 
typically manifests physically as either entry on an issuer’s register of holders (coupled with issue of 
an evidentiary security certificate), or by means of electronic ledger entry in the uncertificated 
securities register. As will be shown in the following chapter, where a certificated security is 
exchanged for an uncertificated security instrument or where a security has been issued in 
uncertificated form, there are important effects on the nature of the security asset and instrument, 
but the first principles articulated in this chapter remain substantially unaffected.  
The function of the security instrument is to bestow on its holder the ability to realise and enforce 
content of the rights and competencies underlying the security itself. The underlying interest is, at its 
core, a specific legal relationship between security-holder and issuer, and as a result the “execution” 
in question is to be understood primarily with reference to the issuer. Thus the incidents of execution 
are those which enable the instrument-holder to: (1) realise and enforce performance in terms of 
rights, and (2) compel compliance in terms of competencies. 
The term “execution” is used for a number of reasons. First, it is the best denotative option for all 
that flows, on the level of incidents, from an aggregated entitlement of determination 
(beskikkingsbevoegdheid) held over the collective rights and competencies that form the underlying 
interest of a particular security.  
Second, “beskikking” could be directly translated to “disposal”, “arrangement” or “determination” – it 
is difficult to capture the same nuance in English. However, the former two are the least contextually 
appropriate or insightful. The concept of a beskikkingsbevoegdheid implies an enabling or 
empowering proximity to the realisation and enforcement of the content of the right (to the exclusion 
of others), but without its counterpart – the ultimate entitlement to enjoy the economic value, or 
patrimony, inherent to such a right (the genotsbevoegdheid). Therefore, the usage adopted here is 
the entitlement of determination, and accordingly the functionalities (or rather incidents) that flow 
 
 




from this entitlement all have to do with the enforcement and realisation of such value – i.e. the ability 
to execute the contents of the underlying interest.  
Third, in the term there is a useful connotative analogy to that of the “executor" of an estate – an 
executor is bestowed with the power to perform all juristic acts related to the realisation of the value 
locked up in that estate, without any ultimate entitlement to that value. So too it is with the holder of 
the incidents of execution of a security.  
Fourth, it adequately distinguishes the elements of rights and competencies which facilitate control, 
from control itself. This is of critical importance in properly dealing with the proprietary aspects of 
securities, where the notion and functions of control in the legal sense must be very clearly and 
carefully defined and understood. This is dealt with in § 4 3 below. 
One of the requirements for valid issue of securities is the creation of a security instrument (whatever 
its form), as the legal intervention necessary for a security to come into existence.121 Inherent in the 
constitutive arrangements of all securities is the consequence that the issuer will only be bound to 
recognise and perform towards the security holder of record, irrespective of the ultimate rights holder. 
This is true regardless of whether the constitutive arrangement is statutory, contractual or a 
combination of the two. Statute, and to a lesser degree common law, further provide this “holder of 
record” with the ability to exercise remedies, rights and other competencies against the issuer.122 
The ultimate holder of the underlying interest remains the holder of the substantive (i.e. patrimonial) 
interest in the security, but the proximate ability to execute that interest – i.e. factually exercise these 
rights and competencies – vis-à-vis the issuer lies, at least as a quite consistent point of departure, 
with this holder of record. 
This is the unique structural property of securities’ underlying interest. Upon issue, whatever their 
source, the totality of the incidents of execution within a security’s bundle of underlying interests 
does not lie with the ultimate rights holder unless that person is also the holder of record (a division, 
where provided for, between asset- and instrument-holders upon issue is typically regulated in the 
acquiring agreement).123 
This view is also supported, if not uncontentiously, by case law. In Kruger Investments Group Ltd v 
Nuberry Holdings Limited,124 it was averred that an (English law) equitable owner of South African 
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123  See § 4 2 for more on issues in the primary market.  




shares, not registered as shareholder in the securities register, did not have the obligationary 
equivalent of “full” ownership of the shares in question. In this regard, the court held that: 
“In terms of s 37(9) of the Companies Act, 71 of 2008, [the respondent] is entered as a shareholder in the 
securities registers of Tyrecore and Falck. Pursuant to the definition of “shareholder” in s 1 of the 
Companies Act, [the respondent] is therefore a shareholder for purposes of the Companies Act, having 
certain rights (such as the right to attend shareholders’ meetings and to vote) to the exclusion of the 
applicants. If the applicants are the owners of the shares, they do not enjoy the full effect of ownership 
because [the respondent] is the registered shareholder. In these circumstances the applicants can only 
obtain the rights currently held by [the respondent] if the applicants are successful in the main application 
and the securities registers of Tyrecore and Falck are amended to reflect the applicants as shareholders.” 
Though the judgment is criticised for its application of the principles of (or rather more accurately the 
incorporation of the legal position of) another jurisdiction in making its domestic law determination, 
implicitly the case provides support for the notion that “where registered title is separated from 
beneficial ownership and that the registered title detracts from beneficial ownership…registered title 
is proprietary in nature.”125 
As an example, when listed securities are issued in uncertificated form, the (registered) holder of 
record, from the moment of the inception of those securities, is typically a Central Securities 
Depositary (CSD), a CSD Participant (CSDP), a client (typically a broker) of the aforementioned, the 
asset-holder in own name (though less typically), or a nominee of one of these parties. With the sole 
exception of the facilitation of full uncertificated security-holdership in own name, the end-of-chain 
investor only ever receives the beneficial interest, but does so at the moment of issue. Any primary 
market acquirer (of a certificated or uncertificated security) thus becomes, after acquisition by issue, 
either: (1) both asset- and instrument-holder (i.e. security-holder), or (2) only asset-holder, with 
authority over the instrument-holder through not only the relationships created by an interceding 
chain of intermediaries, but also directly due to the posited underlying structure of securities.126 
Securities, as a significant concept in South African law (rather than commerce), is quite modern,127 
and before the term had material legal significance the operative constructs were simply “shares” 
and “debentures”. It is not necessarily argued that the security instrument has always been a feature 
of the positive law (although it may have been), but rather at the very least that legal development 
has brought the law to a point where the manifest legal qualities of securities justify its recognition. 
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The origins of the security instrument are found in company law, specifically relating to shares, in s 
27 of the Companies Act 46 of 1926. This provision read that “[n]o notice of a trust, expressed, 
implied or constructive shall be entered on the [share] register or be receivable by the Registrar.”, 
and came directly from English law.128 As seen above, the English law concept of trust allows a 
separation of legal and equitable ownership. The provision was, accordingly, interpreted to mean 
that an issuing company was empowered and obliged to ignore all relationships of “trust” (and 
consequently any “equitable” title) and have regard only to the “legal” (i.e. registered) owner of a 
share. 129  The Report of the Lansdown Commission 130  caused amendment of the provision, 
introducing a formulation which was retained in s 104 in the Companies Act of 1973. This read “[a] 
company shall not be bound to see to the execution of any trust, whether express, implied or 
constructive, in respect of any share.” 
Naturally the English notion of trust and dual-ownership has long since been rejected in South 
Africa.131  Yet reading it to include trusts in the technical South African law sense, as well as 
relationships of agency,132 allowed the section to have approximately the same effect. Thus “a 
company shall concern itself only with the registered holder and not with the owner or beneficial 
owner of the shares.”133 In this manner South African law inherited the English position with minor 
differences, and the issuer of shares needed only to perform towards the person who was to be 
found on the share register. This may be referred to as the perspective of the company (or more 
broadly the issuer), to indicate that a legal dispensation different to that of the positive law’s ordinary 
position vis-à-vis a performance-debtor and -creditor inter se is operative between an issuer and 
registered holder of a security. Illustrative in this regard is the following:134 
“As a result, from a practical perspective, the relationship between a nominee and the ‘beneficial owner’ in 
regard to the rights attaching to the relevant shares is influenced by the perspective from which one is 
approaching it. When viewed from the beneficial owner’s perspective, the rights attaching to the shares are 
generally regarded as vested in and accruing to, or for the benefit of, the ‘beneficial owner’ notwithstanding 
that, in relation to the company, only the registered member can enforce them. For example, dividends 
received by a nominee are regarded as accruing to the ‘beneficial owner’, even though the company only 
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has to pay the nominee and only the nominee can claim them. When approached from the company’s 
perspective, the company is effectively ‘blind’ beyond its register and generally regards the registered 
shareholder as the person that is exclusively entitled to exercise the rights attaching to the shares and will 
not acknowledge the ‘beneficial owner’ as having any standing in relation to the shares.” 
Of crucial importance, for present purposes, is that from early on debentures emulated the effect of 
s 27, and thereafter s 104, by inserting a provision in the terms of issue that entitled the company to 
recognise only the registered holder of the debenture to the exclusion of all others. This remains an 
important feature of debt securities today.135 Thus the concept of a splitting of registered title and 
beneficial ownership via a register of holders became common to all shares and debentures, as the 
legal progenitors of modern securities.  
During the second half of the 20th century, South African law (and other jurisdictions) experienced 
an ascendancy of the securities concept, as inclusive of shares, debentures, and later perhaps also 
other securities.136 As a result, a register of holders, as an exclusive record of the person toward 
whom to perform, had become a feature of securities (though for companies separate registers were 
maintained for shares and debentures). During this same period, for various macro-economic 
reasons, trading of non-equity securities began to increase rapidly in volume and velocity;137 further, 
the old regime of paper-based trading became increasingly overwhelmed by this escalation in 
trading.138 International systemic reform, pushed by the so-called Group of Thirty139 began to be 
implemented in response. 
In jurisdictions (1) whose securities and company law is primarily based on English law and (2) where 
securities are not considered negotiable, this reform was pursued through adjustments to the 
function of the register of holders (and registered holdership).140 This has been typified as a result of 
“doctrinal path dependence” – jurists tend to effect legal reform along the path of least resistance, 
or change, to the underlying doctrinal structure of those jurisdictions.141 South Africa, as one of these 
jurisdictions, caused this reform to occur in three stages.142 
 
 
135  See Chapter 3, § 3 1.  
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136  Specifically outlined in Chapter 3, § 3 1 3 2. 
137  See Chapter 2, § 2 3 2. 
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First, in 1992, the legislature introduced the Safe Deposit of Securities Act.143 This act allowed for 
the immobilisation of listed securities, by transferring registered title of the securities in question to 
a licensed central securities depository. Second, in 1998, the act was amended (thereafter titled the 
Custody and Administration of Securities Act).144 This allowed for the dematerialisation of securities 
into uncertificated form by replacing the issuer’s register with an electronic ledger maintained by a 
central securities depository or one of its participants. Certain amendments, most notably the 
insertion of s 91A, to the Companies Act of 1973 were also effected to facilitate this. It was argued 
in Chapter 3 that this alone allowed all securities to have been issued or converted into uncertificated 
form, but this was not the generally accepted view.145 Thus, third, only in 2004 with the passing of 
the Securities Services Act146 did it become uncontentious that all securities could be issued in 
uncertificated form.  
The impact of these reforms on the notion of registered “ownership” was significant. For the first 
time, all securities could be held in either certificated or uncertificated form. Issuers of securities 
remained bound to perform only towards the holder of record – whether indicated in the issuer’s 
register, or the uncertificated securities register. However, it must be noted that in many respects 
these changes did not adequately consider, or address, key doctrinal differences between English 
law and South African law, leading to a number of still persistent issues regarding uncertificated 
securities. This is dealt with at length in the following chapter and need not be pursued here. 
Before these interventions, a convincing argument could still be made that registered holdership of 
shares and debt securities was a mere legal fact (prima facie evidence of ownership of a security), 
with limited legal consequences (for example determining the locus standi to enforce performance, 
the lex situs of the security, or the proximate capacity to exercise remedial rights). This legal fact 
informed the exceptionalism with which the position of the issuer was formulated, justifying in most 
instances the absence of any actionable nexus between issuer and beneficial interest holder not 
registered in the securities register (or before that, share and debenture registers respectively). 
After these interventions the interest which register entry confers begins to look less like a legal fact 
enabled by s 104 of the Companies Act of 1973 and contractual provisions in debt securities, and 
more like an object with roots in substantive law and distinct features of holdership. The beneficial 
interest is able to change hands independently of registered holdership. Registered holdership is 
able to change hands independently of beneficial ownership. One contains certain elements of 
substantive rights and competencies, the other contains other elements of those same rights and 
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competencies. Further the ordinary, plain language meaning of the words “custody” and “deposit” 
imply some sense of care and control over an object, and it would be unrealistic to ignore that (1) 
securities are generally considered to have a proprietary dimension, and (2) this proprietary 
dimension informs the commercial reality, most notably the commercial (but often also legal) 
tendency to talk of “ownership” or “buying” and “selling”. 
However, due to the incorporeality of a security as the holistic, proprietary object in question the law 
itself (as shown in Chapter 5) had to make use of an abstract (and in many ways artificial)147 
construct to simulate the consequences of what it termed “deposit”, “custody” and “control”, and in 
this way make legal sense of a phenomenon of reality that did not readily fit into its underlying 
doctrinal structure. 
From this bifurcation of registered holdership, it should be inferred that the law countenances a 
higher-order, abstract, conception of registered holdership that has (so far) manifested in these two 
ways – certificated and uncertificated. Thus it is argued that, at the very latest by 2004, the positive 
law regarding securities had reached a stage of development that justifies the postulation of a legal 
interest-conferring security instrument as one of the two components of a security and its holdership. 
In the abstract, the security instrument can be characterised as the legal vehicle for all incidents of 
execution over the complex of underlying interests (i.e. rights and competencies). As argued, these 
incidents are best described as functionalities flowing from an analogue to the entitlements of 
determination and enjoyment over all of the securities’ underlying rights as well as its competencies. 
It has typically (if not always) been made manifest by entry in the issuer’s register coupled with issue 
of a security certificate, or by entry in the uncertificated securities register maintained by authorised 
participants of the particular central securities depositary and the depository itself.  
If so, what is instrument-holdership? In the commercial law context, an “instrument” is a document 
conferring “title” to payment, but in the present context even this designation is perhaps too strict. 
An instrument here must rather be seen to have its more ordinary, plain language meaning as a 
method with which to accomplish something.148 In this case, through removal of the incidents of 
execution from the remainder of the underlying interest and in so doing creating a second legal object 
capable of separate holdership, one is left with a legal instrument that enables its holder to 
accomplish the execution of the underlying interest. 
Recent developments in the law pertaining to exchanges for the transfer of securities have therefore, 
fundamentally altered what form the physical manifestation may take, but the principle remains 
 
 
147   See comments by Borrowdale (1985) CILSA 45-46. 




steadfast. Thus, to say that this legal construct is an “instrument” is to say two things. First, it is a 
higher-order abstract legal construct serving as a means to achieve a specific legal outcome. 
Second, its physical manifestation is indeed describable as a legal object conferring holdership of 
certain intangible relationships arising out of personal rights and other competencies. That is why 
characterisation as an instrument is appropriate. 
If that is the case, what are the “incidents of execution”? The pledge-style security cession outlines 
a theoretically sound basis for the severance of all incidents of execution over a performance, 
through a limited cession of the entitlement of determination as a whole. This, with the added 
complexity of an emergent agency-dynamic, is the basis of the instrument component of securities. 
Already dealt with in some detail, it will merely be refined here. 
In essence, instrument-holdership amounts to conferral, on the holder of the instrument as object, 
of all that is necessary to cause the issuer to act in such a way that the economic and other end-
benefits of the underlying interest are realised. On the isolated subject-object-subject level, the 
entitlement of determination over the rights underlying a security must of necessity reside in the 
security-instrument. But securities are comprised of both rights and competencies. These 
competencies form part of the global legal interest of the security, so a similar limited power as 
against the issuer must also accrue to the instrument. This is why it makes more sense to analyse 
the instrument at the level of incidents, at which level this power is one of the functionalities of 
competency-holdership, and it is similarly severable as an incident of securities.149 
The instrument-holder is thus able, to the exclusion of all others, to enforce and realise: (1) 
performance in terms of rights, and (2) compliance in terms of competencies (for example the 
recognition of a vote at a shareholders’ meeting, the sending of a notice of a general meeting, or the 
provision of information that security-holders are entitled to upon request), from the issuer.150 
As an illustration, consider a security, “X”, the underlying interest of which comprises of rights A and 
B, and competencies C and D. The instrument will comprise of all elements of the legal relationships 
created by A, B, C and D which facilitate the factual, proximate, or direct realisation of what those 
relationships confer on the security-holder. The asset will contain the remainder: the ultimate 
substantive entitlement to, or mastery over, what the relationships created by A, B, C, and D confer. 
 
 
149  See § 4 1 generally, and specifically § 4 1 2. 
150  See also Yeats et al Commentary 2008 at 2-800, stating “where there is a separation of beneficial ownership and 
registered title, it could be argued that the ‘right of action’ vests with the registered holder who generally is regarded 




This analysis facilitates a more sound and theoretically coherent understanding of the current legal 
position, which is typified by contemporary statements such as the following:151 
“While entries in the securities register clearly can be part of the evidence considered when determining 
who has beneficial ownership, it is stressed that the beneficial ownership of the securities can be separated 
from the registered title. While there are some loose South African judicial references to nominees being 
legal owners of shares and certificates evidencing ownership, the preferred view is that in South Africa the 
registered holder is not the legal owner, as is the case under English law. Rather, the preferred view is that 
in South Africa the registered holder is vested with the rights attaching to registered title (which appears to 
be a proprietary interest but not ownership).” 
The instrument is said to manifest as entry of its holder on a register (sometimes coupled with 
possession of an evidentiary certificate) primarily because that entry is what facilitates a holder’s 
locus standi to exact and enforce performance or compliance in any justiciable dispute. This “right 
to claim and receive”,152 as extended from rights also to competencies, guarantees a holder the 
ability to found a valid cause of action, which is the essential prerequisite to any incident of execution. 
Of course, the term “right” in the quoted text is not entirely accurate, as it is an incident of holdership 
of a complex of rights and competencies. No further description is necessary, as each individual 
security’s underlying interest will determine which precise elements thereof must reside in the 
instrument.153  
Lastly, this construct does not in any way contradict the well-established notion, aptly expressed in 
Standard Bank of SA Ltd v Ocean Commodities Inc, that:154 
“[t]here is an important legal difference between immovable property and movable property whether 
corporeal or incorporeal. In regard to immovable property, a court cannot go behind the register. In respect 
 
 
151   Yeats et al Commentary 2008 2-781 – 2-782. 
152   Van der Merwe et al Contract 432 & n 379.  
153  Yeats et al Commentary 2008 2-584 – 2-585 is helpful in this regard: 
 “For example, in Smyth v Investec Bank Ltd the court concluded that only the registered shareholder had locus standi to 
institute proceedings under s 252(1) of the 1973 Act, and not the unregistered beneficial owner. Also, an unregistered 
‘beneficial owner’ of a share cannot bring an application for the winding-up of a company. This was an important factor in the 
case of Barnard v Carl Greaves Brokers (Pty) Ltd and Two Other Cases, where Binns-Ward AJ made the rather progressive 
statement that an owner that was not registered as a shareholder could, in certain circumstances, apply for relief under s 252 
of the 1973 Act together with an application to be placed on the share register. While Lewis Group Ltd v Woollam can be read 
as adopting a generous approach to a beneficial owner’s standing in regard to the derivative action remedy in s 165, it is 
submitted it is not authority for a general broad interpretation of a ‘holder’ for the following reasons:  
• the judgment was clear that Woollam did not qualify as a shareholder in the strict sense (it simply adopted the view that 
regarding him as a shareholder was justified);  
• s 165(2)(a) is expressly available to not only a shareholder but also ‘a person entitled to be registered as a shareholder’; 
and   
• Woollam’s standing to make a demand was not seriously contested and therefore the issue was not fully ventilated.”  




of registered shares [as movables], a court can go behind the register to ascertain the identity of the true 
owner.” 
A court may look past instrument-holdership, manifesting as register-entry, of any security as an 
incorporeal movable in order to determine the identity of the asset-holder.155 
There is one anomalous obstacle to the finalisation of this analysis – s 50(2)(b)(iv)(bb) of the 
Companies Act, which reads: 
“(2) As soon as practicable after issuing any securities a company must enter or cause to be entered in 
its securities register, in respect of every class of securities that it has issued-  
…  
(b) with respect to certificated securities-  
… 
(iv)  in the case of securities contemplated in section 43-  
… 
(bb)  the names and addresses of the registered owner of the security and any holders 
of a beneficial interest in the security…” 
 
 
155  A brief discussion of three important judgments in Yeats et al Commentary 2008 at 2-780 is also helpful to reference 
in this regard: 
“So far, the courts have not been quick to look behind the securities register. In Monique Investments (Pty) Ltd v 167 Bree 
Street Newtown (Pty) Ltd [unreported, [2015] ZAGPJHC 232] the court had to consider an application for access to information 
in terms of the Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000 and s 26(1) of the Act. The applicant asserted that the current 
securities register was incorrect and the applicant intended bringing an application for rectification. The court held that in the 
circumstances, the presumption in s 50(4) held unless and until rectification of the securities register was ordered. Predicated 
on this, the applicant was not regarded as a shareholder because it was not reflected in the securities register as the holder 
of shares, and accordingly, was not regarded as having locus standi for the purpose of an application for access to information 
in terms of s 26(1). This conclusion accords with the distinction between registered title and beneficial ownership and the 
court’s traditional reluctance to go behind the securities register.  
In Knipe v Master, Free State High Court, Bloemfontein [unreported, [2014] ZAFSHC 145] the securities register was accepted 
as proof that Knipe was a shareholder of Schaapplaats 978 (Edms) Bpk (in liquidation) (Schaapplaats) and therefore had 
locus standi to bring the application to review and set aside the decision of the master of the high court to accept the third 
respondent’s claim against Schaapplaats, and the court was not persuaded by the assertion by the third respondent that the 
applicant had ceded shares to another person. 
In Von Siebel v Accentuate Limited [2015 JDR 1182 (GJ)] the court held that the chairperson of the company was correct to 
disallow purported votes by an owner of uncertificated securities where the owner did not appear in the securities register or 
the register of beneficial interests. This decision can be read as supporting the conclusion that an undisclosed beneficial 
interest holder without registered title needs to be appointed as the proxy of the registered holder, or, where the registered 
holder is a juristic person, then as its duly authorised representative (e.g. in terms of s 57(5)), in order to be able to attend a 




It is submitted that this particular provision should read as pro non scripto. There is no need to 
discuss this in detail as the authors in Commentary 2008 provide a compelling and complete account 
of why this provision makes little sense within the broader framework of the Act:156 
“It is unclear why the drafters thought it necessary in s 50(2)(b)(iv)(bb) to require the names and addresses 
of the registered owner and any holders of a beneficial interest in a debt instrument to be recorded in the 
securities register, as this appears to be unnecessary and inconsistent with s 56, which is directed at the 
disclosure and registration of beneficial interests in respect of all securities issued by certain companies to 
be included in a beneficial interests register. Section 56 does not refer back to s 50(2). This gives rise to 
some confusion. If s 50(2)(b)(iv) is read as a self-standing provision, then the specified details of all holders 
of beneficial interests in any certificated debt instruments must be recorded in the certificated securities 
register. This is in marked contrast to s 56(3), which only requires the disclosures of beneficial interests in 
securities issued by public companies, and s 56(7), which only requires a separate register of disclosures 
of beneficial interests in securities to be kept by a ‘regulated company’…It also appears anomalous and 
absurd to require the beneficial interest of certificated debt instruments to be recorded both in the 
certificated securities register and then again in a separate register of disclosures pursuant to s 56(7). The 
foregoing strongly suggests that s 50(2)(b)(iv) was the product of a drafting error, as there is no apparent 
rationale for the divergent treatment of beneficial interests in certificated debt instruments. Perhaps this can 
be reconciled by reading s 50(2)(b)(iv) as subservient to s 56, only requiring the details of beneficial 
interests in debt instruments to be recorded in the register of disclosures to the extent required by s 56. 
Even if it requires a bit of a stretch, this would be a commercially reasonable interpretation that achieves 
the apparent purpose of the relevant provisions while removing the inconsistency and duplication.  
Another possible reading of s 50(2)(b)(iv) would be to read it as aimed at the situation where the company 
has appointed a trustee to hold the debt instruments for the holders of the debt instruments as contemplated 
in s 43(5). In this instance, the trustee could be recorded as the ‘registered owner’ (in the sense of registered 
title only) with the beneficial interests of the ‘holders’ (in the sense of the vested beneficiaries) being 
recorded. This does, however, require a very loose reading of the respective references to ‘holder’ both in 
s 43(5) and s 50(2)(b)(iv). Ordinarily, the holder of a security is the person recorded in the register as the 
holder of the security (vested with the rights of registered title), but a loose reading may be justified because 
the term ‘holder’ is used in s 50(2)(b)(iv) with reference to both registered ownership and beneficial 
interests.” 
The proposed compromise offered in the final paragraph above is, with respect, unconvincing and 
has the unfortunate effect of further obscuring the technical denotations of the terms used throughout 
the Act. Accordingly, this work supports regarding the provision as a drafting error, and it will not be 
dealt with any further. 
 
 




Understood thus, the security instrument can be seen to serve a number of valuable functions, 
illustrating the value of referring to an instrument rather than falling back on the traditional conception 
of registered rights or, worse yet, registered ownership. 
First and foremost, as a locus for the execution of the collective sum of rights and competencies, it 
facilitates the conglomeration, or bundling, of rights in cases where a security is comprised of more 
than one personal right. All rights and competencies accruing to a security must, by necessity, be 
administered through the instrument(-holder), so that these components of the underlying interest 
are bound together by it. This bundling function that the instrument serves will also become 
especially important in the next chapter when dealing with securities held collectively. 
Second, it serves as a single locus of performance and compliance, which increases the economic 
efficiency of the capital-raising arrangement, and correspondingly decreases its economic costs over 
the lifetime of the borrowing arrangement. The issuer, as performance-debtor, need not incur any 
additional transaction-, monitoring- or information-costs in issuing, and thereafter tendering 
performance and otherwise administering the relationship. If securities were capable of 
fragmentation to the maximum extent possible in terms of their underlying interest and each holder 
of each fragment had, to some extent, to be recognised by the issuer, a potentially large multitude 
of persons with disparate interests in individual securities within a larger class or classes of securities 
would divide the attention and resources of the issuer far beyond the bounds of efficient capital 
raising. 
Third, it fulfils an evidentiary function by evidencing both prima facie (through certification), and more 
definitively (through register entry) who the holder of securities is, and also to whom performance 
and compliance (regarding other competencies) is owed. 
Fourth, the instrument construction informs and clarifies the concept of nominee-holding in the South 
African context. This is the crucial arrangement that allows securities to function in the complex and 
heavily intermediated transactional environment and infrastructure of the financial and exchange-
driven marketplace. Whether nominee-holding is a function of the empowering legislation (for 
example the 1973 Companies Act, and more implicitly the 2008 Act) or of the terms of the security 
itself (for instance the required wording inserted into a debenture document under the older regimes 
or government debt securities currently),157 this legal arrangement is one of the core elements of 
securities, allowing the trading of securities at a high volume and frequency in the financial system. 
 
 
157   See Chapter 3, § 3 1 1 2; § 4 2 below; and, as another excellent contemporary example, paras. 2, 8, 9, 10 & 11 of 




The security instrument, as an a priori structural feature of securities at large, can be seen to facilitate 
nominee-holding in a manner that satisfies these commercial needs. 
Fifth, it greatly assists in the clarification of difficult issues arising from the proprietary dimension of 
securities. The application of legal rules and constructs which traditionally reside in the realm of the 
law of things (for example the usufruct, quasi-rei vindicatio or mandament van spolie) to these 
intangible phenomena create not only doctrinal friction, but more importantly legal uncertainty. A 
dual-construct of securities as inclusive of a separate instrument greatly aides an analysis of the 
precise application of this, in a sense appropriated, constellation of legal rules and constructs. This 
will be aptly demonstrated in the final section of this chapter in conjunction with some of the 
outcomes in Part 2. 
Sixth, the security instrument as an abstract concept greatly assists with the classification of legal 
interests, especially if arising from contract, as “securities”, if appropriate. This assists the law’s 
ability to apply its rules and norms in a consistent and predictable manner and is the subject of 
Chapter 6. 
Seventh, and most importantly in the context of this more theoretical chapter as well as the next, it 
fulfils a doctrinal harmonisation function. It allows South African law, which does not countenance 
dual ownership in the English sense, to explain coherently the simultaneous holdership of what 
traditionalist private lawyers would characterise as the same underlying interest (comprised of 
personal rights and competencies) by two different legal subjects. It does so by showing that each 
of these two hypothetical legal subjects simultaneously hold different subsidiary components of that 
underlying interest as separate legal objects, and thus have entirely heterogeneous but 
interdependent types of holdership.158 








In this regard:159 
“[i]t should not be forgotten that a security often includes obligations, it being implicit that shareholders have 
the obligation to abide by the memorandum of incorporation [and in the case of debt securities the 
constitutive arrangement]. While the rights constituting a share may be ceded without registration of 
transfer, there is authority that the obligations are attached to registered title and can only transfer once 
registration is accepted by the company and transferred.  
[Thereafter in n 284: The distinction under English law is founded on dual ownership with the registered 
holder being the actual common-law owner (entitled to enforce the rights and liable for the obligations), with 
English trust law being applied in regard to the unregistered beneficial owner in equity law (the equitable 
benefit being transferable by assignment or trust law without notice to the company or acceptance by the 
company). The equitable beneficial owner is then generally required by trust law to indemnify the common-
law owner holding the shares in trust. It is much harder to explain this under South African law with its 
unitary approach to property ownership that nevertheless recognises a separation of ownership and 
registered title, regarding the nominee not as the owner trustee but rather as an agent. Influenced at a 
functional level by the English law position, our courts recognise that ownership simplicter vested in the 
beneficial owner can be transferred by way of cession (not by constructive trust) without registration of 
transfer, but they rarely consider whether the ownership rights are divisible from the related obligations. 
Usually an agent would not be ‘vested’ with the rights and obligations it holds as agent for a principal, but 
influenced by English law, a nominee is generally regarded as having enforcement rights against the 
company and is personally liable to the company for the obligations…This raises the question whether the 
obligations owed to the company lie exclusively with the nominee and only the nominee can delegate the 
obligations by way of a transfer of registered title, or whether the obligations are actually obligations on the 
beneficial owner (as principal) to the company (as opposed to the beneficial owner having only personal 
liability to indemnify the nominee).] 
… 
The preferred view is that the balance of authority (influenced by the English dual ownership construction) 
appears to favour the conclusion that, generally, in the absence of a restriction the rights attaching to shares 
 
 
159  Yeats et al Commentary 2008 2-513 – 2-515, and importantly at n 282: 
“While some authorities prefer the later definition in Standard Bank of SA Ltd v Ocean Commodities Inc 1980 (2) SA 175 (T) 
focusing on the rights, the following definition provided by Farwell J in Borland’s Trustee v Steel Brothers & Co Ltd [1901] Ch 
279 is preferred because it recognises the obligations attached to and more complex nature of a share, save to note that no-
par value shares are not measured by a sum of money:  
‘A share is the interest of a shareholder in the company measured by a sum of money, for the purpose of liability in the first place, and of interest 
in the second, but also consisting of a series of mutual covenants entered into by all the shareholders in accordance with s 16 of the Companies 
Act, 1862. The contract contained in the articles of association is one of the original incidents of the share.’ (Cited with approval in Smuts v 
Booyens; Markplaas (Edms) Bpk v Booyens 2001 (4) SA 15 (SCA) para 14.)’ 
See also Commissioners of Inland Revenue v Crossman [1937] AC 26 66; [1936] 1 All ER 762 787 (HL); De Leef Family Trust 
v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1993 (3) SA 345 (A) 356; and the footnotes above under ‘(1) Interpretation’ and the notes 
on the definition of ‘shares’ and ‘securities’ in s 1.” 
See also 2-800 – 2-803, including a valuable comparative analysis with respect to English law and the role of the 





can be ceded without registration of transfer and that obligations pass only on registration of the transfer. 
Where beneficial ownership is separate from registered title, generally the registered holder remains liable 
to the company for the obligations attaching to the shares but would be entitled to indemnification from the 
beneficial owner (who hopefully is not insolvent).” 
Here, the instrument-construction supports, and indeed enforces, the view that these duties and 
obligations are operative between instrument-holder and issuer by excluding the asset-holder from 
direct dealings with the issuer. It also harmonises the tension between received English law 
principles and South African law in a satisfactory manner.  
It is submitted that, due to the fact that the constitutive arrangement (though not necessarily the 
elements thereof which constitute the acquiring contract as dealt with in the next section) binds 
instrument-holder and issuer inter se, a unique feature of the security instrument is that any 
obligations flowing in the direction of the issuer accrue wholesale to the security instrument. The 
mere agency construction of the “separate and severable” view of South African securities does not 
similarly enable this position, as obligations cannot vest or accrue to an agent in the traditional sense, 
again illustrating the legal usefulness of the outcomes of this chapter. 
In all of the aforementioned, what is proposed simplifies legal analysis. Positing an instrument, as a 
legal object in the true sense containing the totality of the incidents of execution of the underlying 
interest, (largely) does away with the need to make separate analyses of the position from the 
perspective of the positive law and the perspective of the issuer. The so-called reconceptualisation 
argued for serves to re-integrate these perspectives for the purposes of legal problem-solving and 
exposition, also elaborated upon in the final section of this chapter.160 In the next chapter it also 
proves to be of great value in understanding uncertificated securities. 
However, the use of instrument-holdership go further than merely making theoretical sense. If it is 
to be anything more than a mere idea, it must also explain more direct and concrete aspects of the 
law as it stands and also solve specific problems within that legal framework. Thus the rest of this 
chapter will discuss certain key features of the law related to security holdership, as viewed through 
the asset-instrument paradigm. The larger issue of problem-solving is left for Part 2. 
 
4 2   The creation of securities and the meaning of issue 
 
 




How do securities and their underlying interest legally arise? When securities come into being in the 
primary market the underlying interest must somehow be created. This process is one of the most 
overlooked, and interesting, aspects in the study of securities. 
It is uncontentious to assert that there can be no right without a right-holder, and a personal right is 
the relationship between a given performance and a legal subject, manifesting in a legal claim to 
performance. The previous section showed that a claim itself is capable of giving rise to individual 
incidents (e.g. fructus) or sets of incidents (e.g. all incidents of execution as found in the pledge in 
securitatem debiti), which flow from the two-fold content of such a claim.  
It further showed that competencies, while slightly more complex, can be similarly analysed by 
analogy. Any competency of the type accruing to a security-holder can be characterised as a 
relationship between: (1) the security-holder and (2) something which must be done, abided by, or 
facilitated by the security issuer. This was referred to above as “compliance” with such a 
competency, although nothing truly turns on the precise term settled on. Two illustrative examples 
of compliance are the issuer’s recognition of a voting company security-holder’s vote at a 
shareholders’ meeting, or the co-operation of an issuer in the exercise of an appraisal right in terms 
of s 164 of the Companies Act of 2008. Compliance so closely resembles performance in the strict 
sense as dare, facere or non facere that it is appositely comparable. Crucially, this allows a general 
analysis of securities to take place at the level of incidents. 
There are significant differences between the creation of shares and other securities, but in both 
cases there are common elements that justify a generally undifferentiated initial legal analysis. In the 
creation of each of these types of securities there are invariably two different juristic acts. The first 
is a bilateral contractual act, entailing the conclusion of a binding contract, through offer and 
acceptance (as modified by applicable statutory law),161 causing the prospective issuer of a security 
to perform by “issuing” the security, and the prospective security-holder to provide value, often 
referred to as “consideration”, in the way of counter-performance.162 For clarity and convenience this 
contract, including all its forms, will be referred to as the “acquiring contract”. The contractual 
agreement does not bring the security into existence, nor does it necessarily (depending on the 
security in question) bring the underlying interest of the security into existence. These only provide 
 
 
161   See Chapter 3, specifically the comments made at the end of § 3 1 1 1. Further, in the case of subscription contracts, 
see Blackman et al Commentary 5-241 as stating that “[e]xcept in so far as they have been modified by the 
Companies Act, the common law rules relating to offer and acceptance apply to such a contract…”. 
162   In the context of shares this typically occurs through an “allotment” or, recently more appropriate, a “subscription” 
contract – see Moosa v Lalloo 1957 (4) SA 207 (D) 219 and Blackman et al Commentary 5-241 & n 2.  
In the context of debt securities, methods vary but typically include specialised auctions, “private placement” or 
mere “purchase”. Under the 1973 Companies Act’s regime, the meaning of “shares” in s 1(1)(v), functioning in the 
context of offer, subscription, and issue included then-called debentures also. Clearly, the name of the contract 
does not matter, as all these methods entail principally the same rights and duties (as essentialia) as that of 




for the right to have a security created and registered in the name of the designated instrument- or 
security-holder to-be. 
The question then becomes, what does bring the security and its full content into existence? The 
answer is a second, constitutive (i.e. “regskeppende”)163 juristic act, known as “issue”. Issue is legally 
problematic for a number of reasons. The first is that issue is generally not considered “a technical, 
but [rather] a mercantile term, and…may vary according to its context.”164 Thus, precisely what issue 
is, and how it occurs, needs to be better understood. Despite the above pronouncement, it is 
submitted that the word issue must, and does, have a legal, technical meaning (for much the same 
reasons as given for the view that the terms security and debenture must have discrete legal 
meanings). However, it is also true that what issue entails will vary depending on the nature of the 
security in question. Here a notable distinction exists between shares and other securities.  
The law regarding shares is the most exhaustive source of South African securities jurisprudence, 
and many general, securities-wide principles can be derived from share-specific principles. If 
anything is to be learned about the issue of contractual securities, shares must be dealt with first, 
and then – with justification and modification if necessary – serve as persuasive authority for the 
legal position regarding the former. Obviously in a treatment of shares, the discussion is (primarily) 
bound to the Companies Act of 2008 and to some degree its predecessor.  
The discussion will further be limited to the issue of shares for consideration, and exclude not only 
capitalisation shares and shares acquired in terms of options or conversion rights,165 but also the 
requirements of Chapter 5 of the Act regarding offers to the public. It is submitted that what follows 
is nonetheless applicable, with the necessary modification, to the creation of shares in any of these 
contexts. 
Although the rights created by shares are generally considered as personal,166 it has been styled as 
“artificial” to consider the rights to be contractual in nature, as they flow from a multitude of 
collaborative sources including a company’s memorandum of incorporation, applicable statutory 
provisions, and the common law.167 Simply, shares are not contractual in nature. Thus they are more 
suitably characterised as personal rights sui generis. What does this imply for the creation of shares? 
 
 
163   See Lubbe (1989) 52 THRHR 485 490, and Chapter 3, § 3 1 1 2. 
164   Blackman et al Commentary 5–256-4, and authorities cited at n 5 & 6 therein.  
165   See s 39(1) of the Companies Act. 
166  See for instance Jeffery v Pollack and Freemantle 1938 AD 1 14; Botha v Fick 1995 (2) SA 750 (A) 762; or Cooper 
v Boyes 1994 (4) SA 521 (C) 533-535; inter alia.   
167  See PA Delport et al Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (SI 11 – 2015) § 35 158, and Van Der Walt & 




As a definitive source in this regard, Blackman et al aver (correctly) that issue, as distinct from 
subscription,168 is the act by the issuing company of giving full and unfettered control of the share to 
the subscriber, thereby: (1) creating the share as “an item of property”; and (2) completing the 
subscriber’s “title” to the share,169 irrespective of whether a share certificate has been issued.170 As 
aptly stated in a readily comparable jurisdictional setting by the Australian High Court, and relied 
upon by the authors, it is:171 
“only upon issue, as distinct from allotment, that individual shares come into existence as separate items 
of property, a process which logically must include entry on the share register for without such entry there 
will not have been…‘the investing of the shareholder with complete control over the shares.’” 
This is undoubtedly also a correct reflection of South African law,172 and is further supported by s 
35(4) of the Companies Act of 2008, which “[confirms] the common law principle that a share only 
comes into existence upon ‘issue’”.173 
However, in Moosa v Lalloo,174 the court appears to have held that acquisition of the rights to share 
could occur without registration; this also appears to have been cited with approval in Du Plooy NO 
v De Hollandsche Molen Share Block Ltd.175 It is submitted that due to what is outlined above and 
below, this position cannot be viewed as correct,176 and pragmatic as the point may be, it also has 
no evident basis in the South African framework of private law rights and relationships. 
Through use of the security instrument construct a much more precise understanding of the nature 
of issue can be posited. The security instrument (as one of the two components of securities) is the 
facilitator of the direct or proximate ability to execute the underlying interest of that security. It may 
therefore give rise to all the incidents of rights, and other competencies, which serve to do so. In the 
case of shares the security instrument manifests as entry on the register and issue of security 
certificate, or in the case of uncertificated shares its equivalent of uncertificated securities register 
 
 
168  See also Delport et al Henochsberg 2008 § 38 172(4), citing In re Ambrose Lake Tin & Copper Company; Clarke’s 
Case (1878) Ch 8 635 (CA) 638; In re Biltong Asbestos Co Ltd 25 CPD 356 361; R v Brand 1911 CPD 136 141-
142; and Bavasa v Stirton and Another [2014] 2 All SA 51 (WCC) [38]. 
169  Blackman et al Commentary 5–256-4 & n 7-8, and 5–257. 
170  R v Brand 1911 CPD 136 141-142, contrasting issue of a share with the issue of a certificate.  
171  As per Aiken, J in Federal Commissioner of Taxation v St. Helens Farm (ACT) Pty Ltd 1980 146 CLR 336 427 (HC 
of A) – as cited in Blackman et al Commentary 5–257 & n 3. 
172  See Blackman et al Commentary 5–256-4, and currently Delport et al Henochsberg 2008 § 35 163. 
173   Delport et al Henochsberg 2008 § 35(4) 163. 
174  1957 (4) SA 207 (D). 
175  2017 (3) SA 274 (WCC). 
176  Yeats et al Commentary 2008 at 2-589 also notes that “it is open to debate whether the judgment was using 




entry. It is submitted that the creation of the instrument is an immutable prerequisite for the existence 
of a security and thus all of the security’s content (including the security asset).177 
The reason it is a prerequisite is the nature of that which the security instrument provides its holder. 
Personal rights are relationships between a legal subject and the specific legal object of 
performance, and that relationship takes the form of a “legally valid claim by a legal subject to a legal 
object”.178 Not only can there be no right unless there is a legal subject as right-holder, there can 
also be no civil obligation if there is a right-holder in principle, but no-one the performance-debtor 
can be legally coerced to perform towards directly. These are both prerequisites to a valid and 
enforceable claim as the substance of a personal right, which is, in turn, a prerequisite for the 
creation of a security.179 Conversely, if a security were to be putatively issued to a non-existent 
person, no issue can be said to have effectively taken place because until an existing legal subject 
is identified as performance creditor, no obligation (or more accurately no complex of rights and 
other competencies) can be said to have been created. 
Thus, without the creation of an instrument the issuer is not bound to perform towards anyone – the 
instrument, through bestowal of the incidents of execution, determines the performance-creditor. 
Similarly, other competencies not readily classifiable as rights are subject to the exact same analysis. 
No enforceable competency can exist if the proximate “executer” of that competency is not yet 
identified, and without the creation of a security instrument this is not possible.180 This is why, 
although stated in the context of shares, it is true of all securities that “…the rights only come into 
existence if [they are] capable of being exercised against the company”.181 
However, it does not follow that the mere creation of a security instrument will always and 
automatically also bring the applicable underlying rights and competencies into existence. It has also 
been settled that:182 
“the placing of the applicant’s name on the register of members does not constitute an issue of shares 
allotted when something more is required to complete the applicant’s mastery over the shares. Thus where 
 
 
177  In the context of the Companies Act of 2008, especially s 56, this is a contentious statement but must, it is submitted, 
nonetheless be accepted for a holistically sensible understanding of securities. 
178  Du Plessis Introduction (1999) 140 & 143-144 [own emphasis]. 
179   Natural obligations are legally valid despite their general unenforceability – see for instance Van der Merwe et al 
Contract 3-5. However, it would border on the ridiculous to entertain the notion that the law would allow something 
as financially oriented as a security to be founded on a natural obligation. 
180   See also Yeats et al Commentary 2008 2-280 on s 35(4) in this regard. 
181   Delport et al Henochsberg 2008 § 35(4) 163, based inter alia on: Van Wyk de Vries Main Report para 38.01; Oswald 
Tillitson Ltd v IRC [1933] 1 KB 134; Brotex Cellulose Fibres Ltd v IRC [1933] 1 KB 158; and Murex Ltd v IRC [1933] 
1 KB 173). The original wording is “it is”, which probably refers to the “…‘conglomerate of rights’…” mentioned 
earlier, and only the grammatical concord error is corrected in the paraphrasing above. 
182   Blackman et al Commentary 5–257 and 5–258 & n 1. This is in keeping with the dominant information theory 




notification to the applicant of the company’s acceptance of his offer is necessary to complete the contract 
of subscription and the applicant has not received such notification, the allotment of the shares to the 
applicant in response to his application and entry of his name in the register of members does not amount 
to the ‘issue’ of the shares to him. For until notification there is no contract, and therefore the applicant is 
not yet master of the shares.” 
This would appear to imply that the valid creation of a share by “issue” can otherwise only occur if 
there also is a valid and operative causa (i.e. legal basis) enabling the lawful creation of the rights 
and competencies of a security. According to the above, if there is not yet a valid causa, the applicant 
is not considered a shareholder, as the “mastery” requirement has not yet been met (albeit for a 
different reason). Typically, the causa would be the valid conclusion of, and performance in terms 
of, an acquiring contract.183 
Without a shareholder there is no legal subject in whom to vest any claim to the object of 
performance, and consequently the creation of rights or competencies cannot occur. Further, there 
can undoubtedly be no incidents of rights if there are no rights to begin with. Thus, without a valid 
causa for the concomitant creation of the security’s underlying rights and competencies, this 
amounts to the meaningless entry of someone’s name in the securities register, and not the physical 
manifestation of the coming into existence of an actual (abstract) security instrument. In other words, 
but for this causa: (1) there are no rights from which to sever and allocate the incidents of execution, 
and (2) there is no basis for the positive law to give rise to other ex lege competencies accruing to 
securities, and from which to sever and allocate their respective incidents of execution. 
This brings one to the highly problematic wording of s 50(2) of the Companies Act of 2008, which 
states that “[a]s soon as is practicable after issuing any securities a company must enter or cause 
to be entered in its securities register…” [own emphasis]. This section is applicable to all securities. 
As a point of departure for the broader inquiry, what does this imply for the issue of shares? 
The Act appears to consider a security issued before entry on the register. This simply cannot be 
the case. In addition, it was recently confirmed in Bavasa v Stirton and Another184 (with reference to 
various authorities) that mere delivery of a certificate would not complete a holder’s “title”, and thus 
 
 
183   In terms of this acquiring contract, Yeats et al Commentary 2008 2-305 – 2-306 provides as follows: 
 “When shares of a company are acquired from the company, this is done by way of a contract, not to purchase them, but to 
subscribe for them. This contract has been referred to as a contract of ‘subscription’ or ‘allocation’. Except in so far as they 
have been modified by the Act, the common-law rules of contract relating to offer and acceptance apply to such a contract; 
consequently the general rule is that no particular form of agreement is required, and the contract may be effected in any 
manner in which a contract may be concluded, i.e. it may be either written or oral, and in the latter case either express or 
implied.  
The contract entails the following elements: the company’s offer for subscription; the subscriber’s application; and the 
allocation of shares to the subscriber. It is fulfilled when the subscriber pays for the shares and they are issued to him.” 




entry on the register is vital for the completion of the act of issue.185 Furthermore, especially in light 
of the new Act having effectively done away with the notion of allotment, it is very difficult to imagine 
what kind of express or tacit juristic act: (1) could follow the conclusion of a subscription contract 
(which does not itself bring a security into existence), but precedes registration, and (2) still satisfies 
the mastery requirements for the valid creation of a share (on which the common law is clear). Of 
what would such an act constitute? By comparison, even the real agreement of ordinary cession (the 
epitome of an abstract and form-free right creating, or regskeppende, juristic act), still requires at 
least that the requisite corresponding intentions be made manifest by words or conduct.186 
Section 50(2) can be remedied interpretively. The golden rule of statutory interpretation has always 
been “adherence to the ‘plain words’ of a statute unless this would lead to an absurdity or to a result 
contrary to the legislature’s intention”. The rule serves to preserve rather than subvert that 
intention.187 The absurdity of the section in question is that it not only runs contrary to a very long-
standing meaning ascribed by the positive law to the “issue”, at least, of shares, but also does not 
make doctrinal sense. One must, nonetheless, still consider whether it may have been the intention 
of the legislature to change the state of the law as it stood before the Act’s passage.  
This is not the case. Section 35(4) states that an “authorised share of a company has no rights 
associated with it until it has been issued.” Shortly thereafter, s 37(9) of the Act further states that: 
 “[a] person  
(a)   acquires the rights associated with any particular securities of a company  
(i)   when that person's name is entered in the company's certificated securities register; or 
(ii)   as determined in accordance with the rules of the Central Securities Depository, in the case 
of uncertificated securities...” 
Read together, it would appear that the legislature, at least, intended for no rights to vest until entry 
of the shareholder on the securities register. Logically, there can be no security (neither an asset nor 
an instrument) without vested rights. In this light, it must be true that no security can be considered 
to have been issued until such registration. Thus s 50(2) can justifiably be read in a manner that 
replaces “after” with “in”. Whilst this is not an elegant solution, it is the only solution which resolves 
 
 
185  [39]-[45]. From what follows above it would appear that this is also in line with the approach of the 1973 Companies 
Act’s regime.  
186  See for instance Lubbe “Cession” in LAWSA § 152. 




the above-mentioned absurdity and one that (certainly historically) can be assumed not to run 
counter to what the legislature intended.188 
From this, it becomes clear that the issue of shares has precise legal meaning, and consists of the 
following two elements: (1) the completion of a valid causa for the lawfully binding creation of the 
share’s underlying interest (completion rather than existence, because all requirements for the 
creation of the security’s underlying interest bar registration must be met); and (2) the manifest 
creation of the security instrument, causing those rights to vest in securities’ specific and unique 
structure. This is the composite juristic act that brings the share into existence and must be 
completed before a share is issued. Neither one of the two on its own can effect this, as the causa 
does not cause the share’s underlying interest to arise without the creation of an instrument, and 
vice versa.  
Thus, while the word “mastery” above can mean either control or title, it is submitted that it actually 
means both. The underlying structure of shares, in conjunction with the doctrinal principles regarding 
personal rights, show that without a locus for the incidents of execution no rights (or other 
competencies) can arise, at least in enforceable form, and without enforceable rights and 
competencies there can be no incidents of execution to begin with. 
The next question is whether a similar analysis can be made regarding the creation of other 
securities. Unfortunately, this area of law does not enjoy the same wealth of material as shares. 
There are also fundamental differences between the origin of the content of shares and other 
securities.189 The primary difference between shares and other securities is the mechanism for their 
creation. Shares’ underlying interest originates only upon valid issue, as the sui generis 
consequence of certain positive law arrangements made, primarily, through company law. The case 
of contractual securities is more complex, and the role of classification is much more pronounced.  
Here one must distinguish between consensual rights (and in certain cases competencies) and 
consequential, ex lege competencies (and in certain cases rights). In this context consensual rights 
arise contractually (with the underlying purpose of the arrangement being to create a security), and 
this arrangement then forms the basis of that security. These are the foundational rights such as 
entitlement to the structured repayment of a capital sum and interest. Certain competencies may 
 
 
188  The view is also implicitly supported in Yeats et al Commentary 2008 2-673 – 2-674. 
Further, at 2-304, the authors note that “[t]he strange implication of s 35(4) read with s 37(9)(a) is that the rights 
can exist even though they are not held by anyone. Clearly the rights can only be exercised by the registered 
shareholder or, in certain circumstances, by the holder of a beneficial interest in the particular shares.” 
 The view put forward above resolves this tension. 
 See, finally, also § 4 1 3 above.  




also arise contractually, of which the best example is pari passu ranking between holders of a 
specific class or classes of security in the concursus of creditors. The consequential rights and 
competencies that may arise do so ex lege because the legal interest is classifiable as a security, to 
which the positive law attaches a unique content and set of consequences. 
Having recognised this, it can be said that there are three preconditions for the creation of a 
contractual security. The first is a contractual arrangement that bestows upon the ostensible security-
holder a legal interest.190 Second is classification, or at least classifiability, of that legal interest as a 
“security”. The third, as is the case for shares, is the creation of a security instrument founded on 
that legal interest. Only at the moment that these preconditions are met do the ex lege (and mainly 
statutory) rights and other competencies associated with securities arise, consequentially, to that 
factual matrix as a security. Thus classification plays a central role in the coming into existence of 
the underlying interest of contractual securities. This is alluded to in the discussion of s 35 of the 
Companies Act (the “legal nature of shares”) in Henochsberg:191  
“The nature and types of shares are defined in s 35 (s 1 vis. “share”). A share should be distinguished from 
“securities” (s 1 vis. “securities”). ‘Securities’ includes shares, but is a much wider definition and also 
includes ‘…debentures or other instruments, irrespective of their form or title, issued or authorised to be 
issued by a profit company’…The ambit clearly differs and so would the regulation of the Act depending on 
the ‘instrument’ (see e.g. ss 44 to 48). ‘[I]nstruments issued by the company may therefore include, e.g., 
options in respect of shares and allocation rights. However, the concept of “instruments . . . to be issued” 
presents a problem, as these instruments, whatever they may be, are not issued and do not give any right 
to the holder thereof vis-à-vis the company. To include these unissued instruments in the definition of 
“securities” creates uncertainty. It would be clearer to provide for ‘instruments in respect of issued or 
unissued securities.’”192 
Framing a security as a dichotomous construct comprising of an asset and an instrument (although 
not instrument in the sense meant in the quoted passage, but as an abstract locus for the holdership 
of the ability to execute the security, manifesting in a certain way) does much to clarify the problem 
 
 
190  As per Yeats et al Commentary 2008 Int-92: 
 “the common terms associated with a debenture would include the following:  
• the principal (capital) amount acknowledged as a debt, the interest payable and the maturity date for repayment of the 
principal amount;   
• a description of default events and an acceleration clause to the effect that if the company defaults, then the capital and 
outstanding interest will become immediately repayable; and   
• if secured, details of any security provided, for example over certain assets of the company and the related maintenance 
obligations and circumstances in which the security may be realised.” 
191  Delport et al Henochsberg 2008 § 35 158. 
192  PA Delport Die Verkryging van Kapitaal in die Suid-Afrikaanse Maatskappye-reg, met spesifieke verwysing na die 




stated above. However, the more nebulous classificatory problem remains. To illustrate this, 
consider the following three, highly hypothetical, examples.  
In the first, a company’s board agrees that the company is to borrow an amount from A, to be repaid 
with interest in one singe instalment after 36 months. According to the agreement, the company 
endeavours to record his identity on a password protected Excel spread sheet. It further stipulates 
that the company must be notified of any cession effected by A, as the company will only repay the 
loan to the person whose name is reflected in the Excel sheet. The agreement expressly stipulates 
that “despite any similarities, it is not the parties’ intention that this arrangement be construed to 
have created a ‘security’ for the purposes of s 43 of the Companies Act of 2008.”  
In the second, a venture capital firm provides a company with R500m in start-up funding. The quid 
pro quo of the agreement is split into two stages. The first stage lasts 36 months, during which the 
venture capital firm will receive a majority of voting rights at all general shareholders’ meetings. At 
the end of the 36 months the voting rights will terminate, but the firm may elect to receive the right 
to a fixed percentage of the company’s net profits in perpetuity as an ordinary creditor, or elect to 
“redeem” (i.e. terminate) the arrangement in lieu of payment by the company of R500m free of 
interest, as a preferred creditor. The agreement further stipulates (1) that the venture capital firm’s 
rights in terms of the agreement are non-transferable, and (2) that the arrangement creates a 
“perpetual debenture”, and therefore may provide for voting rights in terms of s 43 of the Companies 
Act of 2008, and must accordingly be registered in the securities register and accompanied by a 
certificate. 
In the third, a public company purports to issue five option contracts, doing so through private 
placement in order to avoid the requirements of making an offer to the public. The option contracts 
are structured as “swoptions”, and the holder of the option may, in 24 months, choose to enter into 
a swop agreement with the company on pre-determined terms. These terms are that, during the 
duration of the swop agreement, the counter-party pays a fixed sum to the company every three 
months (the so-called fixed leg of the swop), and in return will receive an amount from the company 
calculated as a fixed percentage of the remainder of declared dividends after preference share 
dividends have been paid and subtracted (the so-called floating leg of the swop). The agreement 
stipulates that despite the arrangement not being classifiable as an option in terms of s 42 of the 
Companies Act, it is a s 43 debt instrument because the option makes it a performance-debtor, and 
thus the options can be issued as securities, in uncertificated form.  
In the first example the arrangement is most likely, despite the averred intention of the parties, a 
security. However, more important is the fact that there is doubt. In the face of doubt, only an 
appropriate classificatory analysis can determine whether, despite the intention of the parties, a 




the company’s securities register or will have to be duplicated in the official securities register; (2) a 
security certificate must be issued; and (3) the other ex lege rights and competencies that flow from 
any factual matrix giving rise to a security, will arise.  
In the second example, the conferring of voting rights will be entirely contingent on the arrangement 
being classified as a security or not, and whilst it is most likely a debt instrument for the purposes of 
s 43, there remains doubt, and thus classificatory analysis is vital. The third example is the most 
ambiguous. Here classification as a security will determine whether the company may issue the 
swaptions “as securities” and this will determine validity of issue in uncertificated form.  
An appropriate classificatory methodology in hard cases (including the above), specifically by making 
use of the Typenlehre, is left for Chapter 6. Nonetheless, this illustrates that when it comes to 
securities which are not shares, classification of the legal interests bestowed by contractual 
arrangements “as securities” is a pivotal and prior element in the creation of those securities (though 
such a classificatory determination may, and probably will, only occur ex post facto in cases of 
dispute). It determines (1) whether certain given ex lege consequential rights, competencies, and 
even structural features of securities are in fact sanctioned by the positive law, or whether (by not 
being securities) such arrangements fail; or conversely (2) whether certain elements of an 
arrangement that should be classified as a security are missing and, since the positive law requires 
these elements to be present, must be read in. 
This is the importance of classification as a prerequisite (albeit implicit) for the issue of contractual 
securities. The second main problem regarding the issue of these securities is when and how the 
various components of the underlying interest of contractual securities are created. It is clear that, 
as in the case of shares, a valid acquiring contract must be concluded. However, in the case of 
contractual securities, this agreement plays a more foundational role. 
In all cases, there are three essential components of such an acquiring agreement. First, it must 
stipulate the consensual rights which will form part of the security’s underlying interest. Second, it 
must provide for performance in the form of actual issue of the security by the issuer. Third, it must 
determine the counter-performance of the acquirer (i.e. consideration in the parlance of shares). 
However, arrangements creating contractual securities differ in complexity.  
On the one end of the spectrum is a single document stipulating all the necessary terms, including 
inter alia: the performances that will serve as objects to the consensual rights of a security, the 
manner in which the security instrument will be created, and a firm counter-value that must be 
provided for acquiring the security (the so-called “issue price”). 
A slightly more complex arrangement might entail the creation of a document stipulating, inter alia, 




only for a mechanism by which the issue price (i.e. the counter-value) will be made certain in future 
(for example a bond auction, which typically takes the form of a Dutch auction).193 In such an 
arrangement, consensus regarding the acquiring contract may be present immediately because the 
price is at least ascertainable, but this is not true of all cases, and consensus may well only be 
obtained at a future date via the stipulated mechanism.194 
In an even more complex arrangement, the issuer will create a general document, setting out inter 
alia only pro forma terms and conditions of all intended future securities, including the manner in 
which the security instrument will be created.195 This is typically the case in a medium- or long-term 
bond or note programme. The issuer, for each successive issue, will then create a separate 
document setting out specific securities’ exact consensual rights and the method by which these 
securities may be acquired, as well as the counter-value (or issue price). Here the former document 
will be incorporated by reference into the latter.196 The intercession of a trust or a mere fiduciary 
payment agent, as well as the documentary arrangements effecting this, may even further 
complicate the arrangement. The question now becomes how concisely to describe the coming into 
existence of these securities’ rights and competencies – i.e. describing the issue of contractual 
securities. 
The core attribute that differentiates shares from contractual securities is that in the case of the 
former all rights and competencies arise simultaneously upon issue, if it follows the conclusion of a 
valid acquiring agreement (which does not itself create any of those rights). For contractual 
securities, this is not the case. Here, the acquiring agreement, either alone but mostly in conjunction 
with a further, supplementary constitutive agreement, serves as the source of the consensual portion 
of the underlying interest of these securities, whilst the creation of a security instrument causes only 
the supplementary consequential rights and competencies to come into being. This is what underlies 
the creation of a contractual security. Why? 
 
 
193  See for example paras. 5, 6, & 8-11 of the “Terms and Conditions”, and para. 4 under “General”, of the RSA R208 
bond. 
194  One of the requirements for the valid conclusion of a contract is certainty regarding performances and other material 
aspects of the contract – Van der Merwe et al Contract (2012) 192.  
195  See for example the “Programme Memorandum Execution” of Steinhoff International Holdings’ SA Bond 
Programme, specifically paras. 3-4 & 14-15. It is hoped that at least the purely legal elements of the company’s 
bond programme remain sufficiently legitimate for use here. 
196  See for example the “Amended Applicable Pricing Supplement” of 3 November 2015 of Steinhoff International 
Holdings’ SA Bond Programme attached in Addendum E of this work, specifically the preamble, paras. 16-20 & 28, 




With the exception of the so-called “qualifications to the will theory”,197 contractual rights can only 
come into being if consensus has been reached by the contracting parties. This occurs through offer 
and acceptance with the necessary animus contrahendo, provided there is compliance with all the 
contractual validity requirements.198 Just as in the case of subscription for shares, in the acquiring 
contract of any contractual security there must be valid consensus through offer and acceptance by 
the issuer and the acquirer, or vice versa.  
As seen above, this contract can comprise a complex scheme of multiple documents. Irrespective 
of its form, however, this contract always stipulates with certainty what the consensual rights 
underlying the prospective security will be, and that there is a (separate) right to an initial 
performance in the form of the issuing of that security. Thus, when the parties reach consensus on 
the counter-value for acquiring the security, they also reach consensus on: performance in the form 
of creation of the security, and the performances serving as objects of the consensual rights of the 
security. Do both sets of rights arise at the moment when the contract is concluded, or only the right 
to the issue of the security? Also, are both sets of rights, if they do arise at the time of the conclusion 
of the contract, immediately enforceable? 
There are three possible options: (1) both sets of rights vest and are enforceable at the time of 
contract conclusion; (2) both sets of rights vest at the time of contract conclusion, but the 
enforceability of the second set – i.e. the consensual rights forming part of the underlying interest in 
the security – is postponed until issue, at which point the underlying interest of the security is 
complete; or (3) only the right to performance in the form of issue vests at the time of contract 
conclusion, and the vesting and enforceability of the consensual rights forming part of the underlying 
interest are postponed until issue.  
There would appear to be dated case law in favour of the first proposition, namely that both dies 
cedit and venit for the consensual rights underlying the security arrive at the moment of conclusion 
of the acquiring contract. In Coetzee v Rand Sporting Club, 199  the court observed that “[t]he 
obligation undertaken by the defendant was to issue an instrument acknowledging certain 
obligations and to fulfil those obligations.”200 The court’s focus in this case is the impact of delivery 
or non-delivery of the debenture document itself on the legal position inter partes (the word 
“instrument” in the judgement refers to a documentary “assignable acknowledgement of debt”, i.e. 
 
 
197  See Van der Merwe et al Contract (2012) § 2.3.5, 28 et seq. – specifically so-called “objective corrective consensus” 
and iustus error, which may form the basis of a security’s consensual rights. However, consensus by these 
alternative means does not fundamentally alter the analysis, and so will not be dealt with.  
198  Van der Merwe et al Contract (2012) 7-8, 19-45 & 46. 
199  1918 WLD 74.  




the debenture).201 The court is undoubtedly correct in stating that delivery or non-delivery of a 
security certificate does not impact the enforceability of the security’s content unless the debenture 
is to bearer.202 This is because enforceability is intimately tied to who may execute the rights and 
other competencies of the security, and the certificate does not facilitate execution: it is merely prima 
facie evidence of the holder.203 
Thus the court makes it abundantly clear that the issuer of a debt security (a debenture in the 
parlance of the case) cannot evade its obligation to pay principal and interest merely by refusing to 
deliver the debenture certificate to the holder.204 The court puts it as follows:205 
“If the refusal to deliver the instrument amounts to a refusal to carry out the obligations under it, it is clear 
that the plaintiff may elect to sue at once for damages or to wait until the date of fulfilment…If there is no 
provision as to redemption it may be that the company could redeem on giving reasonable notice, but I do 
not see on what principle it can be said that the company by refusing to deliver the debenture deed could 
evade its obligation to pay interest. Yet that would be the effect of holding that the plaintiff cannot sue for 
the rights he was to have had under that deed. To hold this would certainly be to hold that the defendant 
could take advantage of his own wrong, and the principle that you cannot take advantage of your own 
wrong is one which has been applied in our Courts more than once…In my opinion the agreement set out 
in clause 3 of the declaration bound the defendant to pay 12 [percent] interest on £1,600, and to pay the 
sum of £1,600 if it were demanded after and if the interest was one month in arrears. It also bound the 
company to give an instrument containing this obligation which the plaintiff was entitled to assign.” 
However, the court’s position seems not to be that the club refused to deliver what would now be 
referred to as the security certificate, but rather that it refused to issue the debenture (which as per 
Chapter 3 at the time were one and the same thing). This is why the case appears to serve as 
authority for the proposition that all the issuer’s obligations are enforceable as soon as the parties 
have reached consensus on the terms of the debt, and that the “issue” of the debenture is a mere 
subsequent formality. 
Above, in the context of shares, it is argued that issue means creation of the security instrument and 
completion of all other requirements for its creation (the completion of a valid causa). Coetzee would 
appear, therefore, to be authority for the fact that in the case of contractual securities: (1) the 
 
 
201  77.  
202  Cowen & Gering Negotiable Instruments 63-64 & 87; United South African Association Ltd v Cohen 1904 TS 733 
738; Randfontein Estates Gold Mining Co Ltd v Custodian of Enemy Property 1923 AD 576 580-581; and Oakland 
Nominees (Pty) Ltd v Gelria Mining & Investment Co (Pty) Ltd 1976 (1) SA 441 (A) 452. 
203  Section 51(1)(c) of the Companies Act.    
204   See also Blackman et al Commentary 5–330 – 5–331, supporting this position in terms of the Companies Act of 
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consensual rights come into being earlier, and (2) that they become enforceable immediately, 
irrespective of the issue of the debenture. The second proposition will be dealt with first. 
This second proposition would be highly problematic if it were extended to issue as it is, or at least 
should be, understood today.206  
The debentures of 1918 were not securities, as the securities concept was in its infancy. “Issued” at 
that stage of the legal development meant mere creation and delivery of the physical debenture 
instrument (i.e. document). It does not mean that today. Even the register of debenture holders 
seems to have been, at the time the judgment was delivered, of far less importance than it is today. 
Whilst the Company Debenture Act of 1895 was not applicable in casu (as noted in Chapter 3, this 
Act was not operative in the Transvaal, but more importantly the issuer was a club rather than a 
company),207 it serves as a useful indication of the approach that the law had to this type of problem. 
The Act does not deal, as Coetzee does, with unsecured debentures.  
Section 2 of the Company Debenture Act stated that: 
“[a]ny Company may from time to time grant and issue debentures and cause the same to be registered [in 
the Deeds Registry – s 1, “registration”; own emphasis] under this Act, and such debentures when duly 
registered shall as from the date of such registration operate…as a first or preferential charge in respect of 
so much of the property of the Company as shall be mentioned and described in such debenture…”  
In section 6, a debenture-holder: 
“shall be entitled to enforce his rights under such debenture so soon as it shall be issued to him precisely 
as though such debenture had been issued under section three [providing for the registration and optional 
lodging of duplicate debentures at the Registrar of Deeds].” [own emphasis]. 
If the two sections are read together, it would appear that debenture-holder creditors were able to 
enforce their rights as soon as debentures were issued.  
From the above, the issue of secured debentures seems to have meant creation and delivery of the 
debenture instrument and, whilst the real security operated from the moment of registration at the 
Registry, such registration did not affect enforcement of the holder’s rights. The Act did not provide 
for the creation of a register of debenture holders by the issuer, merely for real security arrangements 
centred around the Registrar of Deeds (see s 3). There is no reason to think this conclusion would 
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not apply equally to unsecured debentures, such that issue of unsecured debentures also meant 
mere creation and delivery of the documentary debenture instrument. 
The later Companies Act 46 of 1926 was the first legislation to make mention of a register of 
debenture holders in s 92(1). In terms of this legislative scheme, this register seems to have operated 
in addition to registration of secured debentures in the Deeds Registry in terms of s 91. However, 
the latter form of real registration should not be confused with registration in the register of 
debentures, as it fulfilled an entirely different function centred on real security arrangements. 
Real registration was vital to the issue of secured debentures in the early 20th century. Its principal 
aims were to inform the public of the manner in which the debentures were secured, and validly 
effect that security. It was not intended as a record of those who could exercise the rights 
encapsulated in the debenture.208 This is because the economic function of a “debenture” – as a 
special documentary instrument, accessory to an agreement of loan – was to standardise and 
regulate the on-going relationship between creditor and company-debtor, and to augment the 
residual rules of contract (and other aspects of the common law) in certain desired ways. Its primary 
functions were to acknowledge the debt and to effect economically efficient real security.209  
Therefore, on the construction of issue evidenced by the Company Debenture Act and its 
implications for enforceability, the Coetzee case appears to have been correctly decided. More 
importantly, it would indeed seem absurd to hold that non-delivery of an accessory document 
evidencing an indebtedness could affect the enforceability (or execution) of the underlying 
obligations – especially if the debenture were not operating in conjunction with a register of 
debentures.  
The salient question then becomes whether the judgment is a correct reflection of the current legal 
position. Specifically, is it correct to rely on Coetzee to assert that contractual securities’ rights are 
enforceable irrespective of whether issue of the security has been validly completed? For two main 
reasons, this cannot be correct. 
The first reason concerns a change in the remedial regime for holders of contractual rights, occurring 
after the decision. The problem the court faced in Coetzee was that an order of specific performance 
was viewed, at the time and for some time thereafter, as an exceptional remedy, to be refused unless 
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reasons of equity strongly militated in its favour.210 This legal position was only reversed in the late 
20th century, when specific performance was re-established as a generally available remedy to any 
contractant preferring to see the obligations carried out rather than accepting damages, and to be 
refused only in exceptional circumstances.211 
Specific performance, now firmly entrenched as the remedy of choice for contractants desiring 
fulfilment of the obligations over damages, would solve the problem of a modern plaintiff in Coetzee’s 
position far more elegantly. Such a plaintiff could demand specific performance in the form of issue 
of the security, thereby obtaining the security instrument personally or through an agent, and using 
the control it bestows to enforce and realise the performances locked up in the underlying interest. 
This fully addresses the court’s concern regarding an issuer’s ability to benefit from its own 
wrongdoing. 
The second, more fundamental reason for holding that Coetzee’s pronouncements on enforceability 
before issue are no longer appropriate flows from a more accurate theoretical understanding of the 
legal nature of modern securities, with which the reasoning in Coetzee has become incompatible.  
It has been shown that through a series of 20th century legislative interventions, the legal nature and 
structure of debt securities (and to a degree all securities) had been radically altered, specifically as 
a result of the rise of the securities concept itself.212 During the 20th century, as the focus of debt 
securities began to move away from real security and gravitate towards exchanges and trading, the 
role of what has now been identified as the security instrument gradually became increasingly 
important, more defined, and more sophisticated. The role of the register of debenture holders thus 
became increasingly important in relation to the certificate. Conversely, characterisation of a 
debenture as an accessory instrument augmenting a debt became steadily more inaccurate, as the 
asset and instrument components of the modern security are dependent on one another for their 
legal effect. The modern security situates the incidents of execution (and thus the means to enforce 
and realise the performances and competencies) of its underlying interest within the security 
instrument. 
In the case of company debt securities, the law today requires the entry of debt security-holders into 
the securities register.213 However, in the case of debt securities issued by other entities no law 
mandates a register of holders to which the issuer is bound to perform to the exclusion of all others. 
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Further, in the 1926 and 1973 Companies Acts, nominee-holding in the case of non-equity securities 
was also a matter that had to be addressed externally to the issue, as the company (in terms of s 27 
and s 104 of the Acts respectively) was only free to ignore the “execution of a trust” in the case of 
shares.214 Nevertheless, debt securities, in order to function efficiently in the developing (equity-
dominated) secondary marketplace, began structurally to converge with shares and emulated this 
state of affairs through provisions contained in the debt security itself, such as:215 
“4. The registered holder will be deemed exclusively entitled to the benefit of this debenture, and the 
company and all persons may act accordingly. The company shall not be bound to enter in the register 
notice of or in any way to recognise any trust or the right of any person other than the registered holder to 
any benefit under this debenture save as herein provided.” 
Whether a contractual security is issued by a company or any other entity, the creation of the security 
instrument (typically manifesting as the creation and maintenance of a register of holders and issue 
of a certificate; or entry in the uncertificated securities register according to the provisions of the 
Financial Markets Act)216 remains a matter that must be dealt with in the acquiring agreement of that 
security. This seems to hold true even for non-transferable securities such as retail savings bonds 
issued by the South African Treasury.217 
As a result, much as in the case of equity securities, in terms of the acquiring agreement itself there 
is no performance-creditor until someone is entered into the register of holders, or some other 
arrangement is made to make a security instrument manifest. In short, no consensual rights  arising 
from the creation of a security can possibly be enforceable unless there is a legal subject with the 
legal capability to enforce them. The only potential exception may be in cases where existing rights 
are, subsequent to their inception, made subject to the architecture of a security to be issued.  
In spite of the arguments above, Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008, who – after 
reviewing a number of definitions of debenture from various sources – states the following in terms 
of s 43 of the Companies Act.218 
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“[I]t is submitted that, because the word “debenture” is not defined in the Act, a debenture, as defined in 
the common law, may be issued by the company in addition to a “debt instrument” (see s 1 sv “securities” 
and General Note on s 35). The provisions of s 43 should then not apply to this debenture. The meaning 
of a “debenture” is imprecise, but it has been interpreted to mean any document, however it may be 
described, and whatever form it may take, which creates or acknowledges indebtedness in the company 
to another for moneys advanced or to be advanced to the company…These definitions indicate that the 
term “debenture” is used in respect of the written acknowledgement of debt rather than an indication of the 
underlying (lending) transaction.” 
It could perhaps be argued, on this basis, that a debenture would still operate in the manner 
envisaged in the Coetzee case. However, this is not a correct view. First, more superficially, it makes 
little sense that a debenture may be issued (literally) in addition to a s 43 debt instrument – i.e. in a 
manner that the section should not apply to such an issue. Second, and more importantly, the 
arguments advanced in Chapter 3, as well as inclusion of debentures in the definitions of “security” 
in the Stock Exchanges Control Act of 1947, the Securities Transfer Tax Act of 1965, the Securities 
Services Act of 2004, the Financial Markets Act of 2012, and the current Companies Act itself make 
it difficult to accept this view.  
However, alternatively, it may be that what is meant by “in addition to” is in fact “supplementary to” 
– i.e. as a documentary supplement to the underlying debt instrument. Taken in this way, the 
debenture refers merely to the (debt) security certificate. The debt security itself must then comprise 
of the debt instrument (the underlying loan and entry of the security-holder into the company 
securities register) and the debenture (the prima facie evidentiary certificate which completes the 
manifestation of the security instrument). 
It is, respectfully, submitted that this is also unconvincing. The above view is certainly the correct 
one regarding the “debentures” envisaged in the 1926 Companies Act as augmented by the common 
law in force at the time.219 This interpretation would further be understandable as, up to this point, 
the common law definition of debenture has never been revisited or subjected to any analytical 
critique. However, subsequent legal development (outlined above and dealt with fully in Chapter 
3)220 in conjunction with the analysis of the previous section does not support such a view. Supportive 
of the steadily mounting inappropriateness of this dated common law definition and approach is also 
the fact that debentures themselves were capable of being (and indeed were) traded as securities 
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on BESA in dematerialised form at least from 2004 onwards.221 Furthermore, in Standard Bank of 
SA Ltd v Ocean Commodities Inc, the court states that:222 
“[a]lthough the rights conferred by a debenture on a debenture-holder differ in content from those enjoyed 
by a shareholder, similar considerations apply to the registration of debenture-holders, the issue of 
debenture certificates and the holding of a debenture by a nominee.” 
In light of the facts of the case, this makes it quite clear that a debenture in the more modern legal 
sense must refer to the debt security in its totality, and the term can no longer merely refer to the 
“debenture document” (i.e. certificate). 
Together, the above makes it doubtful that the legal nature of a 21st century debt instrument 
nominally referred to as a “debenture” ought to be subjected to – and thus determined by – a common 
law definition (a “written acknowledgement of indebtedness”) that is, at the time of writing, 103 years 
old.223 
For these reasons it is submitted that the second proposition in Coetzee, affirming enforceability – 
or rather executability – prior to issue, is undoubtedly no longer a correct one. This brings one to the 
judgement’s first proposition – that the rights, although now shown to be unenforceable until issue, 
still vest upon mere conclusion of the acquiring contract. 
Company securities remain bound to rules and principles of the Act, and s 37(9) is applicable to all 
securities. Consequently, all company securities are also subject to the legislative imperative of 
register entry for the coming into existence of rights. This makes the current legal position, as far as 
company securities are concerned, unequivocal. Although the acquiring agreement serves as the 
source of the consensual rights, there is an ex lege (and in fact statutorily imposed) suspensive 
condition attached to all such contracts, postponing both dies cedit (vesting of rights) and dies venit 
(enforceability of rights) until the moment when the primary market acquiring instrument-holder is 
entered into the register. The same arguments made above in the context of shares – to the effect 
that no personal right in terms of a security, i.e. no claim to performance as set out in the security, 
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is able to arise unless both the ultimate beneficiary and the legal subject who must be performed 
towards are certain – are also applicable here. 
However, this may not be the case regarding contractual securities not issued by companies. The 
law of contract gives parties great freedom to build variability into agreements. It is therefore 
submitted that, depending on the intention of the parties as evidenced from the acquiring agreement 
and the surrounding factual matrix, the consensual rights of a non-company contractual security can 
either: vest with enforcement postponed until issue (i.e. dies cedit is immediate but dies venit is the 
moment of issue); or vest and become enforceable upon issue through the operation of a contractual 
suspensive condition that is in effect similar to s 37(9) of the Companies Act (so that both dies cedit 
and venit are postponed until issue). Admittedly, especially in light of the manner in which the law 
treats company securities, the latter view remains doubtful. Nevertheless, in either case, recognition 
of a registered holder to the exclusion of all others remains a central prerequisite for the valid creation 
of the security in question. At the very least it is impossible for dies venit to arrive earlier that the 
date of creation of the security instrument, and though certain rights may have vested prior to 
creation of the security instrument, no security can be said to have been issued prior to that act. 
From the above, the only material difference between the issue of shares and the issue of contractual 
securities appears to be the effect of the acquiring contract. In both cases it serves as causa for the 
creation of a security – the reason for the coming into existence of a bundle of positive law rights 
and competencies. In the case of shares, the causa serves as a requirement for the creation of the 
security (by creating a personal right to be issued the security), but does not itself create any rights 
or competencies. In the case of the latter, this causa serves both as a requirement for the creation 
of the security and also, alone or in conjunction with an additional constitutive agreement or set of 
linked agreements, as the constitutive source of the security’s consensual rights and perhaps also 
certain competencies. 
Further, common to all contractual securities (irrespective of at which point the rights come into 
existence) is that enforceability of the underlying interest of a security will arise only upon creation 
of a security instrument – register entry (though the act of issuing the certificate may, factually, occur 
thereafter). The creation of the security instrument is the performance required in terms of the 
personal right to issue the security, as mandated by the acquiring contract. This performance causes 
the consensual rights either to vest, or vest and become enforceable, as well as causing the 
consequential rights to arise. Without a security instrument, there is no legal subject to perform 
toward, or who can claim performance in terms of the security. Thus, the creation of the security 




only the term as found in sections of the Companies Act dealing either with contractual securities or 
company securities in general,224 but also facilitates an understanding of non-company securities.  
In conclusion, issue in the case of contractual securities is: (1) the valid conclusion of an acquiring 
agreement, serving as source for the security’s consensual rights and causa, or lawful basis, for the 
creation of the security (by creating a further personal right to issue of the security); and (2) the 
creation of the security instrument. These two steps bring into existence, ex lege, the remainder of 
the security’s (non-consensually arising) underlying interest, and cause enforceability of the full 
underlying interest to arise. 
There is one type of security that has been conspicuously absent in this discussion – the participatory 
interest in a collective investment scheme (“ICIS”). The Collective Investment Schemes Control 
Act225 does not contain any provisions dealing with the form that the participatory interests must take. 
It states that such an interest is:226 
“any interest, undivided share or share whether called a participatory interest, unit or by any other name, 
and whether the value of such interest, unit, undivided share or share remains constant or varies from time 
to time, which may be acquired by an investor in a portfolio…” 
It further states that any “assets of an investor must be properly protected by the application of the 
principle of segregation and identification”.227 The form of an ICIS is thus innately variable. However, 
most ICISs take the form of shares in a so-called “open-ended investment company”,228 and are thus 
created through issue in the same manner as ordinary shares. Even other collective investment 
schemes that are labelled as “trusts”, most notably REITS,229 typically make use of the company 
form. However, even true trusts, which are seemingly viable as the vehicle for conferral of  an ICIS, 
could cause a security instrument to be created in a number of ways, including through the trust 
deed in conjunction with the ICIS itself, or contractually in a manner analogous to the issue of purely 
contractual securities. A security instrument is, however, vital for the creation of an ICIS, as it must 
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be capable of being held in uncertificated form,230 which necessitates a separation of asset- and 
instrument-holder.231 
Having established the meaning of issue, as the juristic act bringing securities into existence, the 
next section looks more closely at the legal nature of securities. It focuses specifically on the 
meaning, construction and nature of the security asset and instrument, respectively.  
 
4 3   Consequent features of security-holdership 
This final section will deal, on a principled basis, with three consequent theoretical aspects of (debt) 
securities.  
First, it will deal with the nature of the relationship that exists between an issuer and separated asset- 
and instrument-holders of a security, the relationship between the latter holders inter se, as well as 
the various interceding relationships that can be interposed between the holders of a given security.  
Second, it will use the asset-instrument dichotomy to give a more detailed account of the proprietary 
feature of securities. Specifically, it will discuss some of the more important theoretical legal 
problems in the realm of factual holdership, with specific reference to outlining a  more suitable  
construct for what may correctly or incorrectly be referred to as quasi-possession. This will form the 
basis for the discussion of specific problems in securities law (most notably real rights, agreements 
and relationships). 
Last, it will analyse more deeply the (as yet largely ignored) modern role of the security certificate of 
certificated securities. 
Once again it bears mentioning that any critical differences that arise where a certificated security 
instrument is exchanged for an uncertificated security instrument or where a security is issued in 
uncertificated form will be dealt with in the following chapter, and will as far as possible at least be 
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4 3 1  The relationships between issuer, holders, and select third parties 
This section deals mainly with the effects of separated asset-and instrument-holdership. The 
tripartite relationship which arises between an issuer of a security and separate asset- and 
instrument-holders is a difficult matter, further complicated by the related (but not synonymous) 
relationship between asset- and instrument-holders inter se.  
Though the latter can be described as having “proximate control” over the security through control 
over the incidents of execution, the former holds the incidents flowing from the substance of the 
security’s underlying interest, and must accordingly be able exercise control over how that underlying 
interest is executed. Thus, the asset-holder appears to have the privilege of “control over the 
executor”. This is critical for the analysis below. 
The position of both holders must be understood – and thus dealt with – separately before the totality 
of the consequences of these arrangements is clear. What follows also appears to be the second 
illustration, after the discussion of issue above, of the problem-solving, or at least elucidatory, 
qualities of the asset-instrument dichotomy posited here.  
The global relationship between an issuer and respective asset- and instrument-holders of a given 
security appears to be one of agency, 232  in the narrow sense of representation. 233  Through 
holdership of the incidents of execution shorn of any substantive interest in such a security, it 
appears logical that the instrument-holder represents the asset-holder (as the holder of the security’s 
patrimonial value) through her exercise of those incidents for the benefit, and subject to the 
directives, of the asset-holder. This seems true of all matters that arise between the issuer and the 
security in question. Only the instrument-holder is competent to compel the issuer to act in these 
matters, and even in cases of application for rectification of a securities register a court must restrict 
itself only to deciding who the true instrument-holder is.234  
Yet in Sammel v President Brand Gold Mining Co Ltd the court, in discussing the impact of s 27 of 
the Companies Act of 1926, states:235  
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“no one can be registered as holding the shares as the agent for another; he, the agent, must himself 
appear on the register as the holder of the shares. Consequently, such a person came to be known in 
ordinary commercial parlance as the 'nominee' of the owner of the shares, probably because the word 
conveniently and usefully synthesised the dual concepts that the person was nominated by the owner to 
hold the shares for him in his name and that he thus held them only nominally, i.e., in name only.” 
Nonetheless the instrument-holder of an asset-holder principal meets the criteria for agency, as an 
agent is described as:236 
“a person who concludes a juristic act with the intention to create, alter or extinguish legal relationships for 
another person and not for him or herself.” 
Agency as representation, therefore, extends beyond mere representation in the conclusion of 
contracts on behalf of a principal, and (subject to certain exceptions) “all types of juristic acts can be 
concluded on behalf of another person by a representative.”237 This, in conjunction with the court’s 
use of the term “legal relationships”, seems quite important. As has been established, the security 
instrument bestows on its holder the incidents which enable the execution of the underlying interest 
– i.e. the performance of all juristic acts necessary to realise and enforce the underlying interest. The 
holder of the incidents facilitative of enjoyment of the substantive value or benefits of the underlying 
interest is not enabled to perform any of these juristic acts. Thus the former, who has no substantive 
interest in the security, must perform these juristic acts on behalf of the latter.  
The (instrument-holder) agent in this case acts by virtue of her holdership of the instrument as legal 
object in her own name, but still on behalf of the (asset-holder) principal. This may, prima facie, 
appear problematic as it suggests, as per Sammel, a fusing of agency and mandate. Yet 
understanding incidents as functionalities flowing from interaction between (1) the “subjective rights 
and relationships” dimension of securities’ rights and competencies, and (2) what is countenanced 
by the objective law in the exercise of legal subjectivity, resolves this issue. It is clear from the 
definition above that representation goes further than merely the creation of obligations in the name 
of another. A security instrument-holder, as described, is “a person who concludes…juristic act[s] 
with the intention of creating [through register entry], altering [for example in the exercise of 
competencies] or extinguishing [for example in receiving performances] legal relationships…” on 
behalf of the asset-holder. There is no discernible reason to hold that such an agency cannot arise 
from the deeper structural properties of an underlying interest, instead of by agreement. 
Whatever combination of rights and other competencies the underlying interest of a security 
contains, the execution-functionalities vest in the holder of the security instrument. As a result, the 
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issuer need only perform towards the instrument-holder, for instance by paying this holder dividends, 
coupon-payments (interest and capital on debt securities), the allocated residual portion of assets 
after liquidation, or benefits due in terms of holdership of an ICIS. The issuer also need only, subject 
to limited exceptions, recognise the instrument-holder as empowered to exercise other 
competencies such as voting rights,238 appraisal rights in terms of s 164 of the Companies Act, or 
redemption and conversion rights. Furthermore, only the instrument-holder has the requisite locus 
standi to compel the issuer to do so, because the instrument-holder is the sole holder of the 
entitlement of determination (opvorderingsbevoegdheid) over the totality of the underlying interest, 
allowing this holder to establish a valid cause of action. However, it remains that only the asset-
holder (as beneficial interest holder) is entitled to the ultimate (economic) benefits of these rights 
and competencies as patrimony. 
This manner of construing the nature and structure of the registered “ownership” allows one to make 
much more sense of the current legal position, as well articulated in Commentary 2008:239 
“Generally, upon the entry of a person’s name in the securities register, the person becomes entitled to the 
rights of a registered holder (referred to in these notes as ‘registered title’ for convenience, without 
suggesting that the holder is the legal owner in the same manner as applies under English law) in respect 
of the securities in question…Also, the acquisition and termination of registered title need not correspond 
with the acquisition or disposal of beneficial ownership (or another beneficial interest) in any securities.  
Under English law, registered title constitutes legal ownership at law, notwithstanding that under equity law 
the beneficial ownership can vest with another person based on the application of English law of trust 
(actual or constructive). While South African company and trust law is based on English law, the preferred 
view is that South Africa has not generally adopted the English concept of dual ownership in regard to 
property and has rejected the concept of constructive trusts. Consequently, the relationship between a 
beneficial owner (without registered title) and its nominee (with registered title) is regarded as a relationship 
of principal and agent (in contrast to a trust relationship under English law). Nevertheless, our courts are 
influenced by English jurisprudence and sometimes strive to achieve a functionally similar result. Based on 
this, traditionally a company has been regarded as confined to its securities register and the nominee is 
generally regarded as having the exclusive rights to enforce the rights attaching to a share. This gives rise 
to some uncertainty as to the exact position of a nominee, in particular whether a nominee is vested with 
any proprietary rights. While the agency construction suggests that the nominee is bound by the 
memorandum of incorporation in its capacity as agent, the nominee is nevertheless usually regarded as 
holding the securities as if it were the owner (i.e. as principal) in relation to the company because the 
company is regarded as confined to its register and the nominee is generally responsible for the 
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shareholders’ obligations and entitled to enforce the shareholders’ rights against the company in its own 
name to the exclusion of the beneficial owner.” 
With this in mind, consider first the legal position of this agent and the source of the agent’s authority 
– i.e. the legal basis for execution of the security. It is trite that an agent’s capacity to conclude juristic 
acts on behalf of the principal must derive from authority. Although the source of such authority is 
typically the juristic act of authorisation, there are a number of other ways in which such authority 
can be brought about, including “by operation of law”. 240  Here one must remember that the 
constitutive source of a security’s underlying interest has continued relevance throughout the 
operative lifetime of a security because it is binding upon each successive acquirer, so that any 
structural modifications that source imposes on the underlying interest are intrinsic to each 
security.241 The key structural property in this particular context is the dual nature of securities, and 
the content of the dual components – i.e. the instrument- and asset-holdership respectively.  
In that structure is an implicit and unavoidable legal nexus between the instrument-holder and the 
asset-holder: the contents of holdership of both derive from the same complex of rights and 
competencies forming the underlying interest. Quite simply, the “legal machinery by means of which 
legal relationships can be created, altered or extinguished between…[a legal subject] and a third 
person via the representative” (a formulation ascribed to JC de Wet),242 is already in place, and need 
not be actively created by the principal. Each holder is merely a different kind of creditor with 
reference to the common underlying right or rights.243 
On this basis, it is submitted that the authority facilitating the agency between instrument- and asset-
holder arises by operation of law, as a result of the underlying (dual) structure of securities operating 
vis-à-vis security-issuers. In the case of securities issued by entities other than companies, the 
authority is purely a function of the acquiring contract, as given effect to by issue of the security. In 
the case of companies’ contractual securities, it is a function of the terms of the acquiring contract, 
the memorandum, as well as supplementary provisions in the Companies Act, as given effect to by 
issue of the security. In the case of shares, it is a function of the empowering legislative matrix put 
 
 
240  See AJ Kerr The Law of Agency 3 ed (1991) 8; and Dendy “Agency” in LAWSA § 125 & § 138, the latter also 
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in place by the Companies Act, in conjunction with the company’s memorandum, to govern the legal 
dynamics of shares. 
However, one could argue instead that the primary market acquirer, and all subsequent secondary 
market acquirers, of a particular security authorise – by implicit juristic act – the instrument-holder 
simply by accepting the security asset. To do this, one interprets acceptance of the beneficial interest 
without registered holdership as also constituting the unilateral juristic act required to empower the 
nominee. This is artificial and convoluted. 
Moreover, there is case law which appears to be demonstrably in line with the first view, running 
contrary to this view. These cases pertain to the legal position between the acquirer and disposer 
(or the disposer’s nominee) of a certificated security244 after cession of the beneficial interest has 
taken place, but before registered transfer. What makes the scenarios in these cases crucially 
important is that in each there is no explicit arrangement between the (new) asset-holder and the 
instrument-holder. What these cases appear to establish is that the law is unable to accommodate 
a situation where the asset-holder does not have control over the instrument-holder, and is 
seemingly willing to read in an implied authority in the absence of express provision for it. 
Moosa v Lalloo,245 Standard Bank of SA Ltd v Ocean Commodities Inc,246 and Gomes-Sebastiao v 
Quarry Cats (Pty) Ltd247 all confirm unequivocally that:248 
“a seller, prior to [registered] transfer of a share to the purchaser, is in fact a trustee on behalf of such 
purchaser. As trustee, the transferor is bound to act upon the instructions of the transferee.” 
The English doctrine of constructive trust – intimately tied to legal and equitable ownership – is not 
a feature of South African law,249 and for this reason Blackman et al describe this reference to “trust” 
as a:250 
 “sui generis implied agency…(and has similarities to a deposit arrangement)…”  
 
 
244  Unsurprisingly, the cases deal with shares, but the principle is equally applicable to all securities.  
245  1956 (2) SA 237 (D) 238-239. 
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247  [2010] JOL 26416 (GSJ). 
248  Gomes-Sebastiao v Quarry Cats (Pty) Ltd [2010] JOL 26416 (GSJ) [39]. 
249  Lucas’ Trustee v Ismail and Amod 1905 TS 239 244; Blackman et al Commentary 5-172 n 6; and T Honoré & E 
Cameron Honoré’s South African Law of Trusts 4 ed (1992) 17 & n 132. 




One can now posit more correctly that it is implied not by a juristic act, but rather by the structural 
features of securities. Furthermore its “sui generis” nature is now made clear.251 The instrument-
holder will always be regarded as the agent of the asset-holder, and thus is guaranteed authority by 
virtue of the nature and contents of instrument-holdership as it stands in relationship to the nature 
and contents of asset-holdership. The law will, indeed must, always ascribe authority to the 
instrument-holder as agent of the asset-holder. Thus, this holder will, as a point of departure, always 
have the requisite authority to deal with the issuer vis-à-vis the security in question. This deals with 
the control over the execution of securities.  
What has not been dealt with is the implications thereof for the direct relationship between agent 
and principal – i.e. “control over the executor”. 
In this regard, case law further dictates that a second default facet of this agency is the obligation to 
adhere to the directives of the asset-holder. As cited with approval in Ocean Commodities Inc v 
Standard Bank of SA Ltd,252 the “concept of a nominee” is described in Oakland Nominees (Pty) Ltd 
v Gelria Mining & Investment Co (Pty) Ltd, as follows:253  
“A nominee is an agent with limited authority: he holds shares in name only. He does this on behalf of his 
nominator or principal, from whom he takes his instructions; see Sammel and Others v President Brand 
Gold Mining Co Ltd 1969 (3) SA 629 (A) at 666.” 
The notion that the agent’s authority is inherently limited by an imperative to adhere to the 
instructions of the asset-holder is also echoed in Standard Bank of SA Ltd v Ocean Commodities 
Inc,254 Dadbhay v Dadbhay,255 Francis v Sharp256 and Gomes-Sebastiao v Quarry Cats (Pty) Ltd.257 
This is a converse, but equally de facto, outflow of the structural properties of securities, and is 
almost self-evident from a legal policy perspective. 
In this regard, Blackman et al further state that the instrument-holder as agent “binds himself to 
exercise his rights and powers…as directed by, and in the interests of the beneficial owner”,258 and 
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look to U.S. authorities259 to underscore the fiduciary nature of the nominee-agent’s relationship to 
the beneficial interest-holder.260 However, in light of the above, a better formulation may be that the 
instrument-holder is “is automatically bound…”, as no voluntary juristic act is required for this bond 
to arise.  
Furthermore, the dual premise that the instrument-holder has proximate control over the execution 
of the underlying interest of the security, but the asset-holder remains solely entitled to all patrimonial 
benefits of that interest yields a further insight. Simply: the instrument-holder exercises control over 
the patrimony of another, just as a director exercises control over the patrimony of the shareholders; 
a trustee over the patrimony of its beneficiaries; a depositor over the patrimony of a depositary; or a 
gestor over the patrimony of the dominus negotii.  
These very similar examples serve to highlight that from a policy perspective there appears to be a 
clear fiduciary imperative arising from this arrangement. This is why Blackman et al describe this 
agency as similar to depositary arrangements, and more importantly why the courts have persisted 
in using the term “trust” and “trustee” despite it being inappropriate in the literal and strict sense261 – 
it conveys something of this fiduciary dimension which the courts are, justifiably, reluctant to omit 
from the formulation.262 Importantly, this also strengthens the critical distinction between the right of 
the asset-holder to have instrument-holdership transferred to her (which she holds) and the right to 
registered title (which she may or may not hold, depending on the set of facts, and directives, 
between the two holders).263 
In sum, from the underlying structure of securities, the following becomes clear.  
First, a mere instrument-holder (i.e. a nominee) derives the capacity to act as representative agent 
on behalf of the asset-holder (as principal) by operation of law, due the manner of separation of the 
incident-functionalities of the underlying interest into asset and instrument. 
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Second, the extent, scope and content of the authority bestowed upon the instrument-holder as 
agent is, for that same reason, inherently limited by: (1) the asset-holder’s directives, and (2) the 
implicitly fiduciary nature of the relationship.  
Third, perhaps most strikingly, it greatly simplifies legal analysis related to these relationships. By 
postulating registered rights as a separate type of holdership of a different legal object, it elevates 
the so-called perspective of the issuer – i.e. the position in terms of internal relations – to a feature 
of the objective law, undoing the need for separate legal analyses. It reveals that there is, by virtue 
of instrument-holdership, automatic authority (balanced by limited scope and a fiduciary nature) to 
deal with the issuer, and to do so to the exclusion of the principal. In so doing, it creates a picture of 
these tripartite relationships where the ostensible difference between “internal” and “external” 
positions is resolved. This allows for single integrated legal position and consistent application of 
principles instead of the anomalous effects of received English company law (and ultimately trust) 
jurisprudence within a Civilian private law. It unifies potentially divergent legal outcomes regarding 
issues such as rectification, remedial litigation, authority and control of the agent, and the position of 
the beneficial interest holder.  
It also abrogates the need to posit some entirely separate registered “ownership standing” 
independent of “beneficial ownership” where the former must also (by virtue of the view’s inherent 
inconsistencies) be described as simultaneously resembling quasi-possessio and a proprietary 
interest. 
However, although the exclusivity between instrument-holder and issuer is inviolable, this must not 
be taken to mean that its default form – between asset- and instrument-holder inter se – is not 
alterable. The only hard limitation is that alteration cannot have any bearing on the legal position of 
the issuer. In Francis v Sharp, the court specifically states:264 
“If, as alleged, the plaintiff was the beneficial owner of shares in the company, the first and second 
defendants, as her nominees, were bound to exercise their rights and powers as members as directed by, 
and in the interest of the plaintiff as beneficial owner (Oakland Nominees (Pty) Ltd v Gelria Mining & 
Investment Co (Pty)…). The nature of the rights and obligations of the plaintiff as nominator and the first 
and second defendants as nominees inter se would be governed by the contract or relationship between 
them (Henochsberg on the Companies Act 5th ed vol I at 210).” 
Thus, despite the fact that there is already a fully formed legal relationship between the asset- and 
instrument-holder as described above, the parties may choose to augment, supplement or even 
 
 




change its nature. This can be achieved by altering the scheme of authority (unilateral or bilateral265 
alteration of the above de facto scheme of agency), or through the conclusion of a superordinate 
contract of mandate, or even through the use of a trust or bewind trust. The relationship of trust in 
the less formal sense – i.e. a fiduciary relationship – may also be made more formal and detailed by 
agreement. 
If a contract of mandate is concluded, one could still use the term agency, but in the wider sense, “in 
terms of which one person, called the agent, performs some task for another person, called the 
principal, in connection with a juristic act by or for the principal…[which] belongs to the category of 
contracts known as mandate or mandatum in Roman-Dutch law”. This typically includes a scheme 
of “agency as representation” but goes beyond it.266 The law regarding mandate is fairly settled, and 
it is unnecessary to go further than this here.267  
The relationship between asset- and instrument-holder may also be altered as a consequence of the 
intercession of a formal trust.268 In these cases, one must further distinguish between an ordinary 
trust and a bewind trust.269 
Regarding the former, the trustee is the asset-holder nomine officii,270 and can either make use of a 
nominee as instrument-holder and thus agent, or simply also take the position of instrument-holder 
herself. Such a trustee must manage the security for the benefit of the trust beneficiary, but the latter 
has no direct interest in the security – merely a personal right against the trustee to the benefits of 
the security as a trust asset.271 Thus it contributes nothing to the discussion, as either the default 
legal position (as above) exists between holders, or there is no separated, dual-holdership to begin 
with.  
The case of a bewind trust is more complicated, as the security asset resides in the estate of the 
trust beneficiary, but control over that asset with the trustee. 272 Such control can be brought about 
in two ways. The first is where the trustee is made the instrument-holder, controlling the security 
through the incidents of execution for the benefit of the beneficiary. This leaves the default position 
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as discussed above unchanged in principle, but an additional layer of trust rules is imposed on the 
legal relationship.  
The second manner of effecting the necessary control for a bewind trust is where the trustee makes 
use of a nominee. Here, the nominee (as instrument-holder) holds the ability to execute the security’s 
underlying interest, but ultimate control over the instrument-holder is exercised through the trust 
vehicle by the trustee, despite the fact that the trust beneficiary is the asset-holder. This may seem 
a peculiar situation, as it is the one instance where no ultimate control over instrument-holder resides 
with the asset-holder. However, this is a result of the principles and operation of trust law as overlaid 
upon the holdership arrangements, having little effect on the applicable securities law principles 
outlined here. 
Thus, with the exception of the bewind trust, the asset-holder will always retain an original authority 
to issue directives and instruction to the instrument-holder. Any interceding intermediation between 
these parties manifests, legally, as a delegation of this power to the relevant intermediary or 
successive intermediaries.  
In the case of the bewind trust, on the other hand, the scheme of directives (which both directs and 
limits the instrument-holder’s authority) flows from the trustee rather than the beneficiary-and-asset-
holder, as part of what could be characterised as a delegation effected through the principles of trust 
law. All that appears to be required is that the asset-holder or someone appointed on the holder’s 
behalf (such as a trustee of a bewind trust or when a broker is made use of) must be in a position to 
exercise ultimate control over the executor of the underlying interest (the instrument-holder), doing 
so through the scheme of directives which inherently limits the agent’s authority. 
 
4 3 2  The proprietary features of securities 
It is axiomatic that registered securities are incorporeal property. However, in this context “property” 
is not necessarily a precise, nor helpful term. First:273 
“[t]he use of the word “property” in law is complicated by a variety of factors…Hence, the exact meaning of 
this complex term depends almost entirely on the context in which it is used. Even on the most elementary 
level, this term signifies various different but distinct legal concepts. First, it may signify the right of 
ownership in a legal object. Second, it may also refer to the legal object (or “thing”) to which this right 
relates. Since the introduction of a new constitutional order…the term “property” may, in the third place, 
denote a variety of legal relationships qualifying for protection as such under the Constitution, although they 
 
 




might not resort under either of the two previously mentioned descriptions. Thus “property” is not a term of 
art and in itself no more than a convenient expression to denote the existence of some types of legal 
relationships between specific persons and legal objects, which in many instances can be classified as 
“things”.  
Second, the imprecise scope of the term is exacerbated by issues regarding the meaning of “rights”, 
such that property:274 
“in the sense of “rights” is traditionally seen as ownership or real rights, but may also be perceived in a 
wider sense, so as to include patrimonial rights, such as personal rights and immaterial property rights.” 
Nonetheless:275 
“While it may be doubtful whether the rights which a share confers on its holder can be classified as 
'property' in the usual sense, one thing at least is clear: the share itself is an object of dominion, i.e., of 
rights in rem and not so to regard it would be barren and academic in [the] extreme. For all practical 
purposes shares are recognised in law, as well in fact, as objects of property which can be bought, sold, 
mortgaged and bequeathed. They are indeed the typical items of property of the modern commercial era 
and particularly suited to its demands because of their exceptional liquidity. To deny that they are ‘owned’ 
would be as unreal as to deny, on the basis of feudal theory, that land is owned…” 
The problem of using the terms “ownership”, “property” and “proprietary” without a firm theoretical 
foundation of what this denotes is also aptly illustrated by the authors in Commentary 2008 in their 
description of “registered ownership” of a security as an independent “proprietary”, or “quasi-
proprietary” ownership interest that also has elements of quasi-possessio.276  
However, there is analytical usefulness to the term property in the context of (incorporeal) securities. 
Most notably, this usefulness lies in “property” as: (1) a denotation of the patrimonial characteristic 
of securities as potentially valuable assets, and (2) indicative that certain limited real rights may be 
established over one or more of the incidents of securities, very similar to the manner in which limited 
real rights can be established over corporeal property.277 It follows that the proprietary aspects of 
holdership are in fact quite important, especially in terms of laying a theoretical groundwork for the 
more practical problem-solving exercise of Part 2 of this work. 
The first question in coming to grips with the proprietary dimension of securities is whether securities 
ought to be viewed as (incorporeal) things. This can be easily answered with a comparison between 
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the qualities (or required characteristics) ascribed to things and the demonstrable qualities of 
securities. Both securities and things are: impersonal, independent, susceptible to human control, 
and have a great deal of use and value.278 Thus the issue comes down to corporeality as the final 
ostensibly required characteristic of all things,279 a quality that securities do not possess. Is this 
requirement unavoidable, or can (perhaps rather should) securities nonetheless qualify as things? 
The currently prevalent legal view, principally influenced by the modern paradigm of subjective 
rights, is that (but for a number of what have been styled doctrinal “exceptions”) incorporeal rights, 
such as personal rights or limited real rights, are not things. This is despite their recognition in the 
Roman and Roman-Dutch, essentially Gaian, property systems as res incorporales.280 The main 
reasons advanced281 for their exclusion from the typology are that it (1) would require the recognition 
of a “right to a right”, which has been deemed a jurisprudential absurdity (which argument is, itself, 
absurd);282 (2) would dissolve the distinction between real and personal rights to an unacceptable 
degree;283 (3) obviates the principle that real rights require corporeal things as objects because real 
rights confer direct physical control over their objects; 284  and (4) it subverts, or ignores, the 
fundamental distinction between the legal object of a subjective right and the subjective right itself.285 
For various complex and technical reasons these arguments are unconvincing, but need not be 
further challenged here. 
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Despite this seemingly strict exclusion the law has extended, in a number of instances, certain legal 
concepts (regsfigure) traditionally applicable only to things, to incorporeals – treating rights, and 
indeed incidents of rights,286 as legal objects. From a policy perspective:287 
“[d]ie een waarheid wat die hele lange geskiedenis sowel as die Suid-Afrikaanse regspraktyk in hierdie 
verband leer, is die feit dat daar reeds van die vroegste tye af ’n wesenlike behoefte in die praktyk bestaan 
het na die onstoflike as kommoditeit binne die sakereg, of dan in moderne terminolgie, die funksionering 
van regte as objekte in die saaklike reg. Die rede hiervoor is te vinde in die ekonomiese waarde wat in 
hierdie regte opgesluit is. Trouens, daar word beweer dat rykdom vandag hoofsaaklik uit vorderinge met 
kommersiële waarde bestaan en dat die res mancipi van vandag onstoflik is.”  
This point rings especially true in the case of securities. In the modern economy they serve crucially 
important commercial functions for issuers, most notably the functions of capital-raising and 
conversion of fruit-bearing assets into liquid capital (i.e. securitisation). This is equally true for holders 
– typically securities fulfil an investment-function as a store and creator of wealth, and a less-
mentioned but systemically critical collateral function by serving as real security for the incurrence 
of (mostly commercial) debt.288 
With regard to these exceptional cases of extension (typically through limited real rights over 
incorporeals), a subtle distinction in the nature of the originating rights should be pointed out. Certain 
secondary incorporeal rights are “corporeal-adjacent” in the sense that they pertain directly or 
indirectly to the control of things in the true sense. These rights are mostly, but not always, real 
rights. This accounts for most of the well-established instances of extension, such as the courts’ 
recognition of a pledge over mineral rights,289 as well as provisions in the Deeds Registries Act290 
allowing for real security rights over real rights to land, personal servitudes, and, again, mineral 
rights. Yet certain personal rights, such as those of a lessee, also exhibit an adjacency to an 
underlying corporeal thing. This is evidenced, for example, by the Deeds Registries Act’s recognition 
of real security rights over leases and mineral leases. 
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This adjacency is alluded to by a number of authoritative sources291 in the context of the spoliation 
order. Specifically, this quality is important in determining whether a finding of quasi-spoliation of an 
incorporeal right, as a factual state of affairs, is tenable. Quasi-spoliation seems to require some 
nexus, or at least similarity, to true possessory control over a corporeal thing.292 Hence:293 
“[i]n cases of so-called quasi[-]possession where the mandament has been used in the past, the exercise 
of a right was always so closely connected with possession of corporeal property that loss of the right could 
be regarded as an infringement of possession of the corporeal object itself.”  
However, not all incorporeal rights exhibit such corporeal-adjacency. Securities, inter alia, fall into 
this latter category, and have no sufficiently close connection to (control over) any corporeal legal 
object (as will become clear throughout the rest of this Chapter, the use of physical certificates is not 
enough for this not to be true). The same can be said of a great many personal rights and, perhaps 
as a rule, of intellectual property rights. 
This extension of legal concepts found in the law of things has also been applied to incorporeals that 
have no connection to corporeal things. Most notable is the pledge construction of the cession in 
securitatem debiti. Other examples include the extension of the usufruct construct to shares,294 and 
perhaps even entire estates,295 as well as the quasi-usufruct to, inter alia, debts.296 There has also 
been, whether correctly or incorrectly,297 an extension (in principle only) of the mandament van spolie 
(and by implication some form of quasi-possessio) to securities register entry.298 The protection of 
holdership of securities is more specifically dealt with in Chapter 11 and to some degree also Chapter 
10. However, neither this topic nor other elements of the broader theme at hand can be satisfactorily 
accounted for without a coherent theoretical understanding of the proprietary features, and 
specifically the factual features, of the various forms of holdership of securities. 
Moreover, there are some limited references to incorporeals as things in the literature. It has for 
instance been stated that “South African legal practice has recognised the existence of incorporeal 
things and real rights relating to them, therefore confirming the notion of a right being the object of 
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another right.” 299  Whilst the latter part of the statement is undoubtedly correct, the former is 
doctrinally contentious. It relies on Janse van Rensburg v Grieve Trust CC, where the court made 
the following observations:300 
“On the facts appearing from the stated case, it is clear that the parties entered into a single contract of 
purchase and sale, the traded-in vehicle ostensibly forming part of the purchase price of the vehicle 
purchased in terms of such contract. In fact it was not the vehicle as such which was traded in, but the 
purchaser’s incorporeal right thereto in terms of his credit agreement with a third party. It is common cause 
that the appellant, as purchaser, made an innocent misrepresentation relating to the model of the traded-
in vehicle. On the strength of such misrepresentation, the respondent, as seller, agreed to place a higher 
valuation on such vehicle than was warranted by its actual model. 
In view of the legal considerations set forth above, it is irrelevant whether the contract of purchase and sale 
relates to a corporeal or incorporeal thing. It is likewise of no moment that the said thing does not contain 
a latent defect or defects, but has merely been misrepresented (by way of a dictum or promissum) as being 
something which it is not. In all these cases the aedilitian actions are available. Most importantly, for present 
purposes, is the fact that it does not matter that the defective or misrepresented thing is not the object of a 
sale or barter. The aedilitian actions are equally applicable to an object forming part of the purchase price 
or pretium of a thing purchased. Hence, on the grounds set forth above, the actio quanti minoris is available 
to a seller in a trade-in agreement should the vehicle traded in be defective or misrepresented as aforesaid.” 
In order to justify the availability of the actio quanti minoris, the court appears to have extended the 
notion of things to include incorporeals. Specifically, the right in casu is the seller’s personal right 
operative against the (third) party with whom a credit agreement was concluded (in order to finance 
the vehicle). In such cases, the patrimonial value of the claim against the financing party (as owner) 
for delivery of the vehicle upon full repayment will approximate the value of the vehicle less the value 
of the outstanding instalments. If the model of the vehicle is misstated, the value of the claim will 
have been misrepresented, as was held. This would appear to apply equally to sales transactions in 
which the value of a share or a debt security has been misrepresented.  
Yet to take this as the recognition of incorporeal things within the South African property dispensation 
(“the purchaser’s personal right to the traded in vehicle…was recognised in Janse…as an 
incorporeal thing for the purposes of a contract of sale”)301 is, respectfully, a misreading of the case. 
The contractual construct of sale is not limited to things, as any patrimonial object can, in principle, 
be made subject to a purchase or sale. Logically, therefore, the actio as a remedy of sale applies 
equally to any patrimonial object capable of transfer, and there is no need to elevate personal rights 
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to the status of things before the action becomes available. The use of the phrase “corporeal or 
incorporeal thing” should be seen as mere terminological inaccuracy, where “merx” would have been 
more suitable.302 
Further, AJ Van der Walt and GJ Pretorius in Introduction to the Law of Property also appear to 
suggest that an important exception to the corporeality requirement is the case of shares, citing Ben-
Tovim v Ben-Tovim303 as “[providing] that shares in a company…are incorporeal things.”304 Yet, 
again with respect, (1) a reading of the case reveals the court merely stated that shares are 
“property” and nothing more;305 (2) it does not follow that an incorporeal is a thing merely because it 
functions as the patrimonial object to another right, as per the usufruct example given in-text; and 
(3) this is in any event not in line with the predominant view. 
These rare statements do not make things of these incorporeals, and it is submitted that incorporeals 
should not, for the sake of legal clarity, accuracy and most importantly rigour, be regarded as things, 
despite certain merit-worthy theoretical assertions to the contrary.  
In fact, this position reveals a more important and fundamental source of theoretical friction. Despite 
the fact that the South African private law (including the law of things) is, at least as point of 
departure, ordered in accordance with the doctrine of subjective rights, its common law is not.  
First, to make this argument, a more accurate view of the nature of the South African common law 
must be articulated. It is submitted that to state that the South African common law is the Roman-
Dutch jurisprudence of Holland during the 16th and 17th century306 is a misstatement. In truth, after 
the dust of modernist-purist debate settled during the mid- to late-20th century, it became clear that 
South Africa has a common law system: (1) that relies on Roman-Dutch authority stretching not only 
beyond the borders of Holland (strong reliance on Von Savigny, for example, can be offered up as 
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evidence of this), but also beyond the 16th and 17th century; and (2) wherein a marked English law 
influence is not only evident, but indeed actively present.307  
Moreover, largely due to the operation of the (English) principle of stare decisis in South Africa, the 
most robust description of the South African common law of today is one framed in terms of case 
law. It appears to be more sound and accurate to state that the common law comprises of those 
English law principles received through case law, operating in conjunction with those Roman-Dutch 
(in the wider sense) principles which have been revived through case law.  
The total, wider omnibus of English and Roman-Dutch law principles should not be seen as an active 
or concrete part of the South African law in so far as it is not reflected in modern case law. Instead 
these principles have a latent function, to be relied upon only when the positive law falls short, and 
requires development not evident in existing case law.308 Even then, these principles are often 
modified to suit the contours and unique development of modern South African law, rather than 
received verbatim. To use simple terms, the totality of these respective systems’ principles stand 
with only one foot in, and one foot out, of the South African positive law. 
This is a source of theoretical friction because when the South African courts turn to the Roman-
Dutch elements of the common law to solve unprecedented contemporary legal problems,309 they 
turn to a system of private law which pre-dates the doctrine of subjective rights. The courts’ 
recognition, for instance, of the pledge or usufruct over incorporeal rights is perfectly acceptable in 
the older, essentially Gaian division of things (including corporales and incorporales) from which the 
courts formulate their point of departure. However, this does not so easily accord with the modern 
order of private law constructs flowing from the doctrine of subjective rights. A clear illustration of 
this issue is the circumscription of the merx in the contract of sale as inclusive of incorporeal things 
as discussed above. 
With this as background the focus can turn to securities. The theoretical framework developed in the 
first section of this chapter is partially derived from a theoretical position which arose specifically to 
rationalise one these common law-driven exceptions, namely the pledge construction of the cession 
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in securitatem debiti. As it was necessary to reconcile this cession with a more modern view of the 
structure of personal rights, so it must be done for securities. To do so, as is the case for most of 
this chapter, the chosen point of analytical incision is at the level of securities’ resultant incident-
functionalities. In this paradigm, any analysis driven by the doctrine of subjective rights is bound to 
fail in accounting for the proprietary features of modern securities. 
The following false paradox best illustrates this point. It is trite that, in the law of things, a number of 
simultaneous legal relationships (ownership and various forms of lawful holdership) can exist 
between a given legal object and a number of legal subjects.310 It is further also, by the logic of the 
law, impossible for more than one legal subject to be the possessor 311  of a legal object 
simultaneously – there can only be one possessor of an object at any given time. Further, in order 
to pledge a corporeal moveable, possession must typically be handed over to the pledgee through 
traditio, and such possession is a legal function of effective factual control coupled with the requisite 
animus.312 
However, if one were to take a share or debt security as legal object, the instrument-holder seems 
to have factual control over the rights and competencies which underlie it, through holdership of the 
incidents of execution. Thus, for example, the instrument-holder would appear to have quasi-
possessio of the security for the purposes of the mandament van spolie.313  
On the other hand, it would appear that for the purposes of pledge it is in fact the asset-holder who 
has factual control314 of the security, and consequently by analogy has quasi-possessio required for 
a security cession. Two simultaneous instances of possession of the same object are impossible in 
 
 
310  This is well illustrated in Van der Walt & Pienaar Property 168-169, where by example the authors identify, for a 
television set, the owner as a bank in terms of a credit agreement, a credit purchaser as holder of a first right of 
use, a lessee as holder of a secondary right of use, a thief as interim unlawful holder, and the police (“confiscating 
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(1988) THRHR 276 283. 
312  See for instance GF Lubbe (revised by TJ Scott) “Mortgage and Pledge” in WA Joubert (ed) Law of South Africa 
Vol 17(2) (2 ed) 2008 § 418, and also n 294 above. 
313  As per Tigon Ltd v Bestyet Investments (Pty) Ltd 2001 (4) SA 634 (N). 





the paradigm of the law of things – as a matter of logic and practicality no two persons can possess 
a tangible thing simultaneously. The paradox is, of course, false because possession and, most 
likely, quasi-possessio, are not appropriate constructs for incorporeal objects which are not 
corporeal-adjacent, as they bear no nexus to physical things.315 
It is unnecessary to delve any further into a legal-philosophical exposition of the merits, shortcomings 
or any adjustment of the classificatory scheme of rights and property in South African law, nor to 
characterise securities as things.316 The pledge of securities is unassailably possible. So too, by 
virtue of Cooper v Boyes,317 is the granting of a usufruct over shares and by implication (debt 
security) perpetuities. The case also shows that a quasi-usufruct over ordinary debt securities (the 
underlying debt is “consumable” in the sense that its value diminishes with every coupon payment) 
is possible. By ascribing incidents of use and enjoyment to securities, this opens the door for other 
constructs, such as lease of securities (which, whether or not correctly described as lease, already 
appears to be a commercial phenomenon), as well. 
This is clearly, as Kleyn explains, due to the “wesenlike behoefte…na die onstoflike as kommoditeit 
binne die sakereg…[om rede] die ekonomiese waarde wat in hierdie regte opgesluit is.”318 The 
practice of vesting rights over other rights, or even merely over certain incidents of rights, is not an 
outflow of a characterisation of incorporeals as “things”. Rather, it is feature of law that has 
developed: (1) due to the commercial need for incorporeals and their components to functions as 
the objects of rights; and (2) because the residual Roman-Dutch, essentially Gaian, source material 
facilitated such development in modern South African law. The mere fact that rights (and even 
incidents of rights) may function as legal objects of rights is ultimately sufficient in the current context. 
Nonetheless, it remains true that “a mechanical application of the tenets of property law to shares in 
a company [as well as to other securities] can sometimes result in anomalous conclusions”.319 Of 
central import here are the decisions of Oakland Nominees v Gelria Mining & Investment Co and 
Cooper v Boyes and Tigon v Bestyet Investments.320 The anomalous nature of the legal issues 
raised by these and similar decisions flows principally from the uncertainties regarding the 
proprietary features of bundles of personal rights (and other competencies). However, based on the 
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work preceding this section, it has become possible to show that securities’ unique properties allow 
for a sound and rigorous explanation of their proprietary features. 
The primary hurdle in formulating a coherent account of this proprietary dimension of these 
instruments is the lack of a viable and functional equivalent to possession of corporeals. This factual 
construct fulfils a number of key proprietary functions which are of great relevance to securities.321 
The “enhanced” proprietary dimension of securities, coupled with their unique underlying structure, 
renders the dynamics of holdership of securities difficult to explain using purely existing private law 
principles. This will become increasingly clear in the remainder of this Chapter. Such an analogue 
to the possessory concept will also serve to facilitate a (corollary) understanding of the legal 
mechanics of establishing limited real rights over securities and subsidiary elements of securities, 
as discussed in Chapter 9. Thus the remainder of this chapter is devoted to outlining an account of 
the factual features of holdership. 
However, a preliminary issue must be addressed – there can be no holdership of any sort without a 
legal object to establish holdership over. Thus, before the factual features of holdership can be 
properly treated, an accurate delineation of a “legal object” in the present context is required. This is 
dealt with in the first section, after which the factual features of securities are given full attention. 
 
4 3 2 1 Legal objects in the incorporeal paradigm 
A pivotal concept throughout this chapter has been that each of the dual components of a security 
can be a separate legal object. From an understanding of this, the meaning of holdership and even 
instrument become almost self-evident. 
A logical first question is whether the security asset and instrument, in the form posited in § 4 1 
above, are capable of juridical objectification in the first place. However, as will be seen, an equally 
important question is whether individual incidents potentially residing within these constructs are 
capable of similar, individual juridical objectification. Each of these questions is important in its own 
right and have an impact on the proprietary dynamics of securities. Thus, the issue of juridical 
objectification itself must first be clarified. 
Juridical objectification derives from the doctrine of subjective rights, which sought to emphasise the 
subject-object relationship as the most important legal relationship in circumscribing the nature and 
content of “private law rights and relationships” (i.e. the expanded view of the ambit of the domain 
 
 




of subjective rights).322 In South African law, the father of the doctrine is WA Joubert, who definitively 
saw private-law rights as a legal relationship between subject and object.323 His work relies heavily 
on that of H Dooyeweerd,324 to whom Joubert ascribes the following point of departure:325 
“Dooyeweerd [stel] die subjektiewe reg as die deur veroorlowende regsnorme gereguleerde beskikkings- 
en genotsbevoegdheid van ’n regsubjek oor ’n ekonomiese gefundeerde regsobjek in die samehang van 
geneemskaps- en maatskapsfunksies in die sin van vergelding.” 
This notion is directly assimilated by Joubert, and from it (as well as the influence of Dabin)326 
followed the traditional four-fold327  classification of subjective rights in South African law: real, 
personal, personality, and immaterial property rights, identifiable according to their legal objects. 
Joubert summarises his theoretical outcomes as follows:328 
“(1)  Onmiskenbaar is die feit dat van subjektiewe reg alleen sprake is i.v.m. regsverhoudinge tussen 
subjekte onderling; die verhouding subjek-subjek is so vanselfsprekend van die subjektiewe reg as 
die bestaan van die reg as samelewingsorde. 
(2)  Allesoorheersend by die subjektiewe reg is die betrekking tussen regsubjek en regsobjek, wat so 
duidelik spreek uit die onmiskenbare verhouding tussen die eienaar en sy saak maar by nadere 
analise in elke subjektiewe reg aanwesig is. 
(3) Die inhoud van die subjektiewe reg bestaan in ’n genots- en beskikkingsbevoegdheid van die subjek 
oor die objek van sy reg ooreenkomstig die norme van die ‘objektiewe reg’, wat daardie genot en 
beskikking reguleer deur ’n balansering van belange van regsubjekte onderling. 
(4)  Regsobjek kan alles wees wat vir die reghebbende ’n ekonomiese waarde verteenwoordig in die sin 
dat dit vir hom gaan oor ’n relatiewe skaarsheid van die goed, wat nie noodwendig ‘n geldelike 
markwaarde besit nie maar tog vir die reghebbende op geld waardeerbaar is. 
(5)  Die subjektiewe reg, geleë aan die subjeksy van die reg, staan selfstandig teenoor die die reg as 
norm, maar sy inhoud word deur die regsnorme gereguleer… 
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(6)  Van die beskikkings- en genotsbevoedgheid oor ’n regsobjek (subjektiewe reg) moet onderskei word 
die bevoegdheid in die sin van kompetensie (bv. handelingsbevoegdheid, bevoegdheid van ’n vader 
t.o.v. sy kind), waar geen subjek-objek-betrekking aanwesig is nie. 
Die deurslaggewende aspek van die subjektiewe reg is die betrekking tussen subjiectum en objiectum 
iuris.” 
It has already been stated that this theoretical paradigm, despite its wide-spread acceptance, is of 
little problem-solving value.329 Nonetheless, a measure of critical engagement with the doctrine is 
once again necessary to understand juridical objectification. This is also important for the following 
section’s discussion of a functional possessory concept and other factual features of holdership. It 
is neither necessary nor appropriate to engage in a wholesale critique of the doctrine here. All that 
is required is a discussion of the doctrine’s theoretical limits and problems as they relate to the issues 
at hand. 
Of central importance is that “[c]oncepts of private law are intermediaries between facts and legal 
effects.”330 Even Joubert argued, correctly, that any “regsbegrip” must be developed with reference 
to the features of reality, but also in a scientific manner, subject to falsifiability (although without 
allowing practicality or overly legal-philosophical considerations to override a robust systemisation 
of legal concepts).331 This does not mean the law cannot be practical. Instead, according to Lubbe, 
within the paradigm of juridical dogmatics:332 
“skep die sisteem die vertroue dat die aanwending van regsbegrippe die moontlikheid bied om nuwe 
probleme deur middel van juridiese konstruksie op te los. Hiermee word bedoel 'n proses waardeur uitslae 
kreatief gegenereer word deur karakterisering van die regsaard van 'n situasie, dikwels aan die hand van 
verskillende regsbegrippe en die aanwending van verwante reëls. Die sogenaamde "rationale 
Expansionskraft" van algemene regsbegrippe en die verskynsel van sisteemsdwang dra by tot die 
vrugbaarheid van hierdie metodiek.” 
The legal nature of securities presents just such an opportunity for, as put above, “rationale 
Expansionskraft” in the face of potential systemic error (sisteemdwang).333 The doctrine of subjective 
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A primary reason is that it does not adequately distinguish between economic value and socio-
commercial usefulness in its approach to juridicial objectification. 
The best illustration of the problem of legal objects being founded in economic value is the problem 
of personality rights. The defensibility of aspects of personality against infringement, in which 
success results in an award of economic value (solatium), lead Joubert to conclude that aspects of 
personality must have intrinsic economic value. For that reason, it was argued, personality could 
serve as the object of subjective personality rights. Here the influence of Dabin is also apparent. 
Dabin’s fourfold classification of subjective rights was based on three characteristics: the subject-
object relationship, implying the former’s mastery over the latter; inviolability and enforceability; and 
juridical protection. His process in reaching this model placed less emphasis on the nature of the 
legal object than that of Dooyeweerd.334 
The problem with aspects of personality is that personality's “economic value” is contestable. Most 
importantly, solatium is a(n economic) compensatory expression, or approximation, of non-economic 
suffering, rather than patrimonial harm (economic loss). This makes Joubert’s position, 
fundamentally flawed on its own reasoning.335 Tellingly, Dooyeweerd himself eventually revised his 
theoretical position, excluding aspects of personality from his taxonomy of legal objects. This was 
done on the basis of their lack of economic value and he consequently re-characterised personality 
rights instead as “subjective legal interests”.336 
If something has no economic value, it is – in Joubert’s theoretical paradigm – not capable of legal 
objectification. As JD Van der Vyver argues, if all legal objects must have economic value, aspects 
of personality are not legal objects; if aspects of personality are legal objects, then the metric of 
economic value itself must be flawed.337  
In a slight adjustment of the definition of legal object, an eminently workable solution was found. In 
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“the aspect/facet/function of an entity [“entiteit"] which has legal value for a specific subject, on the basis 
that one or more extra-juridical uses [“waardes"] of that entity is legally designated [“bestem”] to bring about 
satisfaction of need [“behoeftebevrediging”], to the exclusion of all other legal subjects.” 
Accordingly, the concept “legal object” is reduced to the dimension of an “entity” (i.e. a  conceptually 
ring-fenced phenomenon of reality such as a chair) which has legal rather than economic value. This 
legal value is, in turn, derived from its extra-juridical usefulness in satisfying a need. On this basis, 
the focus of the nature of subjective rights is shifted away from the nature of the object and towards 
the legal subject’s ability to derive substantive determination and enjoyment from her relationship 
with that object.339 This is a far more suitable approach. First, it replaces the concept of economic 
value with extra-juridical usefulness. Second, it shifts the focus back to the content of subjective 
rights: the dual entitlements of determination and enjoyment over phenomena that have use for legal 
subjects inter se. Third, it more appropriately reframes the entire issue as being a question of what 
the law is seeking to achieve – the delimitation of an interest in something which is of use (among 
competing interests). 
In the pledge construction of the cession in securitatem debiti generally, the beskikkings-
bevoegdheid serves as the legal object of the limited real right of security for a debt.340 The patrimony 
locked up in the personal right as a whole remains with the holder of the genotsbevoegdheid – i.e. 
the pledgor. The object of the pledge is an entitlement of determination with respect to performance, 
but only a contingent right (upon default) to retain the benefits of such performance. Thus it is difficult 
to argue that this object has intrinsic economic value in the sense Dooyeweerd and Joubert 
envisioned: it is of no patrimonial consequence unless the primary debtor defaults. However, it 
certainly has extra-juridical usefulness: it provides the pledgee access to the underlying value of the 
performance through the ability to realise and enforce it, and the ability to benefit from that 
performance if and when a default-event occurs. 
Thus it can be asserted that holdership of the ability to determine realisation and enforcement of the 
content of a right (a claim to performance) has extra-juridical usefulness, and thus legal value for its 
holder, and indeed others. It must, therefore, be capable of juridical objectification.  
 
 
339   As the two foundational entitlements of subjective rights – Van der Vyver en Joubert Persone- en familiereg 13; 
Van Zyl & Van der Vyver Inleiding 421; and Van Niekerk (1990) TRW 35. 
 This is also dealt with in § 4 1 1 as the source of many of a security’s incidents. 
340  This also shows, for instance, that the pledgee has beskikkings- and genotsbevoegdheid over the incidents of the 
beskikkingsbevoegdheid of the personal right serving as the object of her limited real right of pledge. This may 
seem, at first glance, absurd, but it is the enjoyment component of that limited real right that comes into effect if the 
pledgor cannot repay the debt and the security right of the pledgee is triggered, and it is over that object which a 
full free-standing limited real right comes into existence, complete with its own two-fold components inherent to 




This brings the discussion to the first useful theoretical outcome of this analysis: the legal 
objectification of the security instrument. 
Holdership of the security instrument amounts to holdership of the equivalent of the entitlement of 
determination over the totality of that security’s underlying interest; consequently, its functionalities 
are all incidents of execution of the security’s complex of rights and other competencies. The 
entitlement of determination as the ability to execute the underlying interest has extra-juridical value 
for its holder and others. It must follow that it is similarly capable of juridical objectification without 
doing unnecessary violence to the underlying dogmatic structure of private law rights. Thus, 
holdership of the instrument is holdership, in the full sense, of a legal object (rather than, for instance, 
some amorphous sui generis modification of the holder’s legal subjectivity). 
Furthermore, doing away with the security instrument construct in favour of a mere relationship of 
agency, with or without positing “separate and severable” ownership(s), in explaining the legal nature 
of so-called registered-holdership is insufficient and unsatisfactory. It fails, inter alia but most 
importantly, to explain: (1) the issuer’s exclusive relationship with the registered holder,341 (2) the 
reason for, or source of, the ex lege relationship of agency (with fiduciary features) that automatically 
arises from the use of a nominee, (3) the requirement of registered transfer in completing the transfer 
of security-holdership,342 as opposed to a mere formality of replacing one agent with another; or (4) 
why one of the methods by which securities can be pledged in securitatem debiti is through making 
the pledgee registered-holder. 
Lastly, the qualities of the security instrument further show that it should be regarded as capable of 
juridical objectification. This instrument (separate from the asset) has, as is the case with corporeal 
things, the qualities of:343 an impersonal nature, independence,344 susceptibility to human control, 
and, as argued above, eminent usefulness. Further, in contrast to personality rights, the instrument 
is also transferable.  
 
 
341  “Inderdaad is die implikasie van hierdie reëling dat die geregistreede aandeelhouer in hierdie opsig, byvoorbeeld 
met betrekking tot die opvordering van dividende wat deur die maatskappy verklaar is, as skuldeiser – en nie maar 
net as agent nie – aan te merk is. Die oënskynlike teenspraak in die erkenning van beide die geregistreerde 
aandeelhouer en die genottreker as skuldeisers van die maatskappy word uit die weg geruim indien ingesien word 
dat albei skuldeisers is, maar dan met betrekking tot afsonderlike komponente van die skuldeisersbelang.” – Lubbe 
(1989) THTHR 498 & n 79. 
342  As per Botha v Fick 1995 (2) SA 750 (A). 
343  See § 4 3 2. 
344  “Incorporeals in the form of other rights only meet the requirement of independence if the requirement is widely 
interpreted as stating that the needs of legal practice determine what the law regards as independent.” – Badenhorst 
et al Law of Property 29 (see also n 122). The suggestion that the “needs of legal practice” do indeed demand that 
the security instrument be regarded as independent in this sense is, of course, a central aspect of this entire work, 




In sum it is not possible to conceive of the security instrument, or even the more traditional notion of 
holding “registered ownership”, without judicial objectification – despite the fact that on its own it 
does not appear to have any patrimonial dimension. Consequently it must also be capable of 
holdership in the full sense, though such holdership does not confer on its holder an asset. 
The second useful theoretical outcome of this analysis, and of perhaps even greater importance 
than the soundness of the objectification of the security instrument, is further insight into what is, and 
is not, within the incorporeal paradigm, capable of juridical objectification. Simply: if something has 
legal value due to an extra-juridical usefulness which has been designated to satisfy a need to the 
exclusion of others, it can be objectified. Here a fine distinction must be made. Adherence to this 
definition does not make something a legal object, it makes it capable of objectification where legal 
subjects wish it and the positive law allows it. 
What this then reveals when dealing with securities is that, given the appropriate context, juridical 
objectification can occur on three levels. First, the complex of rights and other competencies is 
capable of juridical objectification as the “security”. Second, both the entitlement of determination 
and the entitlement of enjoyment are individually capable of juridical objectification as the security-
asset and -instrument respectively. Third, at the level of incidents, any subsidiary incident-
functionality which, if appropriately isolated, adheres to the definition is also individually capable of 
juridical objectification. 
 
4 3 2 2 Factual features of holdership – effective factual control 
With this in mind, the next step is understanding the factual features (and potential factual 
consequences) of the various forms of holdership of securities. As has been covered to some extent 
already, and is fully elaborated upon below, there is great complexity in the unique underlying 
structure of (the various forms of holdership of) securities. This causes the traditional constructs 
applied to obligations, and of cession and limited cession, to fall short in explaining all the features 
of holdership of securities, both factual and legal. 
This section will outline the factual features of holdership. First, it will outline the legal functions of 
possession in the more traditional (corporeal) sense in order to understand what a functional 
analogue of possession in the securities context needs to achieve. Second, it will briefly contrast the 
two main competing viewpoints and taxonomies of the possession of corporeals – traditional 
common law possession, and a more modern scheme of “effective control” as developed by AJ Van 
der Walt. This is necessary in order to show (1) that the traditional, common law construct of 
possession (which inevitably informs the notion of quasi-possessio of incorporeals) has certain 




obsolescence; and (2) that a more modern “possessory” scheme centred around control has a 
number of advantages. 
Third, on this basis, the section aims to show that the traditional concept of quasi-possessio is an 
insufficiently developed concept to deal with the various complexities of holdership in the securities 
context. However, due to the fact that quasi-possessio is ultimately informed by control, this will also 
show how Van der Walt’s control-driven scheme may be used meaningfully to refine what is currently 
(and quite loosely) understood as quasi-possessio. Fourth, and most importantly, this theoretical 
basis will enable an exposition of a functional possessory construct (effective factual control) of the 
various potential legal objects to which securities may give rise – one which has problem-solving 
value and is robust in facing the complexities of the various legal relationships and acts securities 
facilitate. 
Much of this discussion is implicitly informed by what appears to be the unusually strong proprietary 
character of securities compared to other obligations. This emphasised or enhanced proprietary 
aspect is driven by higher order socio-economic considerations regarding (1) the historic 
development of holdership and transfer of securities, and (2) securities’ historic and present-day 
primacy among incorporeals345 as an easily acquirable and transferable economic asset. 
The proprietary dimension of securities is strongly tied to the prominent economic status securities 
enjoy as an important store of wealth. Securities are more comparable to movable property than, for 
example, ordinary contractual obligations. Further, securities’ closer proximity to the “corporeal 
incorporeality” of negotiable instruments, if viewed on the spectrum of paper’s effect on obligations, 
adds to their distinct proprietary character. The manner in which paper has historically come to be 
used as a proxy for this enhanced proprietary element of securities (specifically the certificate and 
instrument of transfer) in the mixed South African legal system is particularly instructive in this regard. 
As will be shown below, the instrumentality of both certificated and uncertificated securities evinces 
a kind of control which appears almost more akin to control of corporeals than, for instance, 
obligations emanating from verbal contracts. The form in which control of securities manifests has 
interesting effects. For example, an unlawful, mala fide control of securities is made possible by the 
security instrument – something which would be hard to conceive of in most obligationary contexts.  
This proprietary characteristic makes a coherent version of quasi-possessio specifically valuable and 
imperative, but also inevitably more complex. The fact that securities are treated “more like things”  
in a number of contexts is an important driver of the need for a more functional version for the current 
possessory construct as both a theoretical lynchpin and a practically useful tool. A truly functional 
 
 




analogue must thus be consistent with the nature of the object in question, and in so doing have 
problem-solving qualities.346 
Arriving at such a construct, however, requires a brief overview of the nature and functions of 
possession of corporeals, difficult as the topic of possession may be.347 The concept of possession 
in the corporeal realm has been greatly debated, discussed, and written on; what follows offers a 
limited précis of the essentials. There appear to be two competing views (and correspondingly 
competing terminologies) regarding the possessory concept. 
The first view is more traditional and common law-oriented. It is best concretised by ADJ Van 
Rensburg and CG Van der Merwe.348 It ascribes to possession two elements: animus and corpus. 
 The latter, also known as the objective element, refers to the measure of effective physical control 
which the possessor must have over the object, a measure which varies depending on the 
circumstances (including the nature, size and purpose of the object) in question.349 
The second, more decisive, element is the animus, or subjective, component. The traditional view 
takes a contextually variable view of the nature of possession:350 
“[d]ie belangrikste poging om die besitsproblematiek op te los, is egter die standpunt wat vandag algemeen 
aanvaar word, naamlik dat een omvattende omskrywing van besit nie gegee kan word nie en dat besit vir 
elkeen van die funksies daarvan afsonderlik omskryf moet word.” 
Specifically, it is the particular quality of animus which lends each type of possession its character. 
Each form of possession has a different consequential function, and for each function only one of a 
specific subset of intention(s) will suffice, so that “the content [of the intention] depends on the 
particular legal consequence of possession which one has in mind.”351 In a more forward-looking 
 
 
346  However, care must be taken as to such a construct’s use. For example, sight must not be lost of the principle that, 
as a point of departure, cession of incorporeals requires no formalities akin to (constructive or true) delivery or 
registration to effect a valid real agreement. This has also been held to be true of the full cession of a share, and 
indeed any security – see Botha v Fick 1995 (2) SA 750 (A). Any approach not in line with this principle should be 
approached in a circumspect manner. Yet this is a topic more appropriate for the following section and Chapter 8. 
347  Very well described by Van der Walt in (1990) THRHR 276-277. 
348  See ADJ Van Rensburg & CG Van der Merwe “Die aard van besit en die animus-element daarvan” (1978) Tydskrif 
vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 113; as well as Van der Merwe Sakereg 89-112. It is further, but less 
emphatically, followed in Badenhorst et al Law of Property 253-266 (Chapter 12 - Possession).  
 The traditional view’s best treatment, however, is found in Van der Walt (1988) THRHR, although it is a summary 
and this is the source from which the opposing view originates.  
349  Van der Merwe Sakereg 97-9; Badenhorst et al Law of Property 255-258; see also Van der Walt (1988) THRHR 
287. 
350  Van der Walt (1988) THRHR 283. 
351  Badenhorst et al Law of Property 259, but more fully 258-264; Van der Merwe Sakereg 103-106; and Van der Walt 




sense, the above would seem to imply an open-ended concept of possession, with currently 
crystallised forms for currently understood consequence-creating functions. These functions are a 
key aspect of the overall outcome of this section and the next and can be dealt with in this precursory 
portion of the discussion (alongside the various types of animus which go with them). The functions 
which have no clear applicability to securities have been omitted.352 
The first is the real (saaklike) function, centred around original or derivative acquisition of ownership. 
In order for the legal consequences of ownership to flow from the factual control either held or 
acquired by the acquirer, such control must be accompanied by animus domini (the intention to 
become owner). In accordance with the traditional view, this function circumscribes the required type 
of intention, thereby defining this type of possession. 
The second is the security function (sekuriteitsfunksie), referring to the creation of real security. Here, 
generally, factual or objective control must, it appears, occur alongside the intention either to retain 
physical control for own advantage (animus sibi habendi) or to derive benefit (animus ex re 
commodum acquirendi) in order to bring about the legal consequence of real security. Again, these 
types of intention delineate the corresponding type of possession required.  
Third is the evidentiary (bewysregtelike) function, which is based on the principle of publicity. 
Relevant authorities tend to focus on its function with specific reference to possession forming the 
basis of a presumption of ownership, and thus ascribe the animus domini as the applicable 
requirement. However, there appears to be no reason why the corresponding intention cannot be 
extended based on the evidential necessities at hand – for example, possession with the animus 
sibi habendi could fulfil an equally useful evidentiary function where a third party has placed reliance 
on possession as evidence of real security, and seeks to show the reasonableness of that reliance. 
Fourth is the more contentious legal-political (regspolitiese) function. Briefly, this is a policy-oriented 
function of possession focused on the maintenance of social order and cohesion by protecting the 
status quo on the basis of such possession. However:353 
“[d]ie kernvraag is of die regspolitieke funksie van besit, soos dit in besitsbeskerming vergestalt word, net 
op die mandament van spolie betrekking het en of ander remedies ook daarmee verband hou…Gewoonlik 
word die regspolitieke funksie van besit gekoppel aan die handhawing van ongekwalifiseerde besit teen 
onregmatige versteuring of ontneming daarvan. Die meeste bronne vermeld die feit dat hierdie summiere 
 
 
352  For the sake of convenience, coherence and brevity, the views of the relevant authorities will be synthesised in 
what follows, without any more particular reference; although the structure of Van der Walt’s neat summary (286-
295) will be relied upon to inform the form and order of the discussion.  




handhawing of herstel van die status quo op regspolitieke oorwegings berus…Daar bestaan egter 
onduidelikeheid oor die doel van besitsbeskerming.” 
As a result of its unclear scope and possible fluidity, the precise nature of the animus required to 
fulfil this function is not always certain, although it appears that most forms of conscious intent 
beyond mere awareness would seem to suffice if appropriate for its purpose. This function need not 
be dealt with here any further, as once the outcomes of this section become clear, it may form the 
basis of a discussion of the protection of bona fide unlawful holdership in the securities context (see 
Chapter 11, and to some degree Chapter 10). 
Fifth, and last for present purposes, is the restitutive function (vergoedingsfunksie), in which 
possession plays a material part in the successful pursuit of any applicable delictual claim. Here, 
similarly, there is evidence of a relaxed approach to the necessary intention in order for this 
possessory function to have legal consequences.  
What should be clear from the above is not only that possession fulfils a multitude of vital functions 
in determining the availability, or legitimacy, of certain legal relationships and consequences, but 
also that to some degree “die verskillende funksies nie goed van mekaar onderskei word nie, en ook 
nie baie duidelik omskryf word nie.”354 
For this reason, Van der Walt proposes a significant restatement of the possessory construct, both 
in nature and terminology.355 In this second of the two competing views, possession is relegated to 
status as one of many consequences of a more foundational concept – effective control of a 
corporeal. Thus Van der Walt’s view, echoed in Van der Walt & Pienaar, inverts the typology, making 
control the core construct (comprising of effective physical control and the necessary animus), with 
all else flowing from it:356 
“the distinction between ownership, possession and holdership is explained with reference to lawfulness 
and the intention of the controller in each case…ownership and lawful holdership [all other real rights] are 
lawful forms of control, whereas possession and unlawful holdership are unlawful forms of control. 
 
 
354  Van der Walt (1988) THRHR 295. 
355  Van der Walt (1988) THRHR 508 et seq. (Part II); see also Van der Walt & Pienaar Property 169-175. 






The concept of physical control does not apply to rights in incorporeal property, and it is not necessary 
either, because these rights in property are held and exercised in an abstract manner, not physically.” 
The underlying premise of this restatement is outlined as follows:357  
“Die funksies wat besit in die samelewing vervul, het sedert die die derde eeu ingrypende veranderinge 
ondergaan. Soos in die geval van eiendomsreg sou dit onrealisties wees om te veronderstel dat besit die 
selfde funskie kan vervul in twee samelewings wat so ingrypend van mekaar verskil as die Romeinse en 
die moderne.  
… 
As gevolg van die onvermoë van die bestaande regsistematiek en besitsteorie om die waardverskuiwings 
ten aansien van die saakgebruik in die moderne lewe te akkomodeer, word tradisionele regsfigure soos 
besit oorspan in ’n poging om die sistematiese en terminologiese tekortkominge in die huidge besitsteorie 
te oorkom.  
… 
Een van die belangerikste terminologiese probleme wat in ’n alternatiewe benadering opgelos moet word, 
is om ’n aanvaarbare oorkoepelende begrip te vind waarmee besit, in die sin van ’n algemene verwysing 
na die daadwerklike of feitelike “besit” van die eienaar, die besitter met eienaarsbedoeling, die huurder, en 
alle ander “besitters” vervang kan word. In die regsliteratuur word besit gebruik om hierdie oorkoepelende 
funksie te vervul, maar dit is onaanvaarbaar in die lig van die feit dat ’n enger betekenis in spesifieke 
 
 




kontekste aan dieselfde begrip geheg word…Daar bestaan ’n alternatiewe begrip wat hierdie funksie kan 
vervul. Die begrip beheer…” 
From this central concept (comprised of both a physical and mental element), which refers to all 
factual property law relationships and is free from historical baggage, 358  all others emanate. 
Crucially, it retains the variability of intention found in the common law view, without its conceptual 
and terminological uncertainty. 
In the scheme of effective control, the first additional distinctive quality is whether the control is lawful 
or unlawful. From this distinction “possession” becomes ownership’s unlawful counterpart (unlawful 
control with animus domini), whilst all secondary property relationships are either lawful or unlawful 
forms of “holdership”. The second distinguishing factor is whether control is in good or bad faith (as 
even lawful control may be in bad faith, although this is seldom of legal consequence).  
This second approach does not do away with what should now be termed the functions of control 
(rather than possession). However, its key advantage is that it retains the pure factuality which the 
traditional possessory concept attempts to convey less successfully:359 
“[i]n hierdie sin is beheer kennelik ’n suiwer feitelike gegewe en geen nadere besonderhede oor die 
regsaard daarvan word verskaf nie. Die regsgevolge wat aan sodanige beheer geheg kan word, kan ook 
nie sonder meer impliseer dat dit ’n saaklike reg daarstel nie.” 
Whilst neither view is universally accepted, it would seem as though the latter is not, despite its more 
useful and internally coherent logic, the dominant one. However, the present context need not make 
any determination on this issue, as the goal is finding an appropriate proprietary analytical framework 
for holdership of a particular kind of incorporeal – securities. In this regard, Van der Walt’s scheme 
is undoubtedly superior. 
Take, as point of departure, the following statement:360 
“Regmatige beheer kan op ’n saaklike reg of op ’n vorderingsreg berus.” 
 
 
358  Van der Walt (1988) THRHR 512.  
359  Van der Walt (1988) THRHR 512. 
360  Van der Walt (1988) THRHR 513.  
 See also CG Van der Merwe “Things” in JW Scholtz (ed) Law of South Africa 2 ed (2015) Vol 27 § 70, citing: Grotius 
2 2 5; Voet 41 2 11; Zoesius Commentarius ad D 41 2 par 6; Kersteman Woordenboek 97; Shapiro v SA Savings 
& Credit Bank 1949 (4) SA 985 (W); Sebastian v Malelane Irrigation Board 1950 (2) SA 690 (T); Painter v Strauss 
1951 (3) SA 307 (O); Slabbert v Theodoulou 1952 (2) SA 667 (T); Van Rooyen v Burger 1960 (4) SA 356 (O); 
Rooibokoord Sitrus (Edms) Bpk v Louw's Creek Sitrus Koöperatiewe Mpy Bpk 1964 (3) SA 601 (T); Jansen v 
Madden 1968 (1) SA 81 (GW); Van Wyk v Kleynhans 1969 (1) SA 221 (GW); Beukes v Crous 1975 (4) SA 215 
(NC); Bon Quelle (Edms) Bpk v Munisipaliteit van Otavi 1989 (1) SA 508 (A); Zulu v Minister of Works, KwaZulu 




Effective control is a manifestly appropriate construct in the context of incorporeals.361 This also 
appears to be compatible with the law as it currently stands – supported by an abundance of authority 
is the following:362 
“Because of the physical nature of possession it can only be exercised with regard to physical or corporeal 
objects. However, the law also recognises so-called quasi-possession or juridical possession (possesio 
iuris) which consists in the exercise of control over an incorporeal coupled with animus to exercise such 
control. Factual control of an incorporeal is exercised whenever the thing is exploited in accordance with 
an actual or presumed legal right (for example, a servitude or a contractual right of use) with regard to the 
thing.” 
More importantly, quasi-possessio has been a central feature of a number of cases dealing with “law 
of things” constructs as applied to securities. Again using the pledge in securitatem debiti as lodestar, 
the:363 
“limited cession invests the cessionary with control over the economic value inherent in the debtor’s 
performance, and as such provides the basis for the recognition of a real right of pledge in favour of the 
cessionary…[further in n 366:] This enables the cessionary to ‘hold’ rather than ‘own’ the ceded 
claim…References in decided cases to the transfer to the cessionary-pledgee of quasi-possessio of the 
right confirm the impression that the cession of such a limited interest is the functional equivalent of the 
transfer of physical possession to the pledgee in the case of a pledge of corporeal moveables…This also 
seems to be the consideration underlying traditional practices regarding the utilisation of shares as 
security.” 
This is most evident in Moonsamy v Nedcor Bank Ltd, which explicitly deals with the handing over 
of quasi-possessio of the right in pledging securities in securitatem debiti.364  
However, other cases, operative in different contexts, further reinforce the deeper point. Tigon Ltd v 
Bestyet Investments (Pty) Ltd 365  (addressing the so-called “quasi-spoliation” of securities) and 
Oakland Nominees (Pty) Ltd v Gelria Mining & Investment Co (Pty) Ltd366 (dealing with the so-called 
“quasi-rei vindicatio” in the securities context) also show how quasi-possessio serves as an 
indispensable intermediary to the application of these corporeal principles to securities.  
 
 
361  Its central importance in Lubbe’s theoretical account of the pledge-style security cession, as discussed at length in 
this Chapter, should make this abundantly clear.  
362  See above, as well as Badenhorst et al Law of Property 275, n 93 [own emphasis]. 
363  Van der Merwe et al Contract 430 & n 366 [own emphasis]. It is unclear whether this comment is intended to impose 
further substantive requirements upon such limited cessions. This will be briefly dealt with in Chapter 9. 
364  2004 (3) SA 513 (D) 517. 
365  2001 (4) SA 634 (N). 




In the unique and challenging context of securities, quasi-possessio in its current form is not suitable 
for application to securities. Its precise meaning is not clear, and it has no accompanying body of 
clarifying jurisprudence. For instance, to simply state that “quasi-possession…consists in the 
exercise of control over an incorporeal coupled with animus to exercise such control” does not take 
any theoretical account of the legal nature of securities. It also does not take cognisance of the fact 
that control over different incorporeals may manifest in vastly different ways. In so doing it inevitably 
fails to account for core differences arising from the unique underlying structure of securities. It is 
this structure which makes the precise nature of control of securities or subsidiary elements of 
securities a key lever in understanding the legal nature of securities generally.  
Moreover, perfectly illustrative of this point, is the accompanying statement above that “[f]actual 
control of an incorporeal is exercised whenever the thing is exploited in accordance with an actual 
or presumed legal right”. This statement is certainly incomplete (perhaps even incorrect) as unlawful, 
mala fide control of a security is demonstrably possible due to the existence of the security-
instrument. This shows that control is not always exercised in accordance with even a “presumed 
right”. 
What the common law does seem correctly to emphasise is the element of control. This, alongside 
the proprietary dimension of securities, brings one to why Van der Walt’s scheme (with the necessary 
modification for application to incorporeals) is so analytically valuable. It provides a far more powerful 
platform than the existing common law paradigm of (possession-informed) “quasi-possessio” for the 
formulation of a functional possessory construct for securities. Using Van der Walt’s analytical 
framework in the present context comes without the doctrinal contention it may have in law of things 
context. Its use in the current context also has a great deal of problem-solving value. However, it 
must not be forgotten that despite their more pronounced proprietary aspect, securities remain, 
primarily, governed by the rules and principles of the law of obligations, unlike negotiable 
instruments. 
From the above, “effective control” emerges as the most suitable and effective tool. Why? First, it 
would function to replace the aptly labelled “drogbegrip” of quasi-possessio discussed above,367 
doing away also with the influence of the already unclear traditional concept of “possession”. Second, 
more theoretically, it would also serve to rationalise and explain other instances where the 
proprietary aspects of securities cause doctrinal opacity,368 bringing much needed legal certainty 
 
 
367  I.e. “sham concept” – as per Lubbe (1989) THRHR 492 n 42. 
368  Such as the deeper underlying legal nature and function of the valid acquisition of uncertificated securities by a 
bona fide transferee despite any defects, such as any fraud or illegality, as guaranteed by s 41 of the FMA and s 
53(4) of the Companies Act of 2008.  
 Yet there is no better example of this that the need to rationalise the flawed ratio of Tigon Ltd v Bestyet Investments 




and clarity to what is currently an unsatisfactorily fluid legal landscape. Third, it would facilitate further 
legal development without the need to continually revise and reformulate common law constructs 
that have become redundant and inappropriate because of modern legal and commercial 
developments. Fourth, it allows for a more sensible understanding of the theft of securities as 
incorporeals.369 
In this light, the most pressing issue is to determine what would constitute physical control in the 
context of securities. To do so, the function of physical control needs to be understood. Physical 
control is primarily attributed a publicity function.370 This function, for obvious reasons, informs and 
enhances a great number of the broader functions of effective control (such as its real, security or  
evidentiary functions). 
Yet when dealing with obligations, publicity is often viewed as of lesser importance. For example, in 
the context of the pledge of claims in securitatem debiti, it has been argued that:371 (1) publicity is 
not the overriding policy reason for requiring control; (2) publicity has become at best an attenuated 
requirement for the vesting of real rights even in the corporeal context; and (3) the handing over of 
control over the pledge object sufficiently “isolates” the pledge object against future acts of use, 
enjoyment or enforcement by the cedent. 
Despite this, securities in particular have a number of qualities requiring a more pronounced publicity 
function than may be necessary for most obligationary objects.  
The first is that securities are, to a large degree, objects of trade and wealth. It is in this sense that 
securities appear most like corporeal things both in law and commerce. The importance of the 
principle of publicity in effecting valid transfer is well established in the law of sale (evident both 
through registered transfer of immovable things and the requirement of delivery in the transfer of 
movables).372 It follows that the elevated importance and prevalence of sale in the commercial 
sphere implies an increased emphasis on publicity in the legal sphere.  
Second, publicity plays a key role in defending holdership and by implication defending wealth. It is 
vital in establishing the reasonableness of a reliance in founding a defence of estoppel against the 
rei vindicatio. A good illustration of the application of that principle here, as will be shown in Chapter 
 
 
369  More a useful discussion of this issue see Yeats et al Commentary 2008 at 2-847 – 2-848 and attendant footnotes. 
370  Badenhorst et al Law of Property 259; and Van der Walt & Pienaar Property 185.  
371  Lubbe (1989) THRHR 490-491 & n 36.  
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10, is that estoppel is a prominent feature in the realm of certificated securities, specifically in the 
context of the quasi-rei vindicatio. 
Third, the underlying structure of securities allows for nominee holdership (as instrument-
holdership). The use of a nominee can easily cause the true “owner” (asset-holder) to be hidden 
from the view of third parties dealing with the instrument-holder. In order to mitigate this risk and 
promote legal certainty, greater publicity may be required.  
Fourth, and last, securities also perform an important real security function in commerce, and one 
which is becoming increasingly important in the global economy.373 However, the form-free nature 
of South African cession coupled with the transactional dangers of nominee-holdership seem to 
militate in favour of an enhanced element of publicity in the cession in securitatem debiti of securities 
(most importantly when dealing with certificated securities). 374  Thus publicity seems eminently 
necessary as a feature of the law relating to debt securities. This will be returned to below in 
discussing the true role of the security certificate. 
However, it is submitted that effective physical control also fulfils a deeper function, to which its 
publicity function is innately tied. This is alluded to by CG Van der Merwe in discussing the function 
of publicity in the law of things:375 
“[o]ne of the aims of the law of things is to publicise the legal relationship between a person and a thing 
and thus to effect a correspondence between the legal and the factual situation.” 
Corporeals exist physically. The law as an abstract phenomenon, and in a sense reactive to that 
reality, fashions policy, principles, and rules to subjugate these physical phenomena to its abstract 
systemisation. By way of gross over-simplification, it does so by circumscribing them in its own terms, 
thereby enabling the assimilation of the “legal abstraction of the corporeal” into the law. Seen thus, 
physical control of corporeals is a legal construct existing to assimilate a purely factual state of affairs 
into a legal fact, in order to build or apply positive law rules to it. 
The nature of obligations as phenomena dealt with by the law is vastly different from corporeals. 
Obligations, as creatures of law innately, are subject to the positive law a priori, rendering such an 
assimilation unnecessary. This, however, does not imply that it is unnecessary (or impossible) for 
the law to be able to delineate a factual state of affairs regarding these more abstract legal objects. 
This is simply an argument for why the policy-mix underlying the law of obligations does not seem 
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to treat it as imperative in the manner that the law of things does. For example, a publicity-driven 
requirement such as traditio is not found in the law of cession, but in light of the above it would still 
seem that publicity has a great deal of use and value in the securities context. The pronounced 
presence of the quasi-possessio construct in securities case law, serving as a mediator for the use 
of certain of property law principles, shows as much. 
However, its nature will be very different to that of effective physical control of corporeals.  
Whilst it is tempting to argue that holdership of the security instrument itself is the equivalent of 
physical control, this is not so. This argument appears intuitively appealing, first, due to the security 
instrument's superficially close resemblance to the function of paper as the conduit of physical 
control in the realm of negotiable instruments. Second, the natural connection between execution 
(arising from the entitlement of determination) and control also makes the argument seem stronger 
than it is. As the locus for (holdership of) the incidents of execution, the instrument bestows 
determination over a security – and therefore the proximate ability to realise the underlying interest 
to the exclusion of all others. Who, other than this holder, could be in control of the security in a 
manner factually analogous to effective physical control? The answer to this question lies in the 
purpose of the security instrument, the nature of the underlying interest, and the unique nature of 
the legal relationship between asset- and instrument-holder. 
From an economic perspective, it is now clear that the security instrument developed to function as 
a mechanism to reduce the initial and on-going economic costs of borrowing from a large number of 
separate lenders. The legal solution, as argued in the previous Chapter, 376  to this (primarily 
transaction- and monitoring-cost driven) problem, was to insulate the issuer from the true legal state 
of affairs behind the “veil” of the security instrument, allowing the issuer to have all its legal relations 
vis-a-vis the security with the instrument-holder alone. Such an arrangement is far more 
economically efficient. All that has changed throughout securities’ modern development is that the 
instrument now functions to reduce the economic costs of securities-driven borrowing in the primary 
market and the transfer of those securities at high velocity and volume in certain secondary markets 
(i.e. trading).377 
This does not mean that holdership of the incidents of execution as a legal state of affairs, as a legal 
solution, can be conflated with control as a factual state of affairs. Unlike corporeals, securities are 
complex composite patrimonial objects, constituting bundles of rights and competencies. It has been 
shown that the interest underlying such a bundle is further divisible into entitlements of determination 
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consequences of the security instrument was that it very effectively enabled quick and secure transfer of these 




and enjoyment (enabling, incidentally, the creation of the security asset and instrument), and even 
further divisible into the various incident-functionalities which flow from those entitlements. It has 
also been shown, in the previous section, that each of these subsidiary elements has the potential, 
depending on the factual matrix in question, to be regarded as a legal object.378  
It must follow that different elements of a security may be controlled by different persons 
simultaneously (each of these forms of control existing over separate subsidiary elements of that 
security). Any incorporeal equivalent of the concept of physical control must accommodate this 
crucial difference (as compared to corporeals), and such a concept could almost never indicate who 
controls all of the security at large, unless all elements of that security were under the control of one 
person. The only situation in which this could hold true is when dealing with a security-holder (i.e. 
both asset- and instrument-holder) who has not granted any further interests in securities to third 
parties. 
Further, to vest a real right to such a legal object, that object, rather than the security as a whole, 
must be “isolated” against encroaching future legal acts by the object-giver or other external parties. 
This is achieved, at least practically,379 by the handing over of effective control. 
Thus the most appropriate functionally equivalent construct to physical control is in fact effective 
factual control of the legal object in question. Thus the legal nature of effective control of securities 
can be found in the relationship between asset-holder and instrument-holder (i.e. an “implied sui 
generis form of agency” with a strong fiduciary dimension).380 
Within the control-based taxonomy (reflected also in the more traditional version of quasi-
possession), control must be accompanied with a required animus component. Specifically, for 
corporeals, physical control with “the intention to hold for a principal” will be insufficient to establish 
the animus requirement which completes effective control.381 This is because factual intention is 
deemed insufficient to make a legal fact of the physical control. 
The previous conclusions of this chapter382 show that the instrument-holder acts as representative 
for the asset-holder despite exercising, by virtue of holdership, the incident-functionalities of 
execution in own capacity. This is done through holdership of the security-instrument as legal object. 
If, as it must be, the same animus requirement applies to the effective factual control of securities, 
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then the instrument-holder’s ability to execute the underlying interest on the asset-holder’s behalf is 
not enough to establish effective factual control over the security or any of its incident-functionalities. 
This leads to the conclusion, finally, that the most functionally appropriate possessory construct  in 
the securities context must be effective factual control over the instrument-holder, coupled with the 
necessary mental element(s) of control as already established through common law (though, again, 
they are not to be regarded as a numerus clausus). Control will always be determined with reference 
to the particular legal object in question. The effective controller of a security is the factual controller 
of the instrument-holder for that general purpose; the effective controller of a subsidiary element of 
a security (such as its income stream, or fructus) in turn is the effective controller of the instrument-
holder for that more specific purpose. 
Once that view is adopted, an instrument-holder could factually (and unlawfully) break with that 
fiduciary agency by changing the intent with which the security instrument is held. Thus, for example 
that holder is able in theory to unlawfully usurp effective control of the security by exercising her 
control over the instrument-holder (i.e. herself) animus domini.383 
Further, in the discussion thus far it would appear implicit that the scheme of agency inherent in 
asset- and instrument-holdership entailed the representation of the asset-holder in the entirety of the 
underlying interest. This assumption may now be left aside, as representation may occur in respect 
of any legal object stemming from the underlying interest of a security. Lawful control is achieved via 
modification of the scheme of agency to add the representation of a third party (in respect of some 
more limited aspect of the security’s incident-functionalities) to the arrangement. Unlawful control is 
securing the co-operation of the instrument-holder for specific or general purposes without a legal 
basis. 
Of final and fundamental importance, it is chiefly on analysis at the level of incidents that the concept 
of effective control as a functional possessory construct is fully vindicated. The point is fairly simple, 
yet quite powerful: various elements of a security may be subject to the control of different persons 
simultaneously, but the same cannot be said of incidents. It is in the nature of incidents, as 
individualised legal objects, that each may only be controlled by one person at any given time. 
Therefore, it makes doctrinal and, more importantly, pragmatic sense to regard control over those 
incidents to flow via, rather than reside in, the instrument-holder.  
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It should also be mentioned here that, as a result, lawful or unlawful control may be established de 
facto through instrument-holdership itself, but as a consequence of this principle rather than (as dealt 
with above) an argument for such holdership as effective factual control. 
It is appreciated that, at first glance, this is intuitively unappealing. However, it is a theoretically quite 
precise conclusion, and is best illustrated using a number of examples. To do so, a final word on the 
correct terminology in terms of Van der Walt’s control taxonomy as applied here is helpful.  In the 
present context, holdership should be taken to indicate the incorporeal equivalent of lawful 
“ownership”, quasi-possession then the equivalent of unlawful control animus domini, and finally 
interest-holdership must indicate all other lawful or unlawful equivalents of third-party interests in 
securities.  
Thus, by way of example, through exercising control over the instrument-holder with the requisite 
animus: (1.1) the pledgee or usufructary of a security is a lawful interest-holder, or (1.2) a person 
factually receiving proceeds from holdership of a security without a lawful causa (typically due to the 
lack of a lawful basis and consequent formal modification of the scheme of agency between 
instrument-holder and asset-holder) is an unlawful interest-holder; and (2.1) the bona or mala fide 
acquirer of a security, may be either the asset- or security-holder (if lawfully acquired), or (2.2) the 
quasi-possessor (if unlawfully acquired). 
Lastly, and quite decisively, the incidents of execution residing in the security instrument as object, 
cannot be individually severed and disposed of. This is made so by the structural features of that 
object, specifically its function vis-a-vis the asset-holder, third parties with holdership of interests in 
securities, and most importantly the issuer, respectively.  
Securities registers simply do not allow for fragmented instrument-holdership, and it does not appear 
possible as a matter of principle and policy for elements of the security instrument to be held by 
someone other than the instrument-holder. In order for it to fulfil its economic and legal functions 
effectively, is must operate as an indivisible legal construct, held by a single person. If this were not 
the case, and the locus for holdership of the incidents of execution could be fragmented, there would 
be an unacceptable degree of legal uncertainty as to the control and exercise of, as well as the 
entitlement to benefit from, the underlying rights, other competencies, and subsidiary incidents of 
securities.  
 
4 3 2 3  Certificated securities – the role of the certificate  
The only outstanding factual feature of holdership, in light of the above, is the role of the security 




primary role is to serve as prima facie evidence of instrument-holdership. In this evidentiary function, 
the certificate serves as prima facie proof of instrument-holdership,384 and is proof which will, from a 
procedural perspective, be elevated to an established legal fact unless evidence to the contrary is 
presented.385  
However, 19th century English law jurisprudence clearly articulated that the full function of this 
physical piece of paper goes somewhat further than that. This observation draws once again on the 
law as it relates to shares because of the share-centric bias of South African law and the resultant 
convergence of all (registered) securities on share-based legal principles.  
From an economic perspective, in accordance with a classical dictum of the English courts:386 
“[the power of granting certificates is to give the shareholders the opportunity of more easily dealing with 
their shares in the market, and to afford facilities to them of selling their shares by at once showing a 
marketable title, and the effect of this facility is to make the shares of greater value…[it is] a declaration by 
the company to all the world that the person in whose name [it] is made out, and to whom it is given, is a 
shareholder in the company, and it is given by the company with the intention that it shall be so used by 
the person to whom it is given, and acted upon in the sale and transfer of shares…” 
This begins to make increasing sense of the argument for the importance of publicity as presented 
above. On a foundational level, the importance of the publicity construct flows from the deeper 
principle of legal certainty, which is of increased importance in the highly transactional commercial 
environment that securities inhabit. As shown in Chapter 3, the legal development of the securities 
construct over the last hundred years shows that the securities register evolved from the legal 
necessity of turning novation into a useful transaction-cost saving device in the ordinary course of 
commerce. However, what it also shows is that the certificate (as the second component of the 
certificated security instrument) developed to lend certainty, through enhanced publicity, to securities 
transactions and holdership. 
This yields a core insight regarding the role, or functionality, of the certificate. The paper itself is 
corporeal and physical, and serves to represent in tangible form what remains an intangible legal 
state of affairs. Thus, by visibly indicating the “invisible” legal position, publicity is achieved, 
 
 
384  In Delport Henochsberg 2008 § 51, 208 it is phrased as “ownership (not title)…”. 
385  See for instance Blackman Commentary § 94, 5-264 & n 2; Ex parte The Minister of Justice: In re R v Jacobson & 
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strengthening legal certainty in concluding juristic acts in the context of securities. The strength of 
this indication varies contextually, but the principle runs through every established function of the 
certificate. It is the ultimate manifestation of the proprietary thinking that seems so implicitly to have 
emerged over a hundred years of application of South African law to shares, debentures, and then 
finally securities. In essence the security certificate, seen thus, appears to have evolved in order to 
imbue a “weak corporeality” to securities. In this sense it serves as a good example of the 
observation that “certain legal usages transcend their original purpose and take on new, wholly 
justifiable roles.”387 
Providing securities with a weak corporeality facilitated an easier application, directly or indirectly, of 
principles of the law of things which were not only vital to securities’ efficacy in the commercial 
sphere, but also not fully achievable within the doctrinal constraints of the South African law of 
obligations. This is in no small measure due to the fact that the domestic law’s doctrinal path resulted 
in securities which are not negotiable, despite the more Civilian character of South African private 
law.388 
For example, it is typically (although no longer legally)389 required for the valid transfer of the security 
instrument (so-called “registered transfer”) that a valid instrument of transfer is accompanied by the 
transferring holder’s security certificate. Another instructive manifestation of this underlying set of 
norms is the key role of the certificate in establishing the reasonableness of a reliance in the context 
of estoppel.390 The certificate’s procedural role as prima facie evidence of “title” (instrument- or 
 
 
387  Chapter 2, § 2 2 1. 
 Uncertificated securities were only formally introduced in the mid-1990s. Their inception occurred because, at that 
point, the state of commerce necessitated further structural intervention into the underlying nature of securities. 
This policy intervention was in any event mainly limited to the trading of securities on formal trading platforms, 
where the inherent safeguards and utility provided by the publicity function of the certificate were supplanted by 
other measures. In all other spheres of commerce, (certificated) securities still require these functionalities in order 
to function effectively. 
388  See § 4 1 3 (citing also elements of Chapter 3, § 3 2). 
389  In the context of company securities, a 14(b) of Table B, Schedule 1 of the Companies Act of 1973 entitled the 
directors of a private company to refuse a share transfer if the instrument of transfer was not accompanied by the 
share certificate. Neither the 2008 Act nor its Regulations contain a similar provision.  
 For the transfer of “shares and debentures” authorities such as A Milne Henochsberg on the Companies Act 3 ed 
(1975) 185 & 233; and Blackman et al Commentary § 133 5-355, 5-356 & 5-357 read with n 6 also seem to imply 
that the duties of an “ordinary” contract of sale included delivery of the seller’s security certificate. Under the 2008 
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principle crystallised in Botha v Fick 1995 (2) SA 750 (AD) at 778 that no out and out cession of the full underlying 
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 However, regarding transfer of the security instrument, Deport (Henochsberg § 51 214) states – correctly – of the 
modern legal position that: 
 “[a]s between the transferor and the transferee, it is the duty of the latter to obtain registration of the transfer. Section 51(6) 
does not require the certificate to be lodged together with the instrument of transfer but the Memorandum of Incorporation 
may preclude or restrict registration of transfer of a share unless the instrument of transfer lodged with the company is 
accompanied by the certificate of the share.” 




perhaps total security-holdership) is thus only one manifestation of a deeper policy position running 
through both the adjectival and substantive areas of securities law. 
The common thread amongst these certificate functionalities can, once again, be tied to Kleyn’s 
observation that, in certain instances, there is an undeniable need to access economic value locked 
up in incorporeal things by treating them (as far as possible) as “commodities”, and thus the potential 
objects to other rights, within property law.391 The proprietary principle at play here is publicity of a 
“strength of legal position” not readily achievable in South African law as it relates to incorporeals. 
In order to emulate a level of legal certainty ordinarily associated with the type of publicity that, for 
example, physical delivery (i.e. traditio) effects, securities were linked to a physical thing – a 
certificate; however, this connection could never, due to the English law-oriented development of 
securities in South Africa, be strong enough to make negotiable instruments of securities. Thus 
certificates inhabit a legal no man’s land between the former and truly intangible obligations, but do 
so for very sound reasons of policy and pragmatism. 
This, in conjunction with the preceding analysis regarding effective factual control, seems to suggest 
that one of the most important roles of the security certificate is to indicate, prima facie, to a counter-
party that its possessor in fact also has effective factual control over the incident or incidents at play 
in any given commercial transaction (see the example given at the end of this section). 
Its more traditional role also needs to be briefly revisited. The authors in Commentary 2008 appear 
to take the view that, due to separate nature of registered ownership and beneficial ownership, the 
import of s 50(4) of the Companies Act is that it serves as prima facie evidence of instrument-
holdership as distinct from asset-holdership:392 
“the preferred view is that in South Africa the registered holder is vested with the rights attaching to 
registered title (which appears to be a proprietary interest but not ownership). The fact that the registered 
holder may not be the beneficial owner provides the basis for a reasonable argument that, at least in regard 
to certificated securities, s 50(4) is best read as not giving rise to any presumption that the registered holder 
is the beneficial owner of securities, as ownership should not be regarded as a fact reflected in a securities 
register (even though the registered holder can be the owner and the register can constitute evidence in 
support of an assertion of ownership). 
… 
As was the case under the 1973 Act, a certificate is prima facie evidence of registered title, which should 
not be confused with beneficial ownership. This is also implied from s 51(1), which describes a certificate 
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as evidencing certificated securities and, from this, it is apparent that there is no intention to change the 
law in this regard.” 
This position is supported by this work, though it must be noted that the presumption of security-
holdership may also be supported by physical certificate holdership, should the factual matrix in 
question justify such a presumption.393 Though there is some uncertainty in terms of the full extent 
of the presumption, it is submitted that the appropriate approach would be a variable one, supported 
in its application by the particular factual matrix at issue. 
Such an understanding of the role of the security certificate completes the view of the factual features 
of security-holdership. The evidentiary, publicity, and reliance-strengthening functions of the 
certificate are all elements of this deeper role as factual and physical indicator of control, allowing 
the law better to make factual determinations (especially in the proprietary sphere), without losing 
the essentially obligationary character of the securities construct in South African jurisprudence. 
The full range of legal functionality of the security certificate, and its usefulness, is relatively under-
appreciated, especially in the establishment and publicising of real rights (i.e. interests in securities). 
Consider the following example: there is a certificated security, “X”, of which the instrument-holder 
is A, and the asset-holder is B. B subsequently grants to C a usufructary right, through a limited 
cession, to the income stream associated with that security. The limited cession occurs, in terms of 
the ordinary rules of cession, in a form-free manner. However, to establish C’s control over the 
income stream (and thereby complete the real agreement), B must modify the scheme of agency 
between her and A, providing control over A to C in so far as the security’s income stream is 
concerned. In order to publicise the legal position of this interest-holder, B may hand over the security 
certificate (in A’s name) to C, making it commercially far more difficult (but of course never 
impossible) for either A or B to unlawfully provide a subsequent bona or male fide third party that 
same right.  
Should B then decide to pledge the remainder of the underlying interest to D, another modification 
of the scheme of agency is required. This could be achieved by having D replace A as instrument-
holder, in which case D will be informed that the new certificate must be handed over to C, and will 
also inherit the duties toward C. But it could also be achieved by having C hand over the existing 
security certificate to D directly. In either scenario, knowledge on the part of A, B, C and D of one 
 
 
393  As similarly noted in Yeats et al Commentary 2008 2-787 – 2-788, noting specifically that “[s]uch an interpretation 
would be predicated on an underlying presumption that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, there has been 
no separation of registered title and beneficial ownership….[so that it] remains to be seen how our courts will 




another’s rights and duties rests on what has been done with the certificate, and if the above steps 
have been taken, such knowledge would be difficult to dispute. 
The potential of unlawful alienation is also elegantly limited. Should A, or D as the case may be, wish 
to unlawfully sell the security in toto to a third party by using her instrument-holdership to create the 
impression of security-holdership, the question of who has the certificate (and why) would need to 
be answered. Should C wish to alienate the security, the question of whose name (and why not C’s 
name) is on the certificate will have to be answered. Should A wish to grant an identical second 
usufruct, the co-operation of the instrument-holder (who would already have knowledge of the first 
usufructary) would be required, making this also difficult.   
This example shows that even in a very complex factual matrix of various cessions, agency, and a 
resultant constellation of different interests in security X, a sound understanding of effective factual 
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5 Adaptations in respect of uncertificated securities 
The purpose of this chapter is to acknowledge and examine the necessary adjustments to the legal 
model of (debt) securities, presented in the previous chapter, that is required due to the statutory 
legal arrangements for securities’ taking uncertificated form. 
The first section critically evaluates key elements of the legislative process which first regulated 
immobilisation and then enabled dematerialisation, and the influence of this statutory legacy to better 
understand certain relevant and currently applicable sections of the Companies Act 1  and the 
Financial Markets Act (“FMA”).2 Predominantly, it focuses on the meaning of “deposit”, the structure 
of the system for the custody and administration of uncertificated securities, and the nature of 
“ownership” (or rather holdership) of uncertificated securities. 
 
 
1  71 of 2008. 




The second section deals with the concept of “interests in uncertificated securities” as found in the 
international securities environment, and its consequences for the contemporary domestic legislative 
scheme.  
 
5 1 Understanding the modern statutory framework for uncertificated securities 
The first aim of this section is to demonstrate, through analysis of the legislation and prevailing 
commentary, that the provisions of the FMA which relate to the nature of uncertificated securities 
and their holdership within the custodial system are largely a product of the development of the 
academic views and domestic legislation preceding it. Specifically, it argues that there is in the 
wording of many of these provisions a historical path dependence, both terminologically and 
conceptually, which makes the precise meaning and operation of these provisions in the Act in the 
current environment somewhat difficult.  
Understanding this path dependence enables a better reading of the Act – “statutory evolution is 
important for the interpretation of the FMA, as the provisions relevant to the custodial arrangements 
governing uncertificated securities under the FMA are in many instances a mutation of the original 
provisions in the Safe Deposit of Securities Act.” 3  This in turn facilitates a number of useful 
conclusions drawn regarding the nature of uncertificated securities and their holdership, which will 
emerge from the discussion. 
It is of some importance to state at the outset that this section will outline what is submitted to be the 
most coherent and systemically logical manner in which the FMA should be read. This may to some 
extent diverge from the manner in which it is currently read in practice.4 The FMA in its current form 
“[is not] a model of clarity and consistency”,5 and it is in the nature of the practical commercial 
environment to make good use of such uncertainty. This work prioritises theoretical defensibility and 
holistic consistency. Nonetheless, it is hoped that what is proposed here at least incrementally 
improves the collective understanding of this critical piece of financial legislation.  
 
 
3   JL Yeats, R de la Harpe, R Jooste, H Stoop, R Cassim, J Seligmann, L Kent, R Bradstreet, RC Williams, MF 
Cassim, E Swanepoel, FHI Cassim & K Jarvis (2018) Commentary on the Companies Act of 2008 2-520.  
4   However, the analysis does strive for a measure of balance, as per I Meissner Securities within the realm of private 
law: a theoretical and practical analysis of the legal nature of shares LLD thesis University of Stellenbosch (2019) 
224, in that: 
 “[p]ragmatism and functionality drive markets. Conceptual and doctrinal foundations, on the other hand, are the domain of the 
law. The sphere of shares and securities is shaped by a constant compromise between functionality, doctrine and conceptual 
soundness.” 




Much of the background necessary to analyse the evolution of the relevant provisions of the Custody 
and Administration of Securities Act,6 the Companies Second Amendment Act7 (introducing s 91A 
to the Companies Act of 1973), the Securities Services Act (“SSA”),8  and finally the currently 
operative Companies Act and FMA, was already covered in § 3 2 1 2 and § 3 2 of Chapter 3. It is 
not the aim of this section to repeat this. To explore the manner in which certain fundamental 
provisions in Chapter IV of the FMA contain “inherited” language, and the consequences in terms of 
the nature of the uncertificated security asset and instrument as they exist today, very specific 
elements of its history, as well as the international parlance which influenced its language, must be 
discussed, with the work of Chapter 3 as background.  
In 1984, a comprehensive and insightful comparative analysis of the solutions to the “paper crunch” 
which led to immobilisation- and dematerialisation-based systems in various jurisdictions was 
published by FR Malan. That work then goes on to outline a potential way forward that could be 
adopted domestically (“South African perspectives”). A few of observations and suggestions made 
therein are critical for what follows, and so are reproduced at some length here:9 
“South African securities certificates are not negotiable instruments. Nor, it is submitted, is there any need 
to convert them into negotiable instruments…The movement should rather be towards the elimination of 
the securities certificate where the securities are held by a depository. The choice is not between 
“dematerialization” and “immobilization”. The need is rather to consolidate the vast holdings of banks and 
brokers into a central securities depository or, more correctly put, a central securities nominee company, 
and to provide for the transfer of securities between participants and the creation of security interests in 
securities, by means of book entry.  
… 
The holdings of a central securities depository need not be evidenced by securities certificates – whether 
block or other certificates, and an open “uncertificated” current securities account can be opened for it in 
the register of every issuer of listed securities. It will be possible to make new issues of securities directly 
to a central securities depository and to provide for their issue in this manner in the prospectus offering 




6   85 of 1992, which was entitled the “Safe Deposit of Securities Act” until a 1998 amendment. This will be discussed 
in the following section. 
7   60 of 1998. 
8   36 of 2004. 
9  FR Malan Collective Securities Depositories and the Transfer of Securities (1984) 230-236 [own emphasis]. See 
also Yeats et al Commentary 2008 2-513 – 2-536; FR Malan “Depositories, nominees and the uncertificated 
security” (1987) 9 Modern Business Law 73, specifically § 8 & 9; and FR Malan & MJ Oosthuizen “The safe deposit 




The creation of a collective securities depository system requires no change in the nature of South African 
securities as registered securities. In fact, it will be based on current securities holding practices. 
… 
The participants in the depository are banks, brokers and other financial institutions who have re-deposited 
securities given to them for safe custody with the central securities depository. The securities themselves 
are registered in the name of the depository. Thus, the investor can exercise his rights only through his 
bank or broker, but the latter, not being registered as holder of the securities, must convey to the central 
securities depository the voting and other instructions of the investor.  
… 
An investor depositing securities with a participant for safe custody must be placed, as far as possible, in 
the same position as if he had himself been registered as the holder of the securities. This requires 
legislation to amend present enactments, and to define the rights of the investor to securities held in 
collective deposit. 
… 
What then are the rights of the investor to the body of securities of that kind held by the participant or the 
central securities depository as fungibles on his behalf and on behalf of the other investors? The interest 
of an investor, his collective depositary share, cannot be described in terms of ownership of the tangible 
certificates because the certificates of securities held by the central securities depository will be destroyed, 
and the certificate is, in any event, not strictly a negotiable instrument determining who is holder of the 
securities themselves. Ownership or co-ownership of the tangible does not decide the question who is 
entitled to the incorporeal rights. It is submitted that the holders of the securities deposited with a participant 
are co-holders of the whole body of securities of the same kind held by the participant, and that they are 
also co-holders of the securities re-deposited with the central depository, even if they are deposited on the 
account and in name of the participant. The totality of the rights of the investor is his collective deposit 
share. This he cedes or transfers when deliveries are made and “pledges” when he applies his holdings as 
security.” 
In the above there appears to be an early appreciation, domestically, of three key elements needed 
for the modern centralised and uncertificated system.  
First, the registered nature of South African securities already allowed, theoretically, for the use of a 
central custodial nominee (rather than, strictly, depository) functionary or set of functionaries 
necessary to do away with paper-based holding and transfer. 
Second, the concepts of “immobilisation” (not technically required, or possible, for registered 
securities) and “dematerialisation” are in fact less important than the relevant custodial and electronic 




private law is fundamentally Civilian. What is truly important is the manner in which the system 
arrived at the consolidated holding (and transfer) of uncertificated securities via a central functionary 
or set of functionaries (specifically electronic and consolidated instrument-holdership). In terms of 
the unique development of the current system, and the peculiar confluence of Continentally-
influenced immobilisation and ultimate dematerialisation in South Africa, it is noted that:10 
“[p]ursuant to these investigations [regarding the establishment of STRATE], it was decided that it would 
be beneficial to provide for listed companies to dispense with physical certificates and transfer forms and 
permit the holding and transfer of securities to be recorded electronically only. To ensure that the securities 
registers would be properly maintained and reliable, it was decided that the immobilisation model should 
be used with the securities registers administered by a regulated central securities depository and its 
participants for the various issuing companies. The ‘electronically evidenced’ securities that would be 
subject to this new arrangement were referred to as ‘uncertificated’ securities in order to distinguish them 
from the certificated securities.” 
Third is the insight that co-holdership of the underlying interests of securities appears to be a natural, 
inevitable legal consequence of centrally consolidated, account-based and collective uncertificated 
instrument-holdership, due to the (quasi-) fungibility of securities of the same kind held in a particular 
account by a central, custodial instrument-holder or group of instrument-holders. These holders were 
the depository participants where re-“deposit” did not occur, and the central securities depositary 
where re-“deposit” did occur. This has important consequences for asset-holdership in terms of 
uncertificated securities under the FMA. 
Yet until the passage of the Companies Second Amendment Act, the Safe Deposit of Securities Act 
did not fully implement the outcome of these insights. Instead, it opted only slightly to modify, regulate 
and clarify the then-status quo of (ostensibly) immobilising registered certificated securities through 
(an equally ostensible) deposit of “listed securities, financial instruments, and other securities 
approved by the Registrar of Financial Markets”11 at a central custodial institution. In doing so, the 
Safe Deposit of Securities Act actually enabled two kinds of “deposit” – deposit with already 
prominent custodial institutions such as banks and brokers as participants, and thereafter a 
legislatively enabled deposit (or re-deposit) with a central securities custodian (also unfortunately 
termed a depository).12 The act also formally legislated for the concept of “co-ownership” of the 
fungible bulk of securities “of the same kind” deposited in any single account maintained by a 
participating institution or the central depository. 
 
 
10  Yeats et al Commentary 2008 2-537 – 5-539 [own emphasis]. 
11  M Vermaas “Die wet op die veilige bewaring van effekte” (1996) 8 South African Mercantile Law Journal 190 195.  




The legislative developments which followed, and the associated relevant authoritative views, are 
adequately discussed in § 3 2 1 2, and § 3 2 of Chapter 3 of this work.13 This discussion has a more 
specific focus, namely: (1) to show a persistent terminological and conceptual path dependence 
observable in relation to the relevant provisions in s 1 and Chapter IV of the FMA, and (2) to draw 
upon these insights to better understand the underlying legal position applicable to uncertificated 
security-holdership at present. This will be broken up into three discussions: (1) deposit; (2) the 
structure of the uncertificated custodial system; and (3) the impact of the “co-ownership” construct. 
 
5 1 1  Deposit 
It is important (for this and the following two discussions) that, historically, instrument-holdership 
seems to have been (and perhaps still is) regarded not as a true form of holdership, but rather more 
an administrative, agency-based, arrangement between beneficial owner, registered owner and 
issuer, necessitated by the fact that issuers are, as a point of departure, not obligated to look behind 
their securities register. Malan (whose influence on subsequent developments makes this 
significant) seems to place particular emphasis, in discussing both government and company 
securities, on register entry and certification as prima facie evidence of true “ownership”.14  The duty 
of an issuer not to “see to the execution of a trust”, whether for instance in terms of s 104 of the 1973 
Companies Act or by similar arrangement in the issue of government securities, enabled the 
nominee role in South African law. This in turn allowed “considerable progress…towards the 
immobilisation of securities through the use of nominees and global certificates”.15   
 
 
13  Pertinent authorities on dematerialisation and uncertificated securities (and its development), upon which this 
discussion draws, generally, are: Malan Collective Securities Depositories; FR Malan “Depositories, nominees and 
the uncertificated security” (1987) 9 Modern Business Law 73; FR Malan & MJ Oosthuizen “The safe deposit of 
securities” (1989) Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 502; M Vermaas Aspekte van die Dematerialisasie van 
Genoteerde Aandele in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg LLD thesis UNISA (1995); M Vermaas “Die wet op die veilige 
bewaring van effekte” (1996) 8 SA Merc LJ 190; M Vermaas “Dematerialisasie van die Genoteerde Aaandeel in die 
Suid-Afrikaasne Reg” (1997) 9 SA Merc LJ 42 [Part 1] & 171 [Part 2]; M Vermaas “Dematerialisation of listed 
securities: a synopsis of the Companies Second Amendment Act 60 of 1998” (1998) 10 SA Merc LJ 336; K Van 
der Linde & S Luiz “Aspects of the cross-listing of securities” (2009) 21 South African Mercantile Law Journal 631; 
M Vermaas “The reform of the law of uncertificated securities in South African company law” (2010) Acta Juridica 
87; MS Blackman, RD Jooste, GK Everingham, JL Yeats, FHI Cassim & R de la Harpe Commentary on the 
Companies Act: Volume 1 (RD 8 2011); PA Delport et al Henochsberg 2008 § 52-55; FHI Cassim (ed) 
Contemporary Company Law (2012) 257-258; and Yeats et al Commentary 2008 viz. s 1, s 49, s 52 & 53. 
14  Most notably see Malan Collective Securities Depositories throughout § 6.3, 140-153; and Vermaas (1996) SA 
Merc LJ § 3.3, 207-208. 




Immobilisation (in truth a misnomer in the context of certificated securities)16 in South Africa was 
implemented by placing (whether individually or by global certificate) a custodial institution on the 
issuer’s securities register. This was a process typically referred to as “deposit for custody and 
administration”. It evolved from an earlier, emergent practice whereby investors would keep 
certificates in own name, but physically deposit these certificates with custodial institutions such as 
banks and brokers for safe keeping. 
These institutions began to facilitate dealings between investors and issuers, which in turn naturally 
led to own (i.e. investor’s) name certificates and register entries being replaced by entries and 
certificates reflecting the custodial institution, or a specialised subsidiary, as registered holder 
(‘nominee’). Finally, in the certificated era, it became easier for these institutions to: (1) make use of 
single issuers’ register entries and corresponding “global” securities certificates, and (2) reflect their 
underlying investors’ holdings and cessions of the securities between clients in accounts kept by 
them internally. 
Through these developments, the acts of taking custody of own name certificates and the 
administration of issuer-investor relations evolved into “deposit” as a malapropism for registered 
transfer to an intermediary institution mandated to act as nominee for an individual investor or a 
collective body of investors. This begins to make sense of the wording of the FMA, and specifically 
of the odd interrelation between the definitions of “deposit” and “entry”.  
Given the above, it is fairly clear that so-called deposit did not just “include”, but in fact 
overwhelmingly was, making the custodial institution instrument-holder through “entry”, with entry 
referring to both entry on the issuer’s register and the concomitant destruction and issue of the 
relevant certificates.17 
This brings one to the uncertificated era. As fully discussed in Chapter 3, the passage of the Second 
Companies Amendment Act, which inter alia inserted s 91A into the Companies Act of 1973, as well 
as further amendments primarily to the Custody and Administration of Securities Act (the amended 
title of the Safe Deposit of Securities Act), enabled the dematerialisation of the security certificate, 
enabling uncertificated holdership. 
It is not altogether surprising, in light of the system of putative immobilisation already in place, that 
the introduction of uncertificated securities changes very little in terms of the meaning of “deposit”. 
 
 
16  The true immobilisation of the rarer species of bearer securities was possible under this system, but in such cases 
the position should be seen as follows: the investor loses ownership of the security and acquires a personal right, 
as evidenced by the depository institution’s internal accounts or ledgers, which is the economic equivalent of the 
security itself – i.e. an “interest in a security” as per internationally used terminology. See § 5 2 below for a full 
discussion on this issue. See also Meissner (2019) 230. 




The only true difference is this: instead of the issuer destroying the investor’s own name certificate, 
issuing a new certificate (or amending, if necessary, a global one) in the name of the custodial 
institution or its nominee, and making a corresponding change to the relevant securities register, the 
depository institutions and central securities depository became empowered to maintain 
uncertificated securities registers, with the status of issuer’s register. As a result they were able to 
make entries in that register to reflect the securities as uncertificated, upon which the certificate or 
certificates would be destroyed, and those entries would be seen as those of the issuer.  
With that as background, the meaning of “deposit” and its relationship to “entry” can be made clearer. 
For easier comparison, the legislative evolution leading to the FMA is presented in tabular format:  
Deposit & Entry 
Custody and Administration of 
Securities Act 
Securities Services Act Financial Markets Act 
Section 1 – “deposit” means a 
deposit of securities for custody and 
administration and includes a deposit 
by means of an entry in a securities 
account or a central securities 
account 
Section 29 – “deposit” means a 
deposit of securities and includes a 
deposit by means of an entry in a 
securities account or a central 
securities account 
Section 1 – “deposit” means a deposit 
of securities, and includes a deposit by 
means of an entry in a securities 
account or a central securities account 
Section 1 – “entry” includes an 
electronic recording of any deposit, 
withdrawal, transfer, attachment, 
pledge, cession in securitatem debiti 
or other transaction in respect of 
securities 
Section 29 – “entry” includes an 
electronic recording of any deposit, 
withdrawal, transfer, attachment, 
pledge, cession to secure a debt or 
other transaction in respect of 
securities 
Section 1 – “entry” means an electronic 
recording of any issuance, deposit, 
withdrawal, transfer, attachment, 
pledge, cession in securitatem debiti or 
other instruction in respect of securities 
or an interest in securities 
The structure of the system that preceded dematerialisation, and its development, allows one to 
posit that “deposit” under the FMA should be read (though not without some effort) to cover five 
different possible events. 
First is the physical deposit of bearer securities. Due to their scarcity in South Africa, this is likely to 
be directed primarily at the deposit of foreign bearer securities, in order to create a secondary, 
“representative” uncertificated security fit for use in the domestic exchange environment – see § 5 2 
below for the manner in which these securities are integrated into the South African environment. In 
short, this deposit does not imply a corresponding “entry”, but it does require a subsequent entry 
recording the issuance of the secondary, representative security. This is because a physical deposit 
of bearer securities will, necessarily, cause ownership of these negotiable instruments to pass to the 
depositary institution, making holdership through entry, and transfer by debiting and crediting, of that 




Second, it may refer to the dematerialisation (“substitution” or “conversion”)18 of bearer or certificated 
securities into uncertificated securities by means of entry read as meaning the destruction of the 
relevant physical document and electronic recording of a fictional “deposit” in the (historically 
informed) sense discussed above – i.e. deposit as registered transfer to an intermediary institution 
mandated to act as nominee.19 
Third, deposit is read as entry of a transfer of already uncertificated instrument-holdership from one 
custodial functionary to another – i.e. the transfer of uncertificated security instruments between 
different securities accounts maintained by a Central Securities Depository (“CSD”) or Central 
Securities Depository Participant (“CSDP”), and possibly but improbably (see the following section) 
authorised users and nominees.  
Fourth, but somewhat contentiously, it is the physical deposit of security certificates and the 
corresponding entry into the issuer’s register of the custodial, depository institution (i.e. a CSD, 
CSDP, or authorised user of an exchange) as the nominee of the asset-holder – i.e. immobilisation 
as it was in the past, which still seems possible.20 
Fifth, could the definition also include “deposit” as an entry recording issuance of uncertificated 
securities ab initio? 
It is unclear whether issuers were able, under the systems of immobilisation and early 
dematerialisation, to issue securities in a manner where the intermediary institutions were registered 
holders, as nominees of the underlying subscribers, ab initio. From the analysis quoted in the 
previous section, Malan appears to have at least supported the practice, but whether it constitutes 
a deposit is less clear. 
 
 
18  “Conversion” is used in s 33 of the FMA, “substitution” is the term used in s 54 of the Companies Act, and 
“conversion” is, again, the term used in Regulation 33 of the Companies Regulations, 2011 GN R 351 in GG 34239 
of 26-04-2011. The terms should, as a point of departure but with some caution, be read as synonymous; see also 
Yeats et al Commentary 2008 2-651 – 2-655. 
19  On this, Yeats et al Commentary 2008 2-521 note, and caution, as follows: 
“When there is a substitution of certificated securities for uncertificated securities, the FMA contemplates the relevant 
securities being ‘deposited’ in the relevant securities account and ultimately they must be ‘deposited’ with the relevant central 
securities depository and ‘held’ in the central securities account. This is a unique statutory arrangement. The use of the terms 
‘deposit’ and ‘hold’ appear not to have their ‘ordinary’ common-law meanings and need to be considered in the context of the 
related statutory depository arrangement. This is a fictional statutory deposit, because securities, being intangible, cannot be 
(at least physically) deposited or possessed…The ‘dematerialisation’ process in terms of which certificated securities are 
substituted by uncertificated securities can be viewed simplistically as an exchange of the certificate representing the 
certificated securities for an electronic entry in the uncertificated securities register maintained by the relevant central 
securities depository or participant, which entry evidences registered title to the uncertificated securities. This simplistic view, 
however, belies the substantive complexities and consequences. When there is a substitution of certificated securities for 
uncertificated securities, the FMA contemplates the relevant securities being ‘deposited’ in the relevant securities account 
and ultimately they must be ‘deposited’ with the relevant central securities depository and ‘held’ in the central securities 
account.” 
20  See Yeats et al Commentary 2008 2-519 – “Immobilisation continues to be permitted under the FMA but most 




The issue of securities in a manner where an intermediary depository institution is the primary market 
acquiring instrument-holder is familiar in the modern environment as the de facto manner in which 
listed securities are issued. Explicit recognition of the practice is first encountered in s 91A(10) of the 
Companies Act of 1973,21 but the Custody and Administration of Securities Act is silent on the matter, 
and more substantive provisions regarding the matter were only effected through s 37 of the SSA. 
Nonetheless it seems uncontentious, looking at the various definitions across the Custody and 
Administration of Securities Act and as in s 91A of the 1973 Companies Act, that deposit includes 
entry, and entry therefore could have been read to include entry for the purposes of issuance. On 
balance it is most likely that this is how the term was read.22 
It does not, however, conversely follow that entry for the purposes of issuance necessarily 
constitutes a deposit under the current regime. 
Both s 37(2) of the SSA and its successor in s 33 of the FMA, but even more so the addition of 
“issuance” alongside “deposit” in the definition of “entry” in the FMA (as well as in the wording of s 
46), all seem to point to the view that the issue of securities in uncertificated form does not constitute 
a deposit under the current framework, and is indeed a different kind of entry. 
Yet the definition of “central securities account”, and the entire “deposit”-centric scheme of notable 
provisions such as s 20, s 22, s 32, s 37, and s 44 currently support the contrary view. It is submitted 
that the aforementioned definition and sections (specifically those relating to CSDs, CSDPs and 
authorised users) cannot properly function unless “deposit” includes issuance, because otherwise 
their effect would only be in respect of securities that have subsequently been dematerialised or 
immobilised (i.e. that are already in the system), and not those issued in uncertificated form. 
It is therefore submitted that the circularity, inconsistency, and consequent absurdity of the 
definitional scheme of deposit vis-à-vis entry must be resolved as follows. Deposit in the wider 
scheme of the FMA is a species of entry, and one that includes “issuance” and “transfer” in addition 
to the other three, more natural, uses described above. This is not an ideal solution, and legislative 
intervention to rectify this issue is strongly advocated. 
 
 
21  Which reads: 
“(10) (a) Subject to subparagraph (b), when any new offer of securities is made by a company, the offeree may elect whether 
all or any part of the securities offered to him, her or it must be issued in certificated or uncertificated form. 
   (b) A company shall only issue or allot uncertificated securities to a person who is already a client of a participant or for 
whom a participant has agreed to act.” 
22   Blackman et al Commentary at 5-215, for example, suggest reading entry by transfer, rather than deposit, to include 
“acquisition…by way of subscription”. The reading of deposit provided here resolves this, somewhat forced, reading 




Conversely, the various meanings (and therefore functions) of the definition of “entry” that are not a 
deposit should be clear from the above as comprising “withdrawal…attachment, pledge, cession in 
securitatem debiti or other instruction in respect of securities or an interest in securities”. This wide 
scope afforded for the other possible functions of entry, also evident throughout the legislative 
iterations, will become relevant in the final section of Chapter 8, when dealing with limited real 
interests in securities. 
The truly problematic issue regarding “entry” in relation to “deposit” is the question with whom 
securities may be so deposited. It is specifically problematic because not all actors that are 
empowered to maintain an uncertificated securities account are also empowered to maintain the 
uncertificated securities register. This requires an analysis of the custodial system envisaged by the 
FMA, specifically the structure of the uncertificated securities register and various downstream 
accounts and records that lie between the asset- and instrument-holders.  
 
5 1 2 The custodial and administrative system: the structure of the uncertificated securities 
register, securities accounts, and the traceability of security instrument to security asset 
The second key issue in analysing the nature of uncertificated securities is the influence of the 
development of securities accounts, participants, and “depositories” on the custodial system 
implemented by the FMA. Along with the meaning of “deposit”, the structure of the custodial system 
is a fundamental building block in understanding the proprietary dispensation which governs asset-
holdership under the FMA (the topic of the next section). 
A tabular representation of the legislative evolution to provide the necessary background for the 
subsequent discussion is as follows: 
Depository / Repository 
Custody and Administration of 
Securities Act 
Securities Services Act Financial Markets Act 
Section 1 – “central securities 
depository” means a public 
company incorporated in terms of 
the Companies Act, 1973 (Act No. 
61 of 1973), and registered as a 
central securities depository in 
terms of this Act; 
“central securities repository” 
means a collection of securities of 
Section 1 - “central securities 
depository” means a person who 
is licensed as a central securities 
depository under section 32; 
… 
Section 29 – “central securities 
repository” means a collection of 
securities of the same kind held by 
a central securities depository; 
Section 1 – “central securities 
depository” means a person who 
constitutes, maintains and provides an 
infrastructure for holding uncertificated 
securities which enables the making of 
entries in respect of uncertificated 
securities, and which infrastructure 




the same kind as contemplated in 
section 11; 
… 
“depositary institution” means a 
person or category of persons 
authorized by the Registrar to hold 
and administer securities or an 
interest in securities for the 
purposes of this Act;  
… 
“securities repository” means a 
collection of securities of the same 
kind as contemplated in section 3. 
 
… 
“securities repository” means a 
collection of securities of the same 
kind held by a participant 
Securities accounts 
Custody and Administration of 
Securities Act 
Securities Services Act Financial Markets Act 
Section 1 – “central securities 
account” means an account kept 
by a central securities depository 
for a participant and reflecting the 
number or nominal value of 
securities of each kind and all 
entries made in such account 
Section 29 – “central securities 
account” means an account kept 
by a central securities depository 
for a participant and reflecting the 
number or nominal value of 
securities of each kind deposited 
and all entries made in respect of 
such securities 
Section 1 – “central securities account” 
means an account that reflects the 
number or nominal value of securities of 
each kind deposited and all entries made 
in respect of such securities, held by a 
licensed central securities depository for a 
participant or external central securities 
depository in the name of— 
(a) a participant; 
(b) an external central securities 
depository; or 
(c) any other persons as determined in 
the depository rules 
Section 1 – “securities account” 
means an account kept by or on 
behalf of a depositary institution for 
a client and reflecting the number or 
nominal value of securities of each 
kind deposited and all entries made 
in respect of such securities relating 
to such client 
Section 29 – “securities account” 
means an account kept by or on 
behalf of a participant for a client 
and reflecting the number or 
nominal value of securities of each 
kind deposited and all entries 
made in respect of such securities 
Section 1 – “securities account” means 
an account kept by— 
(a) a participant or an authorised user for 
its own account or for a client; or 
(b) a nominee for a person for whom it acts 
as a nominee, 
which reflects the number or nominal value 
of securities of each kind held for its own 
account or on behalf of that client or 
person, as the case may be, and all entries 




5 1 2 1 “Held” and “hold”: distinguishing the custodial and administrative functions 
Whilst there is some overlap, the development of the system of accounts that reflect holdings of 
uncertificated securities can be divided into three iterations (most of which is dealt with in Chapter 
3, § 3 2 1 2 and § 3 2). The first two will be summarised very briefly and simplistically, after which 
the current system will be discussed at greater length. 
In the first iteration (pre- and statutory immobilisation), participating “depositary institutions” (mainly 
banks and brokers) maintained accounts for individual investors or omnibus accounts (through 
global register entry and certificates) for multiple investors who had deposited certificated securities 
with these custodial institutions. These participating depositories could, but did not have to, re-
deposit their holdings at a central securities depository. The issuers’ securities registers retained 
their traditional function, reflecting these depositories (and later depository participants) as registered 
holders of the securities. 
This system was chiefly characterised by the fact that issuers maintained the securities registers 
reflecting instrument-holdership, and depositories maintained accounts containing the particulars of 
the holder on whose behalf they held instrument-holdership (i.e. asset-holders, or further 
downstream intermediaries on mandate from asset-holders). Later in this iteration central 
depositories arose, and these earlier depositories became depository participants within the chain 
of intermediation, maintaining similar “sub-accounts”. 
In the second iteration (early dematerialisation), central depositories and licensed depository 
participants, in the modern sense, took over both the roles of: (1) these depositary institutions (such 
as banks or brokers, who in turn became their clients), and (2) the issuers, through the introduction 
of their maintaining uncertificated securities registers and “subregisters”. The central depository 
maintained a central uncertificated securities register where securities could be re-deposited by 
participants. In terms of this tiered structure, participants’ subregisters and central depositories’ 
registers required periodic reconciliation (as mandated by the statutory provisions enabling the 
system), together constituting the overall uncertificated securities register. 
Under this system, depositories and depository participants in the system maintained the 
(uncertificated) securities register through central and participant securities accounts reflecting: (1)  
instrument-holdership by entry, and (2) the particulars of the downstream client (participant, further 
intermediary or asset-holder) for whom the account is being kept.23 
 
 





Participants’ clients, and any intermediaries further downstream of those clients, maintained 
unregulated records24 reflecting the particulars of their clients in a manner that should have enabled 
evidentiary traceability all the way down to end-of-chain asset-holdership in more complex factual 
patterns of holding and intermediation. 
In respect of the third (current) iteration, the key elements are a shift away from the tiered 
uncertificated securities register and the addition of the maintenance of securities accounts and 
recordkeeping duties for further downstream actors identified in the FMA (i.e. authorised users and 
nominees). 
In the “custody and administration” of securities, the meaning of the terms “held” and “hold” in certain 
sections of the FMA cause significant interpretive problems. Specifically, the Act makes 
indiscriminate use of the terms for two functionally separate and distinguishable acts, namely: (1) 
maintaining securities accounts (that could, in light of the various meanings of deposit, be called the 
custodial function), and (2) acting as instrument-holder of uncertificated securities (that could be 
called the administrative function).25 
The issue is another that arises directly from the terminological and conceptual path dependence in 
the development of the relevant legislation. 
Under a true system of immobilisation (such as the one developed in Germany),26 the terms held 
and hold are perfectly apt. The bearer securities physically deposited are held for both custody and 
administration with depository institutions as true owners of those securities, and end-of-chain 
investors gain only an “interest in securities” evidenced by ledger entry as understood in the more 
international sense discussed in § 5 2 below. 
Under the first iteration of the South African custodial system, the term was also apt. The custody 
and administration of immobilised securities entailed that the custodial (nominally depository) 
institutions (such as banks and brokers) maintained securities accounts (by book entry) and served 
administratively as instrument-holders using individual and global certificates. Thus the then-




24  Unregulated by the enabling companies and uncertificated securities legislation, though other kinds of financial 
regulation is not precluded by this characterisation. 
25  A good example being the discussion in § 9 2 1 of Chapter 9 below regarding the differences in language between 
s 38 and s 39 of the FMA. 
26  See § 3 2 1 of Chapter 3.  




Between the first and the second iteration, participating custodial institutions began to make use of 
nominees and potentially other third parties. This is the beginning of a divergence between the 
custodial function of maintaining securities accounts and the administrative function of instrument-
holdership, though differentiating these functions in this manner is not a perfect description of the 
true state of affairs (most importantly because the actual administration was no doubt still mainly 
performed by custodial institutions via their nominees on behalf of clients and ultimately the asset-
holders themselves).28 
Issues related to the “holding” of securities in terms of the custodial function (i.e. maintaining 
securities accounts) and the administrative function (i.e. instrument-holdership) by different system 
actors begin to emerge under dematerialisation. At this stage in the system’s development, the 
custodial function expanded to entail maintenance of the uncertificated securities register itself (until 
then the purview of the issuers themselves). 
Consider the definitions of the “central securities repository” and “securities repository” in s 29 of the 
SSA – the use of “held” does not properly distinguish between these two functions. The definition of 
“nominee” (in s 1 of the SSA) reads “…a person that acts as the registered holder of securities or an 
interest in securities on behalf of other persons”, ostensibly limiting those functionaries to instrument-
holdership, and therefore the administrative function only. 
Yet looking at the definition of “securities accounts”, carried over from the Custody and 
Administration of Securities Act to the SSA, securities accounts could be “kept…on behalf of” 
participants, while only the accounts of CSDs and CSDPs constituted the uncertificated register.  
Therefore, for example, if a securities account was maintained by a third party “on behalf of” a CSDP, 
and the instrument-holder of a particular security was a broker’s nominee, what is “held” by that 
CSDP in the securities repository?  
On the one hand, because the definition of “securities account” retained the phrase “deposited and 
all entries made”, the securities accounts of the third party (as agent in terms of an outsourcing 
agreement) could be regarded as those of the participant. Therefore deposit and entry would still 
constitute register entry, so that the participant or its agent at least held the securities in the 
repository in terms of the custodial function.29 The broker’s nominee would still have held the 
securities in terms of the administrative function. In terms of this view the third party agent would 
merely have performed the administrative function of maintaining the register, and would not hold 
 
 
28  See § 3 2 2 and 3 2 3 of Chapter 3. 
29  One should argue, though it stretches the definition of “nominee”, that third party securities account keepers could 
have – and most likely did – include nominee entities acting in such a capacity as administrative agents for 




securities in terms of the administrative function (i.e. with no effect on instrument-holdership by the 
relevant nominee). 
However, on the other hand, it could also be read to mean that until the third party re-deposits such 
securities held by the broker’s nominee (in terms of the administrative function) into the account of 
the CSDP, those securities were not formally reflected in the securities register itself, and nothing 
was held by the third party in terms of the custodial function. This is neither a desired outcome, nor 
one that makes much sense from interpretive and practical perspectives. 
The first (i.e. agency-based) reading is the only viable one, assisted by the retention of “held” in the 
definition of “repository”, as well as the phrase “deposited and entries made” in the definition of 
“securities account”. The real issues surrounding the terminological path dependence inherent in the 
seemingly dual meaning of held, however, only truly come to the fore with the definition of “securities 
account” in the FMA, and its particular use of that term. 
The current iteration is chiefly characterised by the fact that depositories and depository participants 
still maintain the (uncertificated) securities register through central and participant securities 
accounts determining instrument-holdership. Yet, going further than past systems, authorised users, 
their nominees and nominees of participants may further maintain subsidiary securities accounts 
(ostensibly, as per s 1, in the true sense) that reflect instrument-holdership. The records of these 
accounts (together with the records of their clients, if any) ultimately enable the traceability of asset-
holdership. This is not, in principle, a radical departure from the previous iteration, but the changes 
to the definitions of “central securities depository”, “securities account” and the removal of the 
“repository” concept in the custody and administration of securities provisions require a very careful 
reading of the FMA, and as any deeper analysis of the FMA demonstrates:30 
“[i]nterpreting the consequences of…‘deposit’ requires one to try to traverse a proprietary jungle and avoid 
the numerous pitfalls. One is unlikely to emerge unscathed.” 
The removal of the repository concept is a critical development, coming with the passage of the FMA 
within this third iteration, bringing with it two important developments:31 
“First, the co-ownership interest in s 37(1) of the FMA applies to ‘securities of the same kind held collectively 
by a participant, authorised user, nominee or external central securities depository in a securities account 
or by a central securities depository in a central securities account’ as opposed to having application to all 
securities of the same kind deposited with or held by ‘a depositary institution or with a central securities 
depository’. Second, the entitlement in s 37(1) is with reference to ‘securities of the same kind comprised 
 
 
30  Yeats et al Commentary 2008 2-596. 




in the securities account or central securities account, as the case may be’ as opposed to ‘all the securities 
of the same kind comprised in the securities repository or central securities repository’.” 
This makes the currently operative framework account- rather than repository-based. One way of 
interpreting this change is that the legislature has attempted to draw a distinction between securities 
accounts where securities are held collectively (i.e. pooled) and those where securities are not so 
held. This seems the soundest inference from the definitional scheme’s (removal and) replacement 
of the “repository” concept in s 41 of the SSA with the phrase “held collectively” in s 37 of the FMA 
and elsewhere. Such a view will have a marked impact on the operation of s 37, pooling, and the 
entire co-ownership construct. Where relevant for the present purpose of understanding the custody 
and administration system (i.e. the systemic context within which such “ownership” issues emerge) 
it will be included as required, with a more detailed analysis of this issue in section § 5 1 3 below. 
 
5 1 2 2 The structure of the uncertificated securities register 
Regarding the uncertificated securities register:32 
“[w]hile the FMA contains many provisions comparable to the provisions of the repealed Securities Services 
Act in regard to the custody arrangements in respect of uncertificated securities, there have been a number 
of material changes. Most importantly, the repealed Securities Services Act and the 1973 Act provided 
solely for a fragmented, tiered custody structure. The Act and the FMA are more flexible and provide for 
the possibility of a more direct and transparent system; in particular they facilitate a model where investors 
can hold securities directly in the central securities account with such entries forming part of the 
uncertificated securities register…While in relation to equity and bond securities Strate has adopted a 
hybrid model, it remains for the greater part a fragmented, tiered custody structure, even though it has 
introduced the possibility of uncertificated securities being recorded directly in its central securities register 
by way of what it refers to as a ‘segregated depository account’ which can be done by way of ‘own-name’ 
registration or in the name of an approved nominee. Strate’s model in regard to money market securities is 
better in that the securities are held in what it refers to as a ‘securities ownership register’ in the central 
securities account. While the apparent intention is to facilitate direct ‘own-name ’registration of the ‘owner’ 
in the central securities account, this is somewhat undermined by Strate’s still permitting foreign approved 
nominees to be registered in the ‘securities ownership register’. 
… 
While the custodial arrangement is regulated, the Act and the FMA do not prescribe a particular model for 
the registered title and transfer of uncertificated securities, and accordingly there is a great deal of flexibility 
as to the model that may be adopted by central securities depositories. The structure of the uncertificated 
 
 




securities register can be direct, with the security accounts in the central securities account comprising the 
uncertificated securities register. Alternatively, the structure can be a tiered structure, with participants 
maintaining parts of the uncertificated securities register (commonly referred to as ‘subregisters’ or 
‘participant registers’)… 
A participant may have the following securities accounts, which can, depending on the rules of the central 
securities depository, comprise part of the securities register: 
• in the name of a client; 
• in the name of an approved nominee, which could be wholly owned by the participant; or 
• in the participant’s name for the participant’s own account, but generally participants hold their securities 
through a separate wholly owned approved nominee account. 
Accordingly, the investor can arrange for his uncertificated securities to be registered: 
• in the investor’s name, which is referred to as ‘own-name’ registration with the investor being referred 
to as an ‘own-name client’; or 
• through an approved nominee (technically, the approved nominee is registered as the holder in its ‘own 
name’ but for the purposes of these notes, the view adopted is from the investors’ perspective). 
… 
The following diagram explains a tiered depository structure with Strate’s SDA option: 
…” 
Thus, under the current system,33 uncertificated securities are notionally “held”34 at a CSD, because 
as a “depository” a CSD:35 
 
 
33   See also Chapter 3, § 3 2 for the fuller analysis of the legal development of dematerialisation, and the Chapter IV 
of the FMA (“Custody and Administration of Securities”) for the relevant statutory provisions regarding uncertificated 
securities. 
34   What this kind of “custody” means in terms of “ownership” is dealt with in the next section.    




“must constitute, maintain and provide an infrastructure for holding uncertificated securities which 
enables the making of entries in respect of uncertificated securities…” 
Accordingly, for any given custodial system, a CSD maintains the primary uncertificated securities 
register (i.e. the register of instrument-holdership) in the form of one or more36 central securities 
accounts (electronic ledgers) accounting for securities of the same kind so held.  
Licensed participants to the CSD (i.e. CSDPs) may also, if enabled by the depository rules, hold 
securities in this way – i.e. maintain subregisters in the form of securities accounts (also electronic 
ledgers) for their clients.37 Any entries in these subregister securities accounts (e.g. a debit, credit, 
or other entry as per the definition) must be reconciled with the relevant CSD’s primary register. 
In terms of s 32(2)(a) of the FMA, “[a] participant…must, if securities are deposited with the 
participant, deposit them with a licenced central securities depository”. This peremptory provision 
indicates, together with the only sensible reading of “deposit” (as in the wide sense outlined in the 
previous section), that all entries in securities accounts maintained by CSDPs must reflect in the 
central securities account, or accounts, maintained by the CSD.38 This provision is also obviously 
aimed at instances where the depository rules do not enable subregisters. 
Within the statutory framework (with specific reference to the definitions of “uncertificated securities 
register” in s 1 of both the Companies Act and the FMA, as well as s 53 of the Companies Act as 
incorporated by reference into the FMA for application to all uncertificated securities) only CSDs and 
CSDPs are able to maintain the uncertificated securities register, which may, but does not have to, 
include CSDP subregisters. Therefore, the only securities account entries which reflect the 
uncertificated securities register of each issuer of uncertificated securities are those made by CSDs 
and CSDPs in the accounts they maintain.  
Correspondingly, the definition of “central securities account” makes it clear that securities can be 
deposited (again in the wide sense) and thereafter held directly with CSDs, such that instrument-
holdership will be reflected in the central securities account. 
By contrast, the definition of “securities account” contains two key changes to the previous 
dispensation under s 29 of the SSA (and its predecessors). First, it no longer makes reference to 
“deposit” – only to securities “held” and “all entries made in respect of such securities”. Second, it 
makes provision for securities accounts “kept” by CSDPs as well as those “kept” by authorised users 
 
 
36   See s 30(2)(l) of the FMA, its directory “may” indicating a discretion in this regard. 
37   Section 32(2)(b) & (m) of the FMA.     




and nominees; whereas in the past securities accounts reflecting instrument-holdership of 
uncertificated securities could only be kept by CSDPs or on their behalf (see s 29 of the SSA viz. 
“securities account”, as discussed in the previous section). 
In this regard the National Treasury’s Explanatory Memorandum to the Financial Markets Bill of 2011 
provides, in § 1, that the definition was: 
“amended to include accounts held by authorised users and nominees. The accounts include both 
proprietary and client accounts of authorised users, participants and nominees…to extend the necessary 
investor protections to the whole holding chain, i.e. CSDPs, authorised users and nominee holding levels.” 
This raises an interesting issue. The definition of deposit in the Act states that securities may be 
deposited by means of “entry” in a central securities account or a securities account. This appears 
to indicate that securities may be deposited with any actor maintaining such an account – i.e. a CSD, 
CSDP, authorised user, or a nominee of any of the aforementioned. For what follows, it will be 
assumed that the CSD rules enable subregisters. 
Due to the fact that only CSDs and CSDPs may maintain the uncertificated securities register, the 
definition of “securities accounts” read with the definition of “deposit” makes the function and effect 
of securities registers maintained by authorised users and nominees vis-à-vis (1) the uncertificated 
securities register, and (2) end-of-chain asset-holders, somewhat unclear.39 Do these non-register 
level securities accounts reflect instrument-holdership or asset-holdership, or simply the particulars 
and holdings of the clients of these authorised users and nominees? Or some combination of the 
aforementioned? Further, what is the effect of deposit and entry in these accounts on the securities 
register? These questions are examined in the next section.  
 
5 1 2 3 The nature and function of the CSDP securities account40 
This discussion must begin with the nature of the participant securities account in terms of the 
second iteration (early dematerialisation enabled by s 91A of the Companies Act of 1973, and first 
the Custody and Administration of Securities Act and later the Securities Services Act). The nature 
of this (‘prototypical’) register-level securities account enables an informed discussion on the nature 
of register-level CSDP securities accounts, as well as the non-register level securities accounts of 
 
 
39  It is not altogether intuitively satisfying to read into the FMA two different kinds of securities accounts – ones which 
merely reflect the state of the register (non-register securities accounts, maintained by authorised users and all 
types of nominees), and ones which factually constitute the register itself (register-level securities accounts, 
maintained by CSDPs). Yet it is submitted that this is the most logical, consistent, and practical reading possible 
under its larger schema. 




authorised users and nominees (as now included by the FMA) in this current third iteration of the 
system. 
In that context, the following observations regarding the securities accounts of participants and their 
relationship with the “subregister”41 are particularly useful:42 
“[s] 35(e) of the Securities Services Act 2004 places a duty on the participant to record all securities, of the 
same class and of the same issuer company, deposited with it in a subregister…Section 35(b) of the SSA 
also requires the participant to maintain a securities account for a client in respect of securities deposited 
with it by the client…With regard to the information that must be reflected in the securities accounts held 
by participants, s 35(c) of the SSA requires that the number or nominal value of each kind of securities 
deposited must be reflected in the securities account. The rules of STRATE Ltd require further information 
to be entered into the account…[including] the name, an appropriate identification number and physical 
address or principal place of business of the client – who may or may not be the owner of, and who may or 
may not be the member in respect of, shares credited to the account – on whose behalf the account was 
opened.” 
Further, and most important for present purposes:43 
“Surprisingly the relationship between the securities account and the subregister is not clarified in s 91A of 
the Companies Act, Chapter IV of the SSA or the Strate Rules. Section 91A does not refer to a securities 
account while the STRATE rules and the SSA do not deal with the subregister.  
The securities accounts opened and maintained by the participant in terms of the Securities Services Act 
and the STRATE rules contain the information required by s 91A of the Companies Act to be reflected in 
the subregister…The ‘subregister’ is, then, a compilation of those records in the various uncertificated 
securities accounts of the clients of the participants which relate to the holding of shares [here it is further 
noted in n 3: The securities account of the client may reflect entries of shares in various different companies 
deposited with the client] in the ‘relevant company’ by the clients in question. Those records, and not the 
whole of the accounts, constitutes the ‘subregister’ of the company in question’s register…” 
 
 
41   Defined in s 91A(1)(d) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 as “the record of uncertificated securities administered and 
maintained by a participant, which forms part of the relevant company’s register of members as referred to in this 
Act”. Importantly, s 91A(3)(b) further stipulates that the subregister must contain the particulars referred to in s 105 
(“Register of members”) and s 133 (“Registration of transfer of shares or interests”) of the Act. 
 There is no reference to the “subregister” in either the FMA or the Companies Act of 2008, though the discussion 
in § 5 1 2 2 makes it clear that the concept is both still in use and still enabled by the current legislative scheme 
(see also National Treasury’s Explanatory Memorandum to the Financial Markets Bill of 2011 at 32-33 on the FMA 
not making use of the term. 
42   Blackman et al Commentary 5-220-2, 5-220-3, and 5-221 (“Subregisters”) [own emphasis and paragraphing]. 




Securities Account – XYZ Broking Ltd 
Company Reg. No. [YYYY/NNNNNNN/NN] 
1 Example Str., Sandton, Johannesburg, 2196  
CSDP Securities Account: Mr J Doe 
ID No. [YYYYMMDD NNNN NNN]  
2 Example Avn., Sandton, Johannesburg, 2196 
CSDP A 
 
CREDIT ENTRY # 1:  
Interest: 1000 ABC 
Ltd securities  
Holder: XYZ Broking 
Nominee 1 (Pty) Ltd  
CREDIT ENTRY #2:  
Interest: 200 DEF Ltd 
securities  
Holder: XYZ Broking 
Nominee 2 (Pty) Ltd 
CREDIT ENTRY # 1:  
Interest: 300 ABC 
Ltd securities  
Holder: CSDP A 
Nominee (Pty) Ltd  
CREDIT ENTRY #2:  
Interest: 150 DEF Ltd 
securities  
Holder: CSDP A 
Nominee (Pty) Ltd 
This makes it clear that the securities account (as envisioned by the regulatory rules) had a dual 
function. 
First, it had an upstream-facing function as a record of instrument-holdership – i.e. the “entries made 
in respect of such securities”, constituting part of the “subregister”,44 looking “upstream” towards the 
CSD.  
Second, it had a downstream-facing function as a record of the particulars of the client for whom the 
account was maintained and her holdings – i.e. “an account kept…for a client and reflecting the 
number or nominal value of securities of each kind deposited”),45 looking “downstream” towards (but 
not necessary at) the end-of-chain investor. 










Figure 1: a representation of securities accounts maintained by a CSDP under the SSA and Companies Act 
of 1973 (with “holder” in the account entries referring to the instrument-holder) 
This example is designed to illustrate a number of key properties of the securities account. It 
illustrates that a client in whose name a securities account was maintained (by the CSDP in terms 
of the custodial function) was not necessarily the instrument-holder (in terms of the administrative 
 
 
44   As per the relevant portion of the definition of “securities account” in s 1 of the SSA. 
45   Again as per the relevant portion of the definition of “securities account” in s 1 of the SSA. 
46  All the figures found in this chapter are intended as representations, or abstractions, of what the uncertificated 
securities system’s legislative scheme enables, in light of the conclusions of this Chapter on how that scheme 




function) for the securities deposited. It also shows that even within a single securities account 
maintained for a client, different securities could have different instrument-holders. It further 
illustrates that the subregisters for ABC Ltd and DEF Ltd were indeed, as per the quotation above, 
“a compilation of those records in the various uncertificated securities accounts of the clients of the 
participants” (in this case only one participant is shown). Finally, it shows that the upstream-facing 
record of instrument-holdership (the entries in the electronic ledger in each account) was functionally 
and formally different to the downstream-facing record of who the client was (i.e. in whose name the 
account was being maintained), but that both are necessary for the system to function effectively.  
It is submitted that the securities accounts of CSDPs in the current iteration function in exactly the 
same way as the example illustrated above, except in the following four material respects. The first 
is that Mr J Doe would be able, where the CSD rules allow it, to hold the securities in his own name 
instead of having to use his CSDP’s approved nominee, should he so choose. Second, as there is 
no statutory mention of a subregister, the entries in the electronic ledger of each CSDP securities 
account form part of the uncertificated securities register as explained in § 5 1 2 2 above. Third, it 
may be that the FMA, Companies Act of 2008 and applicable CSD rules in question have different 
requirements for exact particulars recorded in terms of upstream-facing entries of instrument-
holdership and downstream-facing records of the client in whose name the account is being 
maintained. Fourth, outlined, neatly by the Explanatory Memorandum to the Financial Markets Bill 
of 2011:47 
“provision has been made for the UNIDROIT principle of segregation of the funds and securities held by a 
participant for its own account and those held for or on behalf of clients…[as there was] no provision in the 
SSA requiring rules to be crafted on the prohibition of debit balances…” 
The exact implication of this segregation and the meaning of the duty, in s 32(2)(m) of the FMA, of 
ensuring that securities “held for or on behalf of its clients are segregated and identifiable as 
belonging to a specific person” is more fully explored in the next two sections. 
 
5 1 2 4 The nature and function of non-register level securities accounts 
There are three kinds of non-register securities accounts: those kept by authorised users, authorised 








Securities accounts of authorised users? 
To analyse these accounts, it is best to begin by establishing a more detailed understanding of the 
concepts of the “authorised user” and the “client”.  
The FMA provides definitions for a number of different actors in the chain of intermediation between 
instrument-holder and asset-holder in the dematerialised depository environment.  
The first relevant definition is that of a “client”, defined as: 
“any person to whom a regulated person provides securities services, and includes a person that acts as 
an agent for another person in relation to those services in which case it will include the agent or exclude 
the other person if the contractual arrangement between the parties indicates this to be the intention…” 
The meaning of “securities services” is provided as: 
“(a)  the buying or selling of securities for own account or on behalf of another person as a business, a 
part of a business or incidental to conducting a business; 
(b)  the use of the trading system or infrastructure of an exchange to buy or sell listed securities; 
(c)  the furnishing of advice to any person; 
(d)  the custody and administration of securities by a participant or nominee; 
(e)  the management of securities and funds by an authorised user; 
(f)   clearing services; or 
(g)  settlement services…” 
Thus a client is any person, or agent of a person,48 who is being offered or provided these services 
by a “regulated person”, which in turn is defined as: 
“(a) a licensed central securities depository; 
(b) a licensed clearing house; 
(c) a licensed exchange; 
(d) a licensed trade repository; 
(e) an authorised user; 
(f) a clearing member; 
 
 
48   This dispenses with observations in Blackman et al Commentary in 5-222 – 5-222-1 that “[i]t is, however, arguable 
that a nominee, where acting a nominee in the strict sense as interpreted by our courts, would not be a client of the 
participant…[and should only be seen as a client] where the nominee acts as principal for itself in its relationship 




(g) a nominee; 
(h) a participant; 
(i) except for purposes of section 3(6), sections 74 and 75, sections 89 to 92, and sections 100 to 103, 
an issuer; or 
(j) any other person prescribed by the Minister in terms of section 5…” 
“Authorised user” is defined by the Act as “a person authorised by a licensed exchange to perform 
one or more securities services in terms of the exchange rules, and includes an external authorised 
user, where appropriate.” 
Finally, “nominee” is defined as “a person approved under s 76 to act as holder of securities or of an 
interest in securities on behalf of other persons” [own emphasis].  
By virtue of the definition of “securities account” in s 1 of the FMA, it is clear that an authorised user 
is able (for a client or own name) to: (1) maintain securities accounts, and (2) act as instrument-
holder. It is also clear that these two functions (custodial and administrative, respectively) are neither 
mutually exclusive nor mutually inclusive, but are definitively separate.  
Finally, it demonstrates that: (1) a CSDP, authorised user or nominee, (2) a further downstream actor 
between instrument-holder and end-of-chain asset-holder (e.g. an intermediary who is not an 
authorised user but a client of one, a bank, or any other service provider to whom these particular 
“securities services” are provided), or (3) an end-of-chain asset-holder, may be a “client” of its relative 
upstream intermediary in relation to these functions.  






Figure 2: “clients” of “regulated persons” 
In accordance with § 5 1 2 2 above, without the amendment of s 53 of the Companies Act, section 
1 (viz. “uncertificated securities register”) of both that Act and the FMA, and other incidental statutory 
amendments, entry in a securities account of an authorised user could not constitute an entry in the 
CSDP 
(client of CSD) 
Authorised user 
(client of CSDP’s nominee) 
CSDP’s Nominee 
(client of CSDP)  
Downstream intermediary  
(client of authorised user, e.g. a bank) 
End-of-chain investor 
(not a “client” unless the downstream 
intermediary is specified as a regulated 








uncertificated securities register. What is, then, the meaning of “held” in relation to keepers of 
securities accounts that do not constitute the register, and what is the nature and function of such 
securities accounts? 
It is submitted that the only logical way forward is to regard these securities accounts as regulated 
records in the exchange environment (the sections on authorised users are also found in Chapter III 
of the FMA – “Exchanges”), and therefore pertain only indirectly to the custody and administration 
of uncertificated securities. This is also supported by the Explanatory Memorandum to the Financial 
Markets Bill of 2011:49 
“Authorised users will be required to deposit own securities and those of clients in separate securities 
accounts and to ensure that they are identifiable as belonging to a specific person. Due to the equal but 
different applicability of this provision to both the exchange and CSD environment, a distinction needs to 
be drawn between segregation requirements for authorised users and those relating to participants.” 
Despite their maintaining “securities accounts” in the technical, FMA-defined sense it must follow, 
therefore, that no securities can be “deposited” in a similarly technical sense with authorised users, 
and further that entry in such an account will also not have the same effects as entry in an account 
constituting the uncertificated securities register. Ultimately, it remains true that:50 
“Ownership continues to vest in the investor and mutates to a co-ownership interest in the total number or 
nominal value of securities held in collective custody by a participant or central securities depository. The 
uncertificated securities register continues to found holding…Holding or co-holding is therefore a 
combination of the entitlement to receive benefits on behalf of the owner and a package of duties owed by 
the holder to its client.  
… 
An account credit is not a share or security. It rather represents all the duties of an agent, or stated inversely, 
all the rights that a client has against his custodian. It is also a numerical representation of the proportion 
of higher-tier holdings. This numerical value, at the same time, gives an indication of the client’s [portion] 
of dividends or monetary contributions received by the custodian in bulk. At the same time, some rights 
against third parties are built into this relationship, such as protective measures against a custodian’s 
creditors. The law [regarding these] accounts is a law of relationships. To conceive of account credits as 
assets in their own right may be a helpful fiction, but it would lead to the same conceptual fault that was 
perpetuated by the conflation of the share with the share certificate.”  
 
 
49   § 19 at 29 (dealing with the addition of what is now s 22 of the FMA) [own emphasis]. 




A particularly strong indication of this position can be found in the wording of s 22 of the FMA 
(“Segregation of securities”):  
“(1)  Every authorised user must deposit securities held for its own account and for or on behalf of its 
clients in separate securities accounts or other accounts, maintained by the person who holds or 
otherwise safeguards such securities on behalf of the authorised user…;  
  (2)   (a) Every authorised user must balance and reconcile the aggregate number of each security 
reflected in securities accounts maintained by the authorised user, and held by a participant, another 
third party, or a licensed central securities depository if so authorised by the registrar, on behalf of 
the authorised user and its clients, with the number of securities held by the participant, other third 
party or licensed central securities depository, whichever may be applicable, on a daily basis unless 
otherwise provided for in the exchange rules.” 
The emphasised parts of these provisions indicate that the intention of the legislature (which is not 
elsewhere obviously evident) is that securities accounts in the technical sense may be maintained 
by authorised users. However, these accounts merely exist as records reflecting : (1) the securities 
held in the uncertificated securities register, and (2) for whom the account is kept – all “to extend the 
necessary investor protections to the whole holding chain, i.e. CSDPs, authorised users and 
nominee holding levels.”51 
In this way, s 22(1) requires a true deposit (in the sense used in the FMA and discussed in § 5 1 1 
above) of securities by an authorised user into a securities account of a functionary that is able to 
maintain accounts that constitute the uncertificated securities register (i.e. a CSD or CSDP). This 
also then makes greater sense of s 22(2), which imposes a duty to reconcile what is reflected in 
those (uncertificated securities register-level) accounts with what is reflected in the subsidiary 
securities accounts of authorised users and their nominees. 
In any other reading of s 22 a problematic circularity emerges, where “held” and “hold” conflate the 
act of maintaining a securities account (the custodial function) with the act of instrument-holdership 
(the administrative function). As should already be clear, these are fundamentally different functional 
acts. 
However, in form and function s 22 securities accounts are very similar to the securities accounts of 
CSDPs with the important exceptions that (1) their content does not constitute a part of the 
uncertificated securities register, and (2) the entries reflect information in the next tier, which is not 
evident in the entries in the securities account kept by the relevant CSDP. It is also submitted, on 
the basis of securities accounts’ upstream-facing function and their definition in s 1 of the FMA 
 
 
51   Explanatory Memorandum to the Financial Markets Bill of 2011, § 1 viz. “securities account” at 13-14. See also § 5 




(coupled with the definition of “entry”), that their entries must reflect the contents of the uncertificated 
register (and therefore instrument-holdership). 
By way of illustrative representation (based on the securities account kept by CSDP A for XYZ 
Broking Ltd. in Figure 1 above): 
 
Figure 3: a representation of the securities accounts of an authorised user (with “holder” in the account entries 
referring to the instrument-holder) 
Securities accounts of authorised users’ nominees? 
It should follow, by virtue of the nominee’s representative nature, that the same position must apply 
where securities accounts are maintained by nominees of authorised users, for the same reasons.52  
Securities accounts of nominees of CSDs and CSDPs? 
The position regarding CSD and CSDP nominees’ securities accounts is slightly more difficult to 
ascertain. On the one hand one may argue that a “nominee” as agent in the scheme of the FMA is 
empowered to do what its principal is empowered to do. By that reasoning, the maintaining of 
securities accounts by CSD and CSDP nominees could constitute the maintaining of the 
uncertificated securities register on their behalf (as has been suggested, in § 5 1 2 3 above, this may 
have been the case under the previous iteration of the custodial system). On the other, one may 
 
 
52  See in this regard Yeats et al Commentary 2008 2-991, noting in terms of an accompanying diagram [displayed in 
the portion quoted in § 5 1 2 2 above]: “The nominee securities accounts detailing investor interests kept by 
approved nominees do not form part of the uncertificated securities register.”   
Securities Account – Bank Z Ltd 
Company Reg. No. [YYYY/NNNNNNN/NN] 
3 Example Str., Sandton, Johannesburg, 2196  
XYZ Broking Ltd 
Securities Account: Ms J Doe 
ID No. [YYYYMMDD NNNN NNN]  
4 Example Avn., Sandton, Johannesburg, 2196  
CREDIT ENTRY # 1:  
Interest: 500 ABC 
Ltd securities  
Holder: XYZ Broking 
Nominee 1 Pty Ltd  
CREDIT ENTRY # 1:  
Interest: 500 ABC 
Ltd securities  
Holder: XYZ Broking 
Nominee 1 (Pty) Ltd  
CREDIT ENTRY #2:  
Interest: 100 DEF Ltd 
securities  
Holder: XYZ Broking 
Nominee 2 Pty Ltd 
CREDIT ENTRY #2:  
Interest: 100 DEF Ltd 
securities  
Holder: XYZ Broking 




argue that the FMA and Companies Act are definitive in stating that only CSDs and CSDPs are 
statutorily enabled to maintain the register to the exclusion of all others. 
Ultimately, under the FMA, the latter is the most convincing argument on balance, primarily because: 
(1) the definition of nominees explicitly limits their function to being the “holder of securities or of an 
interest in securities” on another’s behalf; (2) the definition of “securities account” is entirely different 
from its predecessors; (3) s 53 of the Companies Act and the definition of “uncertificated securities 
register” in s 1 of both that Act and the FMA makes no mention of nominees, where elsewhere in the 
FMA they are often explicitly included, where required; and (4) the use of the phrase “custody and 
administration of securities by a participant or nominee” in the definition of “securities services” is 
not specific enough to override the considerations already mentioned.53 
Just as was the case for the SSA, this has the unfortunate consequence of rendering the already 
vague meaning of “held by…[an]other third party” in s 22(2) very difficult to understand, other than 
in the context of an outsourcing agreement with an agent (most likely a nominee, or an out-and-out 
third party vendor in respect of those services). 
Legislative change, taking into account the fact that the custodial and administrative meanings of 
held are no longer the same, is strongly recommended to address this issue. 
 
5 1 2 5 Segregation and traceability 
This view of (1) the structure of the uncertificated securities register, (2) register and non-register 
securities accounts, and (3) the functions of the securities account finally brings one to a discussion 
of segregation and, ultimately, traceability. This is of some importance in understanding “ownership” 
of uncertificated securities, which will be taken up in the next section. 
For present purposes, the work of the previous two sections, seen together, provide clarity in one 
important respect: it is in the nature of all securities accounts to serve a dual informational purpose 
within the uncertificated system. First, they reflect instrument-holdership by entry (“the number or 
nominal value of securities of each kind held for…own account or on behalf of…[a] client or person, 
as the case may be, and all entries made in respect of such securities”), fulfilling an upstream-facing 
informational function. Second, they reflect for whom they are kept (“an account kept…for its own 
account or for a client”), fulfilling a downstream-facing informational function.54 This applies across 
 
 
53  Supported, again, by Yeats et al Commentary 2008 2-991 in respect of the diagram.  
54  Section 1 viz. “securities account” of the FMA for what is quoted. “Upstream” meaning facing up towards the CSD; 




all register-level and non-register level securities accounts as defined in s 1 of the FMA, as is clear 
from the definition. 
Regarding the accounts and records of CSDs, CSPDs, and nominees (presumably because it 
speaks directly to the custody and administration sphere, it excludes authorised users), s 35(7) 
establishes that: 
“Any securities held by a central securities depository, participant or nominee for or on behalf of another 
person must be segregated and identifiable as belonging to a specific person and are considered to be 
trust property as defined in the Financial Institutions (Protection of Funds) Act, and that Act applies to those 
securities.” 
Section 1 of the Financial Institutions (Protection of Funds) Act55 (“FI Act”) defines “trust property” 
as: 
“any corporeal or incorporeal, movable or immovable asset invested, held, kept in safe custody, controlled, 
administered or alienated by any person, partnership, company or trust for, or on behalf of, another person, 
partnership, company or trust, and such other person, partnership, company or trust is hereinafter referred 
to as the principal” 
This very expansive definition and its effect on “ownership” of securities is discussed more fully in 
the following section. However, for these purposes the following observations in respect of the above 
definition in the FI Act are sufficient. 
The distinction between maintaining a securities account (the custodial function) and acting as 
instrument-holder of an uncertificated security (the administrative function) is of great importance in 
determining the meaning of “ownership” in the FI Act. This distinction, read with the outcomes of 
Chapter 4 as well as s 36(2) of the FMA, indicates strongly that the instrument-holders, asset-
holders, and other possible holders of limited real interests in securities are the only persons who 
can have direct (lawful) holdership of any element of the underlying interest of a security. This alone 
leads to two useful conclusions.  
First, for the custodial function, it follows that custodial functionaries (i.e. CSDs, CSDPs, and perhaps 
also authorised users and nominees) acting in that capacity (maintaining securities accounts as 
distinguished from acting as instrument-holder) can have no proprietary interest in those securities 
by virtue of their custodial roles. This is in line with s 36(2) of the FMA and is also supported by the 
courts’ approach to the FI Act as demonstrated by Louw NO and Others v Coetzee and Others,56 as 
 
 
55   28 of 2001.  




well as Executive Officer of the Financial Services Board v Ovation Global Investment Services (Pty) 
Ltd & Another.57 
Thus it seems incorrect to argue that, by virtue of s 35(7) read with the definition of trust property in 
the Financial Institutions Act, “the FMA introduces a form of dual ownership with the uncertificated 
securities subject to a statutory trust with the central securities depository having legal ownership 
and the investor being vested with beneficial ownership in a manner comparable to that recognised 
in English law.”58  
Instead, with the right understanding of the wide meaning of deposit within the scheme of the Act, it 
is most sensible to argue that the definition in the FI Act applies to institutions in the specific capacity 
in which they act. For the custodial function, the definition covers “incorporeal, 
moveable…asset[s]…kept in safe custody…[and/or] administered” by these institutions. The 
relationship of trust implied (and all consequent statutory protective controls) by the FMA’s 
confirmation of the application of the FI Act must therefore be understood as one of informal trust, 
rather than any proprietary trust in the formal sense (bewind or otherwise).59 Nothing in the FI Act 
suggests that it applies to formal trusts only; in fact, s 2 explicitly recognises fiduciary agency in using 
the phrase “instrument or agreement by which the trust or agency in question has been created.” It 
is submitted that the use of “agency” here, when read with the definition of “trust property”, should 
be read to include species of mandatum as well. The only exception would be those rare bearer 
securities physically deposited with such a custodial institution – here the securities would naturally 
become the property of the institution in the full sense. 
Second, for the administrative function, it indicates that CSDPs, their nominees, and authorised 
users’ nominees (as well as, in all likelihood and despite their explicit exclusion, authorised users) 
who are acting as instrument-holders are included for a different reason. Here the definition in the 
Financial Institutions Act most likely applies to these institutions in this specific capacity because it 
includes “incorporeal, moveable…asset[s]…held…or controlled” by these institutions as instrument-
holders. 
This, on the other hand, is indeed a proprietary (though, as per Chapter 4, non-patrimonial) 
relationship to the underlying interest of the security: holdership of the incidents of execution. Yet, 
 
 
57  (Ovation Preservation Pension Fund, Ovation Preservation Provident Fund, Ovation Preservation Annuity Fund & 
Metropolitan Life Ltd Intervening) [2007] 4 All SA 741 (C) paras. [5]-[17].  
58   Yeats et al Commentary 2008 2-599 & 2-623 – 2-630. The authors appear also not to favour this interpretation – 
see 2-630. 
59  See for instance the discussion of the possible import of the FI Act in respect of “co-ownership” of uncertificated 





again, it need not rise to the level of a “statutory” trust – merely a fiduciary relationship of trust, which 
is already inherent in instrument-holdership. The exposition regarding the content and dynamics of 
the unique relationship of fiduciary agency between instrument- and asset-holder outlined in § 4 3 1 
of Chapter 4 is strongly supportive of this conclusion.  
With this in mind, beginning with CSDs, what are the relevant duties in maintaining central securities 
accounts? Section 30(2) of the FMA states that CSDs: 
“(a)  must constitute, maintain and provide an infrastructure for holding uncertificated securities which 
enables the making of entries in respect of uncertificated securities; 
 (b) must perform custody and administration in respect of a central securities account;  
    … 
(k)  must maintain a central securities account with due regard to the interests of the participant and its 
clients;  
(l) may hold all securities of the same kind deposited with it by a participant collectively in a separate 
central securities account…” 
Thus, a CSD must maintain at least a central securities account for each participant, reflecting all 
deposited securities including, as per the meaning of deposit, dematerialised securities and 
securities issued in uncertificated form, as well as possibly immobilised certificated or bearer 
securities. It may also keep separate central securities accounts for each security “of the same kind” 
(i.e. of the same class and issue) deposited by a CSDP. Own name accounts for asset-holders or 
approved nominees are also enabled, along with accounts for external CSDs.60 
Section 37(5) determines that securities under the custody of a CSD must “be segregated and 
identifiable as belonging to a specific person”. According to the Explanatory Memorandum to the 
Financial Markets Bill of 2011:61 
“a provision has been made for the UNIDROIT principle of segregation of the securities held by a participant 
for its own account and those held for or on behalf of other persons. Currently, there is no provision in the 
SSA requiring rules to be made on the prohibition of debit balances. This has now been provided for in the 
Bill. It is clear in practice (internationally and nationally) that the CSD Rules and Directives could make 




60   As per s 1 (viz. “central securities account”) of the FMA – the provision for any other persons specified in the 
depository’s rules is the central enabling provision for own name account-holding. 




Though this quotation does not pertain directly to s 37 or CSDs themselves, similar commentary is 
found pertaining to each proposed section of the Act in which the duty of segregation is imposed 
with this specific language (see below, as each is dealt with in turn). Yet the precise meaning of this 
phrase, “segregated and belonging to a specific person” is difficult to understand. 
The reference to the UNIDROIT principle is to articles 24 and 25 of the UNIDROIT Convention on 
Substantive Rules for Intermediated Securities.62 Read against the Convention, it is clear that the 
provision has two sets of objectives. The first is to stabilise the custodial system and mitigate 
systemic risk, through the prevention of non-intraday debit balances63 and the related issue of 
shortfalls between what is credited and what is actually held, as well as the insulation of client (and 
ultimately investor) holdings in case of insolvency of intermediaries. Second, it aims to improve 
traceability of holdership within the system and, when read with the expansion in s 1 viz. “securities 
account” and the provisions of s 22, in so doing “to extend the necessary investor protections to the 
whole holding chain…”64 Here security of transfer, as determined by s 41 of the FMA and s 53(4) of 
the Companies Act, is of great importance, but is primarily dealt with in Chapter 10 of this work. 
What is clear from the previous two sections is that each central securities account will include 
entries, reflecting instrument-holdership (and will form part of the uncertificated securities register). 
Thus interpreting the phrase, and specifically the use of “belonging”, to mean that each instrument-
holder must be separately identified would not only be superfluous but also nonsensical.  
 
 
62  of 25 September 2013. Article 25 includes that: 
 “1. Securities and intermediated securities of each description held by an intermediary as described in Article 24(2) shall be 
allocated to the rights of the account holders of that intermediary, other than itself, to the extent necessary to ensure 
compliance with Article 24(1)(a). 
 … 
 3. The allocation required by paragraph 1 shall be effected by the non-Convention law and, to the extent required or permitted 
by the non-Convention law, by arrangements made by the relevant intermediary. 
 4. The arrangements referred to in paragraph 3 may include arrangements under which an intermediary holds securities and 
intermediated securities in segregated form for the benefit of: 
(a) its account holders generally; or 
(b) particular account holders or groups of account holders, 
in such manner as to ensure that such securities and intermediated securities are allocated in accordance with 
paragraph 1. 
Article 24, as referred to, requires: 
 “An intermediary must, for each description of securities, hold or have available securities and intermediated securities of an 
aggregate number or amount equal to the aggregate number or amount of securities of that description credited to: 
(a) securities accounts that it maintains for its account holders other than itself; and 
(b) if applicable, securities accounts that it maintains for itself.” 
63  Debit balances are only possible where the securities of the custodian, and of the custodian’s clients, are not 
individuated. 
64  National Treasury Explanatory Memorandum to the Financial Markets Bill of 2011, § 1 at 13-14 (dealing with the 




Interpreting the phrase to mean that each asset-holder must be indicated is also clearly incorrect. 
The South African system remains primarily, but not entirely, non-transparent,65 and it is further clear 
that in more complex patterns of holdership, the end-of-chain investor may not be a “client” as per 
the FMA and would therefore not be identified within the chain of securities accounts (see for 
example Figure 2 above). In these cases one or more unregulated, 66  further intermediary is 
interposed between the investor (asset-holder) and the lowest tier custodial functionary, so asset-
holdership may not be fully traceable within the regulated system of upstream-facing entries or 
downstream-facing client records. In such cases, what is required to be recorded within the system 
will end with the identity of the unregulated intermediary. In this way, the possibility of reading 
“belonging to a specific person” as referring to asset-holdership is also fairly convincingly excluded. 
The most convincing interpretation is that the phrase is intended to mean that the custodial 
functionary must ensure that all its securities are identifiable as being held (in the custodial sense) 
for a specific client (in this case the CSD holding for a CSDP as client). The key secondary 
interpretive problem that then arises is as follows:67 
“What is unclear from the provisions of the Act and Rules is whether securities must be segregated in such 
a way that specific securities can be allocated to specific clients or whether it is sufficient if a custodian 
separates own securities from a pool of collectively held client securities. The wording of the provisions 
points towards the former interpretation, but this would effectively bar any pooling or collective holdings of 
securities. Considering the purpose of the duty, which is to prevent the mixing of client property with an 
agent’s property, it can be argued that the latter interpretation can find application as long as client accounts 
record the holding of each client in relation to the pool.” 
This work also strongly favours the first interpretation, which is well illustrated by the downstream-
facing details in the securities accounts of Figures 1 and 3 above (which also show that the policy 
outcome of traceability is not precluded by this interpretation). It will be shown in the next section 
that it may not be altogether correct to assert, as above, this this effectively precludes pooling. 
However, the second interpretation remains possible, in which case further details in each account 
entry would be required to achieve such segregation effectively. This point is not as important in the 
context of CSDs as it is in the context of the securities accounts of CSDPs, authorised users and 
nominees, and will be illustrated below in the example in Figure 4. 
 
 
65  See Vermaas (2010) Acta Juridica 99 & n 66, as well as 95-97, and Meissner (2019) 223 & n 22. 
66  In this context, “unregulated” means unregulated by the FMA and but not necessarily unregulated by other financial 
legislation such as the Financial Sector Regulation Act 19 of 2017, the Financial Advisory and Intermediaries 
Services Act 37 of 2002, or the Banks Act 23 of 1965. 




Turning thus to CSDPs, the FMA expands upon s 37(5), including as one of the many duties of 
CSDPs, in s 32(2)(m), that such a participant: 
“must deposit securities held by it for its own account and those held for or on behalf of its clients in separate 
securities accounts and must ensure that securities held for or on behalf of its clients are segregated and 
identifiable as belonging to a specific person...” 
Following the same logic (but drawing now from the definition of “securities accounts”), one uses the 
same reading of “belonging to a specific person” to conclude that a CSPD must reflect for whom it 
is maintaining each securities account, as demonstrated in Figure 1. However, on the possibility of 
interpreting the provision to allow single securities accounts for more than one client, an illustrative 
representation could be as follows: 
 
Figure 4: a representation of securities accounts maintained by a CSDP (with “holder” in the account entries 
referring to the instrument-holder) 
This example shows the accounts and their entries carry the same information as in Figure 1, but in 
a somewhat more convoluted manner. One key concern is that increased complexity of entry means 
increased complexity in what is required for netting and transfer. This would be especially so if a 
transfer were to occur, for instance, between XYZ Brokers Ltd and Mr J Doe – how would the debiting 
and crediting requirement of s 53 of the Companies Act (which is required for the transfer of asset-
holdership) be satisfied? This is dealt with in detail in § 8 2 of Chapter 8. 
From the nature of the security instrument, it is trite that the uncertificated securities register as 
constituted from the accounts of the CSD and any CSDP will only reflect instrument-holdership. 
Nonetheless total security-holdership also remains entirely possible. It is possible with respect to 
Securities Account A 
CSDP A 
 
Securities Account B 
CREDIT ENTRY:  
Interest: 
1300 ABC Ltd securities 
Clients: 
-Client: XYZ Broking Ltd 
(1000 securities) 
-Client: Mr J Doe (300 
securities) 
Holders:  
-XYZ Broking Nominee 
1 (Pty) Ltd (1000 
securities) 
-CSDP A Nominee (Pty) 
Ltd (300 securities) 
CREDIT ENTRY:  
Interest: 
350 DEF Ltd securities 
Clients: 
-Client: XYZ Broking Ltd 
(200 securities) 
-Client: Mr J Doe (150 
securities) 
Holders:  
-XYZ Broking Nominee 
2 (Pty) Ltd (200 
securities) 
-CSDP A Nominee (Pty) 




securities held by a CSD or CSDP for its own account (i.e. where it is also asset-holder), as well as 
where their downstream clients reflected as instrument-holders are also the asset-holders (though 
this is, under the current primarily non-transparent system at the JSE, a minority of cases where an 
own-name SDA account is held).68 In these cases the register will actually reflect security-holdership. 
Finally, what about the subsidiary (‘non-register’) securities accounts maintained by authorised users 
and nominees? 
 For authorised users, in this context, s 22 requires that: 
“(1)  Every authorised user must…ensure that securities held for or on behalf of its clients are identifiable 
as belonging to specific persons.  
… 
(3)  Any securities held by an authorised user for or on behalf of another person must be identifiable as 
belonging to a specific person and are considered to be trust property as defined in the Financial 
Institutions (Protection of Funds) Act, and that Act applies to those securities.” 
The key issue here is whether it makes sense to interpret “belonging to a specific person” differently 
for non-register securities accounts than for CSDs and CSDPs.   
Is the intention that these accounts reflect instrument-holdership (as a reflection of the consolidated 
uncertificated securities register as maintained by a CSD and CSDPs) and to whom the securities 
“belong” (which as explained above is a misnomer for the person for whom the account is 
maintained), or should these accounts reflect the actual end-of-chain patrimonial interests of the 
asset-holders? 
The latter interpretation, which enjoys some support, 69  could mean that the system operates, 
holistically, to ensure that a periodically reconciled record must be kept of: (1) the uncertificated 
instrument-holder as per the accounts of the CSD and CSDP in terms of s 32(2)(m); and (2) the 
 
 
68  Even, for example, under Strate Ltd.’s “SDA” system, only SDA clients holding securities directly in own name would 
have full security-holdership, and SDAs for approved nominees would only reflect instrument-holdership.   
69  Most notably the authors in Yeats et al Commentary 2008, discussing the “co-ownership interpretation” of the 
custodial system (which is cited as the work’s preferred interpretation) at 2-608 – 2-611, and specifically at 2-609: 
 “The fact that there is generally a hierarchical series of securities accounts between an investor and the securities held in a 
central securities depository makes it challenging to determine which securities account is relevant for the purpose of 
determining the investor’s co-ownership interest. It is submitted that it would not make business sense to read the provision 
as regarding investors as having different co-ownership interests depending on which level in the custodial ‘hierarchy’ one 
looked at. To avoid this, it is submitted that it makes sense to read the provision as taking into account the ‘hierarchy’ and 
work from the ‘top-down’ to the securities account reflecting the investor’s interest. That is, if the investor’s specific interest is 
only recorded in an approved nominees securities account, one would look to the credited holding of the relevant participant 
in the central securities account…” [own emphasis] 
 Nonetheless, it is shortly thereafter conceded that a “key issue in this regard is that the securities accounts are only 
evidence of the holding in the relevant account and therefore may not reflect the actual position and, traditionally, 




uncertificated asset-holder as per the non-register accounts of authorised users in terms of s 22. If 
so, each security is traceable as belonging to a specific instrument- and asset-holder, respectively, 
within the system of securities accounts. This interpretation is important not because it is correct but 
because it is strongly indicative of the policy outcome desired – that the ambit of the regulated 
system, as far as possible, has within it the details of the asset-holder. 
Unfortunately, as illustrated in Figure 2 above, it is quite possible that the client of an authorised user 
is not the end-of-chain asset-holder. In that case the system will not necessarily reflect the end-to-
end holding chain between instrument-holder and ultimate investor (as demonstrated by Figures 3 
and 4) – merely instrument-holdership and the next downstream intermediary “client” (who does not 
necessarily have any proprietary patrimonial interest in the held securities).  
A second factor militating against this reading is that nominees are included in s 37(5), but without 
due differentiation between the nominees of CSDs and CSDPs, and those of authorised users, 
respectively. Two divergent interpretations of the same provision for register-level securities 
accounts and non-register securities accounts seems unlikely. 
Third, bearing in mind the analysis above regarding the difficulties encountered in the Act’s inherited 
use of “held”, it is not particularly contentious to assert that held should be interpreted within the 
definition of “securities accounts” as referring to the administrative function (instrument-holdership), 
and therefore that it should also be similarly interpreted in s 22(12) and (3). 
Fourth, there is another key provision in the FMA that regulates the duties of authorised users’ 
securities records – s 19: 
“Marking of or recording details of securities — When a document of title relating to listed securities 
comes into the possession of an authorised user, the authorised user must, as soon as possible –  
(a) mark it; or 
(b) record and store the necessary details, in a manner which will render it possible at any time 
thereafter readily to establish the identity of the owner of those securities.” 
The next section will argue that the correct meaning of “ownership” as found in the statutory 
framework is in reference to asset-holdership. Assuming this to be the case the use of the term 
“owner” in this provision, in contradistinction to the phrase “belonging to” employed by s 22, makes 
the prospect of a securities account intended to reflect asset-holdership directly even more unlikely. 
The “or” in s 19 further demonstrates that this outcome has been considered by the legislature. 
However, the Explanatory Memorandum to the Financial Markets Bill of 2011, envisioning extension 
of the “necessary investor protections to the whole holding chain”, is evidence that the act wishes 




words, it is beneficial to extend these duties downstream as far as the last “client”, so that all clients 
who are indeed also asset-holders enjoy enhanced protection. 
The critical investor protections referred to appear to be: (1) finality of transfer; (2) protection from 
the insolvency of a CSD or CSDP; and (3) risk-sharing in case of a shortfall in the number of 
securities under the custody and administration of a CSD or CSDP, or downstream intermediary. 
There are compelling reasons why one could argue that the act is successful in extending these 
protections although fact patterns may emerge where this seemingly “final” client is yet another 
intermediary for an end-of-chain client (again, as illustrated by Figure 2). 
The latter two protections are successfully ensured by reading the provisions as regulating the 
custodial and administrative functions alone, without the need for direct records of asset-holdership. 
Due to the delineating and “bundling” function of the security instrument (also discussed in the 
following section),70 the securities register alone will adequately determine the extent of any short-
fall because the register-level securities accounts serve as record of the number of securities (1) 
held administratively by instrument-holders, and (2) held custodially through the act of maintaining 
securities accounts.  
Thus, any shortfall will be accurately and correctly apportioned and the risk and shortfall shared 
accordingly. Section 36(2) and the interpretation of s 37 offered in the next section (supporting the 
“co-ownership”, or preferably co-asset-holdership, construct), together with the import of the FI Act, 
further ensures that the insolvency of a CSD or CSDP should not affect the patrimonial position of 
asset-holders, as the former two hold no patrimonial interest in any security of which they are not 
also asset-holder. 
In terms of the first (finality of transfer), regulation of instrument-holdership alone is also sufficient. 
When transfer of instrument-holdership by register entry is understood as a formality requirement 
(quasi-traditio) for the transfer of the security asset (as is argued is the case in § 8 2 2 of Chapter 8), 
the protections of finality of transfer hinge on such a register entry, and again the records pertaining 
 
 
70  This function is alluded to in Chapter 4, in § 4 1 3: 
“as a locus for the execution of the collective sum of rights and competencies, [the security instrument] facilitates the 
conglomeration, or bundling, of rights in cases where a security is comprised of more than one personal right. All rights and 
competencies accruing to a security must, by necessity, be administered through the instrument(-holder), so that these 
components of the underlying interest are bound together by it.” 
  The point is further elaborated upon in Chapter 6, § 6 3 3 2, this is also discussed, under the indicium “Bundling”, 
as follows: 
“The [security] instrument increases the economic efficiency of a complex and multi-party borrowing arrangement by creating 
a single person to perform towards (the instrument-holder), irrespective of the identity of the person entitled to the beneficial 
results of such performance. A corollary of this is that, no matter what the underlying interest consists of, benefits will always 





to any non-securities account administering clients or end-of-chain asset-holders are not essential 
for its protective effect. This is further dealt with in § 9 2 of Chapter 9. 
Consider the following potential chains of holdership: 
 
Figure 5: complex intermediated holdership 
 
Figure 6: simple intermediated holdership 
In these instances, taking the interpretive stance presented, it would appear as though the records 
of asset-holdership are not regulated by the FMA or related delegated legislation.71 However, when 
paired with a sound understanding of the co-ownership construction (as discussed in the following 
section) and the key role of (register-level) securities account entry as a hard formality requirement 
in quasi-delivery for the transfer of the security asset, the system appears quite sound.  
 
 
71  Even the Strate Rules appear not to deviate from the wording and definitions used in the FMA in any meaningful 
way in this particular regard – see Strate Ltd Rules of Strate Ltd [Reg. No. 1998/022242/07] (updated as per 
Government Gazette No. 41132 22 September 2017). 
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Ultimately, the traceability of asset-holdership, and identity of the true asset-holder, remains 
fundamentally an evidentiary matter. In this sense the size and scope of the economic activity of 
securities holdership and trading does not make this position particularly anomalous – the funds held 
in bank accounts and their electronic transfer are similarly evidentiary matters in the context of a 
legal dispute, and are highly comparable in terms of value and velocity. To borrow a phrase from s 
22A of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act,72 all that is necessary in terms of a past securities 
transaction are the records “that are reasonably necessary to enable that transaction to be readily 
reconstructed”. Section 56 of the Companies Act is a further tool, if correctly utilised and complied 
with, to ensure the end-of-chain asset-holder is identifiable, and that transparency exists in a manner 
that does not affect, dilute or impugn on the established rights and duties of the asset- and 
instrument-holder of any particular uncertificated security within the system. 
There is also the obvious economic (mainly financial and reputational) incentives of downstream 
intermediaries who do not maintain any kind of securities accounts to keep sound records of asset-
holdership and holdership of other limited real interests in securities. Further, each securities 
transaction will be accompanied by records of an electronic funds transfer from the prospective 
asset-holder (or acquirer of a limited real interest in securities), after which there will be evidence of 
a flow of funds through the applicable intermediaries into the clearing and settlement system (whose 
records are regulated in terms of both Chapter V of the FMA and in terms of the national payments 
system). The transaction will ultimately result in a register entry of the sort required for the transfer, 
as well as payment to the disposing asset- or real interest-holder in a similar fashion. Finally, it is 
rather improbable that any securities transaction would occur without a documentary record of the 
necessary supporting contractual and pre-contractual undertakings between investor and her direct 
mandated intermediary, and similarly between that intermediary and others until the transaction 
enters the clearing and settlement environment. 
In short, from a policy perspective, with any shortfalls apportionable through records of instrument-
holdership in the non-register and register-level securities accounts, the insolvency of any custodial 
functionary aptly regulated, and the necessary ancillary remedies in place (such as in s 44 of the 
FMA), the view presented does not seem to leave the position of any individual investor, or the 









5 1 3  “Ownership” of uncertificated securities  
The keystone for the proposed scheme of interpretation of the FMA is understanding “ownership” of 
uncertificated securities in light of the co-ownership construct ostensibly imposed by s 37 (and to a 
more limited degree its interplay with s 36). 
Under the older immobilisation and uncertificated securities regimes, any holders of securities of the 
same class and issue which were deposited without full segregation in a “repository” obtained as 
consequence a proportional “co-ownership” of the entirety of the deposited “fungible bulk”. 73 
However, without the outcomes of Chapter 4, specifically its harmonisation of the “dual ownership” 
feature of English registered securities with the doctrinal characteristics of South African private law, 
there does not appear to be perfect clarity about the meaning of ownership, and therefore co-
ownership, in the South African legal landscape. As will be shown, this problem is particularly acute 
when attempting to understand why so-called “omnibus” holding of security instruments by 
intermediaries causes the underlying patrimonial substance of securities to commingle despite their 
being held by individual end-of-chain investors. 
This section will suggest that in the custody and administration of uncertificated securities: (1) 
“ownership” refers to end-of-chain asset-holdership rather than instrument-holdership; and (2) on 
that basis that “co-ownership” so understood becomes a key enabling building block underpinning 
the South African uncertificated regime, supporting the above interpretations regarding deposit, entry 
and the account-based structure of the custody and administration system, and facilitating a sound 
understanding of the legal consequences with respect to the pooling of securities of the same class 
and issue within a securities account.  
 
5 1 3 1  The meaning of ownership 
The first step, then, is to develop a proper understanding of the meaning of “ownership” when used 




73  See Malan Collective Securities Depositories 230-236 as extensively quoted in § 5 1 1 above; Blackman et al 




In the context of securities, the historic meaning of “ownership” leans towards an indication of asset-
holdership (i.e. holdership of the beneficial interest). This is in contrast to “title”, which in most cases 
refers to instrument-holdership (i.e. registered holdership), so that:74 
“ownership of shares in South African law is completely distinct from, although frequently co-extensive with, 
the registered title to shares.” 
Support for this is also found in Blackman et al.75 Yet dematerialisation has a marked impact on the 
ownership, or rather holdership, of the security asset. In the context of the older uncertificated 
securities regime found in the 1973 Companies Act and the Securities Services Act,76 these authors 
remark that:77 
“[i]n the case of uncertificated securities it would seem that, because the transfer is effected by debiting 
and crediting, respectively, of both the account in the subregister from which the transfer is effected and 
the account in the subregister to which the transfer is to be made, it is upon entry of the transferee or his 
nominee’s name in a subregister that the transferee becomes owner of the shares (that is to say, he 
becomes owner of them at the same time as he, or his nominee, becomes a member of the company 
concerned…).” 
As a result of a securities-wide convergence on share-based principles in the domestic legal 
development (due to the large degree of broader share-centricity of South African securities law),78 
debt securities have the exact same structural features. If membership above is taken, 
approximately, to mean instrument-holdership, then the above is equally applicable to these 
securities. 
A further reason to ascribe a meaning of asset-holdership to the term ownership is the wording of s 
38(1)(b) of the FMA. The statement that a transferee is “entitled to all the rights of a transferee of 
movable property” seems to go beyond the common law affirmation of the “movable” status of 
securities as property (as found in s 35(1) of the Companies Act).79 The section seems also to imply 
 
 
74  See A Borrowdale “The transfer of proprietary rights in shares: A South African distillation out of English roots” 
(1985) 18(1) Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa 36 36 & 40, including a discussion of 
McGregor's Trustees v Silberbauer 8 (1891) 9 SC.. 
Further authority is cited therein in n 10: Farrar's Estate v CIR 1926 TPD 501, Jeffery v Pollak and Freemantle 1938 
AD 1 18, West v De Villiers 1938 CPD 96 102, Moosa v Lalloo 1956 (2) SA 237 (D), Davis v Buffelsfontein Gold 
Mining Co Ltd 1967 (4) SA 631 (W) 633F, and Verrin Trust and Finance Corp (Pty) Ltd v Zeeland House (Pty) Ltd 
1973 (4) SA 1 (C). 
75  Blackman et al Commentary 5-169 – 5-170. 
76  36 of 2004. 
77  Blackman et al Commentary 5-173 [own emphasis]. 
78  See Chapter 3, specifically § 3 1 3 & § 3 2. 




that a transferee is entitled to the patrimonial substance of the security. This interpretive view is even 
further strengthened by two other elements of the scheme of Part IV of the FMA, as well as a third 
based on the Companies Act of 2008. 
The first element is the provisions of s 36(2)(a)(ii)(bb)(cc), s 37(2), s 38(1)(a)-(b), and especially s 
40, which make provision for different types of “other rights “ or “limited rights” in securities. This 
appears at least to envision limited real rights (i.e. holdership of one or more individual incident-
functionalities of the security asset) held by third parties.80 The import of these sections, seen 
together and with the definition of “entry” in s 1, seems to make express provision for the entry of 
other lawful interest-holders, additional to the primary instrument- or security-holder, on the 
electronic register (i.e. the relevant CDS and CSDP securities accounts), most notably pledgees. 
Thus the Act clearly contemplates the obtaining of a limited patrimonial interest through register 
entry. In the context of the function (and consequences) of register entry, the juxtaposition of “limited 
interests in securities” and “ownership” is revealing. It strongly suggests that the latter refers to the 
totality (or, as the case may be, the remaining residual interest) of the patrimonial interest of a 
security. This corresponds neatly to the essence of asset-holdership. 
The second element is the provisions of s 41 of the FMA and s 53(4) of the Companies Act. These 
provisions provide for security of transfer (also referred to as “the principle of finality” as more fully 
discussed in § 9 2 of Chapter 9).81 These sections seek to protect certain good faith, but ultimately 
defective or unlawful, acquirers of a security and thereby to improve the efficiency and integrity of 
securities markets’ infrastructure (i.e. trading platforms and by implication the broader financial 
marketplace). This is achieved through entrenching the finality of cleared and settled transactions 
subject to very few exceptions. In its objective:82 
“[t]he rule forms the cornerstone of the integrity of the market and makes the electronic register sacrosanct. 
This is reflected in the wording that the change of ownership is effective notwithstanding illegality, fraud or 
insolvency, provided that the transferee acts without notice.  
The detail of good faith transferee rules is significantly different in different systems, but the principle is the 
same worldwide. Securities are intangible assets and may pass through several accounts. Somewhere in 
the holding chain there will be a true owner, and if there was an illegal double transfer or the title of 
 
 
80  Chapter 4, § 4 3 2 2. 
81  Vermaas (2010) Acta Juridica § IV. However, see also J Benjamin Interests in Securities: A Proprietary Law 
Analysis of the International Securities Markets (2000); and Yeats et al Commentary 2008 2-595 on the “greater 
sacrosanctity of the uncertificated securities register”. 




ownership was defective, the good faith transferee will get legal protection in most indirect holding and 
transfer systems in accordance with this rule.”  
From a functional-policy perspective, finality of transfer simultaneously protects two discrete 
elements of the system. On the one hand, it protects the mechanics of the market infrastructure by 
ensuring that transfers of instrument-holdership are irrevocable. This enables the critical capacity for 
volume and velocity needed by the trading infrastructure itself, ensuring transactions need not be 
halted, investigated, and possibly reversed (especially if the security in question has changed hands 
several times after the originally defective transfer). On the other, it protects the value-chain of the 
market infrastructure by ensuring that transfer of asset-holdership is also irreversible – thus a good 
faith, and for value, acquirer can be assured, assuming the evidentiary basis for such an acquisition 
is strong, that the acquisition is firm. These two functions are critical to the integrity of the market. 
How, more specifically, is this achieved? The FMA protects transfer of instrument-holdership by 
making “entry…valid and effective” despite a host of potential legal defects. The Companies Act, 
however, goes further, making the acquisition of “ownership” (expressly in the Companies Act and 
impliedly by incorporation by reference in the FMA) through debiting and crediting irreversible. Does 
the wording of the Companies Act go further, and cause finality of transfer of asset-holdership also?  
The principle of security, or finality, of transfer can also be described as follows:83 
“[a] transfer is secure if the transferee, being a good faith purchaser, is able to retain the transferred asset 
free from adverse claims.” 
It would be difficult to assert that this policy position is solely aimed at protecting the position of 
nominees within the system, rather than also the value chain of securities transfer itself. Commentary 
2008 also notes, in this regard, as follows:84 
“The greatest benefit in relation to uncertificated securities administered by Strate is the reduction of 
settlement risk derived from the simultaneous payment against transfer of the uncertificated securities. In 
addition, the removal of certificates and transfer forms from the process clearly reduces the risks associated 
with certificate theft and fraud. It remains to be seen if there are any risks of information systems and 
securities accounts being ‘hacked’ or tampered with.   
There are, however, two important drawbacks for the beneficial owner. Firstly, s 53(2) purports to require 
not only the transfer of registered title to be effected in this manner, but also the transfer of ownership in 
any uncertificated securities, which raises doubts as to whether it is still possible for the beneficial owner 
 
 
83  Benjamin Interests in Securities – see generally 73-78, though the topic is primarily dealt with in Chapter 9 of this 
work. 




of the securities to cede beneficial ownership of the uncertificated securities by way of a cession of rights 
independently of such a registered transfer…Secondly…s 53(4) protects the good faith transferee, which 
means that the registered holder can be deprived of registered title (and probably also his ownership) 
without his authorisation and this could effectively deprive the investor of his ownership interest.” 
Despite these reservations the provisions ensure, by affording the transferee finality of transfer, that 
good faith acquirers obtain the benefits of securities transferred to them, and that trading systems 
do not have to reverse the flow of value. It is submitted, in this light, that in order for these rules to 
function properly, “ownership” must refer to asset-holdership; conversely, if it did not always mean 
asset-holdership, a good faith acquirer of value would have to fall back on the difficult remedy of 
estoppel (as between her and other relevant intermediaries), a state of affairs these provisions 
seemingly aim to prevent.85 
The third and final element of the statutory framework which supports this view is the overall scheme 
of the Companies Act itself, which appears to affirm that “ownership” in the Act refers to asset-
holdership. Section 1 viz. “nominee” uses the phrase “registered holder”, rather than “owner”, to 
describe the instrument-holder. The definitions of “securities”, “securities register”, “shareholder” and 
“uncertificated securities register” are all interpretively neutral: they contain no reference to “owner” 
or “ownership”. In contrast, s 1 viz. “beneficial interest” does reference, inter alia, “ownership”. 
Further, the overall objective of Part E of Chapter 2 of the Act seems further to support this view.86 
In conclusion, it becomes very difficult not to conclude that “ownership” in the statutory context of 
the custody and administration of securities has retained its historic meaning and thus, under the 
scheme of this work, refers to asset-holdership. This has an important effect on the statutory 
ownership and transfer provisions of the FMA. 
 
5 1 3 2  The nature of co-ownership  
This brings one to the central issue – s 37 of the FMA and the construct of co-ownership. 
As shown in the second part of Chapter 3 and in the preceding sections of this chapter, the process 
of legal development leading to the dematerialisation of securities was both gradual and iterative. 
Due to the predominantly Civilian nature of South African private law, a key facilitator throughout this 
process of development was the construct of co-ownership. It remains a core concept even in the 
 
 
85  See Chapter 9 generally for more on this topic.  
86   The word “owner” or “ownership” appears in: s 49(6)(b), referring to transfer of ownership by a CSDP and s 
50(2)(b)(iv)(bb), where the word ownership is explicitly qualified by the word “registered”, indicating an intention to 




dematerialised securities environment, due to the primarily “indirect non-transparent” nature of 
intermediation in the system.87  
This begins, again, with a look at the legislative development, presented below in a slightly different 
tabular format. Here there is also a strong terminological and conceptual path dependency in the 
carrying over of the co-ownership construct across the various Acts dealing with the custody and 
administration of securities: 




4.   Ownership of securities. — (1)  Where securities of any kind are deposited with a depositary 
institution or with a central securities depository, or accrue to securities held by such institution in a 
securities repository or by such depository in a central securities repository, the person who was the 
owner of the securities at the time of deposit or accrual shall become entitled to an interest as co-
owner of all the securities of the same kind comprised in the securities repository or central securities 
repository, as the case may be. 
(2)  In so far as any limited right exists in respect of any securities at the time of such deposit or 
accrual, such limited right shall extend to the interest of such co-owner and to any securities 
delivered to that co-owner. 
(3)  The interest of a co-owner, client or participant in all the securities in a securities repository or 
central securities repository, as the case may be, shall be calculated with reference to the proportion 
that the number or nominal value of securities deposited by or on behalf of that co-owner, client or 
participant and accruing to such securities bears from time to time to the total number or nominal 
value of all securities of that kind held in the securities repository or central securities repository, as 
the case may be. 
(3A)  Subsections (1), (2) and (3) do not apply to uncertificated securities. 
(4)  A written acknowledgement signed by or on behalf of a depositary institution in respect of an 
owner of securities or of a client, or by or on behalf of a central securities depository in respect of a 
participant or client, as the case may be, and specifying the interest of that owner, client or 
participant, as the case may be, shall be prima facie evidence of the title or interest of that person 
in such securities. 
Securities 
Services Act 
41.   Ownership of securities. — (1)  Where securities of any kind are deposited with a participant 
or with a central securities depository, or accrue to the owner of securities held by a participant in a 
securities repository or by a central securities depository in a central securities repository, the person 
who was the owner of the securities at the time of deposit or accrual becomes entitled to an interest 
as co-owner of all the securities of the same kind comprised in the securities repository or central 
securities repository, as the case may be. 
 
 




(2)  In so far as any limited right exists in respect of any securities at the time of such deposit or 
accrual, such limited right extends to the interest of such co-owner and to any securities delivered 
to that co-owner. 
(3)  The interest of a co-owner client or participant in all the securities in a securities repository or 
central securities repository, as the case may be, must be calculated by reference to the proportion 
that the number or nominal value of securities deposited by or on behalf of that co-owner, client or 
participant and accruing to such securities, bears from time to time to the total number or nominal 
value of all securities of that kind held in the securities repository or central securities repository as 
the case may be. 
(4)  A written statement issued by or on behalf of a participant in respect of an owner of securities 
or of a client or by or on behalf of a central securities depository in respect of a participant as the 
case may be, and specifying the interest of that owner, client or participant, is prima facie evidence 
of the title or interest of that person in such securities. 
Financial 
Markets Act 
37.   Ownership of securities. — (1)  Where securities of any kind are deposited with a participant 
or with a central securities depository, or accrue to the owner of securities of the same kind held 
collectively by a participant, authorised user, nominee or external central securities depository in a 
securities account or by a central securities depository in a central securities account, the person 
who was the owner of the securities at the time of deposit or accrual becomes entitled to an interest 
as co-owner of all the securities of the same kind comprised in the securities account or central 
securities account, as the case may be. 
(2)  In so far as any limited right exists in respect of any securities at the time of such deposit or 
accrual, such limited right extends to the interest of such co-owner and to any securities delivered 
to that co-owner. 
(3)  The interest of a co-owner in all the securities in a securities account or central securities 
account, as the case may be, must be calculated by reference to the proportion that the number or 
nominal value of securities deposited by or on behalf of that co-owner and accruing to such 
securities, bears from time to time to the total number or nominal value of all securities of that kind 
held in the securities account or the central securities account. 
(4)  A written statement issued by or on behalf of a participant in respect of an owner of securities 
or of a client or by or on behalf of a central securities depository in respect of an owner of securities 
or of a participant, external central securities depository or other person as the case may be, and 
specifying the interest of that owner, client, participant, external central securities depository or other 
person, is sufficient proof of the title or interest of that person in such securities. 
(5)  Any securities held by a central securities depository, participant or nominee for or on behalf of 
another person, must be segregated and identifiable as belonging to a specific person and are 
considered to be trust property as defined in the Financial Institutions (Protection of Funds) Act, and 




At face value the co-ownership construct, as a feature of dematerialisation, remains embedded in 
the statutory regime, so that:88 
“the root of title to securities held with an intermediary in the CSD environment is the credit to a securities 
account. Furthermore, unless the securities are segregated and individually registered on the relevant 
securities account, investors in a particular issue of securities held by an intermediary (e.g. a nominee) in 
a common pool have co-proprietary interest in the pool.” 
Yet despite the explicit mention of “co-ownership” in s 37(1)-(3), s 37(5) stipulates that “[a]ny 
securities held by a central securities depository, participant or nominee for or on behalf of another 
person, must be segregated and identifiable as belonging to a specific person and are considered 
to be trust property as defined in the Financial Institutions (Protection of Funds) Act, and that Act 
applies to those securities.” This raises a difficult tension within s 37 in that:89 
“[t]he proprietary consequences of a ‘deposit’ in regard to the investor’s interest in the uncertificated 
securities is not clear because it is challenging to reconcile s 37(1) to (3) of the FMA with s 37(5) of the 
FMA and with other relevant provisions of the FMA and the Act. While in practice an investor is generally 
treated as if he is the beneficial owner of the deposited uncertificated securities, on the face of it, s 37(1) of 
the FMA provides that where the securities are collectively held in a securities account the investor 
‘exchanges’ his beneficial ownership in the particular securities for an undivided pro rata co-ownership 
interest in all the uncertificated securities in the relevant securities account (referred to as the ‘co-ownership 
interest interpretation’).” 
That tension has now been resolved through the outcomes of the previous section, allowing the 
discussion to focus solely on solving the question of the nature of the asset-holder’s interest.  
The first question that arises in understanding co-ownership is the nature and effect of the 
commingling. Specifically, one must ask whether a “natural” commingling, arising from the quasi-
fungibility of securities of the same class and issue held collectively, is an emergent property of 
securities within the custodial system. Securities are regarded in principle as quasi-fungible and so 
in the context of holdership or sale a security of a particular class and issue, a security’s patrimonial 
substance is fungible relative to other such securities. The outcomes of Chapter 4 now allow one to 
refer to holdership of that underlying substance with more precision – asset-holdership. This allows 
a critical distinction not evident in the current literature to be drawn: it is not the security which is 
fungible, nor the security instrument as a proxy for the security which is fungible, but the patrimonial 
substance of the security – i.e. the security asset – which is fungible, and fully so. The security asset 
– i.e. the locus of (holdership of) the incidents of enjoyment – as legal object in its own right is 
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identical for each security of the same class and issue, and is therefore on first principles capable of 
commingling if that has factually occurred. The importance of this observation cannot be overstated 
for the outcomes of the rest of this section. 
Armed with the distinction between the quasi-fungibility of securities of a particular class and issue, 
and the full fungibility of security assets of the same class and issue, the question of whether a 
natural commingling of security assets is an emergent property of securities within the custody and 
administration system appears to answerable in the affirmative. 
Historically:90 
“[i]n conceptualising a system of deposit for South Africa, Malan & Oosthuizen categorically state that a 
collective securities depository does not become the “owner” of the securities deposited with it or registered 
in its name. Investors become co-owners of the certificates held in collective deposit as well as joint holders 
of the body of securities held collectively. The concept of co-ownership initially developed in relation to 
share certificates and draws on the law of things, based on which former owners of units mixed subsequent 
to a confusion become co-owners of the mixture, whether they have consented to their mixing or not. This 
result has been approximated in statute.”  
However, it is submitted that this statutory approximation is merely confirmatory – it regulates rather 
than enables the commingling. In First National Bank of South Africa Ltd v Perry NO and others,91 
the SCA patently accepts the mixing of money existing only in the form of a personal right against a 
bank, thereby excluding the possibility of a vindicatory action. Therefore commingling of personal 
rights appears possible, and the notion that “the rules of the law of things do not apply because 
shares do not fall within the numerus clausus of rights that are acknowledged to be property”92 can 
be challenged.93 Coupled with the work in Chapter 4, specifically § 4 3 2 in demonstrating the more 
proprietary aspects of securities, one sees that the principle may apply in the current context also, 
and is comparable in that regard to money as a claim against a bank. Therefore, it is submitted that 
commingling of security assets is an emergent property of any securities that are “held collectively” 
in any given register-level securities account. As will be seen, this position is also a necessary 
 
 
90   Meissner (2019) 242 [own emphasis]. See also Yeats et al Commentary 2008 2-605. 
91   2001 (3) SA 960 (SCA) para. [16]. 
92   Meissner (2019) 242 n 142, citing Vermaas Aspekte van die Dematerialisasie van Genoteerde Aandele in die Suid-
Afrikaanse Reg (1995).  
Malan Collective Securities Depositories (1984) 223 also seems to suggest the mixing is a naturally emergent 
property when securities are held collectively: 
 “It is submitted that it is not possible to identify the securities of any particular client held by a bank in such “collective deposit”. 
It therefore follows that the whole body of securities so held belong to the investors jointly, and that each investor is entitled 
to a proportionate share in the group of securities of that kind.” 
93   Though it is beyond the scope of this work, this work questions even the correctness of positing that there is a 




building block for coming to a sensible and consistent interpretation of the meaning of the phrase 
“held collectively”, as found in s 37(1) of the FMA (and elsewhere). 
This allows one to turn directly to s 37 of the FMA, specifically s 37(1). To best analyse the section, 
its language must be deconstructed into three constituent parts, after which its total import will 
become easier to deal with.  
Securities of any kind 
Section 37(1) begins as follows: 
“Where securities of any kind…” 
This merely confirms that the section applies to all securities when subjected to the custody and 
administration system. 
Deposit and accrual 
The next two parts deal with the manner in which securities may be subject to the uncertificated 
securities system and therefore potentially to co-ownership – i.e. “deposit” and “accrual”. Beginning 
with the former: 
“deposited with a participant or with a central securities depository, …” [own emphasis] 
In light of § 5 1 1 and the inferred meaning of “accrue” as discussed below, this must refer to deposit 
as meaning: (1) the physical deposit of bearer securities and the corresponding creation of a 
secondary, representative registered security; or (2) the dematerialisation of certificated securities; 
(3) the immobilisation of certificated securities; or (4) the issue of securities in uncertificated form.  
It is implicit from the scheme of the section that these depository actions will subject securities to the 
uncertificated custody and administration system, so that they will reflect in a CSD, and most likely 
also a CSDP, securities account. As a result, these securities form part of the uncertificated 
securities register, reflecting instrument-holdership in a securities account maintained for a particular 
client, or perhaps for a set of clients.94 
However, the thrust of this element of the section appears to go further in providing that such deposit 
will cause the asset-holder to exchange full asset-holdership of the underlying securities for co-
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asset-holdership of the bloc of securities. It must be pointed out here that the phrase “held 
collectively” is not made use of for deposit as envisaged by s 37(1) – this will be dealt with after the 
next element of the section has been discussed. 
The section continues: 
“or accrue to the owner of securities of the same kind held collectively by a participant, authorised user, 
nominee or external central securities depository, in a securities account or by a central securities 
depository in a central securities account…” [own emphasis] 
This is the manner in which the securities which are already within the system may become subject 
to the co-ownership construct. “Accrue” must, due to the meaning ascribed to “ownership” and a 
subtraction of the various meanings of “deposit” already covered above, be a reference to the 
transfer or transmission (see Chapter 8) of asset-holdership to the transferee asset-holder (i.e. 
“owner”). It is not clear from the language whether the transfer or transmission must have the result 
of the securities in question being added to an existing amount of securities of that kind already (1) 
in the account in question, and (2) already owned by that “owner”. It is submitted, based on what 
follows, that this is not a correct reading and instead it merely serves to indicate that the securities 
have accrued to an asset-holder (“owner”) via entry in an account or number of (tiered) accounts. 
This brings one to “held collectively…in a securities account…or…in a central securities account”. 
Against the discussion in § 5 1 2 above, this should be read with reference to the custodial function. 
Of the intermediaries mentioned, i.e. CSDs, CSDPs, authorised users and nominees, only nominees 
are empowered to fulfil the administrative function of instrument-holdership for another. However, in 
the custodial capacity, all are able to maintain securities accounts for clients. This clearly indicates 
that the phrase is intended to cover the manner in which the securities are custodially held. 
What then is the import of the qualification “held collectively” as in s 37(1)?  
It is submitted that the answer is quite simple: it is a qualification for the effect of s 37(1), which 
(perhaps more importantly) ensures the operation of s 37(3). This latter subsection (dealt with below 
in more detail) prescribes the manner in which a co-ownership interest must be calculated and further 
supports a number of key insolvency and securities-shortfall risk mitigation measures, such as loss-
sharing arrangements, within the system. The correct application of these controls appears to hinge 
on whether securities are held collectively, which is evidently sensible. 
More specifically, therefore, the qualification “held collectively” should be read as a factual 
precondition that must be present for the application of the co-ownership dispensation. It is submitted 
that this factual precondition, given the history of the section and indeed of the system in South 




37(1), as discussed below, does not impose co-ownership – it confirms co-ownership when the 
precondition is met, enabling the operation of further rules and controls, such as s 37(3), loss-
sharing, or shortfall determination and allocation. Therefore, one must determine whether 
commingling occurs, as that will determine whether the securities are held collectively.  
The approach to this determination under the current iteration begins, as mentioned in § 5 1 2 1 
above, with the removal of the “repository” concept, so that “the entitlement in s 37(1) is with 
reference to ‘securities of the same kind comprised in the securities account or central securities 
account, as the case may be’ as opposed to ‘all the securities of the same kind comprised in the 
securities repository or central securities’”.95 According to the Explanatory Memorandum to the 
Financial Markets Bill, the decision was “to remove the reference to “repository”, as the term creates 
legal uncertainty”.96 This makes it clear that a determination regarding commingling must be made 
on the basis of the state of affairs of all relevant securities accounts, which according to the language 
used includes the accounts of CSDs, CSDPs, authorised users and nominees.  
Nonetheless, this work is also in agreement with the following statement:97 
“The Financial Markets Act does not clarify at which level of intermediation this co-ownership interest must 
be determined, referring only to co-ownership “of all the securities of the same kind comprised in the 
securities account or central securities account, as the case may be”. The definition of “securities accounts” 
includes accounts kept by nominees for their clients and is therefore so wide that its ambit appears to found 
a co-ownership interest at every tier of intermediation. This would result in a duplication of co-ownership 
interests. The principles of property law do not, however, permit more than one person to be owner of the 
same asset at the same time. Rather, the co-ownership interest should be calculated with reference to the 
positions recorded in the records that constitute the uncertificated securities register.” 
A better understanding of the nature of securities (as per Chapter 4) and the system of accounts (as 
per § 5 1 2 above) allows one to reconcile: (1) the taking into account of the state of securities 
accounts at all levels, with (2) the notion that commingling must occur at register-level, and in so 
doing one is further able to develop an appropriate test for commingling.  
It is uncontentious that the schema of the FMA does not preclude a custodial system, or practice 
within such a system, in which there are “global”98 security instruments – i.e. an entry reflecting an 
 
 
95  Yeats et al Commentary 2008 2-605 [authors’ emphasis]. 
96  National Treasury Explanatory Memorandum to the Financial Markets Bill of 2011, § 34 at 39 (dealing with the 
“Ownership of securities” clause of the Bill, which is now taken up in s 37 of the FMA).  
97  Meissner (2019) 244 [own emphasis]. 
98  Global in the sense of having a single instrument for many assets, as first arose in immobilisation systems (for both 
bearer-based jurisdictions and later also for the early South African, register-based, system) – see Chapter 3, § 3 




instrument-holder of a number of securities of the same kind. Further, the South African system is 
mainly a non-transparent one.99 Thus a typical entry in a central securities account or any securities 
account, as defined in s 1, that is kept for a downstream client (see Figure 2) has three informational 
functions that are important for these purposes. It must provide: (1) by entry, the identity of the 
instrument-holder, (2) how many securities of each kind she or it holds; and (3) the identity of the 
client for whom the securities is maintained. Equally importantly, what it formally need not reflect is 
the identity of the asset-holder, as the client for whom it is kept may not be that end-of-chain asset-
holder (see Figure 5, as read with Figures 1 and 3 as an example).100 
Security assets of the same class and issue are fully fungible, and so one determines the extent of 
the co-asset-holdership of any end-of-chain investor in terms of ss (3), which hinges on a calculation 
using the “number or nominal value” of securities held by one instrument-holder in relation to the 
total number which is held by all instrument-holders in the securities account in question. This is key, 
because even where an individual securities account is maintained by a CSD in the name of a client 
(such as the so-called “SDA” own name registration option offered by Strate Ltd), and that account 
is therefore not truly an omnibus account, that client may still hold securities (i.e. be instrument-
holder) as nominee for a number of end-of-chain asset-holders.101 
Therefore the fungibility of the security assets of each respective class and issue of securities, as 
indicated by the security instrument(s) of those securities (which are not patrimonial legal objects), 
is an important enabling characteristic of co-asset-holdership within this system. Briefly, the 
uncertificated instrument may not indicate individual securities, but will always demarcate the 
“number or nominal value” of security assets for which it contains the incidents of execution. 
Thus, it is suggested that securities are held collectively when: (1) a state of affairs at any level of 
securities account within the system (i.e. maintained by CSD, CSDP, nominee or authorised user) 
prevails, (2) with the effect that a specific entry in a register-level account reflects instrument-
holdership for more than one asset-holder. Where a single instrument-holder fulfils the administrative 
function for more than one asset-holder, the fungible bulk of security assets corresponding to the 
(global) register entry must naturally have commingled, because any bloc of security assets held by 
an asset-holder can no longer be allocated to a specific bloc of security instruments (regardless of 
the instruments’ serial numbering) on the uncertificated securities register. In such cases, the assets 
 
 
99  See Vermaas (2010) Acta Juridica 99 & n 66, as well as 95-97, and Meissner (2019) 223 & n 22. 
100  See also Meissner (2019) 244: 
“Even if the determination of co-ownership takes place at the level of uncertificated securities registers, co-ownership vests 
in the investors, not in the shareholders acting as nominees. The entry at register-level determines both the numerical 
proportion of an investor’s interest and facilitates a transfer thereof, but without necessitating that the entry be made in the 
name of the co-owner.” 




must be held collectively. To illustrate the degree of complexity, but also the appropriateness of the 
proposed approach for the precondition of commingling (and consequent application of the co-
ownership dispensation), consider the following representation of holdership of securities of the 





Figure 7: various permutations of security-holdership within the custody and administration system (“holder” in 
the securities accounts denotes instrument-holder) 
This illustration demonstrates that there are a large number of ways that security assets are able to 
commingle, and therefore should be regarded as being held collectively.  
In terms of the two own-name CSD accounts, one can make the following observations. The security 
assets of Mrs A Doe have not commingled, as she holds security-holdership via (to use the 
terminology adopted by Strate) an SDA account in own name. Yet the asset-holdership of Ms A Doe 
and Mr A Doe has commingled, despite the fact that Nominee X Ltd holds an SDA account,  because 
it is only the instrument-holder, acting for more than one asset-holder, and holds the securities in a 
manner that does not enable the allocation of either asset-holder’s interest to a specific bloc of 
security instruments. 
In terms of the CSDP A, the following positions would apply. Ms J Doe’s security assets have not 
commingled. She is a direct client of CSDP A, and her security assets are directly attributable to a 
specific bloc of security instruments (held, in terms of the administrative function by CSDP A 
Nominee # 1 Ltd) on the uncertificated securities register, albeit through the granularity provided on 
CSDP A’s subregister rather than the CSD’s central securities account maintained for CSDP A. 
However, the same cannot be true of the non-register level accounts maintained by CSDP A 
Nominee # 1 Ltd. Here the security assets – of Mrs J Doe, Mrs K Doe and Mr J Doe – have already 
commingled at register-level, as their respective holdings are not directly attributable to the bloc of 
security instruments on the subregister maintained by CSDP A for CSDP A Nominee # 1 Ltd. 
Interestingly, in the case of the non-register level securities account maintained for client XYZ (Pty) 
Ltd, the respective, specific interests of Mrs J Doe and Mrs K Doe are also not reflected in the 
securities account. This may have further implications for security of transfer, shortfall allocation and 
insolvency protection, but this is not because they are held collectively by CSDP A Nominee #1 Ltd. 
It is because there is a further subdivision of interests that has occurs outside of the custody and 
administration system.  
One may now turn to CSDP B. Here the central securities account reflects two different instrument-
holders and is therefore in line with the duty of segregation imposed by the FMA. The securities 
account maintained by CSDP B is maintained in a manner that is not favoured by this work, but is 
nonetheless included.102 On Strate’s interpretation, these securities are no doubt held collectively. 
However, on closer inspection, one sees that the state of affairs in the non-register level securities 
accounts will in fact determine whether the asset-holdership of each underlying investor is 
attributable to a bloc of security instruments at register level. The asset-holdership of Mr K Doe is 
 
 




quite clearly attributable to the bloc of security instruments administratively held by Broker X Ltd – 
therefore no commingling has taken place, and the securities cannot be said to be held collectively. 
On the other hand, the asset-holdership of Mr H Doe, Ms H Doe and DEF (Pty) Ltd has been further 
subdivided below register level. Yet, unlike the case of the securities accounts kept by CSDP A 
Nominee #1 Ltd, the securities accounts of Broker Z Ltd contain an indication of which securities, as 
administratively held by Broker Z Nominee #1 Ltd, are kept in each account for the client of that 
account. Therefore, one can determine that asset-holdership of the security assets of DEF (Pty) Ltd 
is attributable to a specific bloc of securities in the uncertificated securities register, and therefore 
are not held collectively. The same cannot be said of the holdership of Mr H Doe and Ms H Doe – 
these securities are held collectively, because although Broker Z Nominee #1 Ltd is instrument-
holder of a specifically allocated number of securities for its client Bank 1 Ltd, the respective security 
assets held by the end-of-chain investors are not attributable to a specific bloc of security instruments 
on the uncertificated securities register. 
However, in its Guidance Note on the Loss Sharing Mechanism In the Strate Environment, Strate 
appears to be of a slightly different view. This is a good test case for what is suggested here. For the 
application of the loss-sharing mechanism, the guidance note must explain what is meant by “held 
collectively” (which will determine the clients affected by the “loss-sharing mechanism” in cases of 
shortfalls in CSDP insolvency proceedings). It provides that this is the case when:103 
“clients…are holding securities collectively in a securities account together with other securities 
holders….[so that w]here securities of an issue are not held collectively in an omnibus account, but 
allocated to only one client and there is a shortfall in that account, that client bears the entire risk of the 
shortfall.  
… 
[Contrastingly, where] a client holds securities in his/her/its own name on the subregister (legal record of 
ownership held and maintained by the CSD Participant) or a segregated depository account, such as the 
Segregated Depository Accounts (‘SDAs’) the securities are individually identified and segregated.  
However, where a client holds securities not in his own name but under the name of a nominee on the 
subregister, the securities of that client are not individually identified and segregated on that subregister 
held and maintained by the CSD Participant.” 
With respect, this explanation conflates the custodial and administrative functions in relation to the 
client-concept, most importantly in that the first sentence equates the position of a “client” with that 
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of an instrument-holder (“other security holders”), and that the final two paragraphs equate the 
position of a “client” with that of an asset-holder. It has already been shown that clients, asset-holders 
and instrument-holders can be different actors with different roles within the system of accounts.  
The more functional view, which remains in keeping with the purposive thrust of the guidance note, 
is to posit, as above, that securities are held collectively when instrument-holdership in the register-
level (CSD and CSDP) securities accounts, maintained for a specific client, is held for more than 
one underlying asset-holder in a manner that does not allow one to link the interests of a specific 
asset-holder to a specific bloc of security instruments. In such cases the interests of the respective 
asset-holders cannot be allocated to the specific interests of the instrument-holder, have thus 
commingled, and must be subject to the loss-sharing mechanism. Thus this work differs from the 
Guidance Note on when securities are held collectively, but is aligned to it in terms of the 
consequences of securities that are held collectively. 
Thus, on the view suggested, it will remain true, as set out by the Strate Guidance Note, that: (1) 
where securities are “allocated to only one client” or “[w]here a client holds securities in his/her/its 
own name on the subregister or a segregated depository account” the loss-sharing mechanism will 
not apply; and (2) also that “where a client holds securities not in his own name but under the name 
of a nominee on the subregister [or in an SDA account]” the loss-sharing mechanism will apply, but 
only in those cases where the nominee is instrument-holder with respect to more than one underlying 
asset-holder. The approach suggested therefore has similar outcomes, but is on sounder conceptual 
footing. 
Co-ownership 
Finally, s 37(1) provides: 
“the person who was the owner the securities at the time of deposit or accrual becomes entitled to an 
interest as co-owner of all the securities of the same kind comprised in the securities account or central 
securities account, as the case may be.” 
This is not, as it first appears, merely a reference to the moment of dematerialisation; instead, it is a 
reference to the moment when a security instrument “joins” a particular register-level securities 
account and a new co-ownership dispensation – as per s 37(3) – begins to apply. Thus it may be 
applied to securities introduced into the uncertificated system as well as to securities, already within 
that system, that are transferred. 
The only remaining problem is that “deposit” into the system is not qualified by “held collectively” in 
the same manner as “accrual” within the system is. There is, based on the above, little sense in this 




therefore the factual prerequisite for commingling) must be read in. It does not make sense, where 
securities are deposited into an own-name SDA account, that the plain language import of the 
section is that such securities will be subject to co-ownership. The client, as security-holder, will not 
on first principles exchange an ownership interest for a co-ownership interest. Neither can this be 
the case when securities are deposited with a CSDP by a direct asset-holder client who takes 
instrument-holdership in her own name. 
Summarised in plainer language, s 37(1) essentially stipulates that at any moment when securities 
(1) become subject to (thorough “deposit” as read above), or (2) have (through “accrual” as read 
above) moved around within the system of custody and administration of uncertificated securities, 
(3) in a manner that has caused the security assets to commingle at register-level, then (4) the 
securities are held collectively and the asset-holder (“owner”) becomes co-asset-holder of her 
portion of the security assets demarcated by an instrument-holder’s total holdership in the 
uncertificated securities register.104 
 
5 1 3 3  Alternative perspectives: Commentary 2008  
Finally, it is necessary to deal specifically with the alternative perspectives articulated in Commentary 
2008. The work offers a singularly detailed, erudite and compelling analysis of the uncertificated 
system in its discussion of Part E of the Companies Act of 2008 (“Introduction to and overview of 
Part E of Chapter 2”), specifically under “(4) Uncertificated securities”, “(5) History of uncertificated 
securities and immobilisation”, and “(6) Separation of ownership and registered title”. 105  More 
importantly for present purposes, these outcomes are then used by the authors as a basis for offering 
a more detailed and excellent analysis, discussed under s 49(3) of the Act, of various (somewhat 
competing) views on the “Nature of the custodial holding of uncertificated securities”.106 
It is not necessary (or possible) to deal with this lengthy exposition in great detail. What must, 
however, be discussed are the two most compelling views offered – the “co-ownership 
interpretation”, which is favoured by the authors; and the “dual ownership interpretation”. What is 
 
 
104  See the following in Yeats et al Commentary 2008 at 2-605 regarding a critical difference between the FMA and 
earlier iterations of the dematerialisation system: 
 “the co-ownership interest in s 37(1) of the FMA applies to ‘securities of the same kind held collectively by a participant, 
authorised user, nominee or external central securities depository in a securities account or by a central securities depository 
in a central securities account’ as opposed to having application to all securities of the same kind deposited with or held by ‘a 
depositary institution or with a central securities depository’. Second, the entitlement in s 37(1) is with reference to ‘securities 
of the same kind comprised in the securities account or central securities account, as the case may be’ as opposed to ‘all the 
securities of the same kind comprised in the securities repository or central securities repository’.” 
105   Yeats et al Commentary 2008 2-517 – 2-590. 




most encouraging about the work of Chapter 4 and this Chapter is that it is seemingly able to deal 
with many of the material challenges outlined by each of these interpretations by harmonising the 
two and consequently accommodating each of their key useful attributes. 
The co-ownership interpretation:107 
“reads s 37(1) as providing that when securities are dematerialised, the investor ‘exchanges’ by way of law 
(rather than contract) his beneficial ownership of the particular deposited securities for an undivided co-
ownership interest in all the uncertificated securities of the same kind held collectively in the relevant 
securities account. This construction is favoured based on the genesis and evolution of the legislative 
provisions regulating uncertificated securities. 
…it is apparent that the explanatory memorandum to the Bill introducing the Safe Deposit of Securities Act, 
1992 generally continues to apply to s 37(1) with reference to collectively held securities. Accordingly, the 
historical genesis and evolution of the provision and the original expressed purpose of the provision 
ineluctably leads to the conclusion that s 37(1) is directed at rendering the depositor a co-owner of collective 
holdings, which favours the co-ownership interest interpretation.” 
The first of three main challenges to this interpretation, according to the authors, is the import of s 
37(5) and other provisions which appear to be contra-indications to co-ownership, and which pose 
various interpretive issues that are then discussed by the authors.108 The preceding analysis of this 
chapter, specifically § 5 1 2 and § 5 1 3, adequately resolves this issue through its approach to the 
meaning of “belonging” and its reading of the definition of trust property in s 1 of the FI Act as 
applicable to the custodial and administrative functions separately. Thus the discussion does not 
require specific treatment here. 
The second challenge is the problem of “different levels of co-ownership”, in terms of which:109 
“the account specific determination complicates matters, with a multiplicity of possible permutations in the 
event of a shortfall in one of the accounts. So if there is a shortfall (e.g. 10 shares) in a participant’s 
subaccount, the co-ownership is reduced proportionately between the investors reflected in the relevant 
participant account (e.g. if the account reflected a total of 100 shares but there were in fact only 90 shares, 
each interest is reduced by 10%), but if this shortfall of 10 shares arises in the sole central securities 
account, the interests of the investors will be reduced proportionately between all the investors holding 
uncertificated securities reflected in that wider account (e.g. if there were 1 000 shares reflected but there 
were in fact only 990 shares, each interest is reduced by 1%). How these differing proportions will be 
reconciled is unclear…It is submitted that it makes sense to read the provision as taking into account the 
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‘hierarchy’ and work from the ‘top-down’ to the securities account reflecting the investor’s interest, 
apportioning any shortfalls in any ‘collective holdings’.” 
The preceding section, and its approach as to when securities should be regarded as being held 
collectively, allows this issue to be easily resolved. The shortfall mechanism will apply to all asset-
holders (1) whose securities are held collectively, and (2) who are affected by a shortfall. In that 
sense the suggested approach in the last sentence above is correct when taking into account the 
proper meaning of “held collectively”. 
Third is the problem of references elsewhere in the FMA to direct ownership. Here the authors 
remark:110 
“The FMA appears to contemplate a two-headed Ettin, with different faces for different purposes. On the 
one hand, it wants to spread the risk between investors in respect of collectively held uncertificated 
securities by way of investors holding co-ownership interests, but on the other hand, it wants to facilitate 
the investor’s control over the specific securities deposited (or subsequently acquired). To achieve this, it 
would be necessary to somehow read the provisions as implying that the co-ownership interest is regarded 
as represented by a pro rata registered holding of the designated securities held in custody, with the 
relevant investor being empowered (through the relevant chain of mandates read together with the FMA) 
to control the exercise of the rights attaching to the relevant pro rata number of securities (often only 
reflected in an approved nominees sub-subregister), as if he were the owner of such securities.” 
Again, the asset and instrument construction, coupled with the preceding analysis regarding: (1) the 
manner in which to interpret the phrase “segregated and identifiable as belonging to a specific 
person”, (2) the correct reading of “owner” (as asset-holder) vis-à-vis “client”, (3) the precise 
understanding of the import of the FI Act, and (4) the import of “held collectively”, resolves most, 
though again not all, of the difficulties that may arise here. 
The last main challenge is the “lack of clarity regarding depositories”111 and the implications of the 
import of a putative deposit of something which is then deemed “trust property” under the FI Act. The 
work done in this chapter regarding the custodial system and a sound understanding of the 
distinction between the custodial and administrative functions, especially in the context of the FI Act, 
makes the depositories’ legal position quite clear.   
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The dual ownership interpretation on the other hand (quoted below at some, but on balance 
necessary, length) posits an entirely different approach to the underlying nature of “beneficial 
ownership” and “registered “holdership”. It:112   
“regards the persons credited as the holders of securities in a securities account (or at least those securities 
accounts constituting the uncertificated securities register) as having ‘legal ownership’ of the relevant 
securities, and where the investor is not the holder of the registered title, to regard him as having a beneficial 
ownership interest by virtue of the securities being held in trust by the registered holder for the benefit of 
the beneficial owners. Such a reading would be based on a marrying of the provisions of s 4 of the Financial 
Institutions (Protection of Funds) Act 28 of 2001 with the concept of entries in the uncertificated securities 
register effecting transfers of ownership in terms of s 53(2). That is, s 37(5) is read as introducing, by way 
of a statutory trust arrangement, a form of dual ownership comparable to that applicable under the English 
law. Section 37(1) can then be married with s 37(5) by reading s 37(5) as requiring the client’s ‘legal 
ownership’ of specific securities reflected in the relevant securities accounts to be segregated and where s 
37(1) is applicable, the ‘legal ownership’ reflected in the securities account is then held in trust for the 
benefit of the beneficial co-owners contemplated in s 37(1). 
This interpretation is predicated on a reversal of the argument that, because registered title and beneficial 
ownership are severable, s 53(2) of the Act cannot be read as contemplating entries in the uncertificated 
securities register effecting transfers of the ownership interests. Instead, it resolves this dilemma by 
asserting that because s 53(2) of the Act requires ownership to be transferred by way of entries in the 
uncertificated securities register, this implies that a separation of the ownership interest from the registered 
title is precluded. M Vermaas appears to adopt such a construction. She states:   
‘As indicated above, South Africa modernised its securities ownership and transfer laws through the enactment of 
s 91A of the old Act to ensure that holders of securities on the various subregisters have property rights in such 
securities. However, in practice, the majority of shareholders are recorded in sub-subregisters [i.e. a nominee 
securities account] in a lower tier which is not recognised in law as the prima facie record of legal ownership. Only 
“own name” clients and nominees (the holders in name on the subregister) enjoy “full” legal ownership (including 
membership) rights vis-á-vis the issuer in the multi-tiered system.’ 
Many shareholders prefer to retain full legal ownership of securities which they hold, thus gaining automatically all 
the benefits of maintaining a direct relationship with the issuer. The legal concept of full legal ownership cannot 
automatically be applied in the multi- tiered indirect holding system, unless the beneficial holder is recorded as the 
full legal owner at the upper tier, such as the [central securities depository].’ (footnotes omitted and emphasis added) 
This is taken further in South African Corporate Business Administration where it is stated (presumably by 
M Vermaas and/or A Henderson as the contributors):  
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‘The subregister reflects legal ownership. Where the securities are held in the name of a nominee, the nominee’s 
name will be recorded in the subregister as the legal owner, not the beneficial owner. The Companies Act allows 
both “own name” registration and “nominee” registration for securities (section 56(1)), but it is clear that where the 
nominee is holding securities on behalf of a beneficial holder, the latter’s name cannot also be entered in the 
subregister as legal owner.’ (emphasis added)  
R Rachlitz supports such a reading by stating:  
‘As the uncertificated securities register also allocates ownership, it can be said that, contrary to certificated shares, 
in the case of uncertificated shares ownership and registration cannot be separated from each other’. (emphasis 
added) 
Unfortunately, Rachlitz does not provide further reasoning for this conclusion. It is submitted that the Act 
and the FMA continue to recognise the possible separation of beneficial ownership and registered title, and 
the abovementioned view does not appear to accord with the agency relationship between a nominee and 
a beneficial owner under South African law.” 
It is here where the work of Chapter 4 and this Chapter truly enables a useful merging of the better 
elements of these two interpretations. It supports the split (between asset- and instrument-holder) in 
a manner that accords with South African private law, making the need to use the FI Act to “simulate” 
a constructive trust entirely unnecessary (and in doing so renders all consequent interpretive 
problems, as discussed by the authors, moot). It therefore provides the two key advantages of the 
interpretation – simultaneous transfer of the instrument- and asset-holdership, as well as netting in 
the clearing and settlement system 113  – whilst preserving most of the advantages of the co-
ownership interpretation.  
The authors thereafter list a number of reasons why the dual ownership approach is not favoured. 
Many of these are now simply dealt with because the duality is no longer premised on s 37(5) or 
reading a constructive trust into South African law. The issue of the wording in s 39(1)(a) is dealt 
with in the discussion of cession in securitatem debiti of uncertificated securities found in § 8 5 of 
Chapter 8. However, shortly, one must read the entry of the cessionary in the securities account as 
both an exception to the norm of not reflecting patrimonial interests in a securities account, and a 
formality requirement. The issue of s 53 of the Companies Act revolves around quasi-delivery, and 
it indeed must be so that register entry sine iusta causa would not reflect the true owner, but the 
security asset is transferred to her nonetheless by operation of law (see § 8 2 2 of Chapter 8). 
Finally, the authors argue that “even if registered title constituted ‘legal ownership’, this would require 
the central securities depository to ensure that the securities accounts in the central securities 
register are segregated down to a registered title level and collective central securities accounts 
 
 




could not reflect a collective participant holding for more than one registered holder of securities, 
unless one argued that each level of securities account in the custodial model is a different level of 
“legal ownership”, which would amount to a triple-tier ownership model (possibly based on a series 
of trust relationships), which appears to be a stretch too far.”114 This argument does not make sense 
once one adequately distinguishes the custodial and administrative functions, and is aware that 
depositories do not have any proprietary interest in securities (unless also acting as instrument-
holders). Register-level securities accounts will always reflect a specific instrument-holder, even if it 
is a “global” register entry evidencing instrument-holdership for many asset-holders. 
Therefore, to conclude, the security asset and instrument are only slightly modified by the 
uncertificated regime. Under the current system, the uncertificated security instrument indicates 
holdership of the incidents of execution over the “number or nominal value” of the security assets it 
so demarcates. This is not in principle so different from earlier system iterations, or even from the 
certificated system, where an instrument-holder may serve as the nominee for multiple asset-
holders. However, by properly distinguishing in the interpretation of the words “held” and “hold” 
between the custodial and administrative functions as they have emerged (especially in relation to 
securities accounts), the entire scheme of the FMA becomes less difficult to understand and one is 
better able to identify provisions aimed at regulating the maintenance of securities accounts and 
those aimed at regulating instrument-holdership. 
When security assets are held collectively, the effect of the system on them is more pronounced. 
Asset-holdership, when the security assets are commingled, becomes pro rata co-holdership of the 
incidents of enjoyment associated with the demarcated number of securities in a specific securities 
account. This is, economically, still the equivalent of holdership of a number of individual security 
assets. Yet the commingling has additional legal effects. Most importantly, the incidents of execution 
held though uncertificated instrument-holdership are no longer incidents that exist with reference to 
a particular individualised set of (the patrimonial) incidents of enjoyment. Instead the instrument 
demarcates the extent of an asset-holder’s holdership of the patrimonial incidents of a larger pool of 
fungible security assets indicated by register-level account entry.  
Finally, proof of the extent of the asset-holdership which an instrument demarcates (but taking into 
account the effect of finality of transfer) remains an evidentiary issue. With these slight modifications, 
one may apply all outcomes of Chapter 4 to uncertificated securities, including the observations 
regarding the proprietary aspects of securities, the objectification and holdership of individualised 








5 2 The interests in securities concept (and cross-border intermediation) 
Thus far in this work the term “interests in securities” has been used to denote limited real interests 
held in respect of securities.115 However, in the context of the international securities markets, the 
term “interests in securities” is used to convey another, very different meaning.  
 
In the most authoritative work on this subject, Interests in Securities: A Proprietary Analysis of the 
International Securities Markets, J Benjamin defines this concept as “the assets of a client for whom 
an intermediary holds securities (or interests in securities) on an unallocated basis, commingled with 
the interests in securities of other clients.”116 
This particular meaning, and the question of its place and application in South African law, has the 
potential to cause conflict with the meaning attributed to the phrase elsewhere in this work (especially 
in § 8 5 of Chapter 8). Furthermore, crucially, the phrase "an interest in uncertificated securities”, or 
a variation thereof, is used a number of times in the FMA, most notably in s 37-39, as well as in s 
51(5) of the Companies Act, which is incorporated by reference into s 53, and thus similarly brought 
into the scheme of the FMA by s 38(1)(a) of the latter.  
In that light, a key question is whether this phrase in the FMA may be intended to denote the 
international meaning outlined by Benjamin above, and to what extent. Is it correct that “the general 
impression is that in a number of instances it references ‘uncertificated securities’ interchangeably 
with ‘interests in uncertificated securities’ or specifies both out of an abundance of caution, rather 
than as a result of technical exactitude”?117  
A further question then becomes to what extent this may cause disharmony in the terminological 
system established thus far in this work.  
This section will attempt to harmonise the two meanings and integrate this concept into the broader 
terminological and theoretic framework established here for the legal analysis of securities.  
 
 
115  See Chapter 4, § 4 3 1 and § 4 3 2. 
116  Benjamin Interests in Securities 5 [own emphasis]; see also at 30 – “This legal analysis informs the drafting of the 
revised article 8 of the US Uniform Commercial Code. Legislation in Belgium and Luxembourg takes the same 
approach, which accords with article 9(2) of the Settlement Finality Directive [Directive 98/26/EC] in relation to 
conflict of laws issues.” 
Benjamin’s Interests in Securities is unusual in the sense that it consolidates a number of different sources from 
different fields on the subject matter, deriving a number of unique insights, explanations and conclusions from those 
sources, as well as from the author’s consultation with industry professionals. There are also no authoritative 
sources which provide a comparable South African law perspective on these issues. On that basis, together with 
its evident quality, Benjamin’s work will – and indeed must – be used as the primary source of reference for this 
section. Any synthesis of its content from further sources will require more effort than the value it adds. 




It begins with the international notion of interests in securities, focusing on English law registered 
securities. Benjamin outlines the basic elements of this concept (in the broader context of its 
application to, and place within, English law) as follows:118 
“interests in securities are legally distinct from securities…The distinction between securities and interests 
is often overlooked in practice…this is a source of legal risk.  
…[T]he interests of the participant in unallocated settlement and custody arrangements are not the same 
assets as the underlying securities. 
…the asset of the participant is different from the asset of the depositary. The economic value of the former 
derives from the latter, but the two are legally distinct. 
Interests in securities are often heavily intermediated, with a series of custodians, depositaries and other 
intermediaries standing in the chain of ownership between the investor and the underlying issuer. The 
investor may be further removed from the underlying issuer where its asset has been repackaged under 
securitisation, depositary receipt or investment funds arrangements. 
…Normally, each link in such a chain shares the characteristics of unallocated settlement, in that the 
interest of the client is indirect, unallocated, and intangible. 
            Investor        Investor           Investor 
                          Interests in securities (5) 
 Global custody client           Fund          Global custody client 
                          Interests in securities (4) 
Sub-custody participant        Global custodian           Sub-custody client 
                          Interests in securities (3) 
       Participant            Sub-custodian            Participant 
                          Interests in securities (2) 
                   Euroclear           Clearstream 
                          Interests in securities (1) 
             Common depositary 
                                 Securities  
              Issuer 
Figure 1.2: Chain of interests in securities 
 
 




Although the underlying securities and the interests of the investor are legally distinct, they are the same in 
economic terms (on the basis that the investor’s asset is not at risk in the event of the insolvency of any 
intermediary). In economic terms the holder of interests in securities has all the risks and rewards of 
ownership of the underlying securities. [Securities] may be tangible…or intangible…In contrast, interests in 
securities are always intangible. The only evidence for them comprises electronic records (i.e. positive 
balances in the client securities accounts maintained by the relevant intermediary)…An important 
consequence of the intangible nature of interests in securities is that they are incapable of possession at 
common law…Choses in action cannot be possessed…Interests in securities confer on their holders rights 
of property in relation to the underlying securities. However, they only do so indirectly, as against the 
intermediary in whose account the interests in securities are recorded.” 
An analysis of these issues is best broken up into two parts. The first is whether, and how, this 
concept may find any domestic application – i.e. whether one can speak of interests in securities as 
meant above in the context of domestically issued and held securities. This requires discussing some 
of the key differences between English and South African private law. Thereafter, the same question 
must be posed with respect to securities held in South Africa but issued abroad, or vice versa. 
Beginning with this first question, the point of departure of the analysis must be the defining 
characteristics of “interests in securities”. As seen above, these interests in securities are intangible, 
indirect, and unallocated. As a starting point for the present analysis, then, uncertificated domestic 
securities should be tested against these attributes (taking into account any pertinent differences 
between the South African and English legal systems).  
First, are South African securities intangible? Yes – it is entirely trite that securities (other than 
domestically rare bearer securities), are intangibles (or rather incorporeals) in South African law. 
Second is the question of whether uncertificated securities-holdership in South Africa is indirect. With 
respect to the Securities Services Act (the antecedent of the currently operative FMA), one finds the 
following statement by Vermaas:119 
“In contrast to the era when securities were held directly by their owners in physical form (the so-called 
‘direct’ securities holding systems), most market players today hold their securities positions through 
intermediaries (e.g. participants, brokers, global custodians) in various different holding patterns…The 
difference between direct and indirect systems can be defined by reference to the presence or absence of 
a direct link between the issuer and the investor. 
The indirect holding system that was introduced in the 1970s to cope with the worldwide paper explosion 
as trading volumes increased has also been in use in South Africa for many years. The operation of 
 
 





omnibus accounts or global accounts generally reduces the cost of holding securities and makes it easier 
for market participants to transfer securities, thus increasing the liquidity of securities positions. The 
business of custody was invented during this time and as a consequence great reliance was placed on the 
intermediary to maintain proper records. With every added tier holding securities for the investor, the issuer 
became more and more dis-intermediate from its shareholder.” 
The question can therefore be refined so as to ask whether this “dis-intermediation” makes the held 
interest also indirect.  
In terms of the current iteration under FMA, the previous section demonstrates that it remains the 
case that when securities are held collectively,  “[i.e.] unless the securities are segregated and 
individually registered on the relevant securities account, investors in a particular issue of securities 
held by an intermediary (e.g. a nominee) in a common pool have a co-proprietary interest in the 
pool”.120 However, the commingling and resulting co-ownership was styled as occurring naturally in 
cases where a number of security assets held by an investor cannot be allocated to a register-level 
bloc of security instruments. Where asset-holders’ interests correlate directly with a separately 
registered set of security instruments, the holding of the asset-holder does not commingle, and the 
securities are not held collectively. 
Yet even when securities are held collectively and the investors’ interests have undergone a change 
from asset-holdership to co-asset-holdership in a fungible bulk, the system remains clearly direct. 
The kind of indirectness meant by Benjamin centres around whether there is, in the chain of 
holdership of securities, a depositary or similar intermediary who “stands in the chain of ownership 
between participants and issuers”,121 severing the proprietary nexus between holder and issuer, and 
enabling only rights against the nearest upstream intermediary holder. 
As a good illustration, the author characterises CREST (a clearing and settlement provider for 
English securities) as a direct system, where “participants hold the underlying securities directly”. 
This is instructive. Throughout Chapter 2 and 3, it was shown that the English securities system was 
highly influential on the South African dispensation, both in terms of law and institutional practice. 
This influence also appears to have had a major hand in the development of the South African 
uncertificated custody, clearing and settlement system.122 As institutions in legal systems where 
registered securities enjoy primacy, it is unsurprising that CREST and Strate Ltd operate in a very 
similar manner. If Benjamin regards CREST as a “direct” system, it strongly suggests that Strate 
also operates, as a point of departure, directly. Is this a correct assumption? 
 
 
120  Vermaas (2010) Acta Juridica 91. 
121  Benjamin Interests in Securities 26 [own emphasis]. 




Much work has been done in Chapter 4 and this chapter to reconcile the English legal influence – 
specifically the enabling English doctrine of constructive trust – on securities in South African law 
with the Civilian attributes of the jurisdiction’s private law. From those outcomes, it is clear that asset-
holdership of (or any limited real interest-holdership in) domestically issued securities constitutes a 
legal interest in the security itself, as a complex of rights and other competencies between issuer 
and holder or holders. The fact that the asset-holder’s interests are only enforceable against the 
issuer via the instrument-holder does not render the former’s interest an interest (specifically a 
proprietary interest) operating solely against the latter – it is clearly also operative against the issuer 
as performance-debtor.  
Any further intermediation which may occur domestically does not alter this fact – intermediaries are 
merely agents or mandatories inserted between an asset-holder (and perhaps other limited real 
interest-holders), and an instrument-holder respectively.123 Thus, where intermediated securities are 
domestically issued and held, the applicable legal principles dictate that the patrimonial elements of 
securities are “owned” (or rather held) directly by the end-of-chain investor. From this a strong 
argument arises for asserting that the domestic system of dematerialised (registered) securities 
holdership must in fact be wholly direct, as it does not place any intermediary in the chain of 
ownership between the issuer and the investor to the exclusion of all others. Put differently, 
separated asset- and instrument-holdership does not sever the proprietary nexus between investor 
and issuer.124 
This observation turns the discussion back to a key doctrinal conflict between the manner in which 
South African law enables the existence of the registered security and the manner in which it is 
enabled in English law. English law does not have an absolute form of ownership or rights-
holdership. Instead, it merely solves disputes of legal priority amongst specified parties. This, 
together with the (historically more personalised) nature of English obligations, had a profound 
influence on the development of the English law concept of the registered security.125 Novation was 
required for transfer of early English securities, from which arose the securities register. The 
existence of the register then paved the way for the English law of trust to shape the modern 
 
 
123  With the intercedence of (1) a “fund” (i.e. a collective investment schemes or unregulated funds), or (2) a 
securitisation scheme, the interest held by the investor also remains direct, albeit for a different reason. Typically 
the shares issued under a CIS, or debt securities issued by a special purpose vehicle (through security- or asset-
holdership) in a securitisation scheme bear no direct or indirect link to the so-called underlying assets. These 
underlying assets, if they take the form of securities, are in no way held or owned by the investor (there is no direct 
or indirect legal interest), and instead an investor’s held securities have value derived from those underlying 
securities. 
124  See also Meissner (2019) § 13 2 3 5 244-245 in this regard. 




concepts of registered ownership (a form of legal title) and beneficial ownership (a form of equitable 
ownership).  
Prior to this work, the legal view of registered securities in South African law reads as a sort of 
begrudging acceptance of the irreversible but ultimately theoretically blunt reception of the construct. 
It can now be understood that the Civilian concept of the components of the creditor’s interest 
facilitates that same splitting in South African law without the doctrinal conflict associated with the 
English concept of trust (see, generally, Chapter 4). 
Yet these very divergent common law underpinnings of the registered security make the use of 
Benjamin’s “interests in securities” concept very difficult in the domestic system.  
In outlining the legal nature of interests in securities (as “legally distinct” from securities), Benjamin 
states that:126 
“[i]nterests in securities confer on their holders rights of property in relation to the underlying securities. 
However, they only do so indirectly, as against the intermediary in whose account the interests are 
recorded…the holder of an interest in securities does not have a direct claim against the issuer of the 
underlying securities. She has an economic interest in the underlying securities, but this must normally be 
enforced through the intermediary or intermediaries that stand between her and the issuer in the chain of 
ownership. 
[Under English law] intangible assets (such as interests in securities) are only subject to property rights as 
against intermediaries. Thus, where debt securities are held for an investor by a custodian, the rights of 
investor as against the custodian are proprietary, [in] the sense that they will not be at risk in the insolvency 
of the custodian. However, as against the issuer, any right in relation to the debt securities [is] personal, 
because of course the rights of investors are at risk in the insolvency of the issuer.” 
The principle that interests in securities confer property rights exclusively against the applicable 
securities-account administering intermediary is based on those deeper doctrinal principles of the 
English property law and constructive trust, in terms of which:127 
“an intangible asset may be the subject of a real action, but only as against a third party. For example, as 
against the debtor, the creditor can only assert personal rights in relation to the debt. However, if the debt 
is held through an intermediary, the creditor can assert real rights in relation to the debt, as against the 
intermediary. On this basis, intermediation is not merely compatible with property rights in relation to 
intangibles; it is their precondition. 
 
 
126  Benjamin Interests in Securities 39. 




Chapter 2 [“The Legal Nature of Interests in Securities”] considered the legal arrangements under which a 
client may enjoy property rights in relation to assets held by an intermediary. In English law…while property 
rights in tangible assets may be intermediated under a bailment, property rights in intangible assets may 
only be intermediated under a trust. Thus, the law of property rights in relation to intangibles is the law of 
trusts.” 
From this, the first important point is that the relationship of trust, constructive or otherwise, is what 
facilitates the existence of any property rights of the beneficiary (i.e. end-of-chain investor) as against 
the intermediary (i.e. constructive trustee). The second key point is the policy basis for this particular 
dispensation of the law of equity. The underlying policy position aims to protect the beneficiary of an 
obligation which is held “in title” by an intermediary (acting as a type of trustee). Where a registered 
holder of a security holds personal rights against the issuer, the proceeds of those rights (at risk due 
to the “bilateral priority disputes” principle of English property law) must be protected from the 
trustee’s personal creditors in the event of insolvency. This protection is provided by enabling the 
beneficiary to assert (equitable) property rights against the trustee with respect to the security. This 
allows the beneficial owner of the security to establish absolute primacy among those creditors 
(though it must be mentioned that this does appear to be a relatively new English legal 
phenomenon).128 On this basis, Benjamin argues that under English law:129 
“obligations can only be subject to property rights as against someone other than the obligor. Personal or 
proprietary status is not unchangeably inherent in the asset, but depends upon whom is suing. In other 
words, property is a function of particular actions, and not of particular assets.  
Because the in personam/in rem distinction applies to actions (and the rights that are extrapolated from 
actions) and not to assets, it follows that both tangible and intangible assets may be subjected to both 
personal and property rights. This might be represented diagrammatically [as follows:] 
 Personal rights Property rights 
Tangible assets 
e.g. an unsettled bargain for the 
purchase of bearer bonds 
e.g. holding of bearer bonds 
Intangible assets 
e.g. registered securities (as against the 
issuer) 
e.g. interests in securities (as against the 
intermediary) 
…” 
Third is the point that a beneficial owner’s interest against a registered owner, though styled as 
proprietary, remains (due to the operative principles of the law of equity) a claim that is personal in 
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nature.130 This also makes clear why, despite the fact that CREST’s uncertificated clearing and 
settlement platform is considered a direct system,131 it could still be argued that an end-of-chain 
investor should nonetheless be considered a holder of an “interest in securities”. This legal analysis 
appears perfectly compelling in the English legal system, though no definitive pronouncement on 
that need be made here. 
The broader point is that the concept of indirectness, once so understood, is simply not doctrinally 
compatible with Civilian South African private law as applied to uncertificated securities domestically 
issued and held. A central tenet of the international interests in securities concept is that these 
interests are “legally distinct” from securities – i.e. that the interests stand alone, though in economic 
equivalence to the securities themselves. 
Thus custody, clearing and settlement under the South African dispensation is (similar to England’s 
CREST) direct – no clearing or settlement platform, or custodial intermediary, stands in the chain of 
ownership between investor and issuer. For example, whilst Strate Ltd performs both the central 
securities depository and many clearing and settlement functions for the JSE, it is trite that it is not 
a depository in the true sense. It deals in dematerialised (registered) securities. In Chapter 1, it was 
argued that under the South African regime even bearer securities must be integrated into the 
system by a further secondary issue and thus function like registered securities once the 
“representative” dematerialised security is issued.132 Therefore where any domestically issued and 
held security is dematerialised (rather than immobilised) it will function, from a legal standpoint, as 
a registered security and become subject to the outcomes as described in this and the preceding 
Chapter. 
Chapter 4 has also shown that the patrimonial, or proprietary, element of securities resides within 
the security asset, and has economic value protectable erga omnes. This is a function of the Civilian, 
Gaian-influenced, and abstract South African property law. The principle is well illustrated by 
Oakland Nominees (Pty) Ltd v Gelria Mining & Investment Co (Pty) Ltd in its intimation of the 
availability of the quasi-rei vindicatio to beneficial interest holders of securities.133 The security asset 
has also been shown to confer no patrimonial interest on the instrument-holder and cannot be 
counted (specifically by would-be creditors) as an “asset” in the instrument-holder’s estate.134 This 
 
 
130  Benjamin Interests in Securities 306 & n 15 – “Equity acts in personam.”  
131  Benjamin Interests in Securities 26 – “In a direct system, participants hold the underlying securities directly. The 
settlement system does not stand in the chain of ownership, but merely serves as a conduit for communications of 
participants to issuers, CREST in the United Kingdom is an example of a direct system.” 
132  See § 1 1. See also the meaning of “deposit” above in § 5 1 1 1. 
133   1976 (1) SA 441 (A). This notion is taken to its logical conclusion in Chapter 10 of this work, and the proposed 
availability of this essentially real action to the beneficial interest holder of shares further supports the absolute 
nature of asset-holdership.  




removes the need to posit, as English law is forced to, a second equivalent interest which is 
protectable in equity as property against insolvency. 
Seen thus, instead of a unitary underlying security and a number of separate but economically 
equivalent “downstream” proprietary legal interests, the South African security itself is split into a 
security and instrument. Various interceding intermediaries may perform administrative functions 
arising in the course of the real relationship between asset- and instrument-holder. Yet – crucially – 
none of these intermediaries hold any proprietary interest vis-à-vis their adjacent counterparts within 
the chain of intermediation.135 
Critically, the presence of an instrument-holder also does not sever the proprietary nexus between 
issuer and asset-holder, and as such does not stand between the issuer and the asset-holder in the 
“chain of ownership”. This is, first, because of the abstract nature of the South African property law 
– holdership of the incidents of execution (as derived from the entitlement of determination) of the 
underlying patrimonial interest does not, as it does in English law, arrest the proprietary nature of 
asset-holdership. Second and more importantly, it is because the “in personam/in rem distinction” in 
South African law rests not on remedies (“actions”), but on rights. 
Somewhat ironically, this outcome does not have relevance to most Civilian custody, clearing and 
settlement systems. This is due to the overwhelming prevalence of immobilised (bearer or otherwise 
negotiable) securities in those systems. This is also true of the two key international clearing and 
settlement systems Euroclear or Clearstream, 136  as these platforms deal primarily with the 
immobilisation of tangible securities, mostly through the holding of a “global” instrument by a 
depositary. In such a system, it is wholly accurate to state that the depositary or one of its direct 
participants does indeed stand in the chain of ownership as the non-putative, actual bearer of the 
securities.137 In that situation, the relationship between the custodian (i.e. depositary in the true 
sense, or a participant) and the end-of-chain investor is “indirect” in a sense where the interests in 
securities concept is very much legally applicable. 
As an aside, this outcome highlights, perhaps more than any other element of this work, the 
particularly unusual and hybrid legal nature of the South African security as a product of its uniquely 
mixed legal system. 
 
 
135  See also Meissner (2019) 229-230 and 245-246. 
136   See Chapter 2, § 2 2 1 (citing E Micheler “English and German securities law: a thesis in doctrinal path dependence” 
(2007) 123 Law Quarterly Review 251 262-264 & 272-276; HD Jencken “On some points of difference between the 
English system of law and that prevailing on the Continent regarding negotiable securities” Journal of the Institute 
of Bankers 1 (1880) 430; FR Malan Collective Securities Depositories and the Transfer of Securities (1984) 7-11); 
Chapter 3, § 3 2 1; as well as Benjamin Interests in Securities 23-24. 




In sum – securities which are issued and held in South Africa cannot be said to be indirectly held in 
a manner that points to legally separate and distinct interest in securities held by various 
intermediaries and the end-of-chain investor. 
Finally, ignoring the seemingly definitive outcome of this indirectness analysis, there is the third 
question of whether South African securities are, or may be, “unallocated”. This remains an important 
question, and it is this quality that prompts the use of the plural securities in the phrase “interests in 
securities”. Securities are unallocated when the settlement system does not attribute specific 
securities to its participants.138  
Here again it may be useful to outline the position in England under CREST.139 As mentioned, 
CREST is a direct system – CREST members (i.e. participants) most typically hold and utilise a 
single pooled, or omnibus, account for their respective clients. In England, issuers’ registers are still 
maintained in the dematerialised context (by issuers or an appointed registrar acting for issuers), 
and these are reconciled with the securities accounts maintained by CREST. Each issuer’s register 
and the securities accounts of CREST reflect the details of the member, irrespective for whom the 
member is holding the securities. However, where the member holds securities in own name it must 
maintain a second account for segregation purposes, and the issuers’ registers will reflect this. 
Further, members can (and do) offer to hold securities for clients on an individual basis and as such 
will hold further separate accounts in a similar fashion to holdership in own name (as the issuers’ 
registers will also show). This is key, as it means that where a member operates an omnibus account 
its clients’ securities are held as commingled, so that they hold interests in securities; conversely, 
where a member operates a separate account for a client, that client holds securities rather that 
interests in securities. 
As a definitive answer to the allocation question in South African law, one must look to the 
boundaries of the custody and administration system in relation to its underlying end-of-chain 
investors. This is arrived at through the understanding of the duties of allocation (or segregation) of 
CSDs and CSDPs, and to a lesser extent non-register level account-maintaining nominees and 
authorised users – as covered by § 5 1 2 as well as the discussion of securities held collectively in 
§ 5 1 3. This work demonstrates that securities accounts throughout the custody and administration 
system must contain details of the instrument-holders (i.e. those persons on the uncertificated 
securities register maintained by a CSD and CSDPs) and the details of the clients for whom they are 
kept. Within that system, instrument-holdership is known and end-of-chain asset-holdership may or 
may not be known, depending on the level of intermediation. 
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Yet, even in cases where full end-of-chain asset-holdership is not traceable within the system of 
accounts, one could not answer the allocation question in the negative. The interests in securities 
concept requires that the “interests of all participants holding the relevant (interests in) securities are 
held together by the settlement system in a commingled pool…record[ing] how many (interests in 
securities) are held by each participant, but not which ones.”140  
It has been shown in § 5 1 2 above that a securities account will always reflect a specific client and 
instrument-holder – i.e. the next intermediary or the asset-holder (as the case may be), and holder 
of the incidents of execution of a particular security’s underlying rights and other competencies, 
respectively. 
The clearing and settlement system must process (netted or individualised, depending on the 
system) securities account debits and credits. Yet the account entries themselves must, according 
to s 51(5) of the Companies Act as incorporated by s 39 of the FMA, contain inter alia both the name 
of transferee (i.e. instrument-holder) and a “description of the securities or interest transferred”. 
Chapter 4’s reconceptualisation of the nature of securities as legally dichotomous shows that there 
will always be an innate subjective rights-level nexus between the instrument-holder and asset-
holder of a security. It also shows that this nexus flows from the proprietary characteristics that arise 
as a consequence from that dichotomy (most obvious in the fiduciary dimension of that relationship 
of representation). This, when seen in light of the information that is required to accompany a 
securities account entry within a particular securities account, should be seen as decisive, despite 
the commingling of the security assets demarcated by those instruments.  
Quite simply, where a security instrument is allocated, the security is allocated, regardless of the 
existence within a register-level account of a commingled pool of security assets to which (co-) asset-
holders have merely equivalent proprietary claims instead of a claim to a specific security asset or 
number of assets. In the past it may not have been apparent how deeply connected a nominee is to 
the underlying substance of a particular security, as it was often seen as a mere agency-based 
arrangement. This may have enabled the idea that the securities themselves were pooled, so that 
even where securities were allocated to specific nominees, allocation could yield no legal information 
regarding beneficial ownership. Yet there is a stronger argument that a component of each of the 
securities themselves (namely, instrument-holdership) is indeed already allocated, notwithstanding 
that the other component (the security asset) may or may not be allocated to a bloc of security 
instruments at register-level. 
 
 




This should make it clear that domestically held and issued uncertificated securities are in all 
probability not “unallocated”.  
Thus, to summarise the comparative analysis, South African asset-holdership lacks two of the three 
core qualities of interests in securities – non-allocation and indirectness. Therefore, one does not 
have to go any further to conclude that the international interests in securities concept cannot be 
applied to domestically issued and held securities which have been dematerialised. To do so would 
be, at least, doctrinally unsound. However, where local bearer securities have been immobilised, 
rather than dematerialised, the concept could perhaps still find application. 
This brings one to the second part of the analysis of this section – the concept’s applicability to 
securities which are held or traded across borders. This particular topic is so vast and complex that 
it deserves its own work altogether, and a very limited analysis of this topic must suffice here.  
Where securities are traded across borders, the drive for uniformity, compatibility and stability has 
led to two main models which may facilitate such transactions. The first is the “hub and spoke” 
method, where an international securities settlement system (of which the two primary systems are 
Euroclear in Belgium, and Clearstream in Luxembourg) provides clearing and settlement as hub to 
national settlement systems who stand in the role of participant as spokes. The second is the 
“spider’s web”, through which national clearing and settlement systems establish mutual links with 
one another, one or both acting as participant in the system of the other.141 
These two models, or methods, need to be understood in terms of the manner in which the domestic 
dispensation (under the FMA, Companies Act, and common law by registered securities and 
dematerialisation) would account for such arrangements. This means accounting for the direct 
nature of the settlement system of the FMA. Where settlement systems operate indirectly:142 
“the operator of the settlement system and/or its depositary stand in the chain of ownership between the 
issuer of the underlying securities and participants. In such cases, the customary method of forming cross-
border links between two systems is very simple: a sub-custodian of the operator or depositary of the first 
system becomes a participant in the second system.” 
Direct systems pose more of a challenge. Here a brief extension of the comparative analysis of the 
English system under CREST is beneficial in accounting for the dynamics of forming of cross-border 
links between domestic CSDs and foreign securities and settlement systems. The key to 
 
 
141   Benjamin Interests in Securities 201. 




understanding how this is achieved in a direct custody, clearing and settlement system is the use of 
depositary receipts (listed in the FMA as securities – see s 1 viz. “securities”).   
Under CREST, only the securities of the United Kingdom may be settled on the system. In order to 
facilitate transactions with regard to foreign securities, CREST established two special purpose 
entities – a nominee entity, and a depositary entity. This configuration exists in order to interpose 
CREST into the chain of “ownership” of these securities, thereby overcoming the central problem of 
cross-border intermediation where a system of direct holdership must integrate into a system 
predicated on interests in securities. 
In order to achieve this, two steps are necessary. First, the nominee company becomes a participant 
to the foreign settlement operator (e.g. Monte Titoli in Italy) and acquires ownership of the security 
in terms of the laws and rules of that foreign jurisdiction. Crucially, it does so as nominee for the 
second, depositary, entity of CREST. 
The second step is that the depositary company, now the beneficial owner of the foreign security, 
issues a new security – a depositary receipt (called a CREST Depositary Interest, or CDI) in favour 
of the client. The CDI is issued as the economic equivalent of the foreign security, so that the CREST 
client (and by implication end-of-chain investor) may conclude the transaction in question as if 
dealing in the foreign security itself.143 
In this light, in order to facilitate transactions with regard to securities issued in other jurisdictions, 
South African CSDs – as direct settlement systems – use broadly the same method. A good example 
is the JSE’s  “South African Depositary Receipts” (or SADRs).144 
However, the above deals only with the equity market. Listed debt securities are typically issued in 
lower volume but at higher value, mainly to institutional investors. This suggests that cross-border 
debt securities transactions could also, as an alternative to depository receipts, be facilitated through 
investment and commercial banks in more bespoke arrangements, and in all likelihood using global 
custodian arrangements rather than depositary receipts issued by a domestic CSD. 
Here one example of a hybrid of the depositary receipt and custodial models stands out – Rand 
Merchant Bank currently offers “US Dollar Custodial Certificates” on the exchange traded funds 
platform of the JSE. The scheme is structured as an exchange traded fund (“ETF”), whereby RMB 
(as opposed to the CSD) operates as a participant in the foreign market. RMB purchases and holds 
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the US treasuries, and in turn issues securities (the USDCSs) on the JSE’s ETF market. The scheme 
is described as follows:145 
“RMB offers clients South Africa’s first US Treasury bond custodial certificates. This investment, listed on 
the JSE in the ETF sector, is suitable for businesses and private individuals. Think of it as an online safety 
deposit box for US Treasury bonds. Clients can invest their excess cash in US dollars, earn an income 
stream in US dollars and benefit from a weakening rand all via the JSE. 
Our clients’ investment capital credit exposure is directly linked to the US Treasury Department — therefore, 
they can avoid the credit risk associated with a normal foreign currency bank account. Businesses and 
individuals may invest without SARB exchange control restrictions, enabling excess cash to be invested in 
a highly liquid USD asset. The DCCs are liquid and freely traded, making them an ideal working capital 
solution. Clients’ investment performance is directly related to the USD/ZAR exchange rate and the price 
performance of US Treasury bonds.” 
More broadly, the analysis here clarifies the nature of foreign securities as held through a depositary 
receipt system in the direct domestic clearing and settlement (and indeed holdership) environment. 
It would appear that depositary receipts are issued by an enabling special purpose vehicle of the 
facilitator of the scheme (e.g. an SPV of Strate Ltd or RMB), which then issued depositary receipts 
as securities in own right. This would make the conclusions of Chapter 4, as well as those of this 
chapter, equally applicable to these types of securities. The crucial implication is that an asset-holder 
with respect to a depositary receipt holds a patrimonial interest with respect to the issuer of that 
security, irrespective of the instrument-holder. That secondary securities’ underlying value derives 
from the value of the securities held by the depositary receipt issuer (the special purpose vehicle). 
As regards the foreign security itself, it is fully accurate to state that a holder of a depositary receipt 
may have an interest in securities in the manner meant by Benjamin. 
Attention can now be turned to the converse – foreign functionaries conducting transactions with 
respect to South African securities. Provision for such activities is evident also in a number of 
provisions, including some relatively new additions to the Financial Sector Regulation Act, No. 9 of 
2017, in section 1 of the FMA: 
“‘external authorised user’ means a foreign person who is authorised by a supervisory authority to 
perform a service or services similar to one or more securities services as defined in this Act and who is 
subject to the laws of a country other than the Republic, which laws— 
(a) establish a regulatory framework equivalent to that established by this Act; and 
 
 






(b) are supervised by a supervisory authority; 
‘external central counterparty’ means a foreign person who is authorised by a supervisory authority to 
perform a function or functions similar to one or more of the functions of a central counterparty as set out 
in this Act and who is subject to the laws of a country other than the Republic, which laws— 
(a) establish a regulatory framework equivalent to that established by this Act; and 
(b) are supervised by a supervisory authority; 
‘external central securities depository’ means a foreign person who is authorised by a supervisory 
authority to perform a function or functions similar to one or more of the functions of a central securities 
depository as set out in this Act and who is subject to the laws of a country other than the Republic, which 
laws— 
(a) establish a regulatory framework equivalent to that established by this Act; and 
(b) are supervised by a supervisory authority; 
‘external exchange’ means a foreign person who is authorised by a supervisory authority to perform a 
function or functions similar to one or more of the functions of an exchange as set out in this Act and who 
is subject to the laws of a country other than the Republic, which laws— 
(a) establish a regulatory framework equivalent to that established by this Act; and 
(b) are supervised by a supervisory authority; 
‘external market infrastructure’ means each of the following: 
(a) An external central counterparty; 
(b) an external central securities depository; 
(c) an external clearing house; 
(d) an external exchange; 
(e) an external trade repository; 
‘external participant’ means a foreign person who is authorised by a supervisory authority to perform a 
service or services similar to one or more of the services of a participant or an external central securities 
depository as set out in this Act, and who is subject to the laws of a country other than the Republic, which 
laws— 
(a) establish a regulatory framework equivalent to that established by this Act; and 
(b) are supervised by a supervisory authority; 
… 
‘securities’ means— 




(i) shares, depository receipts and other equivalent equities in public companies, other than 
shares in a share block company as defined in the Share Blocks Control Act, 1980 (Act No. 
59 of 1980); 
… 
(v) participatory interests in a collective investment scheme as defined in the Collective 
Investment Schemes Control Act, 2002 (Act No. 45 of 2002), and units or any other form of 
participation in a foreign collective investment scheme approved by the Authority in terms of 
section 65 of that Act; 
(b) units or any other form of participation in a collective investment scheme licensed or registered in 
a country other than the Republic; 
(c) the securities contemplated in paragraphs (a) (i) to (vi) and (b) that are listed on an external 
exchange…” 
All the “external” functionaries defined above are also included in their corresponding domestic 
definitions in s 1, so that for example the definitions of “participant” or “central securities depositary” 
include external participants or external central securities depositories, respectively. These 
provisions enable foreign participation in South African securities markets – for example Euroclear 
opened a Segregated Depositary Account with Strate Ltd for this purpose in 2012.146 These actors 
then operate in the domestic marketplace in the exact same way as the local actors do. 
Finally, this analysis also allows one to better understand the phrase “an interest in a security” in the 
FMA and Companies Act, as well as whether it is meant to refer (always, or contextually) to the 
similar phrase which has thus-far served as the subject of this section.  
Uncertainty in this regard stems chiefly from s 38(1) of FMA which, with emphasis added, references 
the term as follows: 
“[t]he transfer of…an interest in uncertificated securities on the uncertificated securities register held by a 
central securities depository or participant must be effected in the manner provided for in Chapter 2, Part 
E of the Companies Act, where applicable, and the depository rules, by making the debit and credit entries 
respectively in the central securities account or securities account of the transferor and the transferee kept 
by the central securities depository or the participant.” 
 
 







Further muddying the issue is the content of s 36(2)(a)(ii) of the FMA, which reads: 
“(2)(a) No central securities depository or participant may become the owner, co-owner, holder, pledgee or 
cessionary for the purpose of securing a debt, of securities merely because of— 
… 
(ii) the registration in its name of— 
(aa)  securities;  
(bb)  limited rights in securities; 
(cc)   other rights in securities; 
(dd)  benefits in respect of securities; or 
(ee)  benefits accruing to securities.” 
It is very difficult to determine what is being anticipated by these provisions other than simply 
clarifying the distinction between the custodial and administrative functions that CSDs and CSDPs 
may fulfil (as per § 5 1 2 above), and doing so in the (unnecessarily) broadest possible way. 
Ultimately, in the context of domestic securities transactions relating to foreign securities, it is difficult 
to so see how the FMA’s mention of interests in uncertificated securities or the limited interests 
described in s 36(2), could find application in a direct system of clearing, settlement and holdership. 
Where a domestic CSD or exchange is involved, the issuing of secondary, equivalent securities 
seems to be the only manner in which to enable this kind of activity.  
This implies that whilst the holder of depositary receipt may indeed have an “interest in securities” 
as meant by Benjamin, what is in fact held and dealt with domestically by its holder or holders is a 
second, representative uncertificated security outright. In terms of the converse, the only manner in 
which to hold and deal with listed or uncertificated domestic securities abroad appears to be the 
reversed method of becoming a participant to the domestic CSD, as Euroclear has done via its 
opening of an SDA at Strate. In such cases, it may well be that foreign holders hold interests in 
securities, but that does not change any element of the domestic legal position.  
It would appear, in conclusion, that: (1) “interests in uncertificated securities” as used in the FMA 
must refer to a domestic construct that is different from the meaning of the similar phrase as used 
by Benjamin; and (2) the phrase is of little to no statutory usefulness domestically. As suggested in 




uncertificated securities interchangeably with ‘interests in uncertificated securities’ or specifies both 
out of an abundance of caution, rather than as a result of technical exactitude.”147 
It is, however, submitted that this phrase has an important meaning in the particularly applicable 
principles of South African common law as preliminarily outlined in § 4 3 2 2 of Chapter 4 when 
dealing with individualised incidents serving as the object of limited real rights. Specifically, as a point 
of departure, the term “interests in uncertificated securities” should, and must, serve to indicate those 
limited real rights – i.e. limited real interests in securities. This is dealt with briefly in the final section 
of Chapter 8.  
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6   The classification of securities 
This chapter, as the final part of the analytic-systemic approach within this work, deals mainly with 
the problem of identifying, and through identification ascribing meaning to, the “securities concept” 
within the broader realm of financial instruments. In order to systematise the concepts necessary for 
a truly analytic-systemic approach, what is meant by “securities” must be identifiable, in order to 
distinguish these phenomena from other financial instruments. 
The ability to identify and distinguish in this way is ultimately a function of the ability to make an 
appropriate and accurate legal classification. Classification, in turn, is a crucial prerequisite for an 
appropriate application of the law, on which rests a proficient functioning of debt securities in South 
African law. 
In § 4 2 of Chapter 4, three hypothetical scenarios were used to illustrate the potential consequences 
of this classificatory problem within the South African securities law.1  This chapter is primarily 
devoted to this problem, using the broader continuum of “financial instruments” as its initial frame of 
reference. Thus, first, it broadly establishes the boundaries of the financial instrument concept, and 
thereafter outlines the merits of a typological solution to classifying (and thereby identifying) 
securities within that continuum. This also facilitates an understanding of the substantive elements 








Chapters 4 and 5 provided a theoretical framework to rationalise the deeper principles of law and 
inform its treatment of (debt) securities. Yet, all of the chapters’ outcomes are applicable to securities. 
As this chapter aims to show, this is a far more difficult question than it appears and none of the 
extant legal issues can be dealt with in Part 2 unless the boundaries of the securities concept are 
clarified. 
 
6 1 The taxonomical contours of financial instruments and securities  
This section sets out a taxonomical topography of financial instruments, with particular emphasis on 
what can be learned from legislation. It shows that securities are part of the broader genus of 
financial instruments. It further posits that the term “instrument” itself, when found in the financial 
legal context, should be construed as widely as possible (and is not to be conflated with the 
traditional, stricter legal definition as “the physical embodiment of a payment obligation”).2 It is further 
vital to distinguish security instrument (the technical phrase arrived at in Chapter 4 referring to one 
of the two components of every registered security) from “instrument” as it is used in this chapter. 
It also aims to demonstrate that the law’s current approach to securities is broad, contextually 
variable, and lacking in depth and substance. Specifically, any current statutory definition of 
“securities” is invariably merely an enumerative list, citing (often legally even less well defined) 
financial instruments which are then to be considered securities. This aptly illustrates the 
classificatory problem faced by South African securities law.3 
First, one must understand financial instruments as a category, or genus. The term “instrument” is 
central to financial legislation and is also often used in the context of securities. This can be illustrated 
(with emphasis on the myriad uses of instrument) as follows. 
In s 1 of the Companies Act4 “securities” are defined as: 
“any shares, debentures or other instruments, irrespective of their form or title, issued or authorised to be 
issued by a profit company” 
Thereafter, in s 43 (“Securities other than shares”), the following is found: 
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3   Note, however, that none of the specifically problematic aspects of these definitions will be dealt with below, as this 
is not the primary focus of this work. 




“(1) In this section - 
(vii) “debt instrument” - 
(i) includes any securities other than the shares of a company, irrespective of whether 
or not issued in terms of a security document, such as a trust deed; but 
(ii) does not include promissory notes and loans, whether constituting an encumbrance 
on the assets of the company or not; and 
(i) “security document” includes any document by which a debt instrument is offered or 
proposed to be offered, embodying the terms and conditions of the debt instrument 
including, but not limited to, a trust deed or certificate.”  
In the context of s 43, the following comments are particularly instructive:5 
“Often it is difficult to identify clear dividing lines between concepts such as debentures, bonds, notes, 
derivatives, bills of exchange, futures contracts, warrants, options and money market instruments. 
Accordingly, it is suggested that the use of the term ‘instruments’ needs to be considered carefully in its 
context and with reference to the ordinary meaning of securities issued by a company, commercial practice 
and possibly the intention of the company.  
What is clear is that the instrument must be issued by a profit company. Generally, it would not include a 
bilateral contract, but instruments sometimes refer to and incorporate the terms of a contract and it is 
possible for a company to issue one instrument to one holder. While instruments would include certain 
‘derivative instruments’ as defined in s 1 of the FMA, most ‘derivative instruments’ are unlikely to have been 
issued by a profit company. For example, while many futures contracts relate to the underlying securities 
issued by a profit company, they will not usually themselves be issued as a security by a profit company, 
though this may depend on the particular circumstances, the contracting parties, and the nature of the 
contract.” 
Furthermore the Financial Markets Act, although it does not define the term “financial instrument” 
itself, exhaustively defines all financial instruments which are to be regulated by it. In s 1 of the 
Financial Markets Act (“FMA”),6 the term “instrument” also occurs multiple times: 
“‘certificated securities’ means securities evidenced— 
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(b)  in relation to securities issued by a public company, by a certificate; 
… 
‘derivative instrument’ means any— 
(a)  financial instrument; or 
(b)  contract, 
that creates rights and obligations and whose value depends on or is derived from the value of one or more 
underlying asset, rate or index, on a measure of economic value or on a default event; 
… 
‘money market securities’ means money market instruments that are uncertificated securities reflected 
in an uncertificated securities register; 
… 
‘securities’ means— 
(e)  listed and unlisted- 
(i)  shares, depository receipts and other equivalent equities in public companies, other 
than shares in a share block company as defined in the Share Blocks Control Act, 1980 
(Act 59 of 1980); 
(ii) debentures, and bonds issued by public companies, public state-owned enterprises, 
the South African Reserve Bank and the Government of the Republic of South Africa; 
(iii) derivative instruments; 
(iv) notes; 
(v) participatory interests in a collective investment scheme as defined in the Collective 
Investment Schemes Control Act, 2002 (Act 45 of 2002), and units or any other form of 
participation in a foreign collective investment scheme approved by the Registrar of 
Collective Investment Schemes in terms of section 65 of that Act; and 
(vi) instruments based on an index; 
(b) units or any other form of participation in a collective investment scheme licensed or registered 
in a country other than the Republic; 
(c) the securities contemplated in paragraphs (a) (i) to (vi) and (b) that are listed on an external 
exchange; 
(d) an instrument similar to one or more of the securities contemplated in 




(e)  rights in the securities referred to in paragraphs (a) to (d), but excludes 
(i) money market securities, except for the purposes of Chapter IV; or if prescribed by the 
registrar as contemplated in paragraph (d); 
(ii) the share capital of the South African Reserve Bank referred to in section 21 of the 
South African Reserve Bank Act, 1989 (Act 90 of 1989); and 
(iii) any security contemplated in paragraph (a) prescribed by the registrar…” 
In all of the above cases the term “instrument” remains undefined or otherwise delineated.  
Nonetheless, in the present context it would not be contentious to state that the legislature (and 
indeed more broadly the law and commercial practice in this context) is concerned with financial 
instruments.7 This more specific term, on the other hand, has been given a multitude of definitions 
or descriptions in many fields. 
In the thirty-second International Accounting Standard (“IAS 32” –  “Financial Instruments”) a 
financial instrument is defined as “a contract that gives rise to a financial asset of one entity and a 
financial liability or equity instrument of another entity”. A “financial asset” includes cash, the equity 
instruments of other entities, contractual rights, or contracts that can be settled with the applicable 
entity’s own equity instruments (subject to certain requirements).8 What is quite problematic from a 
legal standpoint is that an “equity instrument” is understood by IAS 32 as “[a]ny contract that 
evidences a residual interest in the assets of an entity after deducting all of its liabilities.” In South 
African law, it is trite that a share is not strictly a contract,9 which for legal purposes implies that 
financial instruments are not limited to instruments of a purely contractual nature. 
In a wider commercial sense, a financial instrument has been defined as:10 
“[a] real or virtual document representing a legal agreement involving some sort of monetary value. In 
today's financial marketplace, financial instruments can be classified generally as equity based, 
 
 
7  The phrase also occurs only twice in the Companies Act 61 of 1973, and only when defining a security (the term 
“instrument” occurs multiple times elsewhere, but only in reference to the Memorandum, or an “instrument of 
transfer” for the transfer of securities).   
First is s 130A, in which a security is defined as: “any listed security as defined in section 1 of the Stock Exchanges 
Control Act, 1985; and (b) any financial instrument which confers the right to convert such instrument into a listed 
security referred to in paragraph (a)”.  
Second is s 440A, where a security is defined as “any shares in the capital of a company and includes stock and 
debentures convertible into shares and any rights or interests in a company or in respect of any such shares, stock 
or debentures, and includes any “financial instrument” as defined in the Financial Markets Control Act, 1989 (Act 
55 of 1989)”.  
8   IAS 32.11. 
9   See Chapter 4, specifically § 4 2.  
10   Investopedia “Financial Instrument” <http://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/financialinstrument.asp?optm=sa_v2> 




representing ownership of the asset, or debt based, representing a loan made by an investor to the owner 
of the asset. Foreign exchange instruments comprise a third, unique type of instrument. Different 
subcategories of each instrument type exist, such as preferred share equity and common share equity, for 
example…” 
or as:11 
“[a] document (such as a [cheque], draft, bond, share, bill of exchange, futures or options contract) that has 
monetary value or represents a legally enforceable (binding) agreement between two or more parties 
regarding a right to payment of money…” 
Finally there are also two statutory definitions that further make the boundaries of the concept 
clearer. The (repealed) Financial Markets Control Act of 1989, in s 1, provided that “financial 
instrument”: 
“means 
(a)  a futures contract; 
(b)  an option contract; 
(c)  loan stock; or 
(d)  any other instrument declared by the Registrar by notice in the Government Gazette to be a 
financial instrument…” 
This definition is significant. This act was legislated in part to allow the establishment of exchanges 
other than those contemplated in the Stock Exchanges Control Act.12 The definition above is clearly 
limited, excluding, for instance, equity instruments unless so designated by the Minister in terms of 
ss (d). This definition, but for its contextual purpose, would appear to have been drafted too narrowly. 
However, it served an express and definite purpose – to allow the establishment of exchanges 
dealing in financial instruments other than equities, which were already accounted for in another act. 
The only conclusion that can be drawn from this is that there is a need for teleological flexibility in 
the identification of financial instruments (and more importantly of securities within that broader 
category). This demonstrates that any identification methodology must account for the specific act, 
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or other legal rule, for which such identification is required. This point is simple yet fundamental, and 
it informs much of what is stated in the following section.  
Finally, in s 1 of the Income Tax Act,13 the term receives its most detailed treatment. It reads as 
follows: 
“‘financial instrument’ includes— 
(a)  a loan, advance, debt, bond, debenture, bill, share, promissory note, banker’s acceptance, 
negotiable certificate of deposit, deposit with a financial institution, a participatory interest in a 
portfolio of a collective investment scheme, or a similar instrument; 
(b) any repurchase or resale agreement, forward purchase arrangement, forward sale arrangement, 
futures contract, option contract or swap contract; 
(c)  any other contractual right or obligation the value of which is determined directly or indirectly with 
reference to— 
(i)  a debt security or equity; 
(ii)  any commodity as quoted on an exchange; or 
(iii) a rate index or a specified index; 
(d)  any interest-bearing arrangement; and 
(e) any financial arrangement based on or determined with reference to the time value of money or 
cash flow or the exchange or transfer of an asset…” 
The scheme of this particular act, contrastingly, requires a far broader meaning to be given to the 
term, and it is achieved by widening the enumerative scope of instruments designated as financial 
instruments.  
From this, three points emerge. First is the observation that, taxonomically, “financial instruments” 
include securities, but the term represents a far broader genus of financial assets. Clearly not all 
financial instruments are securities, but it is uncontentious to assert that all securities are financial 
instruments. Securities are a type of financial instrument, but one type among many. This broader 
genus includes equities, debt securities, other specific contracts and sub-types of such contracts 
(such as the various swaps, options, futures, and other derivative instruments), negotiable 
 
 




instruments (where the term instrument has a specific, technical legal meaning),14 money market 
instruments (and securities), and potentially other instruments or “arrangements”. Further, financial 
instruments should not be seen as a numerus clausus.  
Second, it is clear that when the phrase is defined (or rather enumerated) in legislation, it is done to 
give effect to the purpose of the particular statute in question. Each of the above acts shares the 
same core conception of a financial instrument but describes it in different terms and with a wider or 
narrower scope, depending on the legislative purpose of the definition, description, or enumeration. 
Therefore, when attempting to substantively (and therefore more abstractly) delineate the securities 
concept, there is a teleological imperative that must be accounted for in the analysis. 
Third, it also appears as though, in this context, the word “instrument” has no fixed, technical juridical 
meaning. In fact, its ordinary plain language meaning has the most utility, as “a means whereby 
something is achieved, performed, or furthered”.15 At face value this may not feel intuitively correct, 
as the term instrument does indeed have a number of technical legal meanings. Yet in this financial 
context a plain language understanding does more for the analysis. In coming to grips with the 
meaning behind instrument in the expression “financial instrument”, an ordinary meaning appears 
far more useful and robust than a variation of the “documentary” definition usually encountered.16 
In light of the above, the central question is how to determine whether a particular financial 
instrument can – and, crucially, when it should – be classified, irrespective of name or form, as a 
security, or not. 
 
6 2 Typologically differentiating securities from other financial instruments  
Classification is the key to the identification and differentiation of legal phenomena, and therefore is 
the focus of this chapter.  
Specifically, this chapter is concerned with determining whether (and, teleologically, when) a 
financial phenomenon is a “security” or whether it should be classified as something different within 
– or even wholly outside of – the broader genus of financial instruments. The answer to this question, 
in turn, points to whether, for example, a borrowing contract falls within or without the scope of s 43 
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of the Companies Act. As illustration, Delport et al make the following point regarding the definition 
of debt instrument in s 43 of the Companies Act.17 
“This definition creates uncertainty as it is not clear whether a debenture can be classified as a debt 
instrument as the basis of the debenture is actually a loan...A debenture is, as defined in the common law, 
therefore basically ‘an acknowledgement of debt in favour of the holder as a creditor of the company for 
the specified amount with a right to interest therein stipulated…’. Therefore the definition of debt instrument 
includes a debenture (by incorporating ‘securities’ as defined in s 1), but then again excludes debentures 
by implication due to the exclusion of loans.” 
This interpretation makes little sense, mainly because it does not accord with the manner in which 
the debenture and debt security concepts have developed in modern South African law, as outlined 
in Chapters 3 and 4. In that light, first it must be questioned whether the term “debenture” in the 
present state of the law is still merely a reference to a specific type of documentary instrument 
augmenting an underlying loan, or a more holistic reference to the security itself, as comprising the 
security asset and instrument.18 The answer is undoubtedly the latter. Second, and irrespective of 
the view taken on the first question, is the deeper classificatory question of whether a loan, when 
serving as one of the components of the architecture of a more complex financial instrument (such 
as a debt security), is still classifiable as a “loan”, or whether such an instrument – with a built-in loan 
– is something entirely different. This problem is typical of many acts, and individual rules, that deal 
with some aspect of “securities”. 
Therefore, this section sets out the merits of a typological methodology. It is argued that a typological 
approach is able to classify financial instruments as securities accurately and appropriately, despite 
the challenging variability in form and function evidenced by the broader spectrum of modern 
securities and other instruments. Typological classification is founded on the theory of types, or 
Typenlehre. The first part of this section is a brief outline of its theoretical foundations and place in 
South African law. Its broader philosophical roots are beyond the scope of this work. The second 






17   PA Delport New Entrepreneurial Law (2014) 63 [own emphasis]. See also PA Delport et al Henochsberg on the 
Companies Act 71 of 2008 (SI 11 – 2015) § 43 184-184(3) for further, similar, interpretive issues. 





6 2 1  The Typenlehre 
Classifying any legal phenomenon implies both the ability to identify and distinguish it from 
phenomena which are “similar but not same”. This is not a new legal problem and has arisen in other 
contexts. The problem has appeared when attempting to distinguish real and personal subjective 
rights from one another.19 It is also relevant when determining the particular set of naturally implied 
terms, or naturalia (in the wider sense),20 that should be applied to a contract – this is determined by 
which type (or sub-type) of contract is being dealt with, requiring a classificatory determination.21 
Another (and perhaps the most notable) instance is where a particular service engagement must be 
classified as a locatio conductio operarum or operis.22 The issue has also arisen in determining what 
is, and is not, a “financial lease”.23 
The above-mentioned instances of classificatory difficulty were chosen for a specific purpose – the 
potential application of the Typenlehre. The first three examples appear in a work by T Naudé,24 
discussing in detail, and very astutely, the usefulness of applying the Typenlehre (“theory of types”, 
or typological) methodology of legal classification to South African contract law as a supplementary 
means by which ambiguous contract types can be classified. The last example is the subject of N 
Joubert’s contribution on the legal nature of the financial lease and is an instance of where the 
Typenlehre methodology is considered but ultimately rejected.25  
Naudé’s work presents a convincing case for the methodology itself and shows clearly when it would 
be appropriate to apply it in a South African law context. Briefly, Naudé's treatment of this theory, 
which is of German origin, can be summarised as follows. Certain contracts, due to the inherent 
 
 
19   CG Van der Merwe Sakereg (1979) 46; or CG Van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 63. 
20   “Legal incidents is a useful phrase denoting a wider meaning including all residual rules, ex lege terms, and variable 
sets of rules that automatically attach to specific types of contracts, and is preferable here to ‘naturalia’…” – T 
Naudé “The preconditions for recognition of a specific type or sub-type of contract – the essentialia-naturalia 
approach and the typological method” (2003) Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 411 413. See also therein n 14 
& 16 – citing JP Vorster Implied Terms in the law of England and South Africa LLD thesis Cambridge (1987); and 
M Vorster “The resolution of contractual disputes: interpretation versus the recognition of novel naturalia” (1987) 50 
Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 450 to the same effect.  
 Naturally the term “incidents” has been used in the previous two chapters to denote something different, and so the 
term naturalia will suffice for present purposes.  
21   The subject of Naudé (2003) TSAR 411, which is discussed at length below; see as well N Joubert “Die regsaard 
van die finansiële huurkontrak” (1989) Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 568. 
22   Minister van Polisie v Gamble 1979 (4) SA 759 (A) 765; and Mtetwa v Minister of Health 1989 (3) SA 600 (D) 606. 
23   Joubert (1989) TSAR 568.  
24   The analysis of this section relies heavily on the treatment of the classical form of the Typenlehre by Prof Naudé in 
the South African context, but the original German exposition on this topic is best found in K Larenz Methodenlehre 
der Rechtswissenschaft (1975); D Leenen Typus und Rechtsfindung (1971); K Larenz & CW Canaris 
Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft (1995); and L Kuhlen Typuskonzeption in der Rechtstheorie (1977).  
25   Whether Joubert is correct in rejecting the methodology need not be debated here, as the focus is not on the 




flexibility of the South African law of contract,26 are not easily classifiable using the traditional 
essentialia-naturalia model. In certain hard cases, classification via this model leads to the 
application of an inappropriate policy-mix of legal norms through the consequent (mis)construction 
of such contracts’ naturalia and other residual rules. In remedying this, Naudé argues that the 
adoption of a typological approach to refine and improve classificatory outcomes has much 
supplementary value.27 
First, it is vital to note that Naudé establishes convincingly that the typological method has found 
some application already in South African law. The most notable instance of its influence is in 
distinguishing locatio conductio operarum from operis.28 Second, a strong case is made for the 
proposition that:29 
“where the classificatory rules that prepare the way for the application of default rules cannot be formulated 
as essentialia, this should not deter the recognition of a new (sub)type of contract formulated in terms of 
vaguer classificatory characteristics where this is required to give effect to legitimate and real economic 
goals. Whether one calls the resultant concept a ‘type’ or an ‘open-ended concept’ is not the important 
issue. If this is the only option, a continual attempt must be made to clarify the indicative features of the 
type as much as possible in the interest of legal certainty.” 
This rings true not only for classifying contract types, but other legal phenomena which exhibit (1) a 
tendency towards variability in form and substance, but (2) must, regardless, be grouped together 
for reasons of legal policy in the application of the law. 
The two locatio contracts are distinguished typologically, and there is (limited) support for the idea 
that real and personal subjective rights could perhaps also be distinguished on this basis.30 What is 
proposed here is that the Typenlehre is the most effective methodology for the classification (and 
therefore identification and differentiation) of securities amongst other financial instruments. This is 
not to be confused with the classification of debt securities – a robust classificatory methodology for 
the securities concept generally ought to solve any classificatory problems related to debt securities 
specifically, as the legal concept of debt (and the creation of debt securities specifically, as per § 4 
2 of Chapter 4) is fairly clear. 
 
 
26   As opposed to a law of contracts.  
27   Naude (2003) TSAR, see specifically § 1 and § 5; and T Naudé The Legal Nature of Preference Contracts LLD 
thesis Stellenbosch (2003) § 6 3 2, 248-262. 
28   Naude (2003) TSAR 425-429. 
29   Naude (2003) TSAR 430-431 [own emphasis]. 




It is submitted that use of the Typenlehre is perhaps the only manner in which the securities concept 
can be meaningfully and robustly circumscribed. A typological circumscription has the ability to inject 
substantive content into the concept without overly formalising it. If such a circumscription can be 
achieved, it would effect much needed certainty in current South African law in so far as it relates to 
securities. 
At its core, the Typenlehre is a methodology for the legal classification of recurring patterns of juristic 
facts (as legal phenomena) to which a particular policy-mix of legal norms and rules must be applied. 
It stands in (partial) opposition to the traditional classification of legal phenomena into “concepts” 
according to the presence of fixed and determinate criteria, only recognisable by the presence of all 
those criteria (“only then and then always”).31 
The best example of this traditional approach is the essentially Pandectist identification of contract 
types and sub-types using the essentialia-naturalia methodology. Identification of contract types in 
this manner paves the way for the nuanced application of broader norms through imposing a 
customised set of legal incidents upon such a contract. The specific subset of naturalia is determined 
by the essentialia. The essentialia, as the “bare bones” of a contract, are loosely understood to be 
the manifestation of the parties’ basic contractual purpose. That purpose is the teleological catalyst 
for the application of the set of norms which ought to regulate how that contract functions in typically 
occurring matters not provided for in the contract’s express terms.  
The application of these norms is therefore concretised in the legal incidents of a contract (as the 
black letter law expression of the law's policy positions on “those kind of contracts”). The essentialia 
determine the contract type, and each type has a particular set of legal incidents that apply to it.32 
The Typenlehre opposes this type of formal and mechanistic “conceptual subsumption” of juristic 
fact-patterns into concepts (Sinnentleerung) to which the same rules, teleological approach and set 
of norms will be applied in all cases. Concepts rely on a scheme in which all criteria for classification 
must be unfailingly met before classification, and norm application, can take place. Critique of 
“Sinnentleerung” includes for instance that in the face of legal or even merely commercial variability, 
such “sets” of norms and rules will sometimes be inaccurately or inefficiently applied. Further it has 
 
 
31  Larenz Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft 104. 
32   See T Naudé “The function and determinants of the residual rules of contract law” (2003) South African Law Journal 
820 for a general exposition; see also T Naudé & GF Lubbe “Exemption clauses – a rethink occasioned by Afrox 
Healthcare Bpk v Strydom” (2005) 5(1) South African Law Journal 441 445-455; Joubert (1989) TSAR 576; and 
finally Naudé (2003) TSAR 414, providing as follows:  
“[The essentialia-naturalia model] rationalises the law by norm reduction, which mediates understanding and application of 
the legal rules involved. This is does by identifying a set of residual terms (naturalia) applicable as a matter of course to 
transactions falling within the parameters of the essentialia, unless inconsistent with the [parties’] agreement…It also facilitates 
a differentiated treatment of the separate types of contract identified in terms of this model, based on the typical party interests 




been said that within this mode of conceptual subsumption (of juristic fact-patterns) new and “mixed” 
fact patterns cannot be adequately managed or accommodated. Also, it can hinder legal 
development by discouraging the recognition of emergent difference in legal phenomena. 
As related to contract law, it could also be argued that this approach is an awkward fit to a law of 
contract as opposed to of contracts, where freedom of contract allows almost infinite variability.33 
This is why the typological methodology finds such ready application in opposition to the Pandectists’ 
formalistic contract classification. It is important to note, however, that all these criticisms are not an 
argument that the typological method should be the standard point of departure for legal 
classification. Instead, they represent an indication of the limitations of the traditional “only then and 
then always” approach, specifically for hard cases, and conversely of the usefulness of the 
Typenlehre in those cases. 
The Typenlehre takes a different methodological approach to grouping legal phenomena for the 
application of legal rules and norms. Terminologically, the typological approach uses the word 
“concept” to refer to a legal phenomenon which can indeed be described by an exact enumeration 
of characteristics or criteria, and thereby adheres to the “only then and then always” mode of 
classification (i.e. Sinnentleerung).  
However, in contrast to concepts, the Typenlehre further accommodates types. Types and concepts 
are not opposites. There can be overlap as a type becomes increasingly definite and approaches a 
concept, or where one or two of a concept’s criteria may not be perfectly definitive, such that it 
approaches a type. Furthermore, there are no absolute boundaries or bright lines between types, 
such that “types may blend into each other due to the variability of their elements”, resulting in ranges 
of types (Typenreihen).34 This concept-type dichotomy within the methodology can be understood 
as follows:35 
“Adherents to the Typenlehre distinguish concepts from types. They point out that there are various legal 
terms that cannot in fact be defined by a complete enumeration of exact, strictly conceptual characteristics, 
the application of which is a simple matter of logical subsumption. Rather, some terms are defined by 
indicative or symptomatic factors that do not necessarily all have to exist and which can exist to a greater 
or lesser extent (their characteristic criteria are therefore gradeable). These terms are called Typen or types 
to distinguish them from concepts. Types are not defined, but described, in terms of the aforesaid indicative 
 
 
33  For these criticisms see Naudé (2003) TSAR 422; Naudé Preference Contracts 249; and Joubert (1989) TSAR 
577-578. 
34   Naudé Preference Contracts 253; and Naudé (2003) TSAR 424. 




factors or concrete examples…The question is whether the typical characteristics of the type are present 
to such a degree that the factual situation as a whole corresponds to this type.” 
The method prescribes a comparison of types, with the focus of the analysis on what the overall 
picture indicates – a Typenvergleich (i.e. comparison of types), looking for a coherent Gesamtbild 
(i.e. overall impression). This comparison uses existing and identified types, with help from 
established concepts as well as previously settled instances.36 It identifies a type based on indicia 
of that type, all of which need not be present. When all the presenting indicia indicate a Gesamtbild 
that suggests the phenomenon is of a certain type, it is classified as such. This paves the way for 
the application of the appropriate subset of rules and policy that should, teleologically, attach to such 
a type. 
As a point of departure for the recognition and constructing of types it has been stated that:37 
“[t]ypes are therefore more ‘open’ than concepts. The application of the type requires a value-judgement 
based on social experience and views of the marketplace. The law builds the type with reference to the 
consequences connected to it. Therefore, when considering whether a concrete example falls under the 
type, one must look to the purpose of why the law wants these consequences to attach to this type. Types 
and typological thinking therefore force one who applies the law to always consider the purpose of legal 
conceptualisation and the appropriateness of a rule’s legal consequences.” 
Seen thus the Typenlehre does not seem to do away with legal certainty (as it has been accused of 
doing). It is common cause that legal concepts must be defined as exactly as possible, but only in 
so far as is possible. Where this is not practical or possible, the complexity of reality must at least be 
recognised and reflected in the law.38 This is what the Typenlehre attempts to achieve. It is argued 
below that this is also the only effective way to approach the identification and differentiation of 
securities from other, often similar, financial instruments. The aim of this section was to address 
arguments to effectiveness and show that the Typenlehre as applied to securities law can be a useful 
and powerful tool for drawing a juridical frame around the securities-concept (or, rather, -type). The 





36   See Naudé Preference Contracts 250-252 & n 269; Naudé (2003) TSAR 423-425; and Joubert (1989) TSAR 577-
578. 
37   Naudé Preference Contracts 252 [own emphasis]. 




6 2 2  The case for a typology of securities 
Financial instruments include shares, depositary receipts, debentures, interests in a collective 
investment scheme, derivatives, certain negotiable instruments, money market instruments such as 
certificates of deposit, as well as, potentially, a number of other instruments or “arrangements”. 
Which of these instruments are securities for the purpose of the application of law?  
Securities, as a sub-class, are extremely difficult to identify and differentiate from other financial 
instruments. However, this is not immediately obvious and at first glance no statute appears readily 
to provide the answer. In terms of currently enacted law, sections 1 of the Companies Act of 2008, 
the Financial Markets Act of 2012 (“FMA”), and the Securities Transfer Tax Act39 (“STTA”) all provide 
a definition of “securities”. Yet each of these acts defines the concept enumeratively rather than 
substantively, providing a list of instruments which are to be considered securities for the purposes 
and application of that particular act. Central to the broader issue is that the definition in each act 
differs in scope.  
The defining provisions of both the Companies Act and the FMA have been dealt with above.40 
The STTA, in s 1, defines securities as follows: 
“'security' means- 
     (a)   any share or depository receipt in a company; or 
 (b)   any member's interest in a close corporation, 
excluding the debt portion in respect of a share linked to a debenture…” 
From the above, shares and receipts issued by central securities depositaries to evidence secondary 
immobilised or dematerialised securities are clearly securities. Yet for the purposes of the FMA, the 
shares of shareblock companies are excluded, whereas the STTA makes no such exclusion. 
Additionally, the latter act also includes members’ interests in a close corporation, but it is the only 
act to do so. Debentures, bonds and even notes (terms which effectively denote the same type of 
instrument and are legally indistinguishable)41 are also clearly securities, yet they – in turn – are 
excluded from the STTA. The FMA does consider debentures to be securities and goes much further 
to include also a broad range of other financial instruments, but it seems to exclude any issued by 
private companies. This forces one to conclude that whether a particular financial instrument is, or 
 
 
39   25 of 2007. 
40  In § 6 1.   





is not, a security is contextually variable, and contingent on the application of the act or legal rule in 
question. 
However, this alone does not sufficiently resolve the matter.  Both the Companies Act and the FMA 
contain plenary, catchall provisions when dealing with securities. In the latter, there is ss (d) and 
(e)(iii) of s 1 (v. “securities); in the former, s 43 ostensibly includes “any other securities other than 
the shares of a company”. Other than the eiusdem generis canon of construction, there is nothing 
contained in the common law, nor any case law, that allows the law to make a determination about 
whether a particular legal arrangement or interest will fall into this category.  
Determining the common characteristics possessed by the list of securities that invariably precede 
such a plenary phrase – and which must ostensibly be given an eiusdem generis meaning – is 
difficult. One cannot argue that they are all investment instruments. First, one cannot satisfactorily 
demarcate the meaning of “instrument” in this context. Second, there are many other types of 
instruments which can be used for investment purposes, including most notably Krugerrands, 
futures, foreign exchange, contracts for difference, money market instruments not making use of the 
custody and administration of securities architecture of the FMA, or even postage stamps. 
Similarly, an argument that they are all investment contracts falls prey to the same critique, as well 
as the problem that neither shares nor all interests in a collective investment scheme are legally 
classifiable as contracts.42 Convertible securities further muddy the waters in this regard. One cannot 
argue that they share a similar set of essentialia because they plainly do not. One can also not argue 
that they are all actively traded investments, primarily because this is also in many instances patently 
untrue, most obviously in the cases of securities of non-listed public companies or private 
companies. Additionally, other financial instruments, such as contracts for difference (“CFDs”), are 
actively traded investments, but in all likelihood not securities in the true sense. In sum, almost all 
attempts to find a definitive base-line meaning for the term securities ends in frustration. 
This may seem trivial – surely, for instance, if something is called a debenture, it can with certainty 
be stated that it is a security? Unfortunately – (1) in the absence of definitive case law or academic 
attention (as is the case);43 (2) in light of the “esoteric, fast-developing and highly-globalised world 
of the finance industry” and its “fast developments of financial instruments, transactions and 
 
 
42  Smuts v Booyens; Markplaas (Edms) Bpk v Booyens 2001 (4) SA 15 (SCA) 22.  
The term “investment contract” is in fact the classificatory “gate-keeper” in US jurisprudence – see § 6 3 3 below. 
43   Whereas in the United States, for instance, “there have been no fewer than 792 cases decided and over 300 law 
review articles written in which either the '33 or '34 Act definition of a security has played a prominent role” – TA 




techniques”;44 and (3) considering the prevalent risk of financial fraud and the lesser systemic risks 
of mere financial irresponsibility45 – the problematic consequences of the lack of firm doctrine of 
securities in South African law 46  are not so trivial. At least, in order to prevent fraudulent or 
unscrupulous simulations, give meaningful effect to the policy objectives of financial and securities 
regulation, and (somewhat counter-intuitively) to prevent an uncertainty-driven chilling effect on 
healthy financial innovation, South African law must be capable of classifying, identifying and 
distinguishing securities from other financial instruments. 
As a further illustration of the problem, consider the case of derivatives. The central aim of derivatives 
is to relocate and spread the risks of changes in certain financial variables between parties.47 
Derivatives include futures, contracts for difference (“CFDs”) and other forward contracts (operating 
both in the commodities and direct derivatives markets), 48  options, swaps, caps, floors, and 
ostensibly any other instrument “whose value depends on or is derived from the value of one or more 
underlying asset, rate or index, on a measure of economic value or on a default event” and which 
entails the "creation of rights and obligations" around this.49 Through the combination as well as 
repackaging of these “traditional” derivatives into new derivatives, the potential variability of these 
financial instruments in their own right is exceptionally complex.50  
As seen, the FMA contains by far the broadest definition of securities. The Act clearly states, 
enumeratively, that the term “securities” includes “derivatives”. 51  However, substantively, it is 
uncontentious to assert that not all (if any) derivatives possess the qualities of registered (or, for that 
matter, bearer) securities. Swaps (although even the swap itself is subject to great fluidity in terms 
 
 
44   H Cousy “The delicate relationship between law and finance: the classification of credit default swaps” (2014) 
Tydskrif vir Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 227 227. 
45   Specifically regarding debt securities: see for example HC Nel The Final Report of the Commission of Inquiry into 
the Affairs of the Masterbond Group and Investor Protection in South Africa (2001), Vol 1-3; or essentially any 
informed account of the 2009 Financial Crisis. 
46   Addressed by Chapter 4 and to some degree also Chapter 5.  
47   AW Oguttu “Challenges in taxing derivative financial instruments: international views and South Africa’s approach” 
(2012) 24 South African Mercantile Law Journal 385 389. 
48   Goode Commercial Law 156.  
49   Section 1 of the Financial Markets Act (viz. “derivatives”). 
50  Oguttu (2012) SA Merc LJ 387. 
51   Which, interestingly, does receive a substantive rather than enumerative definition: see s 1 viz. “derivative 
instrument”, which reads: 
  “‘derivative instrument’ means any— 
(a)  financial instrument; or 
(b)  contract, 
that creates rights and obligations and whose value depends on or is derived from the value of one or more underlying asset, 




of its  possible rights and obligations)52 are instruments that can fulfil any number of functions. These 
include a risk management function (for instance, credit-default swaps effectively insure against the 
risk of default), a financial-engineering function (for example allowing the holding entity of an SPV-
issuer of an asset-backed security to increase leverage on the underlying assets through “synthetic 
securitisation”), or an investment function (such as “total return swaps” which resemble the leasing 
of securities and can be, and are, actively used to create portfolio gains by individual and institutional 
investors alike). Additionally, the parties at both ends of a swap agreement may cede their rights 
freely, unlike the case of registered and bearer securities, where the issuer as counter-party remains 
fixed. 
There are strong arguments in favour of regulating certain types of swaps as insurance contracts 
rather than securities,53 as well as some international debate as to whether swaps in general should 
be regulated as securities, forward-contracts or as sui generis instruments.54 There seems also to 
be, for instance, general international consensus (at the very least amongst the Anglo-American 
oriented jurisdictions) that futures and other forward contracts are not securities in the strict sense.  
Options present a specifically illuminating problem in that, at least, some options to take up securities 
could possibly also be considered securities in that stricter sense, but others perhaps not. The almost 
excessively broad framing in the FMA of the narrow securities concept is certainly justified in terms 
of the purposive thrust of the Act. However, any abstractions about securities based on this 
observation must be approached with caution, as the legislature has surely strained the securities 
concept to cover its regulatory intent. 
More broadly, the problem of derivatives reveals that (1) securities can be, and are, differentiated 
from other financial instruments; (2) the term is contextually variable, so that a functional 
 
 
52   For a very detailed (although somewhat dated) account of swaps, their high degree of variability and their legal 
nature in South African law, see FR Malan & W Faul "Legal aspects of 'swaps'" (1992) Tydskrif vir Suid-Afrikaanse 
Reg 394. 
53   Cousy (2014) SA Merc LJ 223-235, also discussing specifically CDSs. However, see Malan & Faul (1992) TSAR § 
5, as well as, therein, comments of the English courts in Hazell v Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Co 
1990 3 ER 33 (QB); 1990 3 All ER 66 (CA). 
54   See for instance WE Gibson “Are swap agreements securities or futures? The inadequacies of applying the 
traditional regulatory approach to OTC derivatives transactions” (1999) 24 Journal of Corporation Law 379; and 




classificatory framework must be teleologically flexible;55 and (3) South African law is in need of more 
clarity in this field. The ability of the domestic law to make distinctions such as these is vital to its 
role in preserving systemic stability in the financial sector through effective, accurate and ideally pre-
emptive regulation. Even more pressing, however, is the need to identify the core concept that 
underlies designation as a security. Having done so, the law can improve its current treatment of 
financial instruments and proactively address potential issues regarding new financial instruments 
without needing to change the legal framework currently in place. 
Classification, and by implication identification and differentiation, is not impossible. A potentially 
workable framework for the identification of securities has already been tentatively suggested, based 
on a flexible set of indicia which need not all be present, but which “form a range of factors whose 
presence typifies securities”.56 This approach was outlined in an earlier work by this author in the 
context of a comparative study of the US and domestic regulatory implications of investment (or 
equity) crowdfunding, where the types of interests offered on such online crowdfunding platforms 
often resemble, to a greater or lesser degree, instruments that have been classified as securities. 
The caveat placed on these “tentative suggestions” was that “further research will provide more 
definitive answers”.57 Before this approach can be made more definitive, it must be understood. The 
argument begins with a characterisation of the classical security, the share,58 from which flows a 
number of observations. First, securities are invariably premised upon a right or a bundle of rights, 
but it is the manner in which the financial instruments containing such rights are structured (or 
“packaged and evidenced”), rather than the actual rights, that typify them as securities. Second, they 
are so structured partially in order to facilitate the trading of these instruments at high volume and 
frequency. Third, the instruments themselves have no intrinsic value – their value is contingent on 
other factors (such as the market value, financial or economic position, or creditworthiness of the 
issuer), or upon the value or change in value of other underlying instruments or measures. Fourth, 
they are typically quasi-fungible (fungible to the extent that such instruments are issued in multiple 
units, and units of the same issue are economic equivalents). Fifth, in the normal course of 
 
 
55   The primary purpose of the FMA is to regulate financial markets, not financial instruments. A derivatives market, 
such as the JSE’s futures trading platform SAFEX, must therefore fall within its ambit. To achieve its policy goals it 
has nominally included all derivatives into its securities concept. Its regulatory ambit also includes insider trading, 
which further requires the regulation of a wider group of instruments than what traditionally would be regarded as 
securities.  
 This illustrates the need not only for flexibility regarding the term “securities” in general, but specifically for 
teleological flexibility. In other words, the law must be able to classify securities not only (if at all) in general, but 
apply specific rules relating to securities appropriately, and in line with the desired legal outcomes of the context in 
question. Thus, for example, what must be classified as a security to implement the policy aims of the FMA is not 
necessarily what must be classified as a security for the Companies Act. 
56   PJ de Beer “The law of crowdfunding: challenges to the South African securities law – a comparative perspective” 
(2013) 1(2) Penn Undergraduate Law Journal 19 53. See § V ss D (47-54) for the broader argument.  
57   De Beer (2012) PULJ 54. 




commerce, instruments which are represented to be securities, typically are securities.59 On this 
basis, a classificatory benchmark is proposed:60 
“These attributes [of shares] are useful in determining what forms of investment crowdfunding interests (not 
readily classifiable under the Companies Act as securities) may be subject to securities regulation.  
In so doing, they form a range of factors whose presence typifies securities. Thus, an inquiry centred around 
the configuration – not necessarily the content – of these interests could be applied as follows: 
[1]  The nature of the interest obtained – debt, equity, mere profit-sharing and so forth (as    
 opposed to consumer interests such as products); 
[2]  How the rights and duties pursuant to the interest are packaged [by asking]: 
[2.1] Is it structured in such a way that would typify it a security? 
[2.2] Is it evidenced in such a way that would typify it a security?  
 In answering these two questions [2.1 & 2.2] regard must be had for the following: 
[a]  Has the interest been designed to be facilitative to trading? 
[b] Does the interest create a degree of notional removal from the underlying assets it    
 confers rights to, and is this apparent from how it is evidenced?  
[c]  Is the interest fungible? 
[d] Finally, does the presentation of an interest as a security flow from the type of     
 transactional relationship that would render it likely to be a security?” 
In the form found above the approach is at the very least too simplistic, if not in some respects 
inaccurate. However, it is proposed that it can be improved by refining and expanding it. It can then 
be restated in the language of the typological approach. The jurisprudence of the Typenlehre can be 
effectively used for the classification of certain financial instruments as securities. The approach set 
out above is particularly suitable to be so adapted. Once in such a form, it could enable one to draw 
from the pre-existing body of South African legal jurisprudence without the need to establish or 
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6 3 Formulating a Typenlehre for the classification of securities 
As already observed more than a century ago:61 
“The term [securities] is not a term of art, but only a word of description. It is a commercial word which will 
vary with the history of commerce.” 
Undoubtedly this is true. Nonetheless, “securities” remains the operative term on which the 
application of a great number of legal rules depends, and it is central to the workings of many others. 
The law must be able to establish what this term encompasses (or does not) within any given factual 
matrix. The theory of types allows this and yet still retains the fluidity and capability to adapt along 
with commerce, as it must be able to do. 
The strength of the theory lies in its teleological policy-consciousness and its ability to facilitate a 
high degree of legal certainty whilst dealing with non-uniform legal phenomena. This is key to 
robustly accommodating new or mixed factual matrices, which tend to arise regularly in the financial 
sphere. A Typenlehre of securities is thus a highly apt methodology with which to reconcile a slow-
moving regulatory legal paradigm with a fast, ever-changing, innovative commercial reality. 
First, however, the relationship between the Typenvergleich (comparison of types) and both (1) the 
broad, free-standing and (2) narrow, statute- or rule-bound securities concepts, as posited in Chapter 
362 must be clarified. Each statutory definition indicates a particular narrow version of the securities 
concept. However, invariably, each such a definition also contains a reference to the broad securities 
concept. This is typically the eiusdem generis “any other instrument” or “any other security” phrase. 
This illustrates the usefulness of the Typenlehre’s teleological dimension in two important ways. 
On one level, the methodology enables a determination to be made whether a particular financial 
instrument (or more generally a legal phenomenon) which is nominally called by any of the names 
enumerated in a particular securities-related act is in fact such an instrument in substance. If so, it 
can be determined whether the act must be applied to it. For example, on this first level it enables 
an interpreter of the Financial Markets Act to determine whether a financial instrument called a 
“note”, is in fact a note for the Act’s purposes, and do so on a teleologically sound basis. In other 
words, it informs determinations regarding the narrow securities concept as nominally enumerated. 
On a second level, the Typenvergleich serves to make more direct sense of the legislature’s use of 
a plenary, catchall phrase. Such a phrase necessarily refers to a general, or broad, securities 
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concept. Yet such a phrase must still be interpreted in an eiusdem generis manner and cannot simply 
refer to any financial instrument which falls within the broad securities concept. This much is clear 
from the material differences of existing statutory definitions alone. A phrase such as "and any other 
security" can only demarcate instruments (1) which are broadly securities, and (2) to which the 
application of the Act would be teleologically appropriate. 
The Typenvergleich, on this second level, functions to circumscribe the broad securities concept, 
but never to identify it. The law can only classify securities in the narrow sense, as linked to a policy-
position which manifests in a specific piece of legislation. Yet this analysis is also equally applicable 
to, and eminently useful in, classificatory problems in the application of legal rules which do not 
directly emanate from a particular statutory scheme. 
In a sense, therefore, the free-standing general securities concept reveals itself to be somewhat of 
a legal fiction. No doubt there is, in reality, a broad securities concept, including all securities for all 
purposes. However, for legal (and classificatory) purposes, the general securities concept remains 
an abstraction which only becomes concrete once it is applied to a specific legal rule. At that point it 
has already “collapsed” into the narrow securities concept in question. In this way the broad 
securities concept is purely theoretical – a concept from which the law borrows, but one which it 
never delineates, in order to make more specific determinations on when a phenomenon should or 
should not be regarded as a security for a specific purpose or legal rule. The narrower securities 
concept is therefore the phenomenon that is meant to be signified (the teleology) by the particular 
legal signifier securities or security, in the particular context. 
With this in mind, a Typenlehre for the classification and identification of securities can be 
established. This will be done in three steps. First, a framework will be established in order to clarify 
the basic outlines of the inquiry itself. Second, a number of non-variable characteristics (only then, 
but then not always, a security), serving to complement this framework, will be identified. Last, a 
number of variable indicia will be posited, to be used in whole or in part to determine whether a 
phenomenon under examination appears, holistically, to be as security or not.   
However, it must be stated, in strong terms, that what follows is not only by far the most speculative, 
but also the least authoritatively corroborated aspect of this dissertation. The unchartered nature of 
the territory into which it ventures necessitates certain creative and lateral argumentation (or 
“rationale Expansionskraft”).63 This is justifiable only by the submission that these conclusions, while 
 
 
63  “Rational expansion”, as per GF Lubbe “Die verpanding van vorderingsregte en die regsdogmatiek – quo vadis?” 




presented as a proposed set of guidelines, are in reality merely a point of origin for such guidelines 
to begin to develop in South African jurisprudence. 
 
6 3 1  Framing the classificatory inquiry  
Before all else, a range of types must be identified – financial instruments. It is, however, beyond the 
scope of this work to fully develop this range of types any further than has already been done in § 6 
1 above. Nonetheless, it is quite apparent that within this range are a number of categories and sub-
categories of financial instruments exhibiting exactly the kind of fluid borders the theory of types is 
suited to. Some of these display non-variable characteristics that allow them to be classified as 
concepts within the Typenlehre modus. Others merely approach concepts, or defy classification as 
concepts altogether. 
As should be clear, securities fall into the latter category, as the construct is definitely not reducible 
to a concept.64 It follows that the most appropriate manner in which to identify a security within this 
broader range is to characterise securities at large as a type within the taxonomy of “financial 
instruments”. This requires a classificatory judgement to be made by means of a comparison of types 
(Typenvergleich). Any such a “comparison-to-classify” will inevitably be contextually variable, 
implicating slightly different outcomes depending on the legal question, or dispute, at issue. 
Thus the most basic consideration is what, exactly, is being analysed. Financial arrangements which 
are constitutive in nature (such as contracts) cause parties to such arrangements to become holders 
of legal interests. Such a legal interest may include rights, duties, as well as other legal competencies 
or liabilities which are not readily classifiable as personal rights or correlative duties in the strict 
sense. As a result of the fact that financial instruments are typically transactional in nature, there are 
invariably at least two parties to any given financial arrangement resulting in a financial instrument. 
Clearly, the various legal interests that can accrue to each party to such an arrangement have the 
potential to be diverse, variable and often quite intricate.  
However, the present classificatory endeavour does not have to reckon with the full complexity of 
these arrangements. The inquiry at hand analyses only one aspect of any given financial 
arrangement that requires classification. That aspect is: whether the legal interest which accrues to 
the party or parties on one side of the arrangement is of such a nature that it is, holistically, 
 
 




classifiable as a security. If this is the case, the holder of that interest is a security-holder for the 
purposes of the law. The importance of this point cannot be overstated.  
If this is the case, where does the analysis of the previous two chapters fit in? From these chapters, 
it can be said that it is in the nature of registered securities (which of course encompasses the result 
of bearer securities having been effectively dematerialised through the creation of a secondary, 
representative uncertificated security) that the incidents of execution over the underlying legal 
interest may be held by one person whilst the remainder is held as patrimony by another. A first step 
in developing a more general classificatory methodology is recognising that the term “security” (as 
a legal term) primarily but not necessarily always denotes a dichotomous construct, comprising the 
security instrument and asset respectively.65 However, it must be noted that whilst the features of 
registered securities are strongly persuasive in the classification of a particular legal interest as a 
security, this is not always determinative. 
Thus, despite the conclusions of Chapters 4 and 5, it may be that certain legal interests which do 
not fully evince the above qualities would still notionally qualify as securities. This is, of course, 
dependent on the context of the particular inquiry, and most exceptions are a product of the kind of 
legislative over-extension as is evident in the definition of the FMA. In its formulation, the act 
artificially extends the definition of securities to include many instruments which may not, in the purer 
sense, be classifiable as securities.66 This demonstrates that an instrument which does not evince 
the characteristics of registered securities may still be appropriately classifiable, in a particular 
context and for a particular purpose, as a security. 
These observations serve further to underscore the fact that any specific application of the proposed 
Typenvergleich must, more than anything else, be teleologically conscious. It also illustrates that the 
relative persuasiveness of each individual indicium posited in the sections that follow may, and 
indeed must, vary depending on the context in which and the reason why classification is required. 
In this light, the subject (or point of departure) of the typological inquiry into whether a given legal 
interest is a security or not, can be framed as follows. What must be asked is whether:67 
(1) with reference to the teleological imperative of the legal principles applicable to the legal question or 
context at hand, (2) a held legal interest (i.e. the position of a particular counterparty, as the result of a 
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given financial arrangement) displays a sufficient number of positively indicative characteristics for 
appropriate classification as a “security”.  
Thus, the object or phenomenon which must be classified is the result of a given financial 
arrangement – i.e. a “held legal interest”. A further question is when the inquiry should be applied. 
To classify a particular legal phenomenon as a security, the comparison must be made not only with 
reference to the interest held, but also either: (1) at the moment at which the constitutive financial 
arrangement has created the legal interest, or (2) when the interest was last modified,68 rather than 
the stage when the legal question or dispute itself arose. 
From here the inquiry can be expanded upon, and guiding principles for the content of such a 
Typenvergleich can be formulated. It will require an extensive refinement of the “range of [structural] 
factors” discussed in the previous section, but will remain in keeping with the central idea that it is 
both the structure, substance, and context of the financial instrument which is determinative of its 
status as a security. Therefore: what are the indicia that would typically cause such a legal interest 
to be classified as a security? 
It must again be stressed that what follows remains only a proposed factor-based comparison. It 
may be incorrect, it may only be partially correct, and it is certainly probable that, if ever put to use, 
this classification method will undergo continuous modification and development. At least, however, 
it may serve as a point of origin from which the inquiry may develop organically. 
 
6 3 2  Only then, but then not always 
The content of a Typenvergleich, or comparison of types, has been characterised as a collection of 
“indicative factors or concrete examples”.69 Given that quasi-fluid borders may exist between types, 
and indeed between types and concepts, the first question that arises is whether there are any fixed 
or immutable criteria that will always be indicative of securities. 
It should be noted here that one should not presuppose that all securities present classificatory 
problems. It is submitted that equity interests – i.e. shares70 and members' interests in a close 
corporation – usually do not. Shares originate from a fixed and discrete legislative scheme, which 
leaves no ambiguity about their legal status as securities in almost any context. The same cannot 
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necessarily be said for members' interests, but the law is typically explicit when these equity 
instruments are being addressed as equity securities, greatly limiting the ambit of any classificatory 
issues that may arise. 
The most pressing issue is whether a particular factual matrix has given rise to a contractual or 
partially-contractual legal interest which is classifiable as a security. This matter, naturally, is central 
to this work at large, as it refers primarily (if not exclusively) to arrangements of debt. In this area the 
incidence of variability, in both form and function, is far higher. For this reason, the outlined 
classificatory scheme is of primary application to contractual securities and any other non- or part-
equity securities such as hybrid and convertible securities. 
Core to this classificatory issue is that, in contrast to equities, the rights and competencies of which 
the bundle comprises do not arise in a uniform manner. Typically, the personal rights underlying 
these securities (but also, in certain cases, other competencies such as status as preferred creditor 
upon insolvency) are created within the constitutive arrangement between the prospective security-
holder and issuer. However, typically most competencies (and, it being unwise to exclude the 
possibility, perhaps also certain personal rights) will arise consequentially: as a result of classification 
– or classifiability – as a security.71 
These ex lege consequences of the legal interest “being” a security: (1) supplement the complex of 
rights and competencies (for example, additional informational rights are afforded to the holders of 
company securities through s 26 and s 31 of the Companies Act of 2008); and (2) empower the 
issuer to add, voluntarily, certain rights and competencies (such as affording the holder of a company 
“debt instrument” a voting right in terms of s 43 of the Companies Act) to the complex. This is highly 
analogous to the imposition of a particular subset of naturalia upon certain contract types. The ex 
lege consequences in this context are simply the black letter articulation of the positive law's deeper 
policy positions regarding securities.  
Therefore, in order to avoid circularity of logic in the classification process, no regard can be had to 
any consequential features of a held legal interest. These features presuppose the legal interest 
having been classified as a security. Such ostensible consequential rights can also be misleading. 
For example, a constitutive arrangement may purport to bestow a company voting right upon a 
creditor, but unless that debt underlies a company debt security, such a competency is not 
authorised by the positive law, and may well be void.72 Thus the focus of the classificatory exercise 
must be on the aspects of the legal interest in question that flow directly from the constitutive 
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arrangement – i.e. personal rights and, in certain cases, comparable competencies (denoted 
collectively simply as rights going forward). 
With this as background, a number of fixed and immutable properties of securities’ underlying 
interest can be identified. 
First, it is in the nature of all securities that they comprise a bundle of one or more personal rights73 
and other analogous competencies. Securities can never directly confer real, immaterial property, or 
personality rights (personality rights are in any event not directly patrimonial in nature). Generally, 
the following instruments are unambiguously considered to be securities: shares, 
debentures/notes/bonds, and dematerialised money market instruments. 74  Examples of rights 
associated with these established cases of securities include contingent rights to profit-sharing and 
capital gain (equities and equities issued as ICISs), or interest income (debentures, notes and bonds 
and, typically, money market securities). In this light it seems relatively uncontentious to assert that 
the only type of subjective right that can appropriately form the foundation of a security is a personal 
right. Thus the broader underlying interest of which the security is constituted must be structured 
around a personal right (for example an option), or a materially related set of personal rights (such 
as is the case for the other securities mentioned above). 
Second, the underlying interest of a security is primarily operative only against a specific counter-
party, to the exclusion of all others. This is inherent in the nature of personal rights, but where a 
number of personal rights are bundled together, they must still all be claims against the same 
counter-party. An analogous position exists with respect to any competencies arising from the 
constitutive arrangement.75 In other words, irrespective of the arrangement which is constitutive of 
the underlying interest, the interest itself is a claim or set of claims against a single performance-
debtor.76 It would appear that any duties imposed by security-holdership would function in a similar 
manner. The use of “primarily operative” is important, as certain securities (most notably shares and 
members’ interests in a CC) may also regulate aspects of the security-holder’s relationship with other 
security-holders, but this is ultimately a secondary feature of these instruments, and has little to no 
relevance to the inquiry. 
 
 
73   See Chapter 4, § 4 1 2 for more detail. 
74   Of course, as a prime example, the Financial Markets Act would appear to imply that a far greater number of 
different instruments are securities for its purposes. These should not be included here, the reasons for which will 
be become clear below.  
75   See Chapter 4, § 4 1. 
76  Typically, the underlying interest in a security also contains no reciprocity in the form of duties owed to the counter-




Third, it is relatively uncontentious to state that securities cannot be created by natural persons. The 
only possible issuers of securities at present appear to be: companies formed in terms of the 
Companies Act of 2008, which includes state-owned enterprises and entities such as the Reserve 
Bank, banks and other institutions also operating in conjunction with other legislation,77 organs of 
state (most notably the Treasury) in terms of the Public Finance Management Act78 and related 
provincial and local government finance legislation, collective investment schemes (typically also 
structured as “open-ended investment” companies, trusts, or combination of both),79 and perhaps 
also other juristic or quasi-juristic persons. Thus, given this wide scope, it is more appropriate to refer 
to artificial legal persons, and not juristic persons. 
From the above, a number of definite, immutable characteristics of securities can be identified:  
1  securities are structured around a personal right, or a materially related set of personal rights which 
flow from a constitutive arrangement (irrespective of its nature or form) between the applicable legal 
interest-holder and a counter-party;  
2  the underlying interest of a security – irrespective of its content – is primarily operative against a 
single counter-party, to the exclusion of others; and  
3  that counter-party is always an artificial legal person such as an organ of state or a company. 
This may seem obvious, but any working classificatory model that purports to be robust, must be 
built on the most basic of foundational attributes. These characteristics are common to all securities, 
and no held legal interest can be classified as a security without evidencing these qualities. However, 
the presence of these qualities does not automatically classify any given legal interest flowing from 
a financial arrangement, or any given financial instrument, as a security. These qualities simply 
mean: only then, but then not always.  
 
6 3 3  Completing the classification: variable indicia  
From here, the Typenvergleich moves into more variable territory. If the particular held legal interest 
in question satisfies the “only then but then not always” criteria above, one turns to the variable 
indicia in order, if necessary, to make a final determination. This is precisely because the 
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indeterminable nature of the broad securities construct does not allow for it to be reduced, as it were, 
to a concept, and must ultimately be approached as a type. Vitally, it should be kept in mind at all 
times that the application of the indicia which follow are to be viewed through the teleological lens of 
the legal rule, and indeed the legal dispute, in question. This “[forces] one who applies the law to 
always consider the purpose of legal conceptualisation and the appropriateness of [the] rule’s legal 
consequences”.80 The overall impression – i.e. the Gesamtbild – which emerges is what will indicate 
whether the legal interest under examination must be classified as a security for the purposes for 
which the question has been raised.   
It is also important to note from the outset that what follows may appear to be overly-exhaustive, 
quite cumbersome, and at times rudimentary. However, the iterative and casuistic legal development 
that the Typenvergleich methodology requires for its effectiveness cannot be fully pre-empted or 
simulated here. It is also not possible to forecast the nature of future litigation over the products of 
future financial arrangements (which will drive its refinement). Thus, the objective in outlining the 
factors that follow is merely to put forward a certain number of guiding variables. These variables 
may or may not be useful or accurate in the event that this methodology is put to use in legal problem-
solving. Thus, paradoxically, each of these factors stands both alone and in interdependence with 
others. This may not, at first glance, appear to be in keeping with the format in which it is presented, 
but as will be seen a thematic exposition makes the most sense. 
The indicia provided are to be regarded as facilitative of classification – guidelines that if necessary 
provide assistance in forming a holistic classificatory determination. In certain cases, the indicia will 
be further split into constituent aspects. They are also placed into two thematic categories.  
The first are indicia regarding the content and nature of the personal rights in question. Applied to a 
specific scenario, they ask one to look at the nature of the legal interest in question and speak to 
whether this interest evinces the qualities that are typical of the underlying interest in a security. Put 
differently, this portion of the inquiry asks whether the rights and competencies in question are 
appropriately able to form the underlying interest of a security per se. 
The second category of indicia is more fluid. It is tempting to want to further categorise and classify 
these indicia, for example, into “structural”, “environmental” or “evidentiary” subsets, respectively. 
Yet such further subdivision would not add sufficient value. These indicia are simply contextual. This 
second portion of the inquiry reveals whether, holistically, security-like rights and competencies have 
in fact and in law been made to form the underlying interest of a security proper. The order of the 
inquiry is not necessarily decisive as the search is for a coherent and meaningful Gesamtbild – a 
 
 




holistic impression. All relevant aspects must be taken into account together, discounting all 
applicable teleological policy considerations. 
 
6 3 3 1 Indicia regarding the nature of the underlying interest 
Having established the fixed characteristics above, the following indicia centre around the legal 
interest – i.e. rights and competencies – that arises from a constitutive arrangement between the 
particular legal interest holder and the counterparty. As stated, it must analyse one party’s position 
as the result of a legal arrangement, focusing on whether the right or materially related set of 
personal rights of the legal interest (that is held) is typical of a security. It also considers the question 
of duties as part of the legal interest. It further bears repeating that an absence of, or indication 
contrary to, any one or more of these indicia will not necessarily result in a negative answer on 
classification as a security, as this is done on the basis of the emergent Gesamtbild (i.e. the overall 
impression). It must also be noted that not all of these indicia will necessarily and always be relevant 
to a classificatory inquiry. 
The following indicia regarding the nature of the rights are posited: 
1  the personal right, or set of materially related personal rights, around which a security is structured, 
is of such a nature that:  
1 1 it includes one or more performances of a financial nature, comparable to those of known 
securities [“financial performances”]; 
1 2 one of its primary functions for the holder is investment – i.e. the realisation of a net patrimonial 
gain flowing from claims to performance tenderable in the context of the overall financial 
arrangement [“investment”]; 
1 3 performance is intended to be tendered over time at one or more certain or ascertainable 
future dates, rather than only immediately [“deferral”]; 
1 4  it excludes any rights or competencies which would allow the interest holder to exercise direct 
control over the business or affairs of the performance-debtor [“control passivity”]; 
2 the content of a legal interest underlying a security is predominantly free of duties correlative to the 
right or related set of rights held by the performance-debtor [“duty passivity”]. 






Vital to a functional typology of securities is some abstraction of the precise nature, or character, of 
the personal right, or materially related set of personal rights, around which the overall underlying 
interest of a security is structured. From established cases, the right or set of rights may include 
claims to:81 the payment of a sum of money upon declaration of a dividend, or a similar distribution 
of a share of profits; payment of a sum of money representing a proportional claim to the residual 
assets of the issuer after liquidation;82 or a combination of the above.83 From these examples it is 
possible to infer that whilst performances need not be monetary per se, they must at least be financial 
in nature. 
There is one notable exception – shareblock schemes. The definition of “share” in s 1 of the Share 
Blocks Control Act84 is very wide: 
“‘share’— 
(a)  means a share as defined in section 1 (1) of the Companies Act in relation to a company, and 
includes a debenture of a company and a right to or an interest in any such share or debenture; 
(b)  includes any other interest in a company; 
(c)  does not include a right to or an interest in the assets of a company derived from a lease in respect 
of such assets…” 
Clearly, this includes not only shares, debentures, interests in these securities, but also “any other 
interest in the company”. Are these interests in a shareblock arrangement securities? To answer this 
question, they must be notionally declassified and designated only as shareblock instruments. The 
key difference between shareblock instruments and other securities is that a shareblock instrument 
must convey: (1) the right to use or occupy the immovable property of the shareblock company 
(“occupancy rights”), as well as (2) the right to vote at shareblock instrument-holders’ meetings 
(“voting rights”).85 Monetary distributions (such as dividends or interest on loan capital) are not 
typically made to shareblock instrument-holders, as occupation is the core distribution86 made by a 
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shareblock company.87 Thus, the key performances the personal rights shareblock instruments are 
structured around are those which facilitate occupancy (i.e. analogous to the limited real right of 
habitatio, which is arguably difficult to distinguish from usus and fructus).88 This is not financial 
performance.  
However, a prerequisite for the functionality of the Share Block Control Act is the supplementary 
effect of the Companies Act (initially the 1973 Act and currently the 2008 Act). Shareblock companies 
are companies in the true sense. Thus any shareblock company must be incorporated under 
companies legislation.89 A shareblock company is also not possible without a register of holders, and 
the 2008 Act makes provision only for a securities register. Further, whilst there was much 
uncertainty regarding the voting rights of holders of shareblock instruments other than shares,90 
voting rights for such holders is now facilitated by s 43(3) of the Companies Act. Thus one must 
conclude that, at least for the purposes of the Companies Act, these instruments are indeed 
securities. 
From this hard case, three observations arise. First, it reinforces the point that a teleologically 
informed context- and policy-consciousness is crucial to the classificatory inquiry, and that different 
pieces of legislation give rise to divergent results. Second, it perfectly illustrates that the influence of 
any one single indicium should not be decisive to the outcome. Third, although the classification of 
pure equity-instruments as securities is typically unproblematic, the case of shareblock securities 
(as well as the case of inclusion of members’ interests in a close corporation by the STTA) shows 
that a typological approach has supplementary value even when considering equity instruments.  
Investment 
This discussion will benefit considerably from comparable US jurisprudence. In the United States, s 
2(1) of the 1933 Securities Act and the nearly identical s 3(a)(10) of the 1934 Securities Exchange 
Act contain a definition of a security (and whilst the former will be referred to, these definitions can 
be treated as equivalent for these purposes). Section 2(1) of the Securities Act reads as follows:  
“The term ‘security’ means any note, stock, treasury stock, security future, security-based swap, bond, 
debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, 
collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment 
contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, 
or other mineral rights, any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security, certificate of deposit, or 
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group or index of securities (including any interest therein or based on the value thereof), or any put, call, 
straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a national securities exchange relating to foreign currency, or, 
in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a ‘security’, or any certificate of interest or 
participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe 
to or purchase, any of the foregoing.” 
This definition appears to have all the hallmarks of a nominal, enumerative approach. However, the 
legislative scheme within which it functions has always been construed flexibly and with an eye for 
the economic reality of that to which it is being applied.91 More importantly, the United States has 
the benefit of a rich and large volume of case law in terms of which a definitive test has been 
formulated and applied for the classification of securities. It pertains to an “investment contract”, 
which has been treated as the definition’s catchall provision.92 
The original formulation of the test, which has remained substantially unchanged, is found in SEC v 
Howey Co where an “investment contract” is described as:93 
“[1] a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person [2] invests his money [3] in a common enterprise 
and [4] is led to expect profits [5] solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party, it being immaterial 
whether the shares of the enterprise are evidenced by formal certificates or by nominal interest in the 
physical assets employed in the enterprise.” 
This is known as the “Howey test”. It is applied to the phrase “investment contract”, which can be 
characterised as the US equivalent of the domestic definitions’ typical use of “any other instrument” 
or “any other security”. Somewhat counter-intuitively, this “investment contract” need not necessarily 
even be a contract in the strict sense. It should also be noted that it is the dominant but not the only 
legal test used for classifying financial arrangements as securities in the United States.  
During the course of the judicial development of US securities law, the Howey analysis has revealed 
a number of shortcomings. This is evident from the fact that the courts have often reinterpreted the 
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formulation in Howey in order to judicially exclude certain arrangements from classification as 
securities. Courts have also resorted to the creation of rebuttable presumptions based on secondary 
inquiries. Most notable are the specialised supplementary inquiries developed in Reves v Ernst & 
Young94 and Landreth Timber Co. v Landreth,95 used for identifying debt and equity securities, 
respectively.96 Most significantly, in light of the “irreducible tension between the securities laws’ 
language and their purpose”, the Howey approach is criticised as having the potential to apply both 
too widely and too narrowly.97 
From a South African perspective there are also a number of caveats to an analysis of the potential 
usefulness of the Howey approach to the identification of securities. First, the Howey test is tied to 
a very specific statutory framework which has no equivalent in South African law. Moreover, this 
framework is underpinned by a Common law legal system which is markedly different from the South 
African dispensation. Second, the regulatory and institutional characteristics of the American 
financial marketplace are similarly not comparable to those of South Africa (most importantly in the 
the former’s more interventionst approach and its use of the executive and administrative spheres 
of government). Third, the test does not function in accordance with a typological approach: although 
the test is flexible, all its elements must be satisfied for designation as a security. Fourth, the 
legislative intent of the 1933 and 1934 Acts is quite specific in being centred on investor protection. 
These acts attempt to achieve this primarily through enhanced disclosure requirements (including 
registration and prospectus requirements) and a more comprehensive remedial regime focused on 
fraud-prevention.98  This is the teleological imperative that guides determinations on whether a 
transaction has created an “investment contract”, so that:99 
“the definition of an investment contract should relate to the question about which contracts should have 
enhanced disclosure, rather than the level of disclosure required by other statutes and the common law for 
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most contracts. Consequently, in defining an investment contract, we should ask which contracts need the 
protection of the securities acts.” 
Consequently, any direct appropriation of the test, or elements of it, does not suit the South African 
context. Nonetheless, that does not mean that it cannot meaningfully contribute to the formulation of 
indicia which are suitable to South African law. As per the court in Howey, its central quality is that 
it:100 
“embodies a flexible rather than static principle, one that is capable of adaptation to meet the countless and 
variable schemes devised by those who seek to use the money of others on the promise of profits.” 
More recently, in SEC v Charles E. Edwards101 the Supreme Court reiterated the need for flexibility, 
stating that the intention of legislature was simply to: 
“regulate investments, in whatever form that are made and by whatever name they are called.”  
This encapsulates a key insight to understanding the securities concept. Against the background of 
the previous two chapters, and even presently, it is easy to lose sight of the fact that, in law, the 
securities concept is primarily a regulatory concept. This is true regardless of the jurisdiction under 
discussion. Nonetheless, South African securities law creates a particularly strong impression of the 
securities concept as an enabling concept, allowing issuers to issue financial instruments that have 
certain qualities. This is further evidence of the marked influence of company law on its domestic 
development, and one must concede that securities do indeed have an empowering facet, the best 
example being that a company debt structured as a “debt instrument” may confer voting rights.102 
Yet the principal legal function of the securities concept is to articulate and implement a particular 
legal policy position. It does this by facilitating the recognition that certain legal interests have a 
particular set of characteristics that require both general and bespoke corrective regulatory 
intervention (for example to protect investors and reduce systemic financial risk). This recognition 
allows a grouping (as “securities”) of all legal interests that display those characteristics, so that 
recurring factual matrices belonging to that group may be subjected to a certain collection of specific 
corrective legal rules. This is why, for example, the security concept activates tax regulation,103 
securities exchange and securities’ custody and administration regulation, 104  the regulation of 
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securities market abuses such as insider trading,105 regulation by disclosure of holdership,106 the 
regulation of information provided to investors,107 and fundamental transactions regulation.108 
In this light, three of the elements of the Howey test illuminate certain core characteristics which can 
be used, with modification, to typify securities and substantiate aspects of the current, rights-based, 
portion of the typological inquiry. These are the “expectation of profits”, “from the efforts of the 
promoter or third party” and the “common enterprise” elements of the Howey test. These will be 
discussed as and when relevant to the formulation of the proposed typology. 
The first relevant factor is the contribution of “the expectation of profits” to the indicium presently 
under discussion – investment. It is somewhat trite that securities are used for investment. The rights 
around which securities are structured are the source of the economic end-benefits which accrue to 
the security-holder. They are the foundational components of any security. This links strongly to the 
idea that for their holders, securities are, primarily, investments of a particular kind. However, it is 
obvious that “investment” is not a sufficiently definitive characteristic. Securities are not the only 
means of “investing”, and even the simple purchase of art or immovable property can fulfil the same 
function.109 However, this does not change the fact that one of the many indicia that typify a security 
is that the underlying rights should appear to facilitate investment. What does that mean? 
When interpreting the meaning of “in the expectation of profits”, the US courts have framed the term 
“profits” very widely, including the use of an asset such as a recreational facility (but only where it is 
mainly for investment purposes rather than personal use),110 capital gain on the sale of an asset,111 
and more traditional income and capital gains on an investment’s value.112  The return on the 
investment does not have to be monetary.113 Although such a construction of “profits” is perhaps too 
wide for the South African context, the earlier discussion on shareblock instruments shows that the 
classificatory context will ultimately determine what is too wide or narrow a construction.  
What is clear is that the primary function of investment is “profit” of a sort. This is best expressed as 
a net economic return on the counter-value provided for the security. A more legally appropriate 
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construction of this characteristic (domestically) is that the right, or materially related set of rights, at 
the centre of the held legal interest under inquiry should appear to be intended to realise a net 
patrimonial gain. In other words, the purpose of the rights should be the achievement of a benefit, 
and that benefit must be a net benefit in the broader scheme of financial arrangement with the 
relevant counter-party or -parties. The gain itself must also flow from the claims of the interest-holder 
as creditor to both present and future performances. Ultimately, it highlights not only that investment 
is core to the securities concept, but also that the type of profit envisaged by investors is, in light of 
the complex modern financial marketplace, a fluid concept. 
Whole or partial deferral 
Given that securities primarily facilitate investment, framed as a net economic gain in the broader 
scheme of the arrangement, it is logical that the gain should have a temporal component.  
It is uncontentious that most securities have an intended lifespan, which can either be open-ended 
(such as shares or perpetual debt securities) or closed (such as “vanilla” debt securities). The 
lifespan of an open-ended security is naturally contingent on the lifespan of the performance-debtor. 
The lifespan of a closed-ended security depends on its performances. It may be extinguished when 
performance becomes due and is discharged, or – if comprised of a set of multiple, iterative 
performances – when all intended performances have been discharged. It may also make provision 
for early termination or redemption. In either case, fundamental to securities is that the performance 
or set of related performances is to be tendered at one or more certain or merely ascertainable future 
dates. This does not exclude the possibility that a portion of the performance may take place 
immediately: as long as future performance is a component of the underlying interest this indicium 
will favour an affirmative classificatory outcome. 
Control passivity and duty passivity 
These two indicia will be discussed together, as they are both manifestations of the same underlying 
property of securities – passivity. Passivity is a vital concept in understanding what differentiates 
(most) securities from other financial instruments and arrangements. The Howey test is again very 
useful in this regard. This property is most clearly illustrated through a critical analysis of the “solely 
from the efforts of the promoter or a third party” requirement, its (historical) connection with the 
“common enterprise” requirement and the exact meaning of enterprise in this context.  
Beginning with the “solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party” requirement, it appears 




less, such as “largely” or “predominantly”.114 With this in mind, the seminal formulation appears to 
be found in SEC v Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., as a question of:115 
“whether the efforts made by those other than the investor are the undeniably significant ones, those 
essential managerial efforts which affect the failure or success of the enterprise.” 
Further support for this approach is found in SEC v Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., where the court 
rejects the notion that:116 
“the exertion of some effort by an investor is inimical to the holding that a promotional scheme falls within 
the definition of an investment contract.” 
Ultimately, as per SEC v ETS Payphones, Inc.:117 
“the critical inquiry in determining whether investors were dependent on the ‘efforts of others’ for their 
returns is how much, if any, control investors had over the operation of the business or enterprise expected 
to generate their returns.”  
Moreover, it appears that “efforts” in this regard must be of an entrepreneurial nature,118 as it is 
fundamental to the notion of securities that the “investors provide the capital and share in the 
earnings and profits; [whilst] the promoters manage, control and operate the enterprise”.119  
Despite the attenuating effect of the Glenn and Koscot formulations, its outcomes have still not 
escaped criticism. This is best illustrated by the argument  that it opens the door for certain franchise-
based interests (specifically those of franchisors) to be inappropriately classified as securities.120 Yet 
it remains an important feature of the inquiry, and for good reason. To grasp the import and utility of 
the requirement (and its attenuation), its relationship with another Howey requirement – 
“commonality” – must be discussed. This requirement is complex, has been applied differently by 
different courts in the US, and is described as interpretively “troublesome”.121 
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In essence, a commonality analysis centres around whether, and how, both the risk of loss and 
potential for gain are shared between parties. Specifically, its purpose is to establish whether an 
investment is the type “in which the fortunes of the investor are interwoven with and dependent upon 
the efforts and success of those seeking the investment”.122  
However, the court in Howey did not explain or define the commonality requirement. Further, there 
is widespread disagreement regarding whether “vertical” or “horizontal” commonality is required. In 
this regard the US courts “are not only split; they are fractured”.123 Although the distinction is, for 
present purposes, of lesser importance there are:124 
“three basic definitions. Horizontal commonality focuses on the horizontal relationship between 
investors…[and] requires an enterprise in which the investors’ contributions are pooled, and the fortune of 
each investor depends on the success of the overall venture…By contrast, vertical commonality focuses 
on the vertical relationship between the investor and the promoter. The vertical test defines a common 
enterprise as one in which the investor is dependent on the promoter’s efforts or expertise for the investor’s 
returns. Broad and narrow versions of vertical commonality exist. The broad version requires that the 
investor’s fortunes be tied to the efficacy of the manager’s efforts. By comparison, narrow vertical 
commonality requires that the investor’s profits be tied to the manager’s profits – i.e., they must rise and 
fall together.” 
The key to grasping the interrelation of the commonality and (entrepreneurial) efforts of others 
requirements lies in the origin of the test, and these requirements’ original relation to one another.  
In its brief to the court in the Howey case, the SEC argued for the application of a test very similar 
to the one that was eventually formulated by the court. However, crucially, the SEC did not submit 
that commonality was an out-and-out requirement for classification as a security. Rather, it argued 
that if an arrangement does evidence “commonality”, then the efforts need not be tendered solely 
by the promoter or third party, and if the arrangement does not evince commonality then the profits 
would have to arise solely from these “managerial” efforts. Yet the court, seemingly having accepted 
the SEC’s submissions regarding the test, omitted this qualification from its final pronouncement. 
Thus, at worst, the court mis-formulated and consequently misapplied a test it had appeared to 
accept. The end-result is that the commonality requirement became a fixed feature of the inquiry, 
 
 
122  SEC v Koscot Interplanetary, Inc. F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974) 478. 
123  Gordon (2011) Ohio State LJ 61.  
124  Gordon (2011) Ohio State LJ 61. See also Schneider (1981) Rev. Sec. Reg. 984, § B; Schneider (1991) Rev. Sec. 





instead of acting as a subsidiary determinative factor in the kind of “effort” required.125 This explains 
(and justifies) the courts’ subsequent efforts to attenuate the import of the term “solely”.  
Also, even before the Howey judgment, the SEC itself had already:126 
“modulated its investment contract test into its definitive form: where purchasers participate in a common 
enterprise, reliance need only be predominantly, not solely, on the efforts of others. Where they purchase 
tailor-made profit-making arrangements, they must rely solely on the efforts of others.” 
This, it is submitted, is the more theoretically cogent approach to the interpretation of “investment 
contract” in the United States. Seen in conjunction with “[predominantly] from the efforts of the 
promoter or a third party”, the above reveals a key insight into the securities concept as a, primarily 
regulatory, signifier of a specific type of financial instrument. It shows that the more managerial 
control an investor’s legal interest bestows, the less that investor is in need of regulatory intervention 
and protection. As a result, it is less important to classify the legal interest in question as a security, 
thereby subjecting it to corrective legal intervention. This appears to point, at least in US 
jurisprudence, to a materiality threshold (“solely” interpreted as “predominantly”) determining 
whether regulation, facilitated by classification, is necessary.  
In that light what remains to be discussed, in completing a discussion of passivity, is the modern 
meaning of enterprise. The ambit of the term has undergone a significant and continuous evolution 
as the broader financial context has changed dramatically over the past century.  
To understand it, one must consider the nature and role of securities in the current and historic 
context. Securities function, in essence, as a means by which capital may be transferred from capital 
holders (those wealthy enough to have disposable, investable capital) to capital users (those whose 
commercial or public undertakings required such capital). Yet, over time, the nature of these capital 
users has changed significantly.  
As shown in Chapter 2, securities were initially an instrument enabling government or state project-
financing. This led to securities’ use in parastatal commercial finance, which in turn acclimatised 
investors to private corporate finance in capital-intensive industries. These typically large projects 
are the kind of enterprises that represented traditional capital users.127 However, as the financial 
marketplace became increasingly more sophisticated, new players (such as collective investment 
schemes, hedge funds and securitised debt securities schemes) emerged. Typically, these players 
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defy categorisation as entrepreneurs in the traditional sense. Yet their efforts can still be described 
as “managerial”. 
The final contemporary development is that securities have become an integral part of a complex 
finance and investment system that has become increasingly self-perpetuating. Modern securities 
markets have, in part, transcended their original function of financing capital-intensive endeavours 
exogenous to that system and became increasingly important to activities endogenous to the 
financial system. First there is the use of securities as real security for further lending. Second, and 
likely the most illuminating example of this development, is a new and totally different function fulfilled 
by securities – the repackaging of existing financial interests or even securities into new asset-
backed securities. This occurs for a number of purposes, not always strictly related to the financing 
of managerial ambitions.128  
Thus, any activity which involves the creation of securities in order to: (1) obtain capital, (2) leverage 
existing capital, or (3) convert a pre-existing cash-flow stream (e.g. receivables, most notably asset-
backed debt instalments such as mortgage payments) into capital must be viewed as an “enterprise” 
in this context. 
From this, it is clear that any enterprise within the context of securities markets still centres around 
the transfer of capital from holders to users. It follows that securities have not truly transcended their 
investment-functionality. Yet, it would appear that a security may entail something more than a mere 
exchange of capital for economic return.  
If the original relationship between the requirements of commonality and “solely from the efforts of 
the promoter or third party” is historically correctly understood, and this is seen against the wide 
modern ambit of “enterprise”, the following emerges. Securities, by nature, involve not only the 
transfer of capital, but also the transfer of control of capital from holders to users, for the purpose of 
a particular enterprise. From the perspective of the capital user, this decreases the economic 
transaction costs of raising and utilising capital. From the perspective of the investor, it means: (1) 
not having to expend personal and direct effort in generating returns on that capital, and (2) the 
prospect of better returns arising from the knowledge and skill of third-party capital users as applied 
to a specific enterprise. 
This means that over and above the basic trade-off inherent in all investment (capital put at risk for 
return), investment in securities entails a second trade-off – control of capital for effort and expertise. 
However, this second trade-off involves a unique set of risks for the investor. First, handing over 
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control over capital increases agency risk (specifically the risk of moral hazard) and thereby also 
increases monitoring costs. Second, an absence of direct control over the managerial efforts 
expended to generate returns gives an investor far less scope to intervene in order to mitigate 
potential mismanagement. Third, an investor may not have requisite knowledge to evaluate 
accurately whether those in control of the capital are indeed skilled or honest, nor whether any 
representations made about the potential success of the enterprise are reasonable and accurate. It 
is this risk-premium that often drives the need to classify (and thus regulate) a particular legal interest 
as a security. 
The first indicium stemming from the above is control passivity. It is wholly uncontentious that 
government-issued securities can confer no control over the state or any aspect thereof. However, 
this indicium becomes less clear cut when dealing with interests created in the private, commercial 
sphere. Here an investor’s capital is solicited for the pursuit of a specific purpose: a commercial 
enterprise. Control of the enterprise, in turn, is (at least as a point of departure) synonymous with 
control over its capital. It follows that the core issue, if a legal interest does confer upon an investor 
a measure of control over the enterprise, is the degree and nature of that control. If the measure of 
control is sufficiently material, the risks outlined above will not be as acute. This may, depending on 
the teleology underpinning the legal issue or dispute at hand, militate against classification as a 
security. 
To deal with this variability, it is useful to outline a spectrum of control. At the one end of this spectrum 
lies full and direct managerial control. This is the type of control typically held by a managing director 
or executive director – i.e. full or partial control over the “business and affairs” of the enterprise.129  
Although classification is context specific, shares are almost universally considered securities. It is 
further uncontentious to assert that the majority of a body of voting securities-holders within a 
company context is able to exercise a certain kind of control over that enterprise – control over the 
directors. However, the evaluation is performed on the particular legal interest in question. On that 
basis the voting rights attached to single share or debenture are not sufficient to weigh in favour of 
not classifying these instruments as securities. 
Here the definition of control used in the Companies Act130 is quite useful. This test seems to provide 
a substantive guideline as to what this type of control constitutes: “the ability to materially influence 
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the policy of the enterprise”. Delport describes the control as dependent on the context in question. 
Here “material” pertains to the scope of the power held, and the power itself is explained as:131 
“[the] power to do something (which may be the positive power to determine an outcome or the negative 
power to prevent an outcome). However, if the power applies only to one or two matters, depending on the 
nature of those matters, it may not be sufficiently extensive to meet the threshold of materiality. The range 
of influence need not be as extensive as that exercised directly by shareholders through the general 
meeting or indirectly through the board by the person with the power to appoint the directors but it must, as 
in both those cases, be reasonably extensive since otherwise it will not be comparable to the influence.” 
This provides the following insight into the kind of control at issue: individual or direct control over 
the enterprise entails the ability to determine how capital, raised by means of securities, is utilised in 
furtherance of that enterprise. Securities typically place this type of control beyond the purview of 
the single investor in her capacity as investor. But, again, the inquiry is centred on the legal interest 
in question, not the interest-holder in question. 
Therefore, in terms of a given constitutive financial arrangement, if the performance-creditor is 
excluded from having any direct control over decisions regarding the application, by the 
performance-creditor, of her economic contribution, the product of that arrangement is more likely to 
be classifiable as a security. Conversely, by way of example, a 70% members’ interest in a close 
corporation is less likely to be classified as a security in a situation where an Act or rule has not 
explicitly identified “members’ interest” as a security for its application.   
In summary, it is typical of securities that the overall patrimonial value of the performance or related 
set of performances should not only be materially contingent on the strength or weakness of 
enterprise-related decisions, but the performance-creditor should be excluded from having direct 
control over the enterprise and decisions. This accounts for indicium “1 4” above – i.e. control 
passivity.  
A second dimension to the passivity outlined above is that the underlying interest of a security 
typically contains little to no duties corresponding to rights held by the overall performance-debtor. 
Put more simply, if a legal interest holder –  referred to here as the performance-creditor – does not 
incur duties by virtue of her holdership, it is more likely that the underlying interest is classifiable as 
a security.  
The legal interest underlying “true” securities typically does not contain any duties – the fixed 
economic contribution serving as counter-value for the security is typically paid beforehand in terms 
of the acquiring agreement, and is remote from the legal interest underlying the security itself. This 
 
 




is because the constitutive source of rights that make up the beneficial interest of a security typically 
does not contemplate any counter-performance and is therefore incomplete as a source of binding 
obligations. That source fulfils the function of a standard-form offer, or offer to make an offer 
(depending on the factual matrix at hand and whether other material terms, specifically the price of 
the security, are certain or ascertainable yet).132 As seen in Chapter 4,133 the creation of securities 
typically externalises counter-performance to a separate, secondary source – the agreement that 
serves as the causa for the creation and bestowal of those rights in exchange for value. This can 
take the form of an allotment or subscription contract, consensus reached by auction, or a simple 
agreement to transfer. 
The context of derivatives serves to illustrate the point even further. Most financial instruments are 
transactional in nature – accordingly, most derivatives are bilateral. Swaps are the most obvious 
example, as each swap typically contains asymmetrical sets of rights and duties, each tailored to the 
needs of the two holding counter-parties.134 In a credit default swap with fixed and variable legs 
respectively, holdership of the former entails making fixed payments in exchange for receiving more 
value than the sum of those payments if an uncertain future condition occurs. The holder of the latter 
is obligated, should the specified event occur, to provide that value but receives the fixed payments 
on an ongoing basis in return (betting the event will not occur or the condition will not be met during 
the term of the swap). What matters here is that the legal interests held on both sides of the 
arrangement contain both rights and duties. 
However, an option is not a reciprocal derivative. An option displays the kind of duty passivity that is 
to be expected in instruments uncontentiously classifiable as securities. The (generic) option-holder 
has the right to enforce a specific purchase price at a future date. There is typically no duty to 
exercise the option. Furthermore, the ostensible duties of paying for the option and paying the 
agreed-upon price, if exercised, flow from the overall constitutive financial arrangement within which 
the option was created.  
Thus, this indicium increases the likelihood that an option should be classifiable as a security, but 
conversely decreases that likelihood in the case of swaps. 
It must be reiterated, lastly, that consequential rights and duties are excluded from the typological 
inquiry to avoid circularity of reasoning. Securities may very well entail duties, such as the duty of 
 
 
132  See SWJ Van der Merwe, LF Van Huyssteen, MFB Reinecke & GF Lubbe Contract: General Principles 4 ed (2012) 
47-50 & n 14 for auction sales.  
133  See Chapter 4, § 4 2.  




disclosure in s 56 of the Companies Act of 2008, but these are duties that arise consequentially 
rather than consensually. This accounts for indicium “2” above.  
 
6 3 3 2 Contextual indicia  
The second leg of the comparison is a context test, which considers the typical features of securities 
that do not relate strictly to the substantive properties of the underlying interest. Thus the focus is on 
the attributes of: (1) the held legal interest as a whole, (2) the correlative constitutive arrangement 
between legal interest holder or holders and counter-party or -parties, and (3) the context within 
which these elements function. They can briefly be summarised (their numbering following on the 
preceding indicia) as follows. 
3 the legal interest derives a material part of its patrimonial value indirectly, based on the degree to which 
the overall enterprise of the performance-debtor is successful [“enterprise-derived value”]; 
4 the constitutive arrangement evidences the potential for asymmetrical multilateral relations: the counter-
parties stand in a relationship of one performance-debtor to a potential multitude of legal interest holders 
[“multiplicity”]; 
5 the constitutive arrangement, alone or in conjunction with the operation of law, contemplates the (once-
off or repeatable) creation and allocation of more than one such legal interest in series, so that each 
interest is economically fungible in relation to others of the same type and issue [“quasi-fungibility”]; 
6 if the legal interest consists of more than one right, or right and other competency, the constitutive 
arrangement, alone or in conjunction with the operation of law, facilitates the treatment of the totality of 
the underlying interest as a single patrimonial object, over which rights can be established, but out of 
which rights cannot ordinarily be ceded [“bundling”];  
7 the constitutive arrangement, alone or in conjunction with the operation of law, contemplates that the 
performance, or most of the performances, of which the legal interest is comprised must be tendered 
by the performance-debtor exclusively to:  
7 1 one legal subject whose identity is evidenced by entry on a register (irrespective of its form or 
title) as well as, prima facie, evidenced by the issue of a certificate (irrespective of its form or title), 
7 2 one legal subject whose identity is evidenced by entry in an electronic register maintained by a 
licenced central securities depository or participant such that it may, in accordance with the 
applicable general law, be held in dematerialised form, or 




irrespective of whether the patrimonial or economic-end benefits of the performance or related set of 
performances of that object vests in the estate of another, different legal subject [“exclusivity of 
execution”]; and 
8 the constitutive arrangement or held legal interest otherwise presents in a context which indicates that 
the latter is a security [“context”].  
The reasoning behind each of these factors will be analysed below, although these factors are 
admittedly less technical than those of the previous section.   
Enterprise-derived value 
In the analysis of the Howey test above, it was shown that one of the distinctive characteristics of 
securities is the enablement of a trade-off between control of capital and managerial skills and 
expertise. Another consequence of this observation is that securities derive their value from the 
application of that skill and experience in the enterprise towards which the capital is contributed. It 
follows that a strong indicator that a held legal interest is a security is whether the value of the interest 
is in fact to some extent a proxy for the success of the enterprise. This is what is meant by 
“enterprise-derived value” as the first contextual indicium. 
In more detail, it requires that the patrimonial value of the claim to a performance, or set of related 
performances (around which the legal interest is structured), bear a strong nexus to the overall 
success or failure of the underlying purpose towards which the capital is being contributed.  
Typically, that purpose should further be some form of enterprise (typically entrepreneurial, 
managerial or financial) on the part of the issuer and performance-debtor. This does not mean that 
the effect of market forces (i.e. the putative efforts of the surrounding economic environment) or the 
actual efforts of the investor are immaterial or “inimical”135 to classification as a security merely 
because they impact upon that patrimonial value. However, for classification as a security, the 
degree of overall success or failure of the enterprise (as purpose for which the capital was allocated) 
at any moment in time should materially affect, and indeed determine, the value of the claim or set 
of claims bestowed on the legal interest holder. 
Consider the following concrete illustrations. The patrimonial value of the beneficial interest in a 
share is typically based on the estimated discounted future: (1) cash flow from dividend income, and 
(2) current value of payment of a sum proportionate to the proprietary interest in the company and 
 
 




its assets (capital, or the “incidence of risk”136 of the enterprise). Both of these are chiefly derived 
from metrics such as the discounted future cash flow of the company as a whole, or a multiple of its 
“EBITDA” (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortisation). Or, more simply: a 
determination of the present value of the enterprise.   
The patrimonial value of the beneficial interest in a debt security, such as a bond, is typically 
contingent on the discounted future value of the coupon payments (principal sum lent and interest, 
however structured), factoring in two other variables. First is an estimation of the likelihood that the 
debtor will default on those obligations (this is central to the valuation and differentiation of different 
debt securities), which is also a function of the future discounted cash flow of the overall enterprise 
(in this instance not limited only to companies). Second is an evaluation of the prevalent macro-
economic environment and specifically its interest rates, which are crucial in evaluating the market 
value of the debt security relative to other interest-bearing investment instruments.  
Thus the principle is most clear in the case of shares, as the present degree of overall success or 
failure – i.e. the state – of the enterprise directly determines the present value of a claim to potential 
future performance in the form of payment of dividends and the share of the residual assets of the 
enterprise after winding up. More indirectly, the state of the enterprise is also central to determining 
the prospects of the enterprise and will thus materially affect the projected value of future 
performance in the form of payment of dividends. 
In the case of debt securities the state of the enterprise determines the creditworthiness of that 
enterprise, which in turn determines default risk. As seen above, creditworthiness and default risk 
are fundamental determinants of the value of any claim to performance in the form of coupon 
payments.  
Thus a performance or a set of performances that typifies a security (which is typically designed to 
be tendered at one or more future dates)137 derives, at the very least, a material part of its value from 
the state of the enterprise for which the capital was provided. 
Multiplicity 
Multiplicity relates to the types of relationships typically created by securities and is also fundamental 
to understanding the “security instrument” component of registered securities. It is typical of 
 
 
136  See Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd. and Another v Ocean Commodities Inc. and Others, 1983 (1) SA 276 (A) 
288, and F Oditah “Takeovers, share exchanges and the meaning of loss” (1996) 112 Law Quarterly Review 424 
426-427. 




constitutive arrangements that give rise to legal interests which are considered securities to have 
asymmetrically multilateral effect. This rests on two characteristics. 
First, the constitutive arrangement between the legal interest holder and the counter-party should 
provide for, or merely be capable of creating, more than one identical or materially similar legal 
interest (irrespective of whom these interests are bestowed upon over and above the legal interest 
holder in question) operative against a counter-party. 
Second, what multiplicity further requires is that such an arrangement makes provision for one 
performance-debtor counter-party, but a multiplicity of (actual or potential) legal interest holders 
whose interests are identical (or materially similar) to that of the legal interest holder in question.  
Together, this means the arrangement envisages a many-to-one relationship structure – i.e. is 
asymmetrically multilateral. It is not inconceivable that a single security may be issued to a single 
acquirer, as pointed out by Delport. 138  Nonetheless, as long as the constitutive arrangement 
evidences the potential to apply in this asymmetrically multilateral way, it would certainly influence 
the probability that the constitutive arrangement bestows something classifiable as a security.  
Quasi-fungibility 
Something is fungible if its characteristics cause it to form part of a broader genus of identical objects, 
such that one such object is the economic equivalent of another. Thus fungible things are fully 
replaceable by, or interchangeable with, any other object which is member of that genus. 139 
Fungibility is typically encountered in the law of things and the notion of fungible obligations or 
immaterial property rights is an understandably unintuitive one, though perfectly conceivable. 
This quality has a number of important consequences, most notably in the law of sale. For example, 
a generic thing as the object of a sale need not be in existence at the time of contract conclusion, it 
affects the incidence and passing of risk between the time of contracting and the time of delivery, 
and affects the remedies available to the contracting parties. 140  Here the parties’ intention is 
 
 
138  Delport Henochsberg § 43, 184(1), citing the English case of Knightsbridge Estates Trust Ltd v Byrne 1940 AC 613 
(HL) [1940] 2 All ER 401 as an example of the (legitimate) issue of a single debenture.  
139  See Van der Merwe Sakereg (1989) 47-48, PJ Badenhorst, J Pienaar, H Mostert & M Van Rooyen Silberberg & 
Schoeman’s The Law of Property 4 ed (2003) 46. 
140   See for instance G Bradfield & K Lehmann Principles of the Law of Sale & Lease 3 ed (2013) 27, 69, and 76 & 79, 
respectively;  or  CFR Van den Bergh “Perfecta emptione periculum est emptoris: why all the fuss?” (2008) Tydskrif 




important, as a thing may be fungible by nature or fungible by agreement (a good example of the 
latter is an agreement to buy “a car”, making the object of the sale any car).141 
Shares or debt instruments of the same class are typically, but not always, issued in series, and with 
serial numbering. Thus, by nature, each specific such security is identifiable and individualised. 
However, each security asset in such a class is substantively identical. All “class B shares of 
company X” are patrimonial equivalents, though their instruments may be distinguishable by serial 
numbering (if applicable). It follows that any shares or debt securities of the same class must be 
designated as at least quasi-fungible, or if not issued with unique identifying numbers then wholly 
fungible. This has already been covered in some detail in  the context of “collective deposit” in 
Chapter 3142 and more importantly in § 5 1 3 of Chapter 5. 
In the previous two chapters much was made of the enhanced proprietary character of securities, 
specifically as objects of trade.143 Aside from traditional securities such as equities and bonds, large-
scale trading platforms have also developed around derivatives such as futures and swaps144 as 
these instruments became similarly tradeable:145   
“A secondary market for swaps developed, due not only to intermediaries refining their swap financing 
capabilities, but also to swap contracts themselves acquiring those characteristics necessary for their being 
acceptable in trade. Henderson explains the process as follows: 
‘Trading indicia were simulated by making, terminating, and assigning swaps and quoting swap prices, coupled 
with using sophisticated portfolio hedging activities. Many swap institutions began to view themselves as “dealers” 
in swaps, rather than extenders of corporate financial services or credit.’…” 
However, (quasi-)fungibility is not a prerequisite for trading on a financial marketplace. Also, due to 
the inherent nature of derivatives, individual derivative instruments are not always identical to, or 
interchangeable with, others, nor are they always issued in series or classes. 
Once again, here teleology plays an important role in the classificatory process. For example: a 
series of identical grain futures are issued by a certain financial institution and they are purchased 
privately by a number of individual farmers seeking to hedge their risks. The held legal interest of 
each farmer is fungible in relation to that of the others. Depending on the teleological import of the 
 
 
141  See Badenhorst et al Property 46.  
142   In § 3 2 1; as well as § 3 2 2. 
143  See § 4 3 2.  
144  See Chapter 2, § 2 3 2. 




legal issue requiring a classificatory determination, this indicium may carry more or less weight in 
the overall (i.e. holistic) classificatory impression – i.e. the Gesamtbild.. 
Bundling  
Consider the following counter-factual scenario. There are a great many kinds of contracts 
concluded on a daily basis. Some of these contracts (given the South African law of contract, rather 
than contracts) are of great complexity and scope. Complex contracts typically contain a large 
number of unilateral, bilateral, multilateral or reciprocal rights and duties. Many of these contracts 
are financial in nature, and some, such as the en commandite partnership, closely resemble the kind 
of constitutive arrangements that typify securities. That alone does not make the held legal interest 
of one of the parties to such a contract something more that the sum of its parts. The integrated 
whole of a held complex set of rights and duties cannot always correctly be characterised as a bundle 
or complex of rights in the same sense as has been said of, for instance, shares.  
Conversely, in many respects securities are seen as the composite sum of their respective 
underlying parts. In commercial reality a security is perceived and treated as a single asset. 
Commercial law as a living, doctrinally flexible,146 branch of law must take cognisance of this and 
reflect it. In the case of registered securities, this is well illustrated in the function of the security-
instrument as it has developed over time. The instrument increases the economic efficiency of a 
complex and multi-party borrowing arrangement by creating a single person to perform towards (the 
instrument-holder), irrespective of the identity of the person entitled to the beneficial results of such 
performance. A corollary of this is that, no matter what the underlying interest consists of, benefits 
will always flow through that instrument – in other words, the instrument has a strongly cohesive 
effect on the various elements of the underlying interest. 
Personal rights can never be corporeal. Even in the case of negotiable instruments the rights are 
merely “embodied in” the document, rather than having merged with the document.147 Yet on a 
spectrum between oral agreements and negotiable instruments, holdership of personal rights can 
be associated with varying degrees of corporeality. Before the advent of dematerialisation, 
holdership of registered securities specifically was closely tied to paper – not so closely that non-
bearer securities were considered negotiable instruments, but closely enough that negotiability by 
estoppel has been applied.148 
 
 
146   See Chapter 4, § 4 1. 
147  Cowen & Gering Negotiable Instruments 26-27 & 52-55; and Randfontein Estates Gold Mining Co Ltd v Custodian 
of Enemy Property 1923 AD 576 582 specifically in the context of (negotiable) bearer debentures.  




It is, therefore, unsurprising that in commercial reality and common parlance the phrases 
“ownership”, “sale” or “purchase” of securities is often found. Judicial recognition has also been given 
to the usefulness (although not necessarily appropriateness) of this type of terminology. 149 
Furthermore, s 91 of the previous Companies Act150 and s 35 of the current Act both purport that 
shares are “movable property” (and it has been argued that the same ought to apply to other 
company securities as per s 43 of the Act). Designation as property is doctrinally somewhat 
problematic,151 but it has practical and analytical usefulness. Examples of this are the application of 
a vindicatory remedy styled as a quasi-rei vindicatio152 as well as (more contentiously) the availability 
of the mandement van spolie on the basis of so-called quasi-posession.153 This has, however, been 
covered in Chapter 4, and will be dealt with further in Part 2.154  
It would seem that the positive law, for a number of purposes, treats securities as one patrimonial 
object irrespective of whether it comprises of more than one right. The fact that certain interests in 
the underlying interest of that security may be granted reinforces this observation. For example, a 
share primarily consists of the rights to dividend income and the payment of a sum equivalent to the 
holder’s share of the residual assets of the company. Yet it may very well be that the individual right 
to dividend income, for instance, cannot be out-and-out ceded separately to a third party – instead, 
it must be made the subject of a real right such as usufruct. 
Bearer securities take this a step further by utilising the concept of negotiability to tie the underlying 
rights together, not only through, but also to a specific piece of paper. How this may be otherwise 
facilitated need not be dealt with here; however, an example may be a conditional (and instrinsic) 
pactum de non cedendo prohibiting out-and-out cession of one element of the underlying interest 
without the rest.  
Exclusivity of Execution  
The work in Chapter 4 regarding the nature of registered securities should make the import of this 
indicium more than apparent. Suffice it to say here only that a held legal interest would undoubtedly 
 
 
149   For example Oakland Nominees (Pty) Ltd. V Gelria Mining & Investment Co (Pty) Ltd 1976 (1) SA 441 (A) 447H or 
Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd & Another v Ocean Commodities Inc. & Others 1983 (1) SA 276 (A) 288H-289D. 
150   61 of 1973. 
151  See Chapter 4, § 4 1; and AJ Van der Walt & PJ Sutherland “Dispossession of incorporeals or rights – is the 
mandament van spolie the appropriate remedy?” (2003) 15(1) South African Mercantile Law Journal 95 100. 
152   Oakland Nominees (Pty) Ltd v Gelria Mining & Investment Co (Pty) Ltd. 1976 (1) SA 441 (A). 
153   See Tigon Ltd v Bestyest Investments (Pty) Ltd 2001 (4) SA 634 (N) 643A-B, but also the critique of Van der Walt 
& Sutherland (2003) SA Merc LJ 96. 




be more readily classifiable as a security if it evidences, or seems to emulate, the effect of the 
security-instrument as found in registered securities. 
Context 
This particular indicium also needs very little explanation. It functions simply to allow the inquiry to 
make a better holistic determination by examining and analysing the broader context and any 
relevant other factors therein, provided the rationale is clear and sound, when classifying a held legal 
interest as a security. 
In conclusion, from the analytic-systemic analysis conducted in this chapter and Chapters 4 and 5, 
a more theoretically sound and consistent framework for a general understanding of the legal nature 
of securities has been laid out. It is also a framework which is of great use when applied to the 
relatively unexplored context of debt securities in particular, and one which is able to provide a robust 
basis from which to analyse more specific debt-security oriented issues in the domestic law. This will 
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7    What is a debt security?  
Part 2 of this work aims to complete the examination of the legal nature of debt securities through 
the application of a functional-policy approach to issues related to (debt securities), arising from the 
law as currently stated. According to Cowen & Gering, the application of this approach to the law of 
negotiable instruments:1 
 “laid emphasis on the purpose or objectives of the merchants during the great formative periods of the 
relevant law, and especially the various considerations of policy which, from time to time, influence legal 
systems in adopting certain solutions rather than others. Those who adopt this approach focus attention 
particularly on the fact that negotiable instruments were, and are, designed to serve as a substitute for 
money; and they show how many of the operative rules (including what might superficially appear to be 
‘rule of thumb’ requirements of form) are means of achieving this objective with ease and safety. They 
emphasise, too, the fundamental policy choice, and the important consequences of the choice, which legal 
systems have to make in the allocation of risks between the interests, on the one hand, of persons who 
sign negotiable instruments, and, on the other hand, the protection of a market in which these instruments 
are dealt with by persons acquiring them in good faith and for value.” 
This approach, with the necessary modification, is strikingly appropriate to an analysis of the various 
current legal problems and uncertainties surrounding securities. Its application here uses, as basis, 
the historical and theoretical analyses of the preceding chapters.  
Use of this final element of the broader chosen methodology requires an understanding of the 
“purpose or objectives” of participants to the financial marketplace in the adoption of securities as a 
solution to certain commercial and economic problems. This facilitates a more practical analysis of 
the law’s “operative rules as a means of achieving [these objectives]”, because it occurs at the 
intersection of securities’ economic objectives and the policy-matrix underlying the legal rules 
themselves. When applied in light of the theoretical development in Chapters 4 and 5, this 
methodology brings about an improved application of the existing law to securities, allowing for 
improved outcomes both currently and from a forward-looking perspective. 
To some extent the underlying functional-policy dynamics of securities have been considered and 
discussed in previous chapters, but only in so far as it was theoretically necessary. What this Part 
aims to do is concretise these outcomes through analysis that articulates, much more specifically, 
 
 




the effect of securities’ unique legal character on selected elements in the larger body of 
regsproblematiek that surrounds debt securities currently. 
What follows, however, does not attempt to deal with all, or even most, of the issues which may arise 
under the broader stated theme. The number of problems which could potentially be dealt with are 
simply too numerous for a thorough analysis of each. Nonetheless a decision to favour depth over 
breadth has been taken, and therefore this chapter attempts a more in-depth discussion of a select 
number of problems. It is hoped that this treatment illustrates both the viability of the approach 
developed in this work as well as the need for further study and application of its concepts. 
However, before any of this is covered, what is a debt security? From the outcomes of Part 1, a far 
more functional (and legally modern) general definition can be formulated: 
Where an obligationary borrowing arrangement leads to a held creditor’s interest which is typologically 
classifiable as a “security”, that legal interest is a debt security (and shall thereby include all applicable 
‘consequential’ ex lege elements accruing to that interest). 
Thus, being a debt security, it will be subjected to all aspects of the positive law which govern debt 
securities. If such a debt security further evinces the properties of a registered security it can be 
subjected to the principles outlined in Chapters 4 and 5. These securities will be the focus of all 
remaining chapters, as has been the case for all except the preceding chapter. Accordingly, unless 
the context indicates otherwise, the analysis will refer to registered securities simply as “securities”.  
It is also important to note that when dealing with securities in the context of the present and past 
Companies Acts, authoritative sources even today retain a decidedly share-centric approach, and 
much of what is drawn from below is stated primarily in the context of shares. In light of the outcomes 
of Chapter 3 this is not surprising. In contrast, however, the broader scheme of the Companies Act 
71 of 2008 does away with most legislative differences between shares and company debt 
instruments, with most of the relevant provisions referring to securities. The outcomes of Chapters 
4 and 5, again, show that there are few material structural differences between shares and 
contractual securities, though the content of their underlying interest may differ vastly. Thus, as a 
point of departure, any reference to shares will assume applicability to debt securities as well, 







8  The transfer of debt securities .................................................................................. 386 
8 1  The transfer of certificated securities ............................................................................ 388 
8 1 1  Causa .................................................................................................................... 388 
8 1 2  Cession of the security asset ................................................................................ 389 
8 1 3  “Registered transfer” – transfer of the security-instrument .................................... 398 
8 2  The transfer of uncertificated securities ........................................................................ 408 
8 2 1  The statutory framework and transfer ................................................................... 408 
8 2 2  The transfer of uncertificated instrument-holdership ............................................. 412 
8 2 3   The dynamics of transfer of uncertificated asset-holdership ................................. 413 
8 2 2 1  The formality requirement: quasi-traditio ..................................................... 423 
8 2 2 2   Register-neutral transfers and netting .......................................................... 431 
8 3  Restrictions on the transfer of debt securities .............................................................. 435 
8 3 1   Restrictions on the transferability of company debt securities .............................. 436 
8 3 2  Restrictions on the transferability of securities created by contract ...................... 442 
8 4  Transmission of debt securities .................................................................................... 446 
 
8  The transfer of debt securities 
The transfer of securities can be described in general terms as the voluntary conveyance of the 
rights of a security-holder, as contained in a (pre-existing)2 security, from a person who wishes to 
cease to be, to a person who wishes to become, a holder of that security.3 It is to be distinguished 
from the “transmission” of securities, which is dealt with briefly in the final section of this chapter.   
The definition above seems to indicate a transfer of the beneficial interest to the transferee along 
with replacement of the transferor by the transferee on the securities register (and, if certificated, the 
issue of a new certificate in the latter’s name). However, it can also be given a more restricted 
meaning as transfer only of the beneficial interest, without a change to the securities register. It may 
 
 
2  See Rosenberg v Nuco Chrome Bophuthatswana (Pty) Ltd [2010] JOL 25758 (NWM). 
3   Adapted from S Blackman, RD Jooste, GK Everingham, JL Yeats, FHI Cassim & R de la Harpe Commentary on 
the Companies Act: Volume 1 (RS 6 2009) 5-354. The original text reads: 
 “the voluntary conveyance of the rights and obligations of a member, as represented in a share in the company, from a person 
who wishes to cease to be, to a person who wished to become, a member in right of that share.” 
 See similarly JL Yeats, R de la Harpe, R Jooste, H Stoop, R Cassim, J Seligmann, L Kent, R Bradstreet, RC 





also refer only to a replacement of one registered holder with another, although historically this has 
typically been qualified as registered transfer.4 
This ambiguity is no longer necessary. The work of Chapters 4 and 5 reconceptualise securities as 
comprised of two interdependent legal objects – the security asset and instrument – which can be 
separately held as objects. The work of § 4 3 2 of Chapter 4 also replaces the problematic terms 
“ownership” and “title” with (lawful) security-, asset-, or instrument-holdership. Using this more 
precise terminology, the exact import of any transfer is clarified through reference to transfer of: 
security-, asset-, instrument-, or even limited real interest-holdership, as the case may be. 
Turning now to debt securities specifically, these securities can be issued by any artificial legal 
person.5 Any account of the transfer of debt securities should take cognisance of consequential legal 
differences, where they exist, in the transfer of securities of various kinds of issuers. This has been 
integrated into the analysis of each section and highlighted where applicable. 
The transfer of debt securities is not, generally, a particularly contentious aspect of the law at 
present. Nonetheless, a stated goal of this work is also to clarify the law through the lens of Chapters 
4 and 5 in a manner that leaves unchanged as much of the current legal framework as possible.6 
With that in mind, five issues have been identified which do require some attention here: the manner 
in which (1) certificated, and (2) uncertificated securities are transferred; (3) the manner in which 
transferability of (both company and other) debt securities can be restricted; (4) how transmission of 





4   In the context of company securities, as per Yeats et al Commentary 2008 2-513: 
“In its full and technical sense, a ‘transfer’ of securities is not a single act but consists of a series of steps, certain of which 
may be contemporaneous. 278 It involves: (a) an agreement to transfer; (b) the transfer of the rights attaching to the securities 
from the transferor to the transferee (which takes place by way of cession of the beneficial ownership); and (c) the registration 
of the transferee as a securities holder in respect of the securities (e.g. a shareholder as the holder of a share). The term 
‘transfer’ in relation to securities (particularly shares) is, however, frequently given a more restricted meaning with reference 
to only one of the above acts, for example, to just a transfer of registered title.”  
Similarly, see: Blackman et al Commentary  5-354 & 5-355 (see also n 1 on 5-355); A Borrowdale “Shares and the 
elusive meaning of ‘transfer’” (1985) 102 South African Law Journal 277; and Delport et al Henochsberg on the 
Companies Act 71 of 2008 (SI 11 – 2015) § 51, 211. It must be noted that Delport evinces a different opinion on 
the meaning of ‘transfer’ under the 2008 Companies Act, but this will be dealt with in the next section. 
 There is no similar relevant authority for debt securities issued by other issuers, but the principles seem readily 
applicable to all transferable securities on the basis of registered transfer being contractually built into these 
securities – see Chapter 3, § 3 1; and Chapter 4, § 4 1 2; § 4 1 3; and § 4 2. 
5   See also Chapter 5, § 5 3 2.  
6  See Chapter 1, § 1 2 – “a great deal of care was taken to ensure that the theoretical outcomes of this work should 
not be at odds with practice or commercial reality. It is hoped that the foundations have been improved with little to 




8 1  The transfer of certificated securities 
The transfer of certificated securities (i.e. transfer of security-holdership) is traditionally said to 
consist of a minimum of three steps. The first is the coming into existence of a reason for the transfer 
(typically the conclusion of a contract for the transfer of the security), the second is a cession of the 
underlying beneficial interest, and last is registered transfer.7 There is also the requirement, for 
company securities, of delivery of a “proper instrument of transfer”, though whether this is a 
prerequisite for transfer is discussed later in this chapter.8 
In light of the outcomes of Chapter 4 and the treatment of “transfer” above, it is more accurate to see 
these requirements as: (1) the conclusion of a juristic act which serves as causa for the transfer; (2) 
transfer of asset-holdership; and (3) transfer of instrument-holdership. 
 
8 1 1  Causa 
The causa for the transfer of security-holdership, and similarly mere asset-holdership, is typically a 
contract. In most cases it takes the form of sale, bequest, or donation, but it may also arise from 
other obligationary sources. One such example is a court order – in these cases transfer appears 
mandatory, but it remains a legally voluntary transfer (i.e. a volitionary legal act) in that it has not 
occurred automatically by operation of law. A transfer of certificated securities may further be part of 
a larger arrangement or may occur by virtue of a single transaction of transfer. 
In contractual arrangements for the transfer of certificated securities, the ordinary rules of contract 
law apply.9 A specific set of naturalia (or perhaps merely tacit terms), emerging primarily from 
shares-based jurisprudence, has emerged for this kind of sale, specifying that:10  
 
 
7   See also Yeats et al Commentary 2008 2-799; Blackman et al Commentary § 133 generally, 5-354 & authorities in 
n 1, and 5-355 with case law authorities cited in n 5; Delport et al Henochsberg 2008 § 5, 211; and FHI Cassim (ed) 
et al Contemporary Company Law (2012) 241-243. 
8   See § 8 1 3. 
9   However, the Companies Act 71 of 2008 leads to some notable modifications to those ordinary rules, including 
cases of public offers of company securities (Chapter 4 of the Act), certain instances related to fundamental 
transactions, takeovers and offers (Chapter 5 of the Act), business rescue and compromise (Chapter 6 of the Act), 
as well as the effect of restrictions on the transferability of securities (see s 8) and the operation of certain remedies 
(as per Chapter 7 of the Act).  
 In this regard the general discussion in Yeats et al Commentary 2008 at 2-817 – 824 is of great usefulness.  
10  Blackman et al Commentary 5-357.  
From these naturalia the broader publicity function of the security certificate, and rooted in the norm of legal certainty 




“(1) the transferor (the seller) will cede to the transferee (the purchaser) the rights sold; (2) the transferee 
will pay the price and the transferor will hand over to him a genuine instrument of transfer and…a certificate; 
(3) the certificate carries the rights and interest which it purports to convey; (4) there is no undertaking by 
the transferor that the transferee will be registered [as instrument-holder]…; (5) the transferor will do nothing 
to prevent the transferee from having the transfer registered or to delay that event; (6) the transferee will 
indemnify the transferor against any liability which may arise in respect of the [security] subsequent to 
transfer.” 
The transfer itself, in accordance with the South African law’s abstract approach to property and its 
corresponding effect on cession,11 does not automatically occur by virtue of conclusion of this causa. 
Yet this may occur through the parties’ intention for it to be included, for example in a sale.12 In these 
instances, it is merely a case of two separate “conceptually and functionally distinct” juristic acts 
being concluded (and often embodied in a document) simultaneously.13  
 
8 1 2  Cession of the security asset 
Transfer of the beneficial interest in certificated securities occurs by cession, with no formal or 
substantive requirements other than the corresponding intentions of the cedent and cessionary.14 In 
this sense it is quite correct to state that “[t]he distinct agreement effecting the cession of the rights 
to the securities is…governed by the common law with due reference to the memorandum of 
incorporation and the Act”, or the applicable constitutive arrangement for non-company securities.15 
The work of Chapter 4 shows that, technically, it is a limited cession, but this has no practical effect 
on the legal position.  
However, as is the case in the conclusion of all juristic acts, there are certain substantive 
prerequisites related to the “viability” of a cession, namely that:16 
 
 
11  See CG Van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 16-18; PJ Badenhorst, J Pienaar, H Mostert & M Van Rooyen 
Silberberg en Schoeman’s The Law of Property 4 ed (2003) 82-83; and, importantly, SW Van der Merwe, LF Van 
Huyssteen, MFB Reinecke & GF Lubbe Contract: General Principles 4 ed (2012) 389-390 as well as GF Lubbe 
“Cession” in WA Joubert et al Law of South Africa Vol 3 (3 ed) 2013 § 135. 
12   See Botha v Fick 1995 (2) SA 750 (A), Watt v Sea Plant Products Ltd 1999 (4) SA 443 (C) and Blackman 
Commentary 5-361 & n 5. 
13   Van der Merwe et al Contract  389 & n 33. 
14  See Botha v Fick 1995 (2) SA 750 (A); as well as Yeats et al Commentary 2008 2-833; Cassim et al Company Law 
242; Blackman et al 5-360 and the great number of authorities cited in n 3 therein; and Delport Henochsberg 2008 
§ 51, 211. 
15  Yeats et al Commentary 2008 2-804. 




“ (a)  both the cedent and the cessionary exist; 
(b)  both the cedent and the cessionary possess contractual capacity; 
(c)  the cedent is the holder of a right; and 
(d)  that right is capable of being transferred.” 
This is a useful exposition of the implicit assumptions underlying any cession. The corresponding 
intentions which form the core of a cession have been rightly referred to as “mere consensus”.17 This 
should be distinguished from consensus in the contractual setting, and the contractual capacity in 
“(b)” above is simply a reference to the kind of capacity required to form the legally effective intention 
for the juristic act in question. 
It should be clear from Chapter 4 that the term “right” above is too narrow for the securities context, 
in which it should instead be read as referring to the (still essentially obligationary, but composite) 
legal object in question. This is for three main reasons.  
First, it is established that “[r]ights accessory to the subject matter of a cession and powers enjoyed 
by the cedent in respect of such a right will ordinarily pass to the cessionary without the need for a 
special cession thereof.”18 Support for this position is found in Pizani v First Consolidated Holdings 
(Pty) Ltd (rights operative against a surety),19  as well as Frankfurt v Rand Tea Rooms Ltd & 
Sheffield20 and Nell v Barry21 (both dealing with the power to cancel a contract in the event of 
breach). What is being ceded in this context can, and most often is, comprised of both rights and 
other competencies. 
Second, by virtue of the nature of securities, the security asset (i.e. the beneficial interest) does not 
contain any element of its rights and competencies’ entitlement of determination (or 
beskikkingsbevoegdheid). This aspect of the underlying interest resides, for good reasons of practice 
and policy, in the security instrument. Holdership of the instrument is holdership of a separate legal 
object.22 Therefore any limited cession having the beneficial interest as object, but which also 
purports to bestow the ability to execute the underlying interest of a security, must be void at least 
to the extent to which it purports to bestow that which cannot be bestowed. Holdership of the security 
 
 
17   Van der Merwe et al Contract 392 & 393-395. 
18  Van der Merwe et al Contract 401 & n 131. 
19  1979 (1) SA 534 (A) 541. 
20  1924 WLD 253. 
21  1958 (2) SA 687 (O). 




asset does include the entitlement of execution and it is a well-established rule that one cannot 
transfer more than one holds.23 The only manner in which to gain the incidents of execution is 
through transfer of the security instrument, which is dealt with further below. 
Third, although a cession cannot be successful without legal viability, “factual…effectiveness is not 
a prerequisite for validity” of a cession.24 A cession of the security asset cannot, on its own, enable 
the cessionary to factually control the object of that cession. As was established in § 4 3 2 2 of 
Chapter 4, effective factual control of a security, and of any subsidiary element of this security, is 
control over the instrument-holder. Control by an asset-holder can be achieved by obtaining 
instrument-holdership, but this is not necessary in order to establish the asset-holder’s control over 
the content of the security asset. Upon effective cession of the security asset, the law will read an 
automatic, sui generis,25 relationship of agency into the relationship between the cessionary as new 
asset-holder and the instrument-holder. This simultaneously extinguishes the agency that existed 
between the transferor as previous asset-holder and the instrument-holder.26 Nonetheless, whether 
the transferee has gained effective factual control of the security asset’s content does not in any way 
affect the validity of the cession of the security asset. 
Thus an ordinary cession, without more, will cause the transfer of the totality of what is contained in 
the security asset. Although debt securities’ underlying competencies may arise from a collection of 
sources,27 the similar underlying structure of all securities requires no differentiated treatment. This 
position is confirmed in Standard Bank v Ocean Commodities,28 and also supported by the fact that 
 
 
23   “Nemo plus iuris ad alium transferre potest quam ipse habet” – D 50 17 54. 
24   So that, for example “a cession is not invalid because the cessionary is unable to locate either the debt or the 
debtor” – Lubbe “Cession” in LAWSA § 157, and cited therein: Goode, Durrant & Murray (SA) Ltd v Glen & 
Wright 1961 (4) SA 617 (C) 620; Randbank Bpk v Morris 1977 (2) SA 21 (SE) 26; De Villiers v Van Zyl 2005 1 All 
SA 443 (NC). 
25  Chapter 4, § 4 2 shows that the representation is anomalous in a specific respect: the agent exercises the incidents 
of execution in own name, despite doing so on another’s behalf.  
26   Although it may be that, if the transferor was herself the security-holder, she as mere instrument-holder will now be 
agent for the cessionary.  
27   See Chapter 4, § 4 2. 
28  Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd and Another v Ocean Commodities Inc and Others 1983 (1) SA 276 (A) 288-
289: 
 “A share in a company consists of a bundle, or conglomerate, of personal rights entitling the holder thereof to a certain interest 
in the company, its assets and dividends…Normally the person in whom the share vests is the registered shareholder in the 
books of the company and has issued to him a share certificate specifying the share, or shares, held by him.  
Indeed, such a share certificate, duly issued, affords prima facie evidence of his title to the shares specified therein…In some 
instances, however, the registered shareholder may hold the shares as the nominee, i.e. agent, of another, generally 
described as the "owner" or "beneficial owner" of the shares. This fact does not appear on the company's register, as it is the 
policy of the law that a company should concern itself only with the registered owner of the shares…The term "beneficial 
owner" is, juristically speaking, not wholly accurate, but it is a convenient and well-used label to denote the person in whom, 
as between himself and the registered shareholder, the benefit of the bundle of rights constituting the share vests… 
   Although the rights conferred by a debenture on a debenture-holder differ in content from those enjoyed by a shareholder, 
similar considerations apply to the registration of debenture-holders, the issue of debenture certificates and the holding of a 




the content of any security asset is tied together by the “cohesive” effect of the security instrument.29 
From a policy perspective this underpins not only the economic efficiencies enabled by the 
instrument, but also enables securities’ core economic function as assets. 
Thus, in the absence of a valid and intrinsic pactum de non cedendo,30 the point of departure is that 
by way of a simple cession the “property in [securities passes] independently of, and prior to, 
registration of the purchaser…”.31 In other words, in keeping with the posited structure of the security 
asset, all patrimonial elements of the security (including all analogous elements of the security’s 
other competencies) are thereby transferred. The issue of whether one or more individual incidents 
of enjoyment of a security may be ceded out of a security asset will not be dealt with in this section. 
The security certificate plays no formal role in the cession of asset-holdership. It has definitively been 
decided, in Botha v Fick,32 that delivery of the certificate is not a requirement for an effective cession 
of the security asset. However, its publicity function is notable. In Botha, the court made the following 
observations:33 
“mens [moet] 'n onderskeid tref tussen twee kategorieë van vorderingsreg. Die eerste is die soort 
vorderingsreg ten opsigte waarvan 'n dokument die enigste bewys is. Dit is waar die vorderingsreg eintlik 
in die dokument beliggaam word soos byvoorbeeld 'n verhandelbare stuk,  waar die reg nie onafhanklik 
van die dokument kan bestaan nie. Die ander soort vorderingsreg is een ten opsigte waarvan 'n dokument 
bewys bied, maar nie die enigste bewys nie; die reg bestaan onafhanklik van die dokument. 'n Voorbeeld 
van so 'n vorderingsreg is juis 'n aandeel in 'n maatskappy. Die aandelesertifikaat is wel prima facie bewys 
dat die geregistreerde aandeelhouer wie se naam daarop verskyn die reghebbende is,  maar hy mag in 
 
 
29  This function is alluded to in Chapter 4, in § 4 1 3: 
“as a locus for the execution of the collective sum of rights and competencies, [the security instrument] facilitates the 
conglomeration, or bundling, of rights in cases where a security is comprised of more than one personal right. All rights and 
competencies accruing to a security must, by necessity, be administered through the instrument(-holder), so that these 
components of the underlying interest are bound together by it.” 
  The point is further elaborated upon in Chapter 6, § 6 3 3 2, this is also discussed, under the indicium “Bundling”, 
as follows: 
“The [security] instrument increases the economic efficiency of a complex and multi-party borrowing arrangement by creating 
a single person to perform towards (the instrument-holder), irrespective of the identity of the person entitled to the beneficial 
results of such performance. A corollary of this is that, no matter what the underlying interest consists of, benefits will always 
flow through that instrument – in other words, the instrument has a strongly cohesive effect on the various elements of the 
underlying interest.” 
30   Such as may be found in the debt securities of private companies (see below at § 8 3), or inherently non-transferable 
securities such as is the case with the RSA Inflation Linked Retail Savings Bond, attached as Addendum C to this 
work. 
31  See Yeats et al Commentary 2008 2-513 – 5-114 and 2-799; and Blackman et al Commentary 5-360, as well as 
the discussion which follows below. 
32   1995 (2) SA 750 (A). 




werklikheid nie die sogenaamde 'beneficial owner' wees nie, maar slegs laasgenoemde se 
genomineerde…” 
In light of the pronouncements of Standard Bank v Ocean Commodities,34 debt securities must also 
form part of this second category of personal rights.35 Thus in the cession of (debt) security assets, 
the securities’ certificates serve:36 
“slegs…’n bewysaangeleentheid…waarvolgens lewering as 'n belangrike faktor – moontlik 
'n  deurslaggewende faktor – beskou sal word waar die vraag ontstaan of sessie bewys is al dan nie. 
Hierdie benadering is van toepassing ook in 'n geskil tussen sedent en sessionaris inter partes…” 
Here it is also important to note that particular attention must still be paid to determining exactly when 
the cession effectively occurred, and that “in most cases that intention [i.e. the required intention to 
transfer, and take transfer of, the security asset] is present when, and only when, the certificates 
together with a signed blank transfer form are delivered by the seller to the purchaser.”37 
The importance of the certificate in this regard is further supplemented by its role in ensuring the 
object of the cession is ascertained, or at least ascertainable, so that the intentions of the cessionary 
and cedent correspond.38 For example, from the discussion in Chapter 3 of the transfer of listed but 
certificated securities:39 
“a transfer could only be valid (1) once the securities were identified, so that (2) the rights being ceded 
could be ascertained. At this time the animus transferendi would be correspondingly matched by an 
appropriately informed animus accipiendi, and the cession perfected. This concept was taken up in the 
term “appropriated”. Here the certificates played a cardinal role, facilitating the ascertainment which 
perfected the cession. This also illustrates that certificates are not only evidence of ownership, but also 
evidence of the content (i.e. the beneficial interest) of the securities.” 
In conclusion, the legal aspects of cession of the security asset (and the second of three components 
of transfer of security-holdership) appear quite clear from the above.  
 
 
34  Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd and Another v Ocean Commodities Inc and Others 1983 (1) SA 276 (A) 288-
289. 
35  Debentures are debt securities and the common law definition, or more accurately conceptualisation, of debentures 
as “written acknowledgements of debt” has already been shown to be essentially obsoleted by more recent legal 
development. See Chapter 3, § 3 1 2 and § 3 1 3; as well as Chapter 4, § 4 1. 
36  Botha v Fick 1995 (2) SA 750 (A) 779. 
37  Blackman et al Commentary 5-363; see also Cassim et al Company Law 242 & n 163-166. 
38   See Van der Merwe et al Contract 394-395 & n 77; Lubbe “Cession” in LAWSA § 157 & n 4; and GF Lubbe “Die 
oordrag van toekomstige regte” (1980) 43 Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 117 132. 




However, in the context of company debt securities, a difficult final problem lies in s 51(5) and (6) of 
the Companies Act.40 These sections read: 
“(5)  Subject to subsection (6), a company must enter in its securities register every transfer of any 
certificated securities, including in the entry-  
(a)  the name and address of the transferee; 
(b)  the description of the securities, or interest transferred; 
(c)  the date of the transfer; and 
(d)  the value of any consideration still to be received by the company on each share or interest, in 
the case of a transfer of securities contemplated in section 40 (5) and (6). 
(6) A company may make an entry contemplated in subsection (5) only if the transfer– 
(a) is evidenced by a proper instrument of transfer that has been delivered to the company; or  
(b) was effected by operation of law.” 
Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 200841 seems to suggest that, read with s 37(9)(a) & (b), 
this provision changes the traditional position regarding the transfer of the security asset of company 
securities. Section 37(9) states: 
“(9)  A person  
(a)   acquires the rights associated with any particular securities of a company–  
(i)  when that person's name is entered in the company's certificated securities register; or 
(ii)  as determined in accordance with the rules of the Central Securities Depository, in the case 
of uncertificated securities; and 
(b)   ceases to have the rights associated with any particular securities of a company–  
(i)   when the transfer to another person, re-acquisition by the company, or surrender to the 
company has been entered in the company's certificated securities register; or 
 
 
40  71 of 2008. 




(ii)   as determined in accordance with the rules of the Central Securities Depository, in the case 
of uncertificated securities.” 
The authors’ argument, with some reliance on the work of Rachlitz on beneficial ownership under 
the Act,42  is that:43 
“[before the 2008 Companies Act] the registration of the transfer of e.g. the share could be distinguished 
from transfer of the rights in which the share consists, which, as between the seller and the purchaser, 
occurs (unless the terms of the contract indicate a contrary intention) merely upon an effective cession of 
such rights and delivery of neither an instrument of transfer nor the share certificate is a requisite of such a 
cession. 
… 
Section 37(9)(a)(i) and (b)(i) [of the 2008 Companies Act] provide that a person acquires the rights 
associated with any particular securities of a company when that person's name is entered in the company's 
certificated securities register and "ceases" to have those rights when a transfer, a re-acquisition by (s 48) 
or surrender to the company (e.g. s 164), has been entered into the register. The reference is to ‘rights 
associated with’ the particular securities and in this context, it is submitted, that the meaning is the total 
rights that comprise the particular security. 
This would suggest that if a shareholder divests himself of the shares, e.g. by a contract of purchase and 
sale, that the purchaser will only acquire the rights associated with the securities if the latter's name is 
entered into the register. Before that moment, the transferor holds all the rights associated with the 
securities, including dividend and voting rights. If the transferee acquires any of these rights, it must be 
agreed in terms of the particular contract, either expressly or impliedly. The extent of these rights could 
then make the transferee the holder of a ‘beneficial interest’…It would appear that the common law 
distinction between registered shareholder and beneficial shareholder or owner of the shares, will not apply 
to the extent as set out above.” 
This seems to suggest that the Companies Act has made a cession of the security asset impossible 
without a corresponding transfer of the security instrument. In the certificated context this cannot be 
correct, for a number of reasons.  
First, when read correctly, the Act does not affect the continuity of legal principles regarding 
nominees (as is dealt with in detail in Chapters 4 and 5), and the rich body of common law that has 
 
 
42  R Rachlitz “Disclosure of ownership in South African company law” (2013) 3 Stellenbosch Law Review 406. 
 The views expressed by Rachlitz herein are dealt with fully in Chapter 4, § 4 4, as well as in terms of uncertificated 
securities in Chapter 5. 
43  Delport et al Henochsberg 2008 § 51, 211 &  212(1) [with certain in-text references removed for clarity; italics are 




developed around this aspect South African company law should not, without extreme caution, be 
read as so radically altered. Here a lengthy passage of Commentary 2008 is particularly relevant:44 
“Where a separation of ownership and registered title is not prohibited, the rights attaching to certificated 
securities (e.g. the beneficial ownership) may be ceded by the transferor to the transferee independently 
of a transfer of registered title. It is questionable whether this is permissible in regard to uncertificated 
securities. It should not be forgotten that a security often includes obligations, it being implicit that 
shareholders have the obligation to abide by the memorandum of incorporation. While the rights constituting 
a share may be ceded without registration of transfer, there is authority that the obligations are attached to 
registered title and can only transfer once registration is accepted by the company and transferred. 
Presumably, this is derived from the application of novation under English law requiring the company’s 
consent to the delegation of the obligations...  
The preferred view is that the balance of authority (influenced by the English dual ownership construction) 
appears to favour the conclusion that, generally, in the absence of a restriction the rights attaching to shares 
can be ceded without registration of transfer and that obligations pass only on registration of the transfer. 
Where beneficial ownership is separate from registered title, generally the registered holder remains liable 
to the company for the obligations attaching to the shares but would be entitled to indemnification from the 
beneficial owner (who hopefully is not insolvent). 
… 
Foreign jurisprudence based on English law in regard to the transfer of securities should be approached 
with a great deal of caution in regard to the transfer of securities because English law recognises a concept 
of ‘dual ownership’ with legal title generally being transferred by way of registration (at least, traditionally 
based on novation) and beneficial interests in securities transferring or being recognised in terms of trust 
law, which can have different consequences to the application of the law of cession under South African 
law. While this fits into the historical development of English law and its ‘dualistic model’ of ownership, and 
even though South African trust law is based on English law and our company law originated from English 
company law, our courts have rejected the English law concept of a ‘constructive trust’ and the preferred 
view is that they have not holistically adopted the English concept of dual ownership.” 
Separated asset- and instrument-holdership may, and indeed must, be accepted as feature of all 
registered company securities under past and present Companies Act regimes. As per the outcomes 
of Chapters 4 and 5, though the position taken above is correct, its foundation of “separate and 
severable” beneficial and registered (so called) ownership does not perfectly encapsulate the 
position’s true legal basis. 
 
 




Second, if s 37(9) is given this literal meaning its outcome would be absurd. This interpretation would 
render all references in the Act to “nominees” and “beneficial interest” and “beneficial interest 
holders” moot, as it would make it practically impossible to separate asset- and instrument-
holdership. If a person could not acquire “rights” in a security without also being made registered 
holder, there is no possible juristic act which could bring about holdership of the instrument only (i.e. 
as nominee). Instead, all rights (including the patrimonial, substantive content of the security asset) 
could thus only be acquired through register entry. It would also render the current system under 
which the uncertificated environment operates nonsensical. 
From a purely functional-policy perspective, securities must function as readily transferable assets 
(stores of wealth with a high degree of liquidity). Requiring the full transfer of security-holdership for 
each and every voluntary dispositive transaction concluded with a security would greatly decrease 
its liquidity, and by extension its usefulness. It would also greatly reduce market efficiency – for 
example, a security-holder would always have to administer the security personally and could never 
outsource the administration to a third party instrument-holder. The economic efficiencies enabled 
by the security instrument has undergirded the use of registered securities (despite a Civilian system 
of private law) for over one hundred years, and it is highly doubtful that the legislature intended to 
do away with this position.  
Third, it would cause company securities to function like something akin to negotiable instruments, 
where register entry “embodies” the full content of the underlying interest. As will be shown in the 
following section on uncertificated securities, not even s 53 of the Act (which greatly enhances the 
security instrument’s connection with the underlying rights) envisions such an effect.  
Finally, Delport et al seem to provide an at least semi-contradictory view in their discussion of s 37 
itself, stating:45 
“[i]t is submitted that s 37(9) could now have the effect that ‘ownership’ of securities that are issued will only 
follow upon registration in the securities register, as acquisition of the rights associated with a share equals 
ownership of the share because the rights (or rather the competencies in respect of the rights) that comprise 
the share is ‘ownership’ of the share. In respect of a transfer of shares the registered holder will still have 
the rights associated with the share and will be the nominee for the beneficial holder.” 
If this final point argues that the “rights” in question are instead “competencies in respect of rights” 
(i.e. not the “beneficial interest”) it strengthens the argument for what is proposed below. If not, it 
further muddies the issue. 
 
 




Ultimately, the meaning of s 37(9) is unclear. For legal certainty, it must be made unequivocally clear 
and must be interpreted in a manner which avoids all possible absurdity.46 This can be done quite 
simply. The appropriate manner in which to interpret s 37(9) is that it governs determination (i.e. 
enforceability and realisation) with respect to rights. This is also supported by its effect on the issue 
of company securities discussed in Chapter 4.47 Thus, where the section refers to “rights associated 
with any particular security”, this must be taken to mean rights as against the company – i.e. the 
incidents of execution. This will give effect to the intention of the legislature, preserve its usefulness 
in giving clarity to the meaning of issue, avoid the absurdity of the above interpretation, and uphold 
the important distinction between asset- and instrument-holdership. Moreover, as shown below, 
such a reading of this provision actually enhances the law regarding transfer of the security 
instrument. 
 
8 1 3  Registered transfer – transfer of the security-instrument 
The final element of a transfer of security-holdership is registered transfer. In light of Chapter 4, this 
is the transfer of the security instrument as locus for (holdership of) the incidents of execution of the 
underlying interest. Chapter 4 has further shown that the security instrument is a separate legal 
object, capable of holdership in the full sense. Does this affect the current legal position regarding 
the transfer of securities? 
The first question in this regard is whether transfer of the instrument (as governed by a constitutive 
contract alone or, as in the case of company securities, modified by a particular statutory paradigm) 
is a cession. The security instrument is not patrimonial in nature, but it must still be seen as a legal 
object. This is because its extra-juridical usefulness gives it legal value.48 The pledge construction 
of the cession in securitatem debiti shows that the entitlement of determination of any personal right 
may be separately ceded. Thus, it is submitted that the position regarding a more global entitlement 




46  L du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes (2002) 103-104 & the legion authorities found therein (see specifically n 
128). 
47  See Chapter 4, § 4 2. It also seems to fit the second interpretation of the commentary of Henchosberg 2008 as 
above. 




However, this particular (technically also limited) cession of the security instrument is not free of 
formalities. The point of departure that cession is form-free does not imply that cession must be form 
free, and:49 
“[s]uch formalities as may indeed be relevant in exceptional cases vary greatly in origin, tenor and function. 
The consent of the debtor may be necessary in particular cases, either because the law requires it or 
because the debtor stipulated it in the agreement creating the right to be ceded. Parties may link the 
operation of the cession to delivery to the cessionary of the contractual documents reflecting the transaction 
between the cedent and the debtor. 
… 
As a general rule, a purported cession is ineffective if the requisite formal requirements are not met, but 
this applies only to the extent that the transaction is governed by the prescribed formalities.” 
In the case of non-company debt securities, the security instrument and its legal effects come from 
the constitutive arrangement creating and governing such securities. Consider the following 
elements of RSA Treasury’s R208 bond: (1) the “bondholder” is defined in clause 1.1 as “the person 
whose name is entered into the Register as the holder of any Bonds”; (2) clause 9 (“Register of 
Bondholders”) contains the following: 
“9.2 The Register of Bondholders…:  
 … 
9.2.8.  will only recognise a Bondholder as the owner of the Bonds Registered in that Bondholder's 
name as set out in the Register; and   
9.2.9.   shall not be bound to enter into the Register, the fact that a Bondholder may be holding 
Bonds in trust or as agent or mandatory for any third party and the Issuer shall have no 
responsibility whatsoever to such third party.” 
Clearly the asset and instrument dichotomy is built into the bond by virtue of the above. In order to 
transfer the security asset, a mere cession will suffice. However, to transfer the security instrument 
(i.e. “bondholdership” in the above example’s terminology) the scheme implies a formality 
requirement: entry of the transferee on the register. Thus the transfer of instrument-holdership of 
non-company securities requires this additional formality before any of the incidents of execution are 
 
 
49  Van der Merwe et al Contract  399-400. This is also supported by an implicit concession in Botha v Fick that 




able to vest in the transferee. This formality requirement here implies that the general principle that 
factual effectiveness is not a prerequisite for a valid cession does not apply here.50 
The case of company securities is slightly more complex but governed by the same principles. Here 
much, though for debt securities not all, of the arrangements are imposed by the scheme of the 
Companies Act. The main thrust of these arrangements are found in Chapter 2, Part E of the Act. 
Specifically, s 51(5)-(6) reads: 
“(5)  Subject to subsection (6), a company must enter in its securities register every transfer of any 
certificated securities, including in the entry-  
(a)   the name and address of the transferee; 
(b)   the description of the securities, or interest transferred; 
(c)   the date of the transfer; and 
(d)   the value of any consideration still to be received by the company on each share or interest, in 
the case of a transfer of securities contemplated in section 40 (5) and (6). 
(6)  A company may make an entry contemplated in subsection (5) only if the transfer-  
(a)   is evidenced by a proper instrument of transfer that has been delivered to the company; or 
(b)   was effected by operation of law.” 
When seen in conjunction with a more accurate reading of s 37(9) outlined above, it becomes clear 
that any transfer of instrument-holdership must be recorded in the company’s securities register, 
upon which entry the incidents of execution are obtained by the acquiring instrument-holder.  
The use of the phrase “or interest transferred” in s 51(5)(b), however, bears brief discussion. The 
authors in Commentary 2008 argue that “the preferred view is that the reference in s 51(5)(a) to a 
transfer of an “interest” in securities is best interpreted narrowly with reference to the information 
required in relation to a transfer of registered title and as not directed at generally altering the pre-
existing law in respect of a cession of beneficial ownership or as imposing a formality on all cessions 
of beneficial ownership…”51 This is a compelling position to take, but ultimately unsatisfactory. 
Whether security-holdership or instrument-holdership is transferred, it will always only be instrument-
holdership that is reflected on the register and thus regulated by the subsection in question. 
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Therefore, especially in light of the use of “or” in the provision, the authors’ argument is somewhat 
moot.  
Instead, as more fully dealt with in Chapter 9 hereafter, it may be that the phrase is intended to imply 
that this Companies Act requires enhanced publicity in the transfer of limited (real) interests such as 
pledge or usufruct in the conclusion of real agreements with respect to certificated securities. Though 
this is a novel reading of the provision, it is also in keeping with the spirit of enhanced transparency 
within the Act as a whole, as enshrined in s 7(b)(iii) and demonstrated by the (admittedly somewhat 
flawed) provisions of s 56. Ultimately these competing interpretations will require definitive 
clarification, preferably by means of case law or legislative intervention. 
The next issue, then, is what is meant by a “proper instrument of transfer” (note that s 37(9)(b) and 
s 51(6)(b) deal with transmission rather than transfer). It would make sense to assume there is no 
exact and formal delineation of what is and is not a “proper instrument of transfer”.52  
Historically:53 
“[t]he principal purpose of this provision [s 133(2) of the 1973 Companies Act, requiring a proper instrument 
of transfer] was to prevent the evasion of stamp duty, but the same concern can be raised regarding a 
transfer of beneficial ownership by way of a cession. A proper instrument of transfer denotes a written 
instrument such as will attract stamp duty under the relevant fiscal legislation.” 
At present, the Securities Transfer Tax Act54 renders this particular point of policy obsolete as the 
Act does not apply to debt securities.55 However, there is a second element of functionality to the 
instrument (also referred to as the “deed”) of transfer. It is not, in terms of a sale, the duty of the 
transferor to ensure transfer of the security instrument, but it is the transferor’s duty to do all that is 
necessary to enable the transferee to secure transfer of the security instrument.56 
Thus the second functionality of the instrument of transfer (functionally described as “proof of the 
transfer agreement irrespective of the obligationary agreement”)57 is to enable the issuer to alter the 
register without the risk that it will do so inaccurately. For example, a company’s memorandum of 
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54  25 of 2007. 
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incorporation, or a similar constitutive provision in the case of non-company issuers, may prescribe 
a transfer form. If so, delivery by the transferor to the transferee of a duly signed, blank transfer form 
is exactly what the transferee needs to present to the issuer in order for the transferee to effect 
transfer with peace of mind.58 
Further, because the word instrument is used here in its more traditional legal sense, the “proof” 
required must ostensibly be documentary. Therefore, a “proper instrument of transfer” seems to be 
any documentary proof which will satisfy the issuer of the existence of a valid transfer agreement, 
so that a transfer may be safely effected. The form it takes will be a function of the environment in 
which the particular security operates, as well as the particular factual matrix in question. Nothing 
more is necessary in this regard, as the principle is clear. 
However, this also illuminates the fact that a cession of the security instrument presupposes the co-
operation of the issuer-debtor for its viability.59 This is not to be confused with the consent of the 
issuer. This co-operation is not a second formality requirement. As a point of departure, s 51(5) is 
clear in its use of the word “must”, obligating a company to make such a change in its securities 
register if a proper instrument of transfer has been received. Conversely, a company may therefore 
not effect a registered transfer without such an instrument or, alternatively, a court order.60  Though 
the section appears alterable, so that only “[i]n the absence of some particular term in the 
memorandum of incorporation, it is not necessary that registration of a transfer be specifically 
authorised by the directors to be effective, the position being rather that a transferee, on presentation 
to the company of a valid transfer form, has the right to have the transfer registered unless the 
directors, where so empowered, refuse to register the transfer.”61 
Further, in the case of securities not issued by companies, it is self-evident that recourse against an 
issuer unreasonably refusing to affect a transfer must be available to a transferee, but this matter is 
dealt with later in this work.62  
What then of the security certificate? A security certificate is a corporeal augmentation of the security 
instrument, serving a publicity function in the conclusion of juristic acts with respect to the security 
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in question. Chapter 4 also posits that it further serves to facilitate the application of certain principles 
from the law of things to securities.63 In the transfer of the security asset it has no formal role, but 
will of course be of great evidentiary value in disputes between competing cessionaries.64  
An ordinary cession requires no publicity, mainly because:65 
“apart from the practical need for secrecy to protect the credit-worthiness of the cedent, the difficulty of 
creating an effective publicity mechanism, and the belief that the incorporeal nature of the asset does not 
create a significant risk that third parties may be misled by such transfers, seem to play a part.” 
This is a reasonable basis for the generic approach to publicity in the realm of cession. However, it 
may be prudent to question the principle, as established (specifically in the context of securities) in 
Botha v Fick,66 in so far as it relates to the role of the security certificate in transfer of instrument-
holdership. 
First, the court in First National Bank of SA Ltd v Rozenboom67 correctly made the point that a 
cession cannot automatically place doubt on a cedent’s creditworthiness (as was argued in casu), 
and that a “cession of debtors can take place for a number of reasons other than that the cedent is 
in financial difficulty.” Even if this were not the case, the nature of the security instrument is such that 
transfer cannot have an impact on the creditworthiness of the cedent – it is not a patrimonial legal 
object.  
Second, as regards securities, there is no difficulty in creating an effective publicity mechanism: one 
already exists in the form of the security certificate (and, although to a lesser degree, entry on a 
security register). This has already been established and need not be further discussed here. 
Third, due to the possibility of separated asset- and instrument-holdership and the availability of 
some anonymity within the resultant nominee relationship, there is an increased risk that third parties 
may indeed be misled as to the true state of affairs. Moreover, asset-holders’ vulnerability to an 
“underhand cession” by a rogue instrument-holder is far greater due to the nature of the latter’s 
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holdership.68 The prominence of estoppel in protecting good faith unlawful holders in the context of 
securities strongly supports this line of reasoning.69 
Fourth, an additional economically-oriented factor at play is that the enhanced proprietary aspects 
of securities could militate in favour of elevating or enhancing the publicity requirement in the transfer 
of the security instrument.  
Nonetheless, despite all of the above, it is submitted that the currently accepted mode of transfer 
sufficiently discounts these considerations, and there is no need to elevate delivery of the transferor’s 
certificate to a legal requirement for transfer of the security instrument in the certificated context.70  
Here one must consider the ultimately supplementary nature of the certificate – if the issuer has 
sufficient evidence, in an instrument of transfer, that a change in the securities register is legitimately 
required then little more is needed. That makes it doubtful whether transfer can be said to be 
contingent on the presentation of the old certificate.  
Issuing a new certificate is more important. Once a new certificate is issued to the transferee, that 
certificate will provide adequate, though not definitive, publicity of instrument-holdership (which 
facilitates juristic acts vis-à-vis the issuer). The issue of a new certificate perfects the transfer of 
instrument-holdership as the certificate is indeed part of the certificated security instrument.  
The final issue to be discussed here is the relationship between the transfer of the asset and the 
transfer of the instrument. In Moosa v Lalloo,71  the court took the position that acquisition of 
instrument-holdership is not guaranteed to a cessionary of the security-asset. In contrast, the authors 
of Commentary 2008 argue, in the context of the restriction on the transfer of shares, that:72 
“it is highly likely that the vast majority of purchasers and bystanders would anticipate that the seller would 
provide the purchaser with the right to registration and be under the impression that, if not an implied term, 
this would be a tacit term (i.e. that the seller will place the purchaser in a position where the purchaser can 
procure registration should the purchaser so desire), unless this was expressly precluded. Such right to 
registration is usually desirable (if not necessary) to fully enjoy the rights of a share. While it is accepted 
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that shares can be sold with beneficial ownership being ceded from one person to the next without 
registration of the transfer of registered title and that the transferee must apply for such registration, it is 
submitted that most purchasers would be very surprised to learn that the beneficial ownership acquired 
upon cession of the rights from the seller only included a conditional right to apply for registration which 
may be declined.”  
It is submitted that the principle in Moosa is sufficiently mitigated to address the above concerns. 
The outcomes of Chapter 4 demonstrate that either implicit or explicit control over the instrument-
holder is always gained by an acquiring (i.e. cessionary) asset-holder. Thus, surprised as investors 
may be that they are not entitled to instrument-holdership, their (reasonable) expectation of control 
over the security is fully met through their entitlement to control the instrument-holder. This control 
naturally includes that the current instrument-holder may simply be ordered to take the necessary 
actions to have instrument-holdership transferred to the new asset-holder. 
This provides insight into a well-established legal problem: cases where the seller unduly delays 
completion of the contract (and correspondingly the perfecta of the cession of the security asset) in 
order to keep exercising the competencies associated with that security.73 
In Sefalana Employee Benefits Organisation v Haslam, the court examined the voting rights attached 
to shares, stating:74  
“I know of no principle…which, in the absence of anything more, would have entitled [the purchaser], who 
had not yet acquired ownership of the shares or paid for them, to dictate to the seller how the seller was to 
vote pending the passing of ownership. Such a purchaser would obviously not be entitled to vote as if he, 
she or it were a registered shareholder.” 
This is undoubtedly correct, as it is only after transfer of the security asset that the purchaser would 
acquire either instrument-holdership itself, or control over the instrument-holder by virtue of the ex 
lege agency that must arise between the instrument-holder and an acquiring asset-holder.75  
Contrastingly, Blackman et al, using as persuasive authority Kells Investments Pty Ltd v Industrial 
Equity Ltd,76 argue that this should not be the case when the seller unduly delays the completion of 
the contract and cession in order to maintain “voting powers against the wishes of the purchaser, 
and the latter is ready, willing, able and desires completion of the sale.”77 Yet a full reading of Kells 
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shows the decision to have been made in accordance with the law of equity precisely because such 
a remedy was not otherwise available. Thus, lacking a principled basis, the persuasive authority of 
the decision’s application to South African law must be approached with caution.  
Blackman et al point further to Barnard v Carl Greaves Brokers  (Pty) Ltd and Others and Two 
Other Cases 78 as authority for a similar proposition as applied to a credit sale. This case is useful in 
that it does not concern the right to vote, but rather the competency of a member to apply for winding 
up. In Barnard, a credit sale of shares was effected and whilst the purchaser had gained asset-
holdership,79 that purchaser had not become instrument-holder (i.e. been registered as a member).80 
Nonetheless the court found that the purchaser did have the requisite standing, despite not having 
formally become a member of the company:81 
“On the peculiar facts of the current matter I do not consider the fact that Barnard is not yet registered as a 
member is an obstacle to his resort to section 252. I have already found that Barnard is a shareholder 
entitled as against the company to obtain the insertion of his name on the members’ register.  In 
paragraph 2 of the notice of motion, Barnard has sought an order in the following terms: 
‘That in as much as may be necessary, the [company] is ordered to rectify its Members Register to include and 
reflect [Barnard] as a shareholder of the [company].’ 
In my view it is competent for a shareholder who has not obtained registration of his membership of the 
company because of opposition or lack of co-operation by the company or his fellow shareholders, but is 
entitled to such registration, to apply in the same proceedings for an order directing his enrolment on the 
register of members and, in anticipation of the grant of such an order, as a member for relief in terms of 
section 252.” 
For two reasons this case also cannot serve as authority for the proposition that a purchaser may in 
certain cases exercise the competencies bestowed by security-holdership without holdership of the 
security asset or instrument. 
First, the purchaser in casu had already become the asset-holder. A more advanced understanding 
of the relationship between a purchaser asset-holder and a seller instrument-holder, as per Chapter 
4, shows that the purchaser could in any event have compelled the seller as instrument-holder to 
make the s 252 application. This is by virtue of the automatically arising sui generis relationship of 
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agency between them.82 If no co-operation is forthcoming, as seemingly would have been the case 
in Barnard, the remedies of the law of agency, delict (pure economic loss with wrongfulness 
established through a disregard for that agency) and rectification would remain available. This clarity 
is facilitated by the more advanced understanding of this form of agency, arising as it does from the 
underlying proprietary structure of securities. The possibility of the quasi-rei vindicatio should also 
be considered, but whether there is any substantive difference between this and rectification is 
further explored in Chapter 11.   
Second, but related to the first point, is the remedy utilised by the court pre-emptively to deem the 
purchaser a member for the application for winding up. The court’s ascribing of a putative 
membership to the applicant formed the ultimate basis for the relief in question (a directive to transfer 
instrument-holdership without submission of the relevant transfer documentation). This sufficiently 
distinguishes the facts of this case from the proposition Blackman et al purport to use the case for. 
Thus, it is submitted that the underlying structure of securities does not allow for a third party, who 
holds only a personal right (i.e. claim) to performance in the form of effecting transfer, to exercise 
any incident of instrument-holdership herself. The distinction between the entitlement to the 
aforementioned performance and the entitlement to be on the register becomes particularly 
important in understanding the protection of holdership as dealt with in Chapter 11. 
In conclusion, transfer of the security instrument can be described as a limited cession of the global 
entitlement of determination (opvorderingsbevoegdheid) of the underlying interest of a security, 
subject to the formality requirement of register amendment. It presupposes the co-operation of the 
issuer, for which a valid instrument of transfer is, in most cases, key. The issue of a new certificate 
reflecting the entry of the transferee on the securities register completes the transfer but appears not 
to be a requirement for the transfer. However, the certificate’s important role in the good faith 
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8 2  The transfer of uncertificated securities 
In terms of the statutory framework for the transfer of uncertificated securities, this section will deal 
only with the provisions of the Financial Markets Act.83 This is, first, because it seeks to outline the 
legal position applicable to all uncertificated debt securities, rather than company securities alone. 
Second, as per s 5(4)(b)(i)(ff), the Companies Act of 2008 must align with the provisions of the former 
and any conflict which cannot be resolved will be settled by the provisions of the FMA. Last, the 
relevant elements of the Companies Act are incorporated by reference into the FMA and can be 
dealt with as provisions of the FMA. In this way, where the FMA appropriates provisions from the 
Companies Act, this will be fully discussed. 
The asset and instrument of a security in uncertificated form operate somewhat differently to their 
certificated counterparts. This was fully discussed in Chapter 5, and the conclusions of that chapter 
have important ramifications for what follows. 
 
8 2 1  The statutory framework and transfer 
With the outcomes of Chapters 4 and 5 as basis, one may now apply these to the transfer of 
uncertificated securities.  
Prior to the commencement of the FMA, if securities were held collectively (see Chapter 5, § 5 1 3), 
the asset-holder of uncertificated securities of a specific class and issue held a specifically 
demarcated co-ownership in an undivided fungible bulk of all securities of that class and issue 
notionally deposited and thus held (in terms of the custodial function) in the repository of the CSD or 
CSDP in question. The extent of the interest which that co-ownership afforded would have extended 
only as far as the number of those securities held (in terms of the administrative function) by the 
relevant instrument-holder. However, if not held collectively, the securities would not commingle and 
the asset-holder retained full asset-holdership. 
Thus the system hinged on the role of the security instrument. An uncertificated security instrument 
is an electronic ledger entry in the name of the instrument-holder, functioning as the locus for 
(holdership of) the incidents of execution of that security. Therefore when asset-holdership was not 
recorded in a segregated and allocated manner within the system, instrument-holdership not only 
indicated but also delineated the extent of a particular asset-holder’s interest in the fungible bulk of 
securities entered at register-level. Such instrument-holdership also, as per its function, bestowed 
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the incidents of execution associated with that indicated and delineated interest. Seen thus, in 
uncertificated form the security instrument fulfilled an even more accentuated publicity function, 
effectively demarcating the extent of the ownership or co-ownership by indicating to all the world the 
“correspondence between the legal and the factual situation.”84  
As shown in § 5 1 2 of Chapter 5, the FMA brought about a shift from a CSD and CSDP repository- 
to a CSD and CSDP account-based system. The section further posits, on an appropriate 
understanding of the terms “held” and “hold” in the statutory framework, that one must distinguish 
between intermediaries fulfilling a custodial function (maintaining securities accounts) and those 
fulfilling an administrative function (instrument-holdership). Finally, within the custodial function, the 
section argues that a critical distinction must be made between securities accounts that comprise 
the securities register and those which do not.85 
With this analysis as background, § 5 1 3 of the Chapter 5 draws four key conclusions on the nature 
of holdership within the broader uncertificated statutory framework. First, “ownership” in the FMA 
should be read as meaning asset-holdership. Second, security assets of the same class and issue 
are fully fungible legal objects. Third, within the accounts that make up the securities register (i.e. 
register-level securities accounts maintained by CSDs and CSDPs), one determines first whether 
the securities are held collectively (by examining the configuration of the securities accounts). If held 
collectively, one determines the extent of the co-asset-holdership of any end-of-chain investor on 
the basis of a calculation using the “number or nominal value” of securities held by one instrument-
holder in relation to the total number which is held by all instrument-holders in the securities account 
in question. This is so despite any of the various permutations of intermediation that may occur 
between asset- and instrument-holder. Fourth, the fungibility of the security assets of each 
respective class and issue of the securities in question is the enabling characteristic of co-asset-
holdership within this system, as indicated by the demarcatory function of the security instruments 
to those securities (which are legal objects, but not patrimonial legal objects). 
Therefore, under the current uncertificated securities system in South Africa, uncertificated asset-
holdership of securities held collectively is pro rata co-holdership of the incidents of enjoyment 
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associated with the number of securities of the same class and issue demarcated by instrument-
holdership in a specific register-level securities account. 
With the position regarding holdership itself now more precisely understood, what are the deeper 
legal mechanics of transfer of security-holdership, asset-holdership and instrument-holdership of 
uncertificated securities in the current statutory paradigm? 
Section 38(1)(a) & (b) of the FMA reads: 
“(a)  The transfer of uncertificated securities or of an interest in uncertificated securities on the 
uncertificated securities register held by a central securities depository or participant must be effected 
in the manner provided for in Chapter 2, Part E of the Companies Act, where applicable, and the 
depository rules, by making the debit and credit entries respectively in the central securities account 
or securities account of the transferor and the transferee kept by the central securities depository or 
the participant, as the case may be.  
(b)  The transferee of uncertificated securities or an interest in uncertificated securities referred to in 
paragraph (a) is entitled to all the rights of a transferee of movable property.” 
Chapter IV of the Act (“Custody and Administration of Securities”) explicitly states that this provision 
also applies to uncertificated money market securities, despite the fact that these securities are dealt 
with differently with respect to other chapters of the Act. Thus it would appear that all securities held 
in uncertificated form (irrespective of the issuer) are transferable in the manner provided by the 
Companies Act of 2008. Where bearer securities are immobilised, they are not transferred – their 
representative registered securities are. The definition of “uncertificated securities” in the FMA also 
has the effect that immobilised registered securities should be subjected to the same method of 
transfer. 
Turning now to the manner of transfer provided for by the Companies Act, the Act deals with the 
transfer of uncertificated securities in s 53, the relevant portions of which read: 
“(1)  The transfer of uncertificated securities in an uncertificated securities register may be effected only-  
(a) by a participant or central securities depository; 
(b) on receipt of- 
(i) an instruction to transfer sent and properly authenticated in terms of the rules of a central 
securities depository; or 
(ii) an order of a court; and 




(2)  Transfer of ownership in any uncertificated securities must be effected by- 
(a) debiting the account in the uncertificated securities register from which the transfer is effected; 
and 
(b) crediting the account in the uncertificated securities register to which the transfer is effected, 
in accordance with the rules of a central securities depository.  
… 
(4)  A transfer of ownership in accordance with this section occurs despite any fraud, illegality or 
insolvency that may-  
(a) affect the relevant uncertificated securities; or 
(b) have resulted in the transfer being effected, 
but a transferee who was a party to or had knowledge of the fraud or illegality, or had knowledge of 
the insolvency, as the case may be, may not rely on this subsection. 
(5)  A court may not order the name of a transferee contemplated in this section to be removed from an 
uncertificated securities register, unless that person was a party to or had knowledge of a fraud or 
illegality…” 
Finally, echoing s 53(4) above, s 41 of the FMA reads: 
“(1)  An entry effected in terms of section 38 or 39 is valid and effective against third parties despite any 
fraud or illegality that may have resulted in the entry being effected, unless a transferee to the 
transaction resulting in the entry was a party to or had knowledge of the fraud or illegality.  
(2)  This section does not modify the order of priorities determined by section 40.  
(3)  Section 53 (4), (5) and (6) of the Companies Act applies to an entry referred to in subsection (1) with 
the changes required by the context.” 
It is important to note, in line with the outcomes of § 5 1 of Chapter 5, that the FMA (as read with s 
53 of the Companies Act in its referring specifically to the securities register) appears to provide that 
transfer can only occur through the debiting and crediting of register-level securities accounts, as 
maintained by a CSD or CSDP. 
From these provisions, it is clear that a transfer of security-holdership (full transfer of the security 
from direct own name security-holder A to security-holder B) is unproblematic. A debit to the account 




the security in toto. All that is required is that the CSD or CSDP receive a properly authenticated 
instruction of transfer (the functional equivalent of the valid instrument of transfer in the certificated 
context) as per the rules of the applicable CSD. Upon the debiting and crediting, lawful holdership 
of both the security-asset and -instrument (in most cases irrevocably, due to s 41 and s 53(4) of the 
FMA and Companies Act respectively) will pass from the transferor to the transferee. 
However, outright security-holdership is rarely encountered in the heavily intermediated environment 
of uncertificated securities. In the majority of cases, asset-holdership and instrument-holdership are 
separated. Typically, the latter will be held (in terms of the administrative function) by an intermediary 
instrument-holder – i.e. an approved nominee, whilst at the other end of the chain of intermediation 
will lie the asset-holder as end-of-chain client. Transfers occurring in this more intermediated context 
require further analysis. 
 
8 2 2  The transfer of uncertificated instrument-holdership 
Transfer of holdership of the security instrument is uncontentious. In accordance with Chapter 5, in 
the dematerialised context, the security-instrument itself manifests as entry in the securities account 
of the holder in the uncertificated securities register, and further that this register is comprised of the 
relevant securities account or accounts maintained by the CSD and CSDPs in question. This entry 
(in an account maintained for a client) will contain the required details, including the identity of the 
instrument-holder, in the uncertificated securities register, bestowing on that holder the incidents of 
execution of the security or securities demarcated by the entry.  
Therefore, as per s 38 of the FMA read with s 53 of the Companies Act (as quoted above in this 
section), instrument-holdership is transferred through debit and credit entries in the relevant register-
level securities account or accounts (which would then require reconciliation with any further 
downstream non-register level securities accounts). The debiting and crediting entries will amend 
the instrument-holdership reflected by the existing entries86 regarding the transferring and acquiring 
instrument-holders. By way of example: a current entry reflecting the details and holdings of 
(transferor) instrument-holder X in securities account K maintained by CSDP B will be debited, and 
the current entry reflecting the details and holdings of (transferee) instrument-holder Z in securities 
account L maintained by CSDP C will be credited or a new credit entry to that effect will be made if 
 
 
86  As per the meaning of “entry” in s 1 of the FMA as “an electronic recording of any issuance, deposit, withdrawal, 




no such entry already exists. This will also be reconciled with the relevant securities account entries 
of CSD A, reflecting the transfer in the central securities account.87 
 
8 2 3  The dynamics of transfer of uncertificated asset-holdership 
With this understanding, the salient issue in the transfer of uncertificated securities is transfer of the 
security-asset.  
The potential scope of intermediation and the complexity it introduces should not be underestimated. 
Consider the following example.  
In the securities account of CSD R, T Ltd is reflected as the instrument-holder of security A. This is 
because that is what is reflected in the securities account of CSDP S. Together these two accounts 
comprise the uncertificated securities register in respect of security A. However, T Ltd is a nominee 
company of CSDP S. Brokerage Y makes use of the services of CSDP S. Finally, C is the asset-
holder of security A, having obtained the security asset by sending a purchase instruction to his 
broker, an employee of Y. The instruction was matched to a corresponding instruction to sell by B 
(the disposing asset-holder) to her broker, working for brokerage X. Brokerage X uses a different 
CSDP, Z, and uses its own “broker’s nominee” company, F Ltd. Assuming successful payment, the 
clearing and settling system of R would have caused a “properly authenticated instruction of transfer” 
to be generated, causing Z to effect a debit in the securities account reflecting the holdings of F Ltd, 
and causing S to effect a credit in the securities account reflecting the holdings of T Ltd. In this way, 
T Ltd became the instrument-holder of security A.  







87  This perspective seems to imply that certain “entries” can serve to modify other “entries”. It is submitted that this is 
a perfectly plausible position to take, though it would be contingent on the manner in which the specific CSD in 
question chooses to operationalise the Act’s provisions. 
It is also supported by the ostensibly modifying effect that an entry of (as per s 1 of the FMA) “…pledge, cession in 














Figure 1: possible example of a matched trade (for the purposes of the example the central securities accounts 
kept for CSDP Z and CSDP S are conflated; also, any potential non-register level accounts have been omitted). 
The key question then is how legally to describe the process of transfer of holdership of the security 
asset from B to C.  
The first important feature of transfer of asset-holdership is the unfortunate use of the term 
“ownership” in s 53 of the Companies Act and similar references in the FMA. In this work, the 
terminology of various qualified forms of “holdership” has been introduced and adopted as 
functionally and doctrinally more appropriate.88 It has further been strongly argued (in § 5 1 3 of 
Chapter 5) that ownership in this statutory context must be read specifically to refer to asset-
holdership. These two suggested refinements allow one to make much better sense of the legal 
position on transfer, especially as it pertains to the security asset. 
The key question for this section is whether the security asset can be transferred by mere cession, 
or whether it also needs a transfer of the security instrument as formality requirement for it to be 
effective. 
Both s 38(1)(a) of the FMA and its object of reference, s 53(2) of the Companies Act, use the phrase 
“must be effected”. In light of the above arguments of function and policy, the use of “must” strongly 
 
 
88  See Chapter 4, § 4 1 1. 
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indicates a peremptory rather than directory meaning. This is uncontentious with respect to the 
security instrument, but there are both historical and current substantive reasons to take this view 
with respect to transfer of the security asset as well.  
From a historical standpoint, indirect support for such a reading of the sections are specifically found 
in the views of Blackman et al in discussing the regime of transfer of uncertificated securities prior 
to the Companies Act of 2008.89 Three of the authors’ main supporting points merit discussion here, 
as they illustrate why the position of the current Companies Act should be read – in possible contrast 
to its predecessor – as peremptory with respect to the asset. 
First, it is pointed out that the Memorandum to the Bill which led to the Companies Second 
Amendment Act90 specifically indicated that the moment of debiting and crediting is when transfer of 
both “ownership and membership” in respect of uncertificated shares was to take place, as this:91 
“ensures that the time at which membership is acquired and at which ownership is transferred is the same 
and is necessary to avoid doubt and to determine the moment at which complete and irrevocable delivery 
versus payment of uncertificated securities will occur.” 
For the authors, this “raises the question whether…s 91A(4) [of the Companies Act of 1973] is 
intended to…stipulate a compulsory and exclusive formal mode of ceding ownership, rending all 
other modes void?” 92  A plain language reading of the Memorandum certainly leans towards 
answering this question in the affirmative. 
The second point Blackman et al raise is that s 91A(4)(a) used the phrase “shall be effected…”, but 
s 42 of the Securities Services Act93 used the more strongly peremptory word “must”. Thus they 
argued that if there were another, more informal, manner in which to transfer mere ownership (asset-
holdership), it would require the “reading down of s 42 of the SSA…reading s 91A(4) as the dominant 
provision”. This is presented as the basis of an argument for the possibility of more informal means 
of transfer of asset-holdership. Yet under the current legislative scheme the argument is no longer 
possible: all relevant provisions make use of “must” (including s 38 of the FMA in stating the transfer 
provisions of the Companies Act must be followed). Therefore this argument can no longer be made, 
 
 
89  See Blackman et al Commentary 5-229 – 5-232-6. 
90  B49D-98, and 60 of 1998 respectively.  
91  Subsection (4) of the Memorandum, B49D-98.  
92  See Blackman et al Commentary 5-228. 




and in this manner indirectly supports a peremptory import of the “must” in the relevant provisions of 
both current Acts in terms of the transfer of asset-holdership. 
The third important point raised is the fact that “the contemplation of a cession of ownership other 
than by way of entries in the subregisters raises further complexities”. 94  Briefly, two such 
complexities are outlined and can be summarised as follows. First, it would be difficult to explain 
how, under the privity of the scheme of (agency-based) mandate between the would-be cedent and 
his nominee, the cessionary would acquire rights against this nominee. Second is the near 
unacceptable degree of uncertainty regarding true asset-holdership such cessions would introduce 
to the system, including the deleterious impact it would have on the effectiveness (and therefore 
policy outcomes) of finality of transfer provisions as now taken up in s 41 and s 53(4) of the FMA 
and Companies Act, respectively. These issues are equally persuasive today. 
Unfortunately, in terms of current authorities there is no uniform view on this issue. It is submitted 
that, backed by the historical points above, a peremptory reading of “must” with respect to 
“ownership” should, on balance, be extended to the transfer of asset-holdership. 
Vermaas appears to assert that the manner in which the security-asset is transferred is an open-
ended matter – a function of the rules of the CSD in question. Impliedly, an independent transfer of 
the security-asset is thus possible without a change of instrument-holdership (i.e. a debit and credit 
to the uncertificated securities register), if those rules permit it. The core of the argument is as 
follows:95 
“Ownership in certificated shares used to be transferred by way of a contract of cession, provided that there 
was the necessary intention to pass ownership. Property in the shares passed [independently] of 
registration on the register of members. In the dematerialised environment, the old Act prescribes that 
transfer of ownership and membership takes place when the entry is made on the subregisters kept by the 
participants. The new Act no longer refers to the transfer of membership, but refers to the holders of 
securities and determines how a transfer of ownership must be effected in the case of uncertificated 
securities. The old Act is, however, silent on transfer of ownership issues in the lower tiers of the holding 
chain in the subregister system. The new Act also refers to the transfer on the uncertificated securities 
register that may be effected only by a participant or the CSD in accordance with the section of the new 
Act and the CSD rules. The new Act is, therefore, also silent on ownership issues in the lower tiers of an 




94  See Blackman et al Commentary 5-232-5 – 5-232-6. 
95  M Vermaas “The reform of the law of uncertificated securities in South African company law” (2010) Acta Juridica 




The legal concept of full legal ownership cannot automatically be applied in the multi-tiered indirect holding 
system, unless the beneficial holder is recorded as the full legal owner at the upper tier, such as the CSD.” 
The core problem with the above is that it does not adequately discern the precise meaning of 
“ownership” (i.e. lawful holdership). Instead, it distinguishes various “ownership issues” solely by 
factual context. This seems to imply that where the issue lies within the overall chain of custodial 
and administrative intermediation will determine the meaning of ownership in terms of the statutory 
provisions at play. Yet the prior regime as quoted uses ownership in contradistinction to membership, 
almost ineluctably indicating that ownership referred to the patrimonial, beneficial element of 
securities. It is further clear that s 53(1) refers to the transfer of instrument-holdership, and is quite 
clearly linked to s 53(2), which then prescribes the mode of transfer of asset-holdership 
(“ownership”). Thus, in fact, s 53 deals with the method of transfer of instrument-holdership, and the 
transfer of asset-holdership, the full effect of which is then brought into the FMA via s 38. 
Chapters 4 and 5 allow a more cogent description of the ownership-membership dichotomy by 
looking rather at asset- and instrument-holdership, with all that underpins these concepts, coming to 
a more accurate understanding of these two elements of securities under past and present 
uncertificated regimes. The implicit share-centricity of Vermaas’ view is also immediately obvious, 
and a viewpoint that can adequately account for all securities, based on their common underlying 
properties, would be more useful. 
Such a variable ownership terminology reflects neither the meaning of the historic legal usages in 
the securities landscape nor that of company law, which has always traditionally distinguished 
between registered title and beneficial ownership. It is not a clear or practical use of legal terminology 
and does not account for the already separate designations of “ownership” and “title” (and 
membership). 
Finally, there is only one section in the entire statutory framework which, prima facie, appears to 
support this usage – s 37, specifically subsections (9)(a)(ii) and (b)(ii). These provisions specifically 
state that a person both “acquires” and “ceases to have the rights associated with any particular 
securities of a company…as determined in accordance with the rules of the Central Securities 
Depository, in the case of uncertificated securities…”. However, it has already been argued that s 
37(9) must be read to refer only to rights as against the company,96 and there is very little in the way 
of a persuasive counterargument. To the contrary, the overall position articulated above would seem 
to lend further credence to the more restricted interpretation of s 37(9) offered in this work. It should 
 
 




also be noted that this provision occurs in Part D, and thus does form part of the portion of the Act 
which is (at least explicitly) incorporated into the FMA, giving it only persuasive legal effect at best. 
Thus, it is submitted that the position taken by Vermaas, as supported (but not truly substantiated) 
by R Rachlitz,97 should not be taken to reflect the correct statutory (and supplementary common law) 
legal position of South African law on this issue. Furthermore, even if it were true that the issue 
hinged on the rules of the CSD, the Rules of Strate (as the main CSD in the South African securities 
market) themselves appear to hinge on the meaning of “ownership”. As a test-case, the Rules 
provide as follows:98 
“Definitions 
1.2 In the Strate Rules, unless the context otherwise requires or indicates: –  
    … 
 ‘Transfer’ means the transfer of Uncertificated Securities or an interest in Uncertificated Securities 
by debiting the account in the Uncertificated Securities Register from which the transfer is effected 
and crediting the account in the Uncertificated Securities Register to which the transfer is effected 
in accordance with the Strate Rules, and in respect of Securities issued in terms of the Companies 
Act, in the manner provided for in Part E of Chapter 2 of that Act;  
… 
6.11.3 Transfer of ownership in any Securities in a Securities Account must be effected by debiting of 
the Securities Account or Segregated Depository Account from which the Transfer is effected and 
crediting the Securities Account or Segregated Depository Account to which the Transfer is 
effected, as the case may be, in accordance with the Act, Companies Act, where applicable, 
Strate Rules and Strate Directives.   
6.11.4 A transferee becomes the owner of the Securities upon the crediting of the Securities Account in 
the Subregister.   
 
 
97  R Rachlitz “Disclosure of ownership in South African company law” (2013) 24(3) Stellenbosch Law Review 406 410 
– “[a]s the uncertificated securities register also allocates ownership, it can be said that, contrary to certificated 
shares, in the case of uncertificated shares ownership and registration cannot be separated from each other.”  
Yet as noted by Yeats et al in Commentary 2008 § 53 n 139, “[Rachlitz] does not, however, provide a clear basis 
for this with reference to the provisions of the FMA.” It is submitted that the basis for Rachlitz’s argument is simply 
the same position as taken by Vermaas – the notion that the acts’ references to “ownership” are indications that 
ownership may refer to security-, asset- or instrument-holdership, depending on the context. This is not supported 
here. 
98  Strate Rules of Strate (Pty) Ltd (Registration Number 1998/022242/07, updated as per Government Gazette 




6.11.5 Transfer of ownership of Securities in accordance with Strate Rules 6.11.3 and 6.11.4 occurs 
despite any fraud, illegality or Insolvency Proceeding that may affect the relevant Securities; or 
have resulted in the Transfer being effected: but a transferee who was a party to or had knowledge 
of the fraud or illegality, or had knowledge of the Insolvency Proceeding, as the case may be, 
may not rely on this Strate Rule.” 
Therefore, if ownership were taken to mean asset-holdership, the Rules would serve to confirm what 
is advocated for here. If not the rules do not truly regulate the legal position, as Vermaas appears to 
assert, because the Rules in question themselves demur on the meaning of ownership. 
Moreover, as stated in Commentary 2008, this imprecise use of “ownership” gives rise to further 
inconsistencies between the above and the depository’s conception of its securities register:99 
“In terms of Strate Rules, a participant’s ‘Subregister’ is defined as meaning ‘the record of uncertificated 
securities held in a Securities Account kept by a Participant in terms of the Strate Rules, which is the register 
of ownership of the Securities deposited therein, and is deemed to be the uncertificated securities register, 
where applicable’. This definition regards the register as reflecting both the ownership and registered title 
and, accordingly, does not appear to recognise the possibility of the separation of registered title from 
ownership, for example where an approved nominee holds the securities for an investor. It is submitted that 
the reference to the ‘register of ownership’ should be read as part of the uncertificated securities register 
reflecting registered title, which will not reflect the owners of the relevant uncertificated securities where 
they are held through an approved nominee.” 
It is this that brings one directly, and finally, to the detailed treatment given to this issue by the authors 
in Commentary 2008.100 Whilst the full scope of the analysis cannot be given the lengthy treatment 
it deserves here, its key propositions must be dealt with.  
The authors, after having dealt with “transfer of registered title”, discuss this issue as “cession of 
ownership interest in uncertificated securities”.101 From the work it is clear that it appears to prefer 
to use “ownership” (roughly) to denote asset-holdership but that “[i]t is also not entirely clear from 
the FMA and the Act as to what the interrelationship between the uncertificated securities register 
and the ownership of the uncertificated securities is.”102 It outlines five possible interpretations to 
 
 
99  Yeats et al Commentary 2008 2-548. 
100  Yeats et al Commentary 2008 2-1031 – 2-1074. 
101  Headings in Yeats et al Commentary 2008 at 2-1022 and 2-1031, respectively. 
102  Yeats et al Commentary 2008 2-1032. See also therein: 
“It is clear that approved nominees can hold uncertificated securities for investors and from this it follows that the beneficial 
interest of an investor (‘investor’s beneficial interest’) is capable of separation from the registered title. Where the uncertificated 
securities are held by an approved nominee for an investor, the approved nominee has registered title. Applying the ordinary 
nominee construction, it would appear that the investor is vested with the ownership interest, the approved nominee being 
regarded as the agent of the investor; but attempting to reconcile this construction with the apparent conflation of registered 




transfer in light of the use of “ownership” in s 53 of the Companies Act and s 38 of the FMA: (1) 
“ownership formality”;103 (2) “registered title only”;104 (3) “corresponding ownership and registered 
title”;105 (4) “relevant securities account”;106 and (5) “dual ownership”.107  
Only the first and the last will be discussed here. In § 5 1 3 of Chapter 5, it was shown that the “co-
ownership” and “dual ownership” interpretations of s 37 of the FMA and securities holdership in 
 
 
103  Yeats et al Commentary 2008 2-1039 – 2-1055. This interpretation is favoured by the authors. It takes the view 
that, based on the (also preferred) co-ownership reading of s 37, s 38 of the FMA as read with s 53 of the Companies 
Act imposes a formality requirement on the cession of the beneficial interest – i.e. as at 2-1035 – 2-1036: 
 “where uncertificated securities in a collective ‘pool’ held by an approved nominee are transferred to another collective ‘pool’ 
held by a second approved nominee by way of entries in the uncertificated securities register, effecting the transfers of 
registered title and resulting in the ownership interest of a disposing investor being ceded to an acquiring investor (assuming 
it entails a cession from one investor to another), then it is possible to see the transfer of the pro rata number of the 
uncertificated securities at the uncertificated securities register level as standing ‘proxy’ for, or evidencing, the cession of the 
ownership interest as between the respective investors, or possibly as between the respective collective ‘pools’ (i.e. the 
collective investors as the pools themselves have no legal personality). 
The ownership formality interpretation appears to require that for an ownership interest to be ceded, at least the respective 
securities accounts of the cedent and cessionary reflecting the registered title must be debited and credited, respectively. It 
is reiterated that lower level entries in an approved nominee’s nominee securities account do not form part of the uncertificated 
securities register and appear to not meet this requirement.” [own emphasis] 
 In this way, “entry in the uncertificated securities register serves a dual function in that, not only does it record 
registered title to a specific number of uncertificated securities, it also reflects the aggregate number in the collective 
pool used for calculating the corresponding pro rata co-ownership interest (based on the number recorded in the 
relevant account, e.g. an investor’s securities account maintained by an approved nominee in relation to its omnibus 
securities account in the uncertificated securities register)…[and] an investor’s co-ownership interest can be 
regarded as indirectly evidenced by the recording of the pro rata number of uncertificated securities reflected in the 
securities register (even though the investor is not identified at that level and he does not own any specific 
uncertificated securities).” – see 2-1046. 
104  Yeats et al Commentary 2008 2-1055 – 2-1057. This interpretation asserts that the requirements of s 53(2) of the 
Companies Act as read with s 38 of the FMA refer solely to the transfer of instrument-holdership, and therefore 
that: (1) the uncertificated securities register does not in any way indicate asset-holdership, and (2) asset-holdership 
is freely transferable.  
As noted at 2-1057, the primary arguments against this view are that “[1] the provisions of the FMA [especially s 38 
and s 39] favour the conclusion that the purpose of the provision was to ensure simultaneous settlement by way of 
electronic payment and transfer of ownership by way of participant securities account entries, which is critical to the 
integrity of the trading system…and [2] the desired ‘sacrosanctity’ of the  uncertificated securities register would be 
undermined if the ownership interests could be freely ceded without any record of such cessions”. This line of 
reasoning is fully supported here, and this interpretation will not be dealt with any further.  
105  Yeats et al Commentary 2008 2-1058. This interpretation reads the provisions as requiring “the formality that 
ownership interest must transfer together with the transfer of registered title in the limited circumstances where 
there is a correlation between the registered holder and the beneficial owner, but then…permit[s] the free transfer 
(cession) of ownership interests by investors holding uncertificated securities through approved nominees.” This 
view is rejected for the same reasons as outlined by the authors and will not be dealt with any further. 
106  Yeats et al Commentary 2008 2-1058 – 2-1061. This interpretation “follows the ownership formality interpretation 
but instead reads the references to debits and credits in the uncertificated securities register loosely as extending 
to including the nominee securities accounts maintained by approved nominees where relevant.” – 2-1058. This 
view, though somewhat compelling, is also rejected for the reasons set out by the authors and will not be further 
discussed here.  
107  Yeats et al Commentary 2008 2-1061– 2-1067. This interpretation, as per 2-1061: 
“follows the ownership formalities interpretation but resolves the challenges facing the latter by regarding the registered holder 
as having legal ownership, while the investor is regarded as having a less direct beneficial interest. It is based on a marrying 
of the provisions of s 4 of Financial Institutions (Protection of Funds) Act 28 of 2001 with the concept of entries in the 
uncertificated securities register effecting transfers of ownership….It would have parallels to the English dual ownership 
construct. This interpretation is predicated on a reversal of the argument that, because registered title and beneficial ownership 
are severable, s 53(2) cannot be read as contemplating entries in the uncertificated securities register effecting transfers of 
the ownership interests. Instead, it resolves this dilemma by asserting that because s 53(2) requires ownership to be 
transferred by way of entries in the uncertificated securities register, this implies that a separation of the ownership interest 




general – as put forth by the authors in Commentary 2008 – are capable of harmonisation through 
the outcomes of Chapter 4. 
This harmonisation allows one similarly to assess here the compatibility of the authors’ dual 
ownership approach with their preferred ownership formality approach to the transfer of the security 
asset. From Chapters 4 and 5 it should be clear that the separate but interdependent legal objects 
comprising the security (the instrument and asset) are capable of independent holdership, but not 
due to the effect of s 37(5) and its invocation of a kind of statutory trust as per the Financial 
Institutions (Protection of Funds) Act.108 Their separateness and their interdependence is, rather, 
due to the private law nature of these objects as they have developed in South African law.  
Under the dual ownership approach to transfer, the authors seem to adopt a dual meaning for 
ownership – registered ownership (holdership of the security instrument) and beneficial ownership 
(holdership of the security asset). On that basis, they then argued that:109 
“where the uncertificated securities are registered in the name of an approved nominee as trust property, 
then this would only apply to the cession of the ownership interest vested in the approved nominee as 
trustee. If this is the case, then there would appear to be a persuasive argument that the beneficial interest 
in the trust property held by the investor as against the approved nominee is distinguishable from the ‘legal 
ownership’ (i.e. the trust property) and can be ceded separately. This would be similar to a beneficiary of a 
trust ceding a vested beneficial interest. Such a cession could be effected with the consent of the approved 
nominee by way of recording the cession of the investor’s beneficial interest in the trust property in the 
nominee securities account, without a corresponding entry in the uncertificated securities register.” 
For reasons already outlined, and due to the share-centric development of South African 
uncertificated securities law, the transfer provisions of past regimes used the term ownership to 
ensure simultaneous transfer of ownership and membership. Taking the superordinate principles 
evinced by this and applying them to all securities equally demonstrates that the intent (supported 
by the plain language reading of the relevant provisions) was to ensure the security asset is 
transferred at the same time as the instrument. There is no reason to believe that intent has changed. 
Therefore, a middle ground between the ownership formality and dual ownership approaches 
appears to be possible. This middle ground rests on the notion that there are indeed two separate 
legal objects but due to their being gleaned from the same underlying rights and other competencies 
they are also interdependent in a manner that does indeed parallel English securities’ dual 
ownership, and reads “ownership” in the statutory context as referring to asset-holdership. Thus it 
posits that the statutory transfer provisions should be read as imposing a formality requirement 
 
 
108  28 of 2001. 




(transfer of instrument-holdership) on the transfer of asset-holdership, rather than read as referring 
to the transfer of one of two types of “ownership”. This is also supported by a number of unwelcome 
second-order “complexities” a formality-free approach would cause,110 not least of all an erosion of 
the finality of transfer principle. 
Crucially, this middle ground also allows some of the advantages of the dual ownership approach to 
transfer to be preserved. Specifically, it still facilitates: (1) “the transfer of ownership where the 
uncertificated securities are held, or are to be held, by an approved nominee whilst preserving the 
investor’s beneficial interest…”; (2) “simultaneous transfer of ownership against the payment of the 
consideration on settlement, removing any timing differences that [may] arise”; and (3) “the 
ownership interest vesting in the approved nominee but ‘belonging’ to the investor in the sense of 
the investor enjoying the benefits and having control through its mandate with the approved 
nominee”.111 The fourth and final benefit outlined in Commentary 2008 is that the dual ownership 
variant also “facilitates the netting of transfers between the registered holders of the uncertificated 
securities, as the net ownership interest transfers at the registered title level, and this is unaffected 
by the delay in the approved nominee updating its nominee securities account to reflect the change 
in the investor’s beneficial interest rights and claims against the approved nominee.”112 This last 
benefit is not discussed here, and is instead dealt with on own footing in § 8 2 2 2 below. 
On balance, all of the above strongly indicates that one must interpret “ownership” as asset-
holdership, such that: (1) asset-holdership must be transferred by means of a transfer of the security 
instrument – i.e. debiting and crediting; and (2) instrument-holdership is what is reflected by means 
of such debiting and crediting in the relevant securities account or accounts of the CSD and CSDPs.  
Therefore, it would seem that the answer to the question of whether “it is also possible to transfer 
rights to uncertificated securities by way of cession based on the judicial precedent”113 is firmly in 
the negative. The converse of this conclusion is most important: the security-asset cannot be 
transferred without a corresponding debiting and crediting in the electronic ledger of a CSD or CSDP, 
which, by definition, is also a transfer of instrument-holdership.  
This leaves two important final issues that require deeper treatment : (1) what is the precise nature 
and effect of this formality requirement?; and (2) what does this imply for transfers in terms of which 
 
 
110  See for these the discussion in Yeats et al Commentary 2008 at 2-1071 – 2-1072. 
111  Yeats et al Commentary 2008 2-1064. 
112  Yeats et al Commentary 2008 2-1064. 




the identity of the instrument-holder can remain the same, and therefore do not need a transfer of 
instrument-holdership (register-neutral transfers) and the related issue of netting? 
 
8 2 2 1  The formality requirement: quasi-traditio 
The exact nature of the relationship between a transfer of instrument-holdership (as formality 
requirement) and the transfer of asset-holdership (which is separately held and not necessarily 
reflected within the system of securities accounts) must then be determined. Superficially this seems 
quite simple – the provisions of the FMA, when correctly interpreted, cause that holdership of the 
security-asset to transfer to the end-of-chain acquirer by operation of law and simultaneously to a 
corresponding transfer of instrument-holdership.114 Yet, similarly to simply stating something is sui 
generis and thereby avoiding a deeper theoretical inquiry, referring to transfer by operation of law is 
not sufficient.  
For the purpose of this section it will be assumed that transfer requires the substitution of one 
instrument-holder for another (as is the case in Figure 1 above) – the possibility of register-neutral 
transfers (i.e. where the disposing and acquiring asset-holders envisage using the same instrument-
holder) is dealt with in § 8 2 2 2 below.   
The function of the formality requirement hinges on the control function.  
In the uncertificated securities environment, a number of standard permutations of intermediation 
occur, and these may form the basis of this discussion, despite the possibility of more exotic chains 
of holdership. By the nature of securities, the asset- and instrument-holders will always lie at opposite 
ends of the holdership structure. Further, for the purpose of this discussion it can be assumed that 
the asset-holder is always the end-of-chain “investor”. This assumption is made because although 
juristic or quasi-juristic vehicles for holdership may intercede (for example a trust or a company 
serving as asset-holder for the benefit of ultimate beneficiaries behind those vehicles), this does not 
alter the legal ramifications of the issues at hand.  
 
 
114  See also in this regard the comments of Blackman et al Commentary 5-232-1, stating that transfer of “ownership” 
is achieved through mere debiting and crediting. See further these authors at 5-228 on the Memorandum to the 
Companies Second Amendment Bill issued as part of the passing of the Companies Second Amendment Act 60 of 
1998, legislating s 91A into effect in conjunction with the passing of the Custody and Administration of Securities 




The main driver of intermediary-variation is the identity of the instrument-holder. This holder, in terms 
of the administrative function,115 could be an approved nominee or the asset-holder, i.e.:116 (1) a 
CSD itself; (2) a CSDP in own name; (3) a nominee of a CSDP; (4) an authorised user in own name; 
(5) a nominee of an authorised user; (6) some other downstream nominee client, in terms of the 
FMA, of any of the aforementioned parties; (7) some other non-client nominee of the asset-holder; 
or (8) the asset-holder in own name. Any number of these intermediaries may also be found within 
a broader chain of intermediated security-holdership, acting in a capacity other than instrument-
holder (most pertinently either as custodial functionary or client). Thus one of the most complex 
chains of intermediation is illustrated by Figure 1 above – asset-holders making use of brokers, 
whose brokerages use a nominee-company of the brokerage and of the CSDP (respectively) as the 
instrument-holder of their clients’ securities. As already stated,117 the nature of the relationships 
between, and including, the asset-holder and the instrument-holder with respect to particular 
securities are a mixture of agency, mandate, or a combination of both.118 
Nonetheless, it is strongly contended that all interceding relationships are fundamentally 
administrative in nature. They serve to ensure that rights exercisable by the instrument-holder are 
exercised in the manner wished by the asset-holder. Their primary purpose is to facilitate the flow of 
instructions (e.g. how to vote at a shareholders’ meeting) in one direction, and the distribution of 
benefits (e.g. coupon payments yielded by debt securities) in the other.119 
In Chapter 4 it was shown that effective factual control of a security, or any subsidiary element of a 
security, is (as a point of departure) control over the instrument-holder for the factual purposes under 
examination.120 In the case of lawful asset-holdership (i.e. “ownership”), that control occurs through 
a sui generis agency whereby the instrument-holder acts, albeit in own name and capacity, as 
instrument-holder, functionally on behalf of the asset-holder. The instrument-holder is also, due to 
 
 
115  See Chapter 5, § 5 1 generally, and § 5 1 2 specifically.   
116  For nominees: provided (ostensibly – a fuller discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this work) that the 
instrument-holder is duly appointed as per s 1 viz. “nominee” as read with s 76 of the FMA.  
117  See specifically Chapter 3 in § 3 2 and Chapter 4 in § 4 3 1.  
118  See in this regard the excellent discussion in I Meissner Securities within the realm of private law: a theoretical and 
practical analysis of the legal nature of shares LLD thesis University of Stellenbosch (2019) § 13 2 2 3, 231-240. 
119  See also Meissner (2019) 244 & 245: 
“Holding or co- holding is therefore a combination of the entitlement to receive benefits on behalf of the owner and a package 
of duties owed by the holder to its client. These duties flow from agency relationships… 
…An account credit is not a share or security. It rather represents all the duties of an agent, or stated inversely, all the rights 
that a client has against his custodian. It is also a numerical representation of the proportion of higher-tier holdings.” 




the unique nature of this agency,121 beholden to (1) the directives of the latter, and (2) a fiduciary 
obligation in the carrying out of her function. 
Does this state of intermediation change, or more importantly interrupt, sever, or modify this direct 
sui generis agency operative between the asset- and instrument-holder? The answer is, in all 
likelihood, that it does not. That agency flows from the deeper proprietary consequences of the 
dichotomous underlying structure of securities, and has been shown to be effective in the certificated 
environment even in the absence of any express or tacit provisioning for it. It is, for lack of a better 
word, “embedded”, and there are no compelling arguments for asserting that uncertificated securities 
are any different. Any interceding relationships must be seen as facilitative of that primary agency 
and therefore of a superimposed, secondary nature. In theory, for example, the asset-holder should 
be fully entitled to communicate instructions directly to her broker’s nominee serving as instrument-
holder as a result of this position. 
However, what does materially differ from the certificated environment is the far smaller degree of 
intimacy between these respective holders. In many cases these two parties are effectively 
anonymous to one another. This has significant ramifications for the nature of the effective control 
which the asset-holder, theoretically, must have over the instrument-holder. From a legal 
perspective, this is vitally important, as that control facilitates certain proprietary consequences of 
juristic acts concluded with respect to securities. Adding to the level of complexity is the factual 
nature of that control – the opacity of the intermediated environment hampers the demonstrability of 
the legal fact of control.  
A second, related modality of the control in question is the fact that end-of-chain investors’ 
relationships with their brokers (or similar authorised users) may be controlled or non-controlled. 
These terms denote investors with funds and securities held in the custody of brokers, who in turn 
deal with CSDPs in a representative capacity, and those who manage their holdings directly with a 
CSDP in own capacity as authorised users, respectively.122 
Third, there is also a difference between discretionary and non-discretionary arrangements as 
between end-of-chain investors and their brokers. The former denotes a situation where the relevant 
intermediary, such as a broker or fund manager, makes investment decisions (i.e. what securities to 
buy and sell) for the end-of-chain asset-holder. The latter denotes a situation where the 
intermediary’s function is execution-only – she merely executes the buying and selling instructions 
of that client.  
 
 
121  See Chapter 4, § 4 3 1. 




In sum, what has been established is that: (1) both the security instrument and asset appear to be 
transferred simultaneously upon debiting and crediting; (2) transfer of the former is a formal 
prerequisite to transfer of the latter; and (3) the heavy degree of intermediation does not theoretically 
dilute the legal relationship between the asset-holder and instrument-holder, but it does complicate 
and dilute the factual state of the control exercisable by an asset-holder herself, from a more practical 
perspective.123 On this last point, however, one might add that the securities industry’s development 
over the last century appears to have dealt adequately with the potential distance (in terms of 
intermediaries) between asset- and instrument-holders. 
The ultimate question then becomes whether the underlying legal mechanism of the transfer of the 
security asset is simply what might be called a “black box” ex lege effect arising from debiting and 
crediting124 or whether something more substantively useful can be said of this formality requirement.  
From further analysis it would appear that one can indeed tie this requirement more strongly to 
existing legal principles, allowing for a better understanding of the dynamics of these transfers.  
The transfer of uncertificated asset-holdership is clearly a cession. Further, in the uncertificated 
securities environment, it is prohibited for any CSD or CSDP to effect a debit or credit in a securities 
account unless either a properly authenticated instruction to do so has been received, or a court has 
ordered it to be done.125 What lies behind such an instruction is a complex set of steps, much of 
which is automated in the listed environment. The process effectively brings together, typically 
anonymously, two parties who have reached, in the abstract (due to intermediation), agreement to 
transfer a particular security asset, or number of such assets, from one to the other. How?  
A selling party places an order offering a particular security or number of securities for sale. This 
offer is at a particular price – either certain, (e.g. R200 per security), or ascertainable (e.g. the best 
price obtainable over a set period, such as a day’s trading hours, or a week). A buying party places 
an offer to buy a security on the same terms. In the listed environment, these orders are executed 
on a trading system and sent through to the relevant clearing system (the JSE mainly uses various 
clearing systems offered by Strate Ltd), along with a great many others. 
 
 
123  See § 8 2 1 & 8 2 2 above for “(1)” and “(2)”. 
124  This seems to be the position evinced by a broad review of the current authorities, albeit implied by way of no further 
explanation or discussion.  
125  Section 53(1)(b) of the Companies Act as adopted via s 38(1)(a) of the FMA. Instruction by court order will be 
ignored, as it is the simpler and more factually reliable of the two. Similarly, the transfer of uncertificated but unlisted 
securities will also not be dealt with. It is submitted that if the most complex arrangement – fully voluntary transfer 
of listed, uncertificated securities – can be fully understood, these other two scenarios become mostly self-




These two orders are matched via an automated clearing process. Once matched, the transaction 
must be cleared and settled (i.e. payment must be made and confirmed against delivery by means 
of debiting and crediting). Thus the transaction is passed on to the clearing and settlement systems, 
or if the two are integrated the clearing and settlement system. The system generates the “properly 
authenticated” transfer instructions to clear against simultaneous settlement through the national 
payment system. The instruction affects the relevant security account holders (the CSD, CSDPs, or 
authorised users), and a debiting and crediting of their respectively applicable securities accounts 
cause transfer of the security instrument or instruments. This, as discussed, must also cause transfer 
of the security asset or assets in question. 
With this understanding the discussion can now turn to the nature of cession of the security asset, 
vis-à-vis the formality requirement. Assuming all prerequisites for valid cession are met,126 causa for 
the cession is clear: the automated matching of complementary offers of sale and purchase 
(matching). Yet in the South African law of cession, a causa and the actual transfer agreement are 
“functionally and conceptually distinct”.127 In the abstract system of transfer of property found in the 
South African private law, a valid causa is not a prerequisite for cession.128 
Thus, the more crucial element for characterisation as a cession is the real (transfer) agreement 
between cessionary and cedent. Does the transactional process discussed above show a clear 
animus transferendi et accipiendi on the part of the end-of-chain seller and buyer? 
In the antiquated scrip-based regime of listed, certificated securities transactions could be pre-
arranged (i.e. manually cleared on instruction by selling and buying brokers), or be open-ended.129 
If open-ended, the selling broker (acting as mandatory for her client) took cession of the securities 
from the seller (through delivery in “negotiable form”) in order to find a willing buying broker. Once a 
transaction had thereafter been manually cleared and settled on instruction by the selling and buying 
brokers, the selling broker would hand over the securities in “negotiable form” to the buying broker. 
This broker would appropriate the securities to the buyer, which perfected the cession of the security 
asset between the selling broker (as mandatory) and the end-of-chain buyer through her own broker. 
However, if the transaction was pre-arranged (i.e. cleared beforehand) the position differed. The 
 
 
126  See § 8 1 above.  
127  See § 8 1 above.  
128  See specifically Van der Merwe et al Contract, § 12.2.3, 391 & n 48-51 (notably citing Grobbelaar v Shoprite 
Checkers (710/2008) [2011] ZASCA 11 as confirmation of this position by the Supreme Court of Appeal).   
129  For what follows on scrip trading, see Chapter 3, § 3 2 1 2, 111-112, and as referred to therein FR Malan Collective 
Securities Depositories and the Transfer of Securities (1984) 169-182 (and specifically 175, 176 & 178-179) for a 
detailed account of this process. 
 “Appropriation” is the act of identifying the particular securities in question as “delivered” to the buyer – see Chapter 




selling broker would not take cession of the security asset, and rather upon receipt of settlement 
hand it over directly to the buying broker in negotiable form, for appropriation to the buyer. In this 
case, the cession would take place, albeit remotely and often anonymously, directly between end-
of-chain seller and buyer. 
The modern automated and electronic clearing and settling process130  seems more closely to 
resemble this latter process of pre-clearing and post-settlement appropriation than is initially 
apparent. The real agreement resulting in transfer appears to stem from a unique set of 
corresponding intentions on the part of the buyer and seller. The animus transferendi et accipiendi 
are formed upon execution of the buy and sell orders and are open-ended, as was the case in 
transfers of certificated listed securities, where:131 
“[t]he offer to cede, made by delivering to his broker a securities transfer form accompanied by the relevant 
certificate, is directed either to his broker or to anyone to whom his broker may deliver the documents in 
terms of the applicable clearing house rules. The offer to cede is made, it is submitted, ‘to whom it may 
concern’.” 
However, each party’s intention is also conditional, upon: (1) matching with a corresponding 
intention; and (2) payment in terms of the agreement of sale serving as causa against effective 
debiting and crediting – i.e. clearing and settlement. The remaining underlying requirements for a 
valid cession are also evident. The first is certainty regarding the object of cession (evident in the 
executed buying and selling orders). Second, agreement on the nature of the transaction is required 
(this is also self-evident).132 Third, the parties to the cession must at least be ascertainable, but not 
necessarily certain. In this context, the heavy degree of intermediation makes it clear that the 
counter-parties are not the concern of the end-of-chain buyer and seller, but rather that of their 
intermediating representatives. Through the matching process, the parties are ascertained, but need 
not be known to one another. Thus it would appear as though, through the application of the ordinary 
principles of cession, the cession is perfected upon the meeting of the outstanding condition – 
clearing and settlement. 
Transfer of asset-holdership (“ownership” as per legislation) must, by way of the interpretation of the 
FMA put forward above, occur via debiting and crediting of the applicable register-level securities 
accounts – i.e. transfer of instrument-holdership. The effect of this transfer is ultimately what 
completes the transfer of the uncertificated security asset, as taken up in the clearing process. 
 
 
130  See also Meissner (2019) § 13 2 5.   
131  See again Malan Collective Securities Depositories 175. 




A coherent theoretical explanation of this becomes clear through the proprietary principles outlined 
in Chapter 4, coupled with the fact that clearing and settling of a particular securities transaction is 
pre-arranged. In all scenarios (except in the case of a non-controlled client for whom a CSD 
administers a securities account in the client’s own name) the acquiring instrument-holder takes 
instrument-holdership upon instruction from the end-of-chain buyer. Strictly it is irrelevant whether, 
due to intermediation, the acquiring instrument-holder is unaware in fact of that buyer’s identity, as 
the instruction ultimately emanates from the prospective asset-holder as end-of-chain buyer.  
Once the transaction is cleared and settled, the system has generated and executed the requisite 
properly authenticated instruction of transfer. This instruction enables a transfer of the security 
instrument to the chosen representative of the buyer. Crucially, the acquisition of the security 
instrument in this manner bestows on the acquiring asset-holder effective control over the 
instrument-holder. From this moment onwards the unique underlying properties of securities brings 
into existence a sui generis agency between these holders even in the absence of any express or 
tacit provision for it. Yet the prearranged nature of the transaction shows that a very similar 
relationship should already be in place, even prior to acquisition of instrument-holdership. Finally, 
having shown that the meaning of “ownership” in the Companies Act is of patrimonial import, it 
confirms that the transfer of the security asset appears to occur simultaneously to transfer of the 
instrument.133 
This implies that the statutory requirement of transfer of instrument-holdership to effect simultaneous 
transfer of asset-holdership voids the common law rule that a cession need not be factually effective 
for its legal effects.134 Instead, taking into account the proprietary analyses of Chapters 4 and 5, the 
following picture emerges. Once instrument-holdership is acquired, the person on whose behalf it 
was acquired gains what is legally necessary to exert control over the instrument-holder: asset-
holdership. Conversely, also at that exact moment, the establishment of the control conferred by 
asset-holdership causes the transfer of asset-holdership to have real effect. 
Taken to its logical conclusion, this analysis indicates that (alongside the necessary corresponding 
intentions) a statutory form of quasi-traditio is required in order for a transfer of uncertificated security 
assets to have real effect.135 Although this seems to be quite a radical theoretical restatement, in 
reality it simply confirms and reinforces the already existing statutory dynamics of these transfers. 
What it adds, on the other hand, is the ability to cast an existing legal process in the mould of a pre-
existing and well-understood legal concept in South African law. This enables the jurist to make use 
 
 
133  See also § 8 2 2 above. 
134  See above in § 8 1 above. 




of existing jurisprudence (including a layer of legal policy considerations as well as the more 
pragmatic, scenario-driven resources of existing case law) and with slight modification bring it to 
bear on new problems arising from the aforementioned process. In this sense it functions as a useful 
legal heuristic, as shown below. 
It is tempting, due to the form of the transaction, to draw an analogy to the registration necessary for 
the transfer of immovables, instead of the delivery of movables. However, the publicity function which 
possession achieves through the requirement of delivery of movables far better describes the legal 
machanics outlined above than does a process of quasi-registration. Whilst both delivery of 
movables and registration of immovables serve a deeper-order publicity function, the element of 
effective control that underlies delivery is key to the transfer of uncertificated securities as incorporeal 
movables. 
Delivery, in the case of moveable corporeals, is handing over “possession” (which factually denotes 
effective control)136 of a thing to the acquirer, completing the real agreement and causing ownership 
to pass. In the case of transfer of “ownership” of securities (i.e. transfer of asset-holdership) the FMA 
requires the transferor to hand over effective factual control of the security-asset by transferring the 
security-instrument to the acquirer’s chosen representative, thereby bestowing control over the new 
instrument-holder upon that acquirer. 
The underlying policy considerations for requiring quasi-delivery further support this conclusion. The 
South African system of dematerialisation is indirect. It further remains, even after the FMA’s 
expansion of record-keeping requirements to authorised users, at least partially non-transparent. 
The asset-holder may be traceable due to the mandated record-keeping of the intermediating 
authorised users and the economic incentives of further downstream parties,137 but that holder is not 
reflected on the uncertificated securities register and cannot be known in a real-time transactional 
environment (not least from the perspective of the clearing and settlement system or systems). This 
significantly decreases the level of legal certainty regarding the rights, remedies and legal position 
of the underlying holders (or “owners”) of dematerialised securities.138 In the corporeal environment 
delivery effects legal certainty due to its publicity function.  
Thus, in order both to mitigate this legal uncertainty and to enhance market efficiency and stability, 
quasi-delivery of the security-instrument (which fulfils a publicity function innately in all securities) is 
 
 
136  See Chapter 4, § 4 3 2 2.  
137  Traceability is discussed fully in § 5 1 2 of Chapter 5 (see § 5 1 3 also). 
138  Blackman et al Commentary at 5-229 – 5-323-1 provides an excellent analysis of the legal problems of certainty 
surrounding the co-ownership under the previous regime of the Securities Services Act coupled with the Companies 




elevated to a requirement for the effective transfer of asset-holdership. Once there is transfer of the 
security-instrument, there can be no doubt that both the interest and the entitlement to execute that 
interest are effectively controlled by the acquirer (as new asset-holder). 
This also provides the necessary proprietary foundation for the effective application of the principle 
of irrevocability of transfer. The full impact of the quasi-delivery construction on s 53(4) of the 
Companies Act read with s 41 of the FMA is dealt with in Chapter 10.  
Finally, what if a specific asset-holder wishes to change her CSDP or broker, without losing 
holdership of her securities? Due to the above, this presents no problem. The outgoing instrument-
holder’s account will be debited, and the new instrument-holder’s account will be credited. Due to 
simultaneous transfer of security asset and instrument, there is no moment in time when the asset-
holder does not have specific and publicly demarcated effective control over her security asset 
through control of the applicable instrument-holder.  
 
8 2 2 2   Register-neutral transfers and netting 
The example given in Figure 1 above is an example of a register-affected transfer, as a debiting and 
a crediting in the legally effective securities accounts was necessary within the overall scheme of 
the transaction. However, if both B and C’s brokers were making use of the same nominee, or if they 
were making use of the same broker then it would appear that – but for the conclusions of the 
previous section – no securities accounts entries (i.e. no debiting and crediting) would necessarily 
be required to transfer the security-asset from B to C.  
This problem is also tied to the issue of netting – i.e. scenarios where the clearing and settlement 
system only produce authenticated instructions of transfer for the net transfers of instrument-
holdership required to effect all trades over the netted period. If a transfer of instrument-holdership 
is required for each transfer of asset-holdership, not all the gross transactions would comply with 
that formality requirement. The authors in Commentary 2008, in discussing their ownership formality 
approach, state that:139 
“not all transfers of ownership will involve a transfer of registered title, especially where the approved 
nominee that held registered title for the transferor will continue to hold registered title for the transferee. 
This raises the question as to whether, in such circumstances, a transfer of the ownership interest can take 
place without entries in the uncertificated securities account, or must there nevertheless be a debit and 
credit entry in the uncertificated securities register (i.e. both against and in favour of the approved nominee, 
 
 




with no net change in the nominee’s aggregate holding)? From a registered title entry perspective, it is 
unnecessary to record the transfer in the uncertificated securities register because there is no change in 
registered title and from an accounting perspective alone, the transfer of the ownership interest could simply 
be recorded in the relevant approved nominee’s securities account. If this were accepted…it appears to 
run counter to the peremptory wording of s 53(2) that states that debit and credit entries must be made to 
effect a transfer of the ‘ownership’. Read strictly, even where there is no change in the registered holder, 
the transfer should still be effected by way of a debit and credit entry in the securities account of the relevant 
registered holder in the uncertificated securities register…The most apparent motive for requiring this would 
be to ensure a clear record in the uncertificated securities register of all transfers of ownership interests 
and to facilitate simultaneous settlement, and possibly also to ensure that there is, at all times, a correlation 
between transfers of ownership interests reflected in the approved nominee’s securities account and 
transfers in the uncertificated securities register (marred by the slight timing delays in recording the entries 
at the different levels). If this is the aim, then the netting of transactions would not be compliant, because 
where netting takes place there are no individual entries in the uncertificated securities register for each 
specific transfer of an ownership interest effected by each investor. And the investor is not identified at the 
time of the ‘netted’ transfer because transfers between relevant accounts are effected by ‘set-off’ and only 
the net amount is transferred, without identification of the cedent and cessionary at an investor level.  
Such a strict reading of s 52(3) does not correlate with s 35(2)(y) of the FMA which requires a depository’s 
rules to provide for ‘netting arrangements if a transaction in one or more categories of securities settled 
through the central securities depository settle on a net basis’. Presumably, this provision contemplates 
netting at least at a registered title level in the participant maintained securities account and possibly in 
regard to accounts in the central securities account.” 
Thus register-neutral transfers present a significant problem. 
It has been shown, quite definitively, that asset-holdership cannot be transferred without quasi-
delivery – i.e. transfer of the security instrument by debit and credit. It would thus appear that register-
neutral transfers, including those under scenarios of netting, cannot occur. Does this position result 
in a good policy outcome? 
The JSE has been, until recently,140 the only securities exchange in South Africa, and by association 
Strate Ltd has remained the only CSD in the securities trading environment. Strate provides most of 
the JSE’s clearing and settlement services. The overwhelming majority of the South African listed 
securities sector’s liquidity lies in the JSE and is thus under the care and custody of Strate. However 
that system is historically informed by the so-called “subregister model”, in which it was the 
 
 
140   The ZAR X exchange completed its first trade on Monday 20 February 2017, see – Fin24 “Trading kicks off on SA’s 
newest stock exchange” (20-02-2017) Media24 <http://www.fin24.com/Markets/Equities/trading-kicks-off-on-sas-




subregisters of the CSDPs that enjoyed primacy.141 This was, in principle, reversed by the passage 
of the Financial Markets Act, which provides that:142 
“[i]f the records of a licensed central securities depository are inconsistent with those of a participant 
regarding securities deposited with the licensed central securities depository by the participant, the records 
of the central securities depository are deemed to be correct until the contrary is proved.” 
Despite this formal change, the system remains largely (though not entirely) CSDP-driven, and few 
transactions are concluded in a manner where the register of the CSD is debited and credited 
directly. For this reason, practically, the reconciliation between the two consists mainly of the 
updating of Strate’s central register rather than vice versa. Moreover:143 
“as a result of the majority nominee holding accounts, the Strate subregister system may be classified as 
a non-transparent system.” 
This non-transparency persists and the identity of asset-holders is only in certain instances reflected 
in the uncertificated securities register, making many (if not most) end-of-chain investors 
unidentifiable from the accounts within the custody and administration system in real time or 
thereafter (see Chapter 5, § 5 1 2 and 5 1 3). This is despite the inclusion of (the innately rather 
problematic) s 56 of the Companies Act as part of the FMA’s wholesale appropriation of Part E of 
Chapter 2, as well as allusion to it in the CSD Rules of Strate.144 The fact that the FMA now requires 
record-keeping by authorised users does not have any impact on transparency within the trading 
system itself, and there may indeed be further downstream intermediaries not subject to these formal 
statutory record-keeping duties. 
In that light the following observations are still of relevance, not only formally to the subregister-
system, but also more substantively to the operational realities of how Strate’s ostensibly reformed 
system functions at present:145 
“The subregister model has implications for systemic risk in South African financial markets. All the 
participants currently run their own custody systems, none of which is tailored to be inter-operable with any 
other. Should a participant fail, it would not be possible to quickly and easily transfer beneficial shareholder 
details onto the system of another participant. It would also be difficult for the clients of the participant to 
prove ownership of their shares in the lower levels. If the CSD operates a transparent and centralised 
 
 
141   Vermaas (2010) Acta Juridica 98-102. 
142  Section 43. 
143  Vermaas (2010) Acta Juridica. 
144  Para 6.8.2.4. 




register, it has a more-or-less up to date version of beneficial shareholding details at all times. Furthermore, 
each participant will have a custody system that is able to interface with the Strate register. Should a 
participant fail, the CSD can easily transfer the beneficial shareholding record to another participant with 
the result that settlement will experience minimal disruption. The counter argument is a concern that 
centralisation of records of ownership has a potential to introduce systemic risk, particularly if changes to 
the system result in data corruption or system failure. These risks can be well mitigated, primarily through 
the provision of strict disaster recovery mechanisms and associated processes and procedures.” 
Without transparency in principle as a property of the system (rather than as a property of some 
cases within such a system), centralisation of the register does not address the root cause of these 
problems – namely that it could be “difficult for the clients of the participant to prove ownership of 
their shares in the lower levels”. Moreover, the outlined “systemic risks” of centralisation remain. It 
seems that in the practically entrenched non-transparent system currently in use, one of the 
underappreciated ways in which this risk is currently mitigated is the legislative requirement of quasi-
delivery. What this requirement effectively brings about is that all uncertificated securities transfers 
are elevated to a legally relevant securities register. It creates a record of the transaction with both 
the relevant CSDP and the CSD, improving the security of the transaction data and reducing the risk 
posed by failure of any particular CSDP. It also provides a record of the transfer in cases where the 
records of authorised users (or nominees) are in dispute. If register neutral transfers were accepted 
as possible (i.e. not requiring a transfer of instrument-holdership), authorised users’ lower-level 
records alone would determine asset-holdership. If such “off-system” transfers were countenanced 
by the legislation it would effectively bypass the finality of transfer provisions, as there would be no 
register entry that one could regard as irrevocable. That does not seem to be a sound policy 
outcome. 
A final consideration is whether the position taken here is unduly disruptive to the currently utilised 
practices of register-neutral transfer. Taking the position, as Blackman et al suggest, that it is 
“necessary to nevertheless debit and re-credit the same account to record the transfer of 
ownership”146 is not overly disruptive, and eminently practicable. Thus it is suggested (albeit with 
caution) that any register-neutral transfer practices are currently non-compliant with the FMA as read 
with the Companies Act. However, remedying this may not require overly costly remediation efforts. 
A simple solution is the implementation of (otherwise redundant) debiting and re-crediting of the 
account of the same instrument-holder. This ensures quasi-delivery, which simultaneously 
establishes the agency required for control, and the control required for the real agreement to take 
 
 
146  Blackman et al Commentary 5-232-2. In context the authors suggest this must be the case but for the possibility of 




effect. In doing so it also more reliably demarcates the interest of the asset- or co-asset-holder in the 
register, and enhances the stability of the trading system both legally and from a risk perspective. 
 
8 3  Restrictions on the transfer of debt securities 
The underlying constitutive arrangement that gives rise to a debt security is contractual. This is true 
regardless of whether the issuer is a company or not. In the case of non-company securities, 
restrictions on the transferability of debt securities – if they are to be regarded as “original incidents 
of ownership of a [security]”147 – must be created in terms of the constitutive arrangement giving rise 
to those securities. This is an important point, as “our courts…distinguish between restrictions in 
respect of what are referred to as pre-existing rights by way of contractual undertaking by the person 
holding the rights and those restrictions that are an intrinsic detraction from the rights themselves”.148 
This section will deal principally only with so-called intrinsic restrictions. 
These restrictions will arise from a contractually valid pactum de non cedendo included in the terms 
and conditions that govern the coming into existence and further operation of that security. Further 
common law restrictions, such as transfers which are contra bonos mores, or restrictions due to 
proceedings regarding a security as subject matter of a legal dispute which has reached litis 
contestatio, are also applicable here.149 
Company securities, on the other hand, are modified by both the operation of the Companies Act 
and the particular issuer’s memorandum of incorporation, and restrictions may be “imposed by the 
common law, the Act, or by the company’s articles”.150 Examples of the latter two include the 
restriction on the transferability of a private company’s securities found in s 8 of the Companies Act 
of 2008, or the prerequisite of directors’ approval to alienate a public company’s securities (as built 
into a memorandum of incorporation). Due to the differences between company and non-company 





147  Borland’s Trustee v Steel Brothers & Co Ltd [1901] 1 Ch 279 288, cited with approval in Smuts v Booyens; 
Markplaas (Edms) Bpk v Booyens 2001 (4) SA 15 (A) para [14].  
148  Yeats et al Commentary 2008 2-874 – 2-875.  
149  See Lubbe “Cession” in LAWSA § 163, or Van der Merwe et al Contract 407-408.   




8 3 1  Restrictions on the transferability of company securities 
The Companies Act of 2008 is not clear on whether the creation, existence or content of debt 
securities needs to be reflected in the memorandum. If, as indeed seems to be the correct position, 
debt securities can exist free from (at least standard) company memoranda, the constitutive function 
that the memorandum fulfils for shares is not necessarily mirrored with respect to “debt instruments”. 
However, no determination on this issue is necessary for the present discussion. As per s 
8(2)(b)(ii)(bb) of the Companies Act of 2008, the transferability of the “securities” of private 
companies must be restricted. 
One must begin with the policy basis for restrictions on transferability. As it relates to shares:151 
“the object would seem to be that of protecting the public and restricting speculation…[and] to allow existing 
shareholders a measure of control over the identity of the company’s shareholders, to maintain an existing 
pattern of control, or to prevent one [or] more shareholders from obtaining control by purchase from other 
shareholders.” 
There is no reason why these elements of policy should not, at least approximately, hold true for the 
shares of more closely held (i.e. non-listed) public companies in which a choice to restrict 
transferability has been made. Further, both arguments (investor protection and control) should also 
be correspondingly applicable to any company debt securities to which voting rights have been 
attached. These securities appear to function similarly to redeemable preference shares, with the 
important exception that they typically have a finite lifespan. 
The problem at hand is that, at face value, the argument regarding the maintenance of “existing 
patterns of control” does not seem as readily applicable to debt securities without voting rights. This 
non-voting category of company debt securities is by far the more prevalent. The key difference 
between voting and non-voting debt securities is that transfer of non-voting debt security-holdership 
is a change in the identity of creditors rather than those who are able to exercise control over the 
management of the company (holders of equity). Because no voting rights change hands, the profit-
sharing masters of company policy remain the same. The transfer of debt security-holder merely 
effects a substitution of a special class of creditors. 
Yet the policy goal of protecting the investing public will apply in both the private and more closely 
held public company settings. First, from the perspective of the investing public (which, in the non-
listed environment, must be assumed to be unsophisticated in terms of investment acumen), 
 
 




protection against ill-advised lending seems equally important as protection against investment in 
unsound equity.152 
Ultimately, however, the policy position is primarily aimed at private companies, forming one of the 
two criteria underlying the private-public distinction (alongside the prohibition on offering securities 
to the public).153 Why? 
As shown in § 2 2 3 of Chapter 2, the regulation of the domestically influential English securities 
market was historically mainly left to private actors in the past. This was so despite a number of 
market failures experienced as a result of the increasingly public availability of the incorporated form. 
The noted exception to this principle, which is crucial for present purposes, was the emergence of 
stringent financial reporting and prospectus requirements for companies whose securities were 
publicly traded. As seen, this was adopted into company law by the English parliament primarily to 
minimise informational deficiencies (and outright fraud) in the more volatile, speculative and overly-
optimistic equity securities markets that arose around companies in the 18th and 19th centuries.  
The measure proved extremely successful and became a lasting feature of English company law. 
Consequentially, as part of South African law’s broader reception of English company law principles, 
stringent financial reporting became a key feature of domestic company legislation. It enjoyed similar 
success and, as shown in § 3 1 2 of Chapter 3, this regulatory tool featured prominently in the further 
refinement-by-commission of South African company law throughout the 20th century. It remains a 
vital control measure in the regulatory arsenal of company law even today.  
Yet the scope of application of this regulatory control measure was, and remains, subject to an 
important qualifier. Namely, where: (1) company securities are not traded in the public domain, or 
(2) the integrity of their financial information is otherwise not judged to be of systemic importance, 
the stability, efficacy, and degree of investor-protection of the securities and broader capital markets 
at large is not contingent on their being held to such stringent reporting standards. In fact, where 
either of those conditions are not met, the economic cost of imposing such high financial reporting 
standards on businesses outweighs the benefits the measure may have, and the net result is a 
chilling effect on entrepreneurship. In such cases the better overall policy choice seems to be to 
make it as cost- and resource-effective as possible to profitably establish and maintain small to 
medium sized businesses with the benefits of juristic personality and limited liability. 
 
 
152  It should be noted, though, that due to a lack of volatility (and thus scalable gains) relative to equity, speculation in 
debt securities would be almost, but not entirely, fruitless. See also Chapter 2, § 2 3 1. 




That, it is submitted, broadly underlies the essence of the public-private distinction with regard to 
companies. The distinction enables company law to apply different economically calibrated rules to 
companies which meet either of those criteria compared to those who do not. This calibration is 
naturally informed by the lawmaker of the day’s position on how company law, and thus companies 
themselves, can be harnessed in furtherance of the prevailing public and economic policy objectives 
of the legislature and executive government at any given time. 
If companies wish to make use of the access to public and institutional capital markets (and other 
benefits) that free transferability provides, they must comply with the stricter rules and regulatory 
control measures that apply to public companies. In modern form these measures have developed 
to include more than financial reporting and prospectus requirements, most notably now 
incorporating a far broader battery of requirements for public offerings of company securities, more 
stringent corporate governance requirements, and enhanced transparency measures (for example 
the maintenance of a register of beneficial owners of public company securities). Chapter 3 of the 
latest iteration of the Companies Act also attempts to address more directly cases where the second 
condition above is met, but the first is not, but this is a new feature of company law with little bearing 
on the argument at hand.  
Conversely, if companies opt not to avail themselves of the advantages of free and public 
transferability of their debt and equity, but at the same time free themselves of costly compliance 
obligations, they are compelled to restrict the transferability of their securities.  
Therefore, though stability of company ownership does not seem readily applicable to debt 
securities, its counterpart of investor protection alone appears a sufficiently sound policy basis for 
the restriction of the transferability of all securities.  
Whatever the underlying policy position, the fact remains that there are significant practical issues 
in formulating and implementing restrictions on company debt securities.  
Two illustrative restrictions are the pre-emption right for holders to take up debt securities pro rata 
to their existing holdings and the board of directors’ right to refuse any transfer. Based on the policy 
outcomes above, when these restrictions are used it would be wise to consider crafting a specifically 
bespoke mechanism for the restriction of transfer of debt securities, as those commonly used to 
restrict the transfer of equity may not be appropriate or effective. Perhaps there are even different, 




Regardless, the prohibition itself is unambiguous. This is well illustrated by the fact that all private 
companies with debt securities listed on the JSE had to convert into public companies in order to 
comply with s 8 of the Act.154  
Further, the precise nature of this prohibition was best addressed, though in the context of both 
shares and the 1973 Companies Act, by the court in Smuts v Booyens; Markplaas (Edms) Bpk v 
Booyens. The court begins with the impact of the nature of the private company on the nature of its 
shares, noting that:155 
“oordragsbeperkings ten aansien van aandele [is] ‘n onontbeerlike eienskap van ‘n privaatmaatskappy soos 
in die Wet omskryf. Die Wet bepaal by wyse van definisie dat ‘n privaatmaatskappy een is wat so ‘n 
beperking in sy statute bevat; by onstentenis hiervan is dit regtens onmoontlik dat die betrokke entiteit ‘n 
privaatmaatskappy kan wees. Dat die tersaaklike beperkings betrekking het op die regsaard en -essensie 
van só ‘n maatskappy is (soos later sal blyk) myns insiens van belang by die bepaling van hulle effek en 
betekenis…Die gebruik van die omvattende begrip “die reg” in art 20(1)(a) is opvallend. Dit dui op die 
wetgewing se bedoeling dat die aandeelhouer se [bevoegdheid] om die maatskappy se aandele 
hoegenaamd oor te dra in die statute beperk moet word.” 
This position is extended in the context of the 2008 Companies Act to all securities by means of s 
8(2). In s 20 of the Companies Act 6 of 1973, the restriction applies only to shares (though the 
prohibition on offers to the public extends also to debentures); the 2008 Act refers to all securities. 
The 1973 Act also stated expressly in s 91 that shares were transferable (impliedly: only) in the 
manner provided by the Act;156 in the 2008 Act, this provision’s equivalent is found in s 37(1), but 
also speaks only to shares. Nonetheless, because s 8(2) is the contextually operative provision and 
refers to “securities”, there is no ambiguity about the rule’s applicability to debt securities.  
Third, it requires a restriction of the transferability of these securities rather than merely a restriction 
on the right to transfer them.157 This quite firmly indicates an intent that speaks to intrinsic restrictions 
on the transferability of securities as “original incidents” of the underlying interest.158 It is further 
submitted that the portion of the Smuts ratio quoted above also, when read with s 8 of the Act, 
ensures that the restriction is operative regardless of whether the memorandum is part of the 
 
 
154  CIPC Non-binding Opinion of the Companies and Intellectual Property Commission in terms of s 188 (2) (b): 
Guidance on the interpretation of the provisions of the Companies Act, 2008, on the limitation of listing debt 
instruments on the JSE by private companies and the consequential effect of such listing) 2 April 2012.  
155  2001 (4) SA 15 (A) paras [8]-[9]. 
156  Smuts v Booyens; Markplaas (Edms) Bpk v Booyens 2001 (4) SA 15 (A) para [8]-[9]. 
157  See also PA Meskin et al Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (SI 11 – 2015) § 8 5 1[2G] – “It is submitted 
that "right to transfer" is much more limited than "transferability", but the authorities on the former should apply to 
the latter (but not vice versa).” 




constitutive arrangement of debt securities in question or not (and irrespective of the fact that s 15(6) 
of the Act limits the binding nature of the memorandum to shareholders and directors). Here it may 
also be reasoned that the nature of any security is subordinate – where relevant – to the nature of 
its issuer. In this case what is relevant is the manner in which that issuer may or may not issue and 
then further deal with all classes of its securities. In other words, what is key is the effect of the 
memorandum on the issuer rather than its effect on the security itself.  
The memorandum, as the source and governing instrument of a company’s capacity to act, should 
be seen inherently to limit any secondary, contractual constitutive arrangement which creates debt 
securities. As discussed in Chapter 4,159 the ratio of Smuts indicates that an intrinsic restriction on 
the transferability of private companies’ securities is an a priori structural feature of those securities 
– in the court’s words an “[onontbeerlike] oorspronklike eienskap in die aandele self…”.160 The 
embeddedness of intrinsic restrictions is due to the nature of the company rather than wholly due to 
the nature of the security – i.e. private companies are private in part because the transferability of 
their shares is restricted. Here the thinking seems to be that the nature of the entity as “parent” is an 
overriding determinant of the nature of the security as “child”. Whilst company debt securities are 
not necessarily created with the company’s memorandum as constitutive source, the restriction itself 
must be contained in the memorandum. Therefore, any restriction applicable to any kind of security 
in the memorandum must inherently restrict the transferability of company debt securities as an 
implicit limitation upon, rather than within, the constitutive arrangement creating the security in 
question.161  
There is some authority for the view that this restriction only applies to a transfer of the underlying 
interest – i.e. asset-holdership.162 However, the better position appears to be reading a global effect 
into such restrictions, such that they extend to the transfer of security-, asset-, or instrument-
holdership of securities. This is for two main reasons.  
First is the superordinate effect of the restriction as emanating from the memorandum – its terms, in 
accordance with s 8(2), must reside within the memorandum. Therefore any restriction as 
contemplated in that section should be seen as operative over the entire complex of underlying rights 
and competencies, affecting that complex as a whole, or in the words of the Smuts judgment “in die 
 
 
159  See § 4 1 1. 
160  Smuts v Booyens; Markplaas (Edms) Bpk v Booyens 2001 (4) SA 15 (A) para [17]. 
161  See also Yeats et al Commentary 2008 2-835 on the difference between intrinsic and extrinsic restrictions. 
162  This is the view in both Blackman et al Commentary 5-5-185 – 5-186, supported in FHI Cassim et al Contemporary 




volle en tegniese sin van die woord”,163 as they must – and will – be governed by the Act and the 
memorandum in this regard. 
The second is more practical – the likely presence (in the case of debt securities) of a trustee 
(fiduciary or in the fuller technical sense). Such a representative would hold more power and 
responsibility than is evident in the agency of an instrument-holder acting for a single asset-holder, 
as she directly or indirectly exercises the incidents of execution on behalf of entire classes of asset-
holders. A broader interpretation of the meaning of “restriction”, extending it also to instrument-
holdership, protects the stability of arrangements of trust despite changes in asset-holdership. 
Moreover, such arrangements are typically institutionalised rather than voluntary. The power to 
prevent transfer of instrument-holdership to someone other than a soon to be (collectively) appointed 
trustee would be an important element of the maintenance of such an institutionalised arrangement.  
Accordingly, any individual incident or subsidiary set of incidents should also similarly be incapable 
of cession (e.g. the granting of a pledge or quasi-usufruct over the debt security). In other words, 
these individual incident-functionalities are, as part of the whole, subject to the particular restriction 
in question. Such a conclusion also aligns to, but ultimately also enhances the clarity of, the common 
law position (as confirmed in case law) on the pactum de non cedendo. Specifically, such an 
agreement “excludes not merely a transfer made with a view to the alienation of the right, but also 
cession in securitatem debiti.”164 
Finally, any supplemental restrictions contained in the constitutive arrangement of company debt 
securities should probably be (rebuttably) presumed additional to, rather than in fulfilment of, the 
restriction envisioned in s 8.165 This, no doubt, does not resolve all tension in these instances, but it 
must be put beyond the scope of this work to explore this particular matter any further (except to the 





163  Smuts v Booyens; Markplaas (Edms) Bpk v Booyens 2001 (4) SA 15 (A) para [10]. 
 This view is subjected to some debate and critique in Yeats et al Commentary 2008 in the discussion from 2-879 
to 2-891, but the work ultimately concludes at 2-891 that: 
 “[i]n the Smuts case Cameron JA went so far as to hold that the statutory requirement that a private company must restrict 
the transferability of its shares [read: securities] required a company to restrict transfers in the ‘full technical sense’, which can 
be read as precluding private companies from only restricting a transfer of registered title. In so far as this was intended, the 
view is not supported, but as a ruling of the Supreme Court, it is a binding statement of the law, until it is overturned.” 
164  Van der Merwe et al Contract 407, citing in n 175 Britz v Sniegocki 1989 (4) SA 372 (D) 382-383 and Trustees of 
the Insolvent Estate of Foley v Natal Bank (1883) 4 NLR 26 (as additional persuasive authority). See also Van Der 
Berg v Transkei Development Corporation 1991 (4) SA 78 (Tk). 




8 3 2  Restrictions on the transferability of securities created by contract 
The next question is whether the same can be said for non-company debt securities’ internal 
features, where no public-private distinction is operative. 
The answer lies in a secondary line of inquiry – to what extent is the constitutive function fulfilled by 
company memoranda in the creation and regulation of company securities analogous to that of the 
contractual arrangement creating those debt securities not issued by companies? 
Whilst there are undeniable differences between memoranda of incorporation and contracts, both 
are a species of what English law would refer to as a broader class of “covenants”. More importantly, 
both fulfil a constitutive function in the creation of securities.  
Thus it should be asked whether the principles of the previous section can be applied without 
qualification to contractually constituted securities and, if not, to what extent certain isolated 
elements of the court’s reasoning may be applied nonetheless. 
As discussed above, there are two main underlying considerations that have bearing on the nature 
of restricted shares and the nature of those restrictions. The first consideration is that restrictions on 
private company securities hinge on the nature of the private company as legal entity.166 This 
underlying rationale obviously cannot apply to non-company issued debt securities.  
The second consideration is the binding effect of the memorandum amongst shareholders. Here a 
binding memorandum and a binding contract between security issuer and security holder(s) are of 
the same effect, enabling the application of a very similar argument, and it is submitted that the 
principles of restrictions on the transferability of company securities can be applied to non-company 
securities on this basis alone.  
Like most, if not all, company debt securities, a non-company debt security is issued in terms of a 
contract; unlike company debt securities, there is no memorandum of incorporation exerting 
additional influence on the governance of the issuer-holder relationship (aptly illustrated by the fact 
that it is the memorandum, not the contract, which must contain restrictions on the transfer of 
company securities). A memorandum, as a species of covenant, can be said, among other things, 
to regulate a very complex set of relationships between a multitude of stakeholder interests in a 
commercial enterprise. The most striking result is that it has a majoritarian or democratic element 
not evidenced in the more binary terms of contracts in the narrower sense.  
 
 




Contracts, though they may be multilateral, are more absolute in their functioning. There is little need 
to discount any interests other than those of the issuer and holder, and where there is such a need 
the law as it relates to contract suffices. In other words, any argument on the binding quality of a 
contractual term restricting the transfer of contractual rights needs no additional strengthening. Thus, 
a supporting argument that the nature of the issuer reinforces the absolute nature of the restriction 
becomes unnecessary. The purely contractual nature of the restriction, rooted in the foundational 
legal value of private autonomy,167 is reason enough to assert its absoluteness in relation to the 
complex of rights and competencies it creates and governs.   
Nonetheless there is one very important qualifier to this statement. It is the exception which proves 
the rule. Any purely contractual pactum de non cedendo is qualified by the fact that “the prima facie 
right…to deal freely” with one’s rights (in this case securities) will not always “yield to contrary 
provisions ascertained on a correct construction” of the pactum.168 This is an easily overlooked 
subtlety in the underlying principles of these pacta – agreements to this effect are only valid where 
the debtor has a legitimate interest in restricting the creditor’s right to cede.  
Right-holders are, as a point of departure, free to deal with their rights as they see fit.169 However, 
the pactum de non cedendo (arising either at the time the right was created, or “at the time when the 
obligationary agreement preceding or accompanying the act of cession was concluded”) is a 
recognised restriction on this right, itself also underscored by the deeper legal value of autonomy.170 
 
 
167  See Lubbe “Cession” in LAWSA § 164; and Van der Merwe et al Contract 406.  
 See also GF Lubbe “Estoppel, vertouensbeskerming en die struktuur van die Suid-Afrikaanse privaatreg” (1991) 
Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 1 13-14 & n 97-111 for an excellent exposition of the principle of autonomy as 
a foundational element of legal policy informing horizontally operative legal rights and relationships.   
 Here it can be said that autonomy as value is made manifest in the law binding legal subjects by virtue of their 
mutual prior agreement to be bound, favouring the enforcement of a prior exercise of autonomy over any current 
desire to exercise autonomy in a conflicting manner. 
168   As suggested in Estate Milne v Donohoe Investments (Pty) Ltd 1967 (2) SA 359 (A) 370F-G in the case of shares.  
169  Lubbe “Cession” in LAWSA § 161 & n 1-2. 
170   The power and effect of the value of individual autonomy to create and be held accountable to what has been 
agreed upon is reduced in the far more complex, and multilateral, constellation of competing interests inherent in 
the commercial juristic form.  
This must surely to some degree have driven the statutory creation of a majoritarian dispensation in the memoranda 
of incorporation of companies. It is submitted that the role of the memorandum as a multilateral interest-discounting 
instrument is supported by the work of leading so-called theorists of the firm, specifically in the notion of a company 
as a “nexus of contracts” (see most importantly M Jensen & WH Meckling “The theory of the firm: managerial 
behavior, agency costs, and ownership structure” 3 (1976) Journal of Finance and Economics 305), and the 
coalescing of that nexus into a “firm as a co-ordinating third entity representing a contractual locus through which 
business is organised” (see H Hansmann & R Kraakman “Organizational law as asset partitioning” 44 (2000) 
European Economic Review 807 808-809). This is also briefly discussed in R Stevens & P de Beer “The duty of 
care and skill, and reckless trading: remedies in flux?” 28(2) (2016) South African Mercantile Law Journal 250 276-




These restrictions by agreement may be outright or be conditional.171 In this discussion, only pacta 
arising from a constitutive arrangement creating a security are of interest. In these cases:172 
“the restraint is a characteristic of the right itself. From its inception the right lacks the attribute of 
transmissibility. Since a cedent is unable to transfer a better title to another than his or her own, it ought to 
follow that any cession effected in defiance of the undertaking should be without legal effect…Yet…ever 
since Paiges v Van Ryn Gold Mine Estates Ltd, the approach has been that a contractual restraint cannot 
be enforced unless it served some or other functional purpose or interest of the party, be it debtor or cedent, 
in whose favour it was stipulated. The rationale seems to be that a restraint per se would tend to impede 
the free flow of commerce.” 
The approach of the Paiges dicta173 appears to operate on the grounds that “a contractual restriction 
on the creditor’s capacity to dispose of a right is contrary to public policy, unless justified by some 
legitimate interest on the part of the debtor”.174  
Yet a number of cases take a differentiated stance in instances where the restriction is an intrinsic 
one (i.e. was created alongside the right itself). Most notable is Trust Bank of Africa Ltd v Standard 
Bank of SA, in which the court stated (in an obiter dictum) that the principles relating to the validity 
requirement of a “functional purpose or interest of the party”:175 
“do not, however, apply where the right is created with a restriction against alienation, and the restriction is 
contained in the very agreement recording the right, for in such a case the right itself is limited by the 
stipulation against alienation and can be relied upon by the debtor for whose benefit the stipulation was 
made.” 
Opponents of this view would rather that the distinction be scrapped in favour of a policy-aware 
inquiry into the legitimacy of the creditor’s interest, including an element that examines the underlying 
reasons why the debtor opposes the transfer. This requires elevating the policy considerations at 
 
 
171  See Jeffery v Pollak & Freemantle 1938 AD 1; Lubbe “Cession” in LAWSA § 163 & n 13; as well as Van der Merwe 
et al Contract 407. 
172  Lubbe “Cession” in LAWSA § 164. See further: Paiges v Van Ryn Gold Mines Estates Ltd 1920 AD 600 617; and 
MTK Saagmeule (Pty) Ltd v Killyman Estates (Pty) Ltd 1980 (3) SA 1 (A) 11. This is also supported by Vawda v 
Vawda 1980 (2) SA 341 (T); Smuts v Booyens; Markplaas (Edms) Bpk v Booyens 2001 (4) SA 15 (A); Van der 
Merwe et al Contract 406; GF Lubbe & CM Murray Farlam & Hathaway: Contract – Cases, Materials and 
Commentary 3 ed (1988) 654-656; and Yeats et al Commentary 2008 2-875 – 2-876. 
173   Paiges v Van Ryn Gold Mines Estates Ltd 1920 AD 600 615-617. 
174   Van der Merwe et al Contract 406 & n 165. 
175   1968 3 SA 166 (A) 189 [own emphasis]. Similar views are found in Britz v Sniegocki 1989 (4) SA 372 (D) 382; 
Italtrafo Sp A v Electricity Commission 1978 (2) SA 705 (W) 711; and Capespan (Pty) Ltd v Any Name 




play to form part of each dispute, and subsuming the legitimacy requirement into that broader policy-
consideration discounting part of the inquiry.176 
Which position is most appropriate in the context of debt securities?177 
The most prominent, and perhaps in practice the only, non-company debt securities are those issued 
by government. By way of example, the (unsecured) RSA Inflation Linked Retail Savings Bond 
issued by the National Treasury, contains the following provision: 
“17.  TRANSFER OF RETAIL SAVINGS BONDS  
 17.1.   Retail Savings Bonds shall not be transferable and may not be sold or redeemed by the 
Investor, except in accordance with the provisions of clauses 11 and 13 above.   
  
 17.2.   Registered Holders shall not be entitled to encumber or transfer any of their rights in the 
Retail Savings Bonds to any third parties, save that transfer to a third party shall be 
permitted in the event of the death of the Registered Holder and in accordance with the 
provisions of clause 18 below.”  
The scheme of the issue demonstrates a clear interest on the part of the borrower to restrict the 
transferability of these securities in § 3 (“Purpose and Objectives of the Issue), as being: 
“3.1.   The purpose of the Issue is to raise funds to be utilised for the general  purposes of the 
Government.  
 3.2.    The main objectives of the issue inter alia are the following: 3.2.1. to create awareness amongst 
the general public of the importance to save; 3.2.2. to diversify the financial instruments on offer to 
the market; and 3.2.3. to target a different source of funding.” 
As a matter of government policy, the state-as-debtor has an undeniably defensible macroeconomic 
interest in denying the security-holders the right to transfer the security – namely increasing private 
saving through bond purchases. 
In the majority of cases such a policy-aware inquiry into whether there is a “functional purpose” or 
legitimate “debtor’s interest” is essentially moot, as any litigant will typically have little difficulty 
 
 
176   See notably D Hutchison “Agreements in restraint of cession: time for a new approach” (2016) 27(2) Stellenbosch 
Law Review 273, and Yeats et al Commentary 2008 2-876 – 2-878 & n 497-505 in support of the discussion. 
However, while giving an excellent treatment to the issue, the latter authority takes a (qualified) position in favour 
of the distinction in this context. 
177   The point remains potentially unresolved and was not pronounced upon by the SCA in Smuts v Booyens; Markplaas 




providing at least a precursory interest or function in such a restriction. Thus, the traditional 
formulation of the validity requirement, even if applicable to restrictions created at inception, is of 
little practical value as legal rule, and perhaps one could even go so far as to suggest that:178  
“would-be cessionaries who take cession without reasonable inquiry as to the existence and transferability 
of the subject matter of the proposed cession, do so at their own risk.” 
The preferred approach in this work is to retain the qualification – i.e. that this requirement only 
applies to extrinsic restrictions.  
Finally, is the extent of any such restriction analogous to those that are in memoranda of companies 
and are applied to company securities, and thus of holistic, global effect? Subject to interpretive 
exceptions that may be found in specific agreements to restrict transferability, it seems so. It is fairly 
settled that such a pactum includes all forms of limited cession.179 For this reason, it is submitted 
that the default position must be that a restriction includes transfer of both the security instrument 
and security asset, as well as any form of cession of an isolated incident-functionality or set of 
functionalities (e.g. in the case of a quasi-usufruct or cession in securitatem debiti), as described in 
Chapter 4. 
 
8 4  Transmission of debt securities 
The concept of transmission is currently understood to denote a change in asset-holdership in a 
manner other than transfer, and excludes the devolution of instrument- or security-holdership.180 The 
locus classicus in this regard is the English decision of Barton v London & North Western Railway 
Co, where it was stated that:181 
“‘transmission’ appears to be used in contradistinction to ‘transfer’, and to include devolution by death, 
bankruptcy, marriage, and in any other way than by transfer.”  
 
 
178  Van der Merwe et al Contract 406 & n 170, citing Trust Bank of Africa Ltd v Standard Bank of SA 
1968 (3) SA 166 (A) generally. 
179  Van der Merwe et al Contract 406 & 167-168.  
There is also an excellent and detailed discussion of this issue, albeit in the context of company securities, in Yeats 
et al Commentary 2008 2-879 – 2-891. 
180  This is the position taken in Blackman et al Commentary 5-371 and n 3 therein. Transfer is defined in § 7 above as: 
“the voluntary conveyance of the rights of a security-holder, as contained in a (pre-existing) security, from a person who 
wishes to cease to be, to a person who wishes to become, a holder of that security” 




This, together with the definition of transfer offered at the start of this chapter, should make the 
essence of transmission quite clear – a change in holdership of the patrimonial essence of a security 
by operation of law. The key characteristic in the transmission of securities, thus, seems to be the 
fact there is no element of legal voluntariness in the transfer of the security asset.  
Involuntary changes in ownership of things – i.e. change in ownership by operation of law – must be 
distinguished from cases where it is not desired by the disposing party, but the act in essence 
remains voluntary. This can be seen as factual voluntariness. The best example of these cases of 
transfer is a change in ownership in accordance with an order of court. Conversely, in the case of 
transmission, the disposing party may wish the change in ownership, but it will still occur by operation 
of law – the best example here is a merging of estates by marriage. These principles are easily 
applicable to asset-holdership in the securities context. 
Thus, the list provided by the Barton case is highly instructive and it is hard to dispute that most 
cases revolve around death, insolvency, and marriage or civil union. However, it should not be seen 
as a closed list, and may include any change in asset-holdership occurring automatically through the 
operation of a legal principle that has been activated by a particular factual matrix.  
Four important issues are most relevant in the present discussion. The first concerns transmission 
of certificated security-assets upon the death of an asset-holder. Under the South African law of 
succession:182 
“a beneficiary…never becomes owner of the inherited assets immediately upon the death of the 
deceased…Succession is thus itself not a mode of acquiring ownership. The most a beneficiary can obtain 
upon the death of the deceased (if vesting of rights has already occurred) is a claim (personal right) against 
the executor of the deceased estate. The content of the right is that, upon completion of the process of 
administration of the estate, the executor must transfer the bequeathed assets to the beneficiary. Only upon 
transfer of the assets (in the appropriate manner) will the beneficiary become owner of the assets.  
This naturally raises the question of who owns the assets of the estate in the period between the death of 
the of the deceased and the transfer of the assets to the beneficiaries.” 
This final question requires investigation, as the true complexity seemingly arises in the estate 
administration process. The position regarding the deceased estate is also useful in that it is 
generally representative of the most important dynamics of other cases of estate administration. In 
terms of the law of succession, once dies cedit has arrived, but before dies venit, the:183 
 
 
182  See MJ de Waal & MC Schoeman-Malan Law of Succession 5 ed (2015) 10-11. 




“executor does not step into the shoes of the deceased on his death; he does not succeed to the person of 
the deceased. He is simply required to administer and distribute his estate…” 
The most authoritative, and useful, view on the deeper legal position is that “the executor of the 
deceased estate is the owner of the assets in his or her official capacity during the period of the 
administration of the estate…”.184 This implies that the executor or administrator of the estate must 
become asset-holder, albeit nomine officii, until the discharging of the obligation to transfer asset-
holdership to the appropriate beneficiary. As will be shown below, that is indeed the position with 
respect to instrument-holdership. Unfortunately, neither the exact nature of a deceased estate nor 
the nature of the executor nor administrator’s relationship to it are clear, so that no definitive answer 
regarding transmission of the security asset can be given. 
All that might be said in this regard is that it cannot be accepted that the security asset is, for the 
duration of the administration of the estate, a res nullius. It is also, as previously mentioned, not 
regarded as the property of the appropriate beneficiary during this period. As a result, despite not 
enjoying widespread acceptance, the “ownership nomine officii” construct provides the most 
reasonable and practicable set of legal outcomes.  
For this reason, it is submitted that upon the death of the deceased the security asset is transmitted 
to the executor or administrator in her official capacity until she duly transfers the asset to the 
appropriate beneficiary. Accordingly, this is to be regarded as a unique form of holdership (i.e. 
“ownership”) of the patrimonial substance of the security (or, where there is more than one executor 
or administrator, co-holdership). This also makes clear the position of the instrument-holder at the 
time of the death of the asset-holder. Until the executor or administrator also becomes instrument-
holder nominee officii (see below), the principles of the sui generis agency of the instrument-holder 
must apply, and her duties of representation must automatically become effective against the 
nominal asset-holder upon transmission of the asset. 
This also appears to accord with historical best practice as evidenced by the model memorandum 
provided in Table B of Schedule 1 of the 1973 Companies Act (neither forms CoR15.1A nor 
CoR15.1B associated with the 2008 Act suggest terms in this regard), which provided as follows: 
“16. The executor of the estate of a deceased sole holder of a share shall be the only person recognised 
by the company as having any title to the share. In the case of a share registered in the names of two or 
more holders, the survivors or survivor, or the executor of the deceased survivor shall be the only persons 
recognised by the company as having any title to the share. 
 
 




17. Any person becoming entitled to a share in consequence of the death or insolvency of a member shall, 
upon such evidence being produced as may from time to time be required by the directors, have the right, 
either to be registered as a member in respect of the share or instead of being registered himself, to make 
such transfer of the share as the deceased or insolvent could have made, but the directors shall, in either 
case, have the same right to decline or suspend registration as they would have had in the case of a transfer 
of the share by the deceased or insolvent before the death or insolvency. 
18. The parent or guardian of a minor and the curator bonis of a lunatic member and any person becoming 
entitled to shares in consequence of the death or insolvency of any member or the marriage of any female 
member or by any lawful means other than by transfer in accordance with these articles, may, upon 
producing such evidence as sustains the character in which he proposes to act under this article, or of his 
title, as the directors think sufficient, transfer those shares to himself or any other person, subject to the 
articles as to transfer hereinbefore contained. 
This article is hereinafter referred to as the 'transmission clause'. 
19. A person becoming entitled to a share by reason of the death or insolvency of the holder shall be entitled 
to the same dividends and other advantages to which he would be entitled if he were the registered holder 
of the share, except that he shall not, before being registered as a member in respect of the share, be 
entitled in respect of it to exercise any right conferred by membership in relation to meetings of the 
company.” 
It seems clear that the intent of the above is to deal with the issue of a change in asset-holdership 
by operation of law despite no formal change in instrument-holdership. This appears to be confirmed 
in clause 19 (the “transmission clause”) in its providing for benefits “to which he would be entitled if 
he were the registered holder of the share”.  
A key issue in this section, however, is the position with respect to the security instrument. Here it 
should be considered whether it is settled that transmission can only, as per the view of Blackman 
et al,185 apply to changes in asset-holdership and that it does not extend to changes in instrument-
holdership. Again the most illustrative example, yielding principles of wider application, is the death 
of a nominee instrument-holder. In the absence of express alternate arrangements, would the death 
of an instrument-holder cause holdership of the security instrument to pass by operation of law to an 
heir?  
Both the 1926 and 1973 Companies Acts enabled the use of nominees in the same manner, best 
expressed by s 104 of the latter: 
 
 
185  Blackman et al Commentary 5-371 n 3. This is also broadly supported in Yeats et al Commentary 2008, specifically 





“A company shall not be bound to see to the execution of any trust, whether express, implied or constructive 
in respect of any share.” 
This has been taken to have meant that a company was barred from registering any person acting 
in a representative capacity on its register. The important exception, however, was persons 
authorised to act nomine officii, as per s 103(3) of the Act: 
“A company shall, subject to the provisions of its articles, enter into the register as a member, nomine officii, 
of the company, the name of any person who submits proof of his appointment as the executor, 
administrator, trustee, curator, or guardian in respect of the estate of a deceased member of the company 
or of a member whose estate has been sequestrated or of a member who is otherwise under disability or 
as the liquidator of any body corporate in the course of being wound up which is a member of the company, 
and any person whose name has been so entered, in the register shall for the purposes of this Act be 
deemed to be a member of a company.” 
Whether the broader position that an executor or administrator of a deceased estate “owns” the 
assets of the estate nomine officii is ultimately correct or not, this provision provided a statutory basis 
for the legal position regarding, at least, instrument-holdership of shares. Section 56 of the current 
Companies Act appears to have a similar import – the executor may, upon presentation of her 
authority, be entered into the register and is therefore the instrument-holder nomine officii.  
This narrows the issue down to what the position is between the death of the deceased and the 
registration of the executor or administrator as nomine officii instrument-holder or in cases where no 
such registration occurs. In Chapter 4, it was shown: (1) that the security instrument is a legal object 
capable of holdership and cession because it has extra-juridical usefulness; but also (2) that it is not 
a patrimonial object. By its definition it is what remains where the patrimony (derived from the 
collective entitlements of enjoyment) of the underlying interest resides elsewhere in the security 
asset.186  
This provides a clearer understanding. The definition of an estate is the sum of the assets and 
liabilities, and the security instrument is a non-patrimonial object – thus it is incapable of being viewed 
as an asset. The relevant principles of the law of succession are only applicable to assets. As the 
instrument is not an asset, those elements of legal framework of succession are simply not 
applicable. The security instrument does not and cannot devolve. It follows that the security-
instrument must, on instruction from the asset-holder to the executor or administrator of that estate, 
be transferred to the former’s chosen successor. This is also in line with the applicable provisions of 
the Companies Acts past and present. 
 
 




Although this will not happen often, the nature of instrument holdership means there is in fact no 
reason a security cannot, for a short period of time, have no instrument-holder. Its patrimonial 
substance remains owned (it is not a res nullius), but that substance simply cannot be realised or 
enforced until a new instrument-holder is entered onto the register. A similar position, to further 
illustrate the defensibility of this argument, exists in the time between a court order being handed 
down to rectify a company register and the time the register is rectified – could one say that during 
that time the underlying complex of rights and competencies are enforceable? The company could 
not recognise either the registered holder (due to the court order), nor the person in whose favour it 
is granted (it may only recognise the person on the register). One may even go so far as to say that 
in this very short period of time the obligations (and other private law relationships) are temporarily 
natural, rather than civil, in nature. Another example is the factual scenario found in Brink and 
Others v Mampudi Mining (Pty) Ltd187 – registration in the name of a person or trust that does not 
exist.  
In Lurie v Sacks and Another188 the court held that a provision in a company’s articles of association 
stating “until transfer has been effected [a person entitled to a share should] be entitled to the same 
dividends and advantages to which he would be entitled if he were the registered holder of the 
shares” did not cause the executors of the deceased shareholder’s estate to be entitled to attend 
and act at company meetings until they were duly entered nomine officii on the company share 
register.189 Presumably, in line with the transmission clause under the 1973 Act, this ensured the 
passing of benefits while prohibiting the exercise of other competencies as conferred by holdership 
of the asset and instrument. 
Nonetheless, the authors in Commentary 2008 argue that “on balance, the authorities favour 
references to a ‘shareholder’ in the memorandum of incorporation being read as including the estate 
of a deceased holder of securities with the estate being regarding as a metaphorical member prior 
 
 
187  2003 (5) SA 221 (T), where the court held there was not sufficient cause to rectify the register. 
188  1972 (2) SA 396 (O). 
189  Article 18 of Table A in Schedule 1 to the Companies Act of 1973 contained the following: 
 “18. A person becoming entitled to a share by reason of the death or insolvency of the holder shall be entitled to the same 
dividends and other advantages to which he would be entitled if he were the registered holder of the share, except that he 
shall not, before being registered as a member in respect of the share, be entitled in respect of it to exercise any right conferred 
by membership in relation to meetings of the company. 
  Article 19 effectively replicated the wording of s 103(3) of that Act, and the latter stated: 
 “A company shall, subject to the provisions of its articles, enter in the register as a member, nomine officii, the name of any 
person who submits proof of his appointment as the executor, administrator, trustee, curator or guardian in respect of the 
estate of a deceased member of the company or of a member who is otherwise under disability or as the liquidator of any 
body corporate in the course of being wound up which is a member of the company, and any person whose name has been 
so entered in the register shall for the purposes of the Act be deemed to be member of the company.” 
 A Milne (ed), C Nathan, K Lamont Smith & P Meskin Henochsberg on the Companies Act 3 ed (1975) further remark 
regarding article 18 in light of the Lurie judgement at 789 that “[i]t is doubtful whether, in the absence of any provision 
specifically giving the right to vote, a person is entitled by transmission but not registered as a member is entitled 




to the executor becoming a de facto member by way of registration”. The authors support the notion 
of “metaphorical membership”, which should really rather be expressed as putative instrument-
holdership under the 2008 Act, by noting that from a policy (and presumably practical) perspective 
this is a sensible manner in which to approach the state of affairs.190  
While the argument is persuasive, it requires an examination into the construct and nature of 
executorship that is beyond the scope of this work. It is suggested, however, that a basis for 
recognition of a putative instrument-holdership may be found in the statement by the court in Van 
den Bergh v Coetzee that “the executor does not step into the shoes of the deceased; he does not 
succeed to the person of the deceased. He is simply required to administer and distribute his 
estate…”191 What the statement seems to evince is that at the core of the nature of executorship, 
whatever its legal form, is an ability to enable the executor to administer the estate of the deceased, 
and it appears quite plausible that a putative instrument-holdership should be recognised as a 
necessary component of that ability. 
On the same basis – i.e. that an estate excludes non-patrimonial legal objects – it can be argued 
that this conclusion applies mutatis mutandis to curators or trustees of insolvent estates of 
instrument-holding persons.192 There is no loss of instrument-holdership in these cases, but the 
person able to exercise the incidents that come with instrument-holdership is nonetheless also no 
longer the person named on the register. The merging of estates by marriage or civil union could 
also abide by this rule. If a security-holder’s estate is merged, instrument-holdership simply becomes 
instrument-holdership – as a sui generis form of agency – for the security asset as patrimony in the 
new, merged estate. If a mere instrument-holder’s estate is merged there is no transmission of 
security-instrument, as it has been shown to be out of scope of the estate per se (this must not be 
confused with the merger of legal entities as specifically regulated by the Companies Act). The same 
position probably could not apply to liquidations, as the legal subjectivity of a juristic instrument-
holder in liquidation does not come to an end or change hands in a similar manner, and 
arrangements for a new instrument-holder would naturally occur during the process of winding down. 
The third issue to be dealt with in context is the transmission of uncertificated securities. In dealing 
with the changing of “ownership” of securities, the FMA relies on s 53 of the Companies Act of 2008. 
Transmission is dealt with specifically in s 53(6) and also in s 38(1)(c) of the FMA; though similar, 
the latter is the more comprehensive formulation providing: 
 
 
190  Yeats et al Commentary 2008 2-863 – 2-864 [own emphasis]. 
191  2001 (4) SA 93 (T) 95. 




“Nothing in this section prejudices any power of a participant or central securities depository, as the case 
may be, to effect a transfer to a person to whom the right to any uncertificated securities or an interest in 
uncertificated securities referred to in paragraph has been transmitted by operation of law.” 
This would appear to mean that where a person has furnished a CSD or CSDP with sufficient proof 
that the transmission of asset-holdership has indeed taken place, a register entry must be effected 
to give effect to the transmission. The instrument-holder in question will simply be regarded as the 
sui generis agent of the (new) owner by transmission from the time the transmission was legally 
effective. Because, as shown above, instrument-holdership is not an asset and cannot devolve, there 
can be no transmission of an instrument-holder. This also means that where an instrument-holder is 
a natural person, the underlying complex of rights and other competencies of security may be briefly 
unenforceable in the case of her death or in cases of a less final loss of legal capacity. 
The fourth issue is the matter of interests in securities (dealt with more fully in the section which 
follows). This issue can also be put to rest with relative ease. The transmission of these limited real 
interests (i.e. isolated incident functionalities of securities) appear to be no different to transmission 
of the entirety of the security asset. Interests in securities are real in nature, they are patrimonial, 
and their real effect is rooted, factually, in the holders’ effective control over the instrument-holder. 
This effectively means that transfer and transmission of these interests can be dealt with on the 
same basis as the transmission of asset-holdership itself. The sole exception, of course, could be 
the possibility of the granting of a personal servitude – this is dealt with in Chapter 9. 
It naturally remains open for any provision in the constitutive arrangement of a security (including 
not only acquiring contracts or similarly constitutive contractual instruments, but also where 
appropriate the memorandum of incorporation of the issuer) to deal with these matters differently. 
The only proviso is that the provisions are permissible in terms of general law and not contra bonos 
mores. An example of a provision incompatible with general law would be a provision that provides 
for the transmission (upon the death of the security-, asset-, or instrument-holder) of the ability to 
compel the company to pay dividends to a third party who is not the executor of the estate, but 
without bestowing on her instrument-holdership. This would amount to the acquisition of rights as 
against the company in respect of dividends, but ultimately contravenes the correct reading of s 
37(9) of the Companies Act of 2008, making the provision unlawful. However, a similar bestowal of 
the right to receive the ultimate patrimonial substance of the dividends in own capacity would not – 
it would merely amount to the bestowal of a limited real right enforceable against the instrument-
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9  Limited (real) interests in securities 
It was established in Chapter 4 that securities’ incident-functionalities may serve as legal objects to 
(the creation of) secondary rights on three levels. There may be (lawful) holdership of: (1) the 
security; (2) the asset or instrument on its own; or (3) any of the more specific incident-functionalities 
that can be isolated from within the underlying interest. It was further noted that on the level of 
incidents, individual incident-functionalities of a security are not necessarily or always legal objects. 
Instead, they are made so, dynamically, by the specific exercise of legal subjectivity through holding 
an element or elements of the broader subjective rights (and relationships) content of the security.1 
In other words it is more accurate to state that they are capable of functioning as, rather than ab 
initio are, legal objects. 
It is fairly trite that in the case of corporeals, the ability to grant secondary limited real rights is a 
function of bestowing physical control over the object upon the acquirer of such a right together with 
the requisite kind of animus. The former is traditionally referred to as possession according to the 
majority of property law authorities, but has been reconceptualised as effective control by Van der 
Walt. It is simple to understand, for instance, in the case of a right of use of a car – the keys to the 
car coupled with access to the car provides effective physical control, such that together with the 
correct corresponding intentions, a real right is effectively constituted.  
It can generally (but not always)2 be accepted that only one person can have effective control, or 
possession, of a corporeal thing at any given moment.3 In this regard, a key doctrinal challenge 
 
 
1  See § 4 1 and § 4 3 2. A good example would be the act of granting a usufruct.  
2  See AJ van der Walt & GJ Pienaar Introduction to the Law of Property 6 ed (2009) § 13.3.5, 191. 




posed by incorporeals in general, at the level of rights, is that this does not seem to be the case. 
Rather, it seems that different persons are able to establish effective control, simultaneously, over 
different elements of the security as objects of that control.4 This could facilitate the establishment 
of multiple limited proprietary relationships of holdership – i.e. limited real rights – that are 
simultaneously exercisable, which is ostensibly not true of corporeals.  
The outcomes of Chapter 4, specifically in § 4 3 2, outlining effective factual control as control of the 
instrument-holder held in relation to a specific legal object, assists greatly with this issue. Effective 
factual control of an incorporeal, coupled with the correct form of intention, gives one effective control 
– a functionally superior construct to the “drogbegrip”5 of quasi-possessio. Factual control may 
manifest lawfully as a facet of the agency implicit in instrument-holdership, or unlawfully as mere 
control over the instrument-holder sine iusta causa. It may be exercised over the security asset (as 
object) or subsidiary and more limited legal objects created from the content of that asset. Most 
importantly, effective control may be exercised in this manner over different elements of a security 
simultaneously.  
However, crucially, effective control over a specific incident-functionality rising from, for example, a 
security cannot be held simultaneously by two people – i.e. simultaneous control over a personal 
right is possible, but simultaneous control over a specific legal object gleaned from that right (at the 
level of incidents) is not possible.  This is the key to grasping how various contemporary yet effective 
proprietary interests in securities – i.e. limited real rights – may be established.  
 
9 1  Real security – cession in securitatem debiti  
In this section it is neither necessary nor appropriate to outline, discuss, and evaluate all the salient 
legal principles relating to: mortgages in the broader sense, pledge as a species of mortgage,6 or 
even cession in securitatem debiti of ordinary obligations. These areas of law enjoy a rich and deep 
wealth of judicial and academic analysis, and they do not require any wholesale re-evaluation within 
the context of this work. All that is required here is a discussion of the application of the principles of 
Chapters 4 and 5 to those legal rules and principles that are relevant to the cession in securitatem 
 
 
4  However, see Chapter 4, § 4 3 2 2. 
5  “Sham concept” – as per GF Lubbe “Sessie in securitatem debiti en die komponente van die skuldeisersbelang” 
(1989) 52 Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 490 492 n 42. 





debiti of securities. In that regard, also, the work of Chapter 4 (and specifically in § 4 3 2) need not 
be repeated or summarised here – it will merely be drawn upon as required. 
 
9 1 1  Certificated securities 
There are two kinds of cession in securitatem debiti. The first is the so-called “out and out” cession 
of an obligation to secure a debt (typically with an agreement to reverse the cession once the 
principal debt is extinguished without the event of default). This is also referred to as a “fiduciary 
cession” (a type of pactum cum fiduciae), wherein the creditor agrees to re-cede the obligation to 
the debtor once repayment of the principal debt has occurred.7 It may take the form of an out-and-
out transfer of security-holdership as a whole, or the transfer of asset-holdership only, as both will 
broadly have the same economic and legal effect. There is nothing contentious about this kind of 
security cession and the applicable legal principles are clear when read with the discussion of the 
transfer of securities in Chapter 8, and will not be dealt with further. 
The second construction is a limited cession styled as the pledge of a moveable, incorporeal thing. 
The focus of this section will be on this pledge of a debt security in securitatem debiti. Thus, in this 
section and the next the term “cession in securitatem debiti” must be taken to refer to the pledge 
construction of the cession (unless the context indicates otherwise).  
In the generic construction of the pledge in securitatem debiti, the real right is bestowed on the 
pledgee by a limited cession of a specific component of the creditor’s interest – the entitlement of 
determination (beskikkingsbevoegdheid). This effectively isolates the pledge-object from further acts 
of determination (most often disposition) by the pledgor and provides the pledgee with the kind of 
control required to be able to realise the economic object underlying the pledge.8 
The potential problem with the use of this generic construction is that the underlying juridical 
principles which support this construction are the same principles which, in Chapter 4, enabled 
securities to be viewed as comprising of a security asset and instrument respectively. Yet, as a result 
of the fact that the entitlement of determination over the security’s total underlying interest resides, 
already isolated, within the security instrument, it cannot be “ceded out of” that instrument in 
 
 
7  See for instance Badenhorst et al Property § 16.8; MS Blackman, RD Jooste, GK Everingham, JL Yeats, FHI 
Cassim & R de la Harpe Commentary on the Companies Act: Volume 1 (RD 8 2011) § 133, 5-365 & n 4 and 5-368 
& n 1 (and numerous authorities cited therein); GF Lubbe (revised by TF Scott) “Mortgage and Pledge” in WA 
Joubert et al Law of South Africa Vol 17(2) (2 ed) 2008 § 180; or SWJ Van der Merwe, LF Van Huyssteen, MFB 
Reinecke & GF Lubbe Contract: General Principles 4 ed (2012) 425 & n 322. 




securitatem debiti. How then to effect the pledge of a debt security in a manner that creates a 
concrete limited real right in similar fashion? 
The answer lies in returning to first principles. In what is regarded in this work as the most 
authoritative, and accurate, statement on the nature of the pledge in securitatem debiti, a number of 
guiding principles are found in respect of the real agreement:9 
“dat nakoming daarvan [i.e. cession of the beskikkingsbevoegdheid] ‘n sekere mate van heerskappy oor 
die sekuriteitvoorwerp vir die sekerheidsnemer bewerkstellig. Sodoende word die sekuriteitsvoorwerp teen 
verdere beskikkingshandelinge deur die sekuriteitsgewer geïsoleer…Inderdaad is dit juis die element van 
feitelik-juridiese heerskappy wat, tesame met die publisiteitsfaktor, die jurdiese erkenning van die 
sekerheidsnemer se belang as ‘n saaklike reg veranker en regverdig…Dit bring onder meer mee dat die 
vereistes vir beheer in enige geval afhang van en bepaal word deur die geaardheid en eienskappe van die 
sekerheidsvoorwerp.” 
This provides three core principles. First, the real agreement must effect a certain measure of control 
for the pledgee over the economic object underlying the pledge (the “sekuriteitsvoorwerp”). Second, 
the measure of control must be sufficient to “isolate” that pledge object against further dispositive 
acts (“beskikkingshandelinge”) by the pledgor. This protection of the pledge object facilitates the 
juridical recognition, or concretisation, of the real right. Third, the nature and characteristics of the 
pledge object in question will be determinative of the requirements for the mastery (“heerskappy”), 
or perhaps rather control, necessary to establish this particular real right.  
These principles, thus, are of general use in understanding the deeper theoretical implications of the 
final acceptance of the pledge construction into South African law. Leyds v Noord-Westelike 
Koöperatiewe Landboumaatskappy Bpk10 is generally regarded as the watershed decision that 
cemented judicial acceptance of the pledge construction. Thereafter Grobler v Oosthuizen went 
further, confirming that pledge is in fact the default construction of a security cession.11 Yet the courts 
have not yet chosen explicitly to explain its underlying nature. This, it is submitted, does not matter, 
as: (1) the pledge in securitatem debiti is part of South African law; and (2) Lubbe’s submissions on 
the nature of that pledge represents, by some margin, the most convincing and practically coherent 
approach to the nature of the construction.  
 
 
9  Lubbe (1989) THRHR 491. See also GF Lubbe “Cession” in WA Joubert et al Law of South Africa Vol 3 (3 ed) 2013 
§ 180 n 19; GF Lubbe “Die verpanding van vorderingsregte en die regsdogmatiek - quo vadis?” (1991) 2 
Stellenbosch Law Review 131 145; and Van der Merwe et al Contract 430 & 366. 
10  1985 (2) SA 769 (A). 
11  2009 (5) SA 500 (SCA) [24]. See also Lubbe “Mortgage & Pledge”  in LAWSA § 180; Badenhorst et al Property § 




Adherence to these three principles makes it possible to arrive at a sound and practical construction 
of the pledge of securities, though one that differs slightly from the generic construction. 
To arrive at such a construction, one must re-examine the principle of the provision of mastery 
(“heerskappy”) as articulated above. This is said to hinge on the nature of the pledge object and thus 
the discussion must begin with a proper understanding of that object.  
From the broader field of mortgage and pledge it seems that the content of the right of pledge is 
typically described as the entitlement to sell in execution the property which has been pledged (or to 
share preferentially in the proceeds of its sale in attachment or insolvency, if applicable).12 It is further 
clear that this is a conditional entitlement, as it must be in a sense activated by the pledgor’s inability 
to settle the secured principal debt. As such the pledge object is clear – the thing itself. 
However, the pledge object is described differently in the pledging of (obligationary) incorporeals. In 
this regard, the following point of departure is particularly useful:13 
“The conceptual nature of the pledge construction has not been fully developed by the courts. Such 
indications as there are, however, suggest that the pledge of incorporeals is based on the idea of a limited 
cession to the cessionary of a particular component of the cedent’s interest in the performance due from 
the debtor, namely ‘the exclusive right to claim and receive…the amounts owing’…Such a limited cession 
invests the cessionary with control over the economic value inherent in the debtor’s performance, and as 
such it provides a basis for the recognition of a real right of pledge in favour of the cessionary…Strictly 
speaking, the real right exists in respect of the proceeds of performance due from the debtor, rather than 
in respect of the personal right itself.” 
Here the legal object of the pledge in securitatem debiti is described as the economic value of the 
result of the performance contemplated (“the proceeds of performance”), not the personal right itself. 
This is also in keeping with the manner in which this work defines a legal object as anything which 
can be said to have legal value by virtue of its extra-juridical usefulness.14 This also helps distinguish 
the legal object itself from the content (or entitlement) of the right, as the latter circumscribes what 
the legal subject as right-holder is enabled to do with respect to the former – i.e. realise the value of 
that object in execution. 
 
 
12  Badenhorst et al Property § 16.1, 358; Blackman et al Commentary § 133, 5-366 – 5-367 (including a multitude of 
authorities cited in n 1 on 5-367); GF Lubbe (revised by TF Scott) “Mortgage and Pledge” in WA Joubert et al Law 
of South Africa Vol 17(2) (2 ed) 2008 § 179; CG Van der Merwe Sakereg (1979) 470-471; and Van der Merwe et 
al Contract 429-430. 
13  Van der Merwe et al Contract 431-432 [own emphasis]. As an aside, the quoted portion describes the 
beskikkingsbevoegdheid as the ability to “claim and receive…the amounts owing”, but one should take it to refer, 
more precisely, to the ability to claim and receive the benefits of performance, as it is trite that performance does 
not necessarily have to take the form of payment of a sum of money. 




To relate this understanding of the legal object to the pledge of securities, consider as a point of 
departure the description of the pledge of shares by Blackman et al:15 
“Where the shareholder pledges his rights, the ‘dominium’ or ‘bare ownership’ in the rights pledged remain 
vested in him (the cedent) – just as the rights of ownership remain vested in the pledgor of corporeal 
movable property. This ‘dominium’ is said to be a ‘reversionary interest’ which, by operation of law, causes 
the pledged rights to be re-ceded to the cedent (pledgor) upon repayment of the indebtedness (and is 
based on the cedent’s interest in the debtor’s performance and is not a claim in contract for re-cession). 
The dominium is an attachable right, and on the insolvency of the cedent it entitles the trustee of his estate 
to control the realisation of the pledged asset. It has a money value, and can itself be ceded, and even 
pledged in securitatem debiti. 
The cessionary (pledgee) acquires a restricted ‘real’ right to the pledged right, which (absent the 
intervention of the cedent’s insolvency) entitles the cessionary to the exclusive right to enforce the ceded 
right, a right which he may exercise in the event of non-payment of the principal debt. If there remains a 
balance after the principal debt has been paid, the cedent can, on the ground of his reversionary interest, 
claim it.” 
Here, one observes a subtle return to a more traditional and proprietary description of pledge, which 
is unsurprising given the observation that securities are often treated as more proprietary than their 
obligationary nature technically accounts for. Nonetheless, one must arrive at an understanding 
which describes the pledge object in terms of the value of the result of performance, rather than 
merely borrowing vague terms such as “reversionary interest” from property law.  
This begins with the manner in which the courts have generally treated the concept of the 
“reversionary interest” in the context of pledge in securitatem debiti. In this regard, the dictum of 
Grobler v Oosthuizen is most useful:16 
“With regard to the meaning of this concept [the court a quo] referred to the following statement in Incledon 
(Welkom) (Pty) Ltd v Qwa-Qwa Development Corporation Ltd…: 
'When the company executed the [cession in securitatem debiti] it thus retained the ownership of its rights against 
the [principal debtor]…That ownership, as appears from the authorities, consists in a reversionary interest which 
entitled the owner (cedent) to claim the re-cession of the rights upon payment of the indebtedness.' [My emphasis.] 
In the light of this statement the full court understood…[the] reversionary interest to lie in a claim for re-
cession of the policies… 
 
 
15   Blackman et al Commentary § 133, 5-366 – 5-367 [own emphasis].  




The question is, however, whether that statement constitutes good authority. With respect, I think not. First, 
I believe it would simply amount to a recapitulation of the outright cession-cum-pactum fiduciae-
theory…Secondly, it is, in my view, in direct conflict with those decisions which held that a claim ceded in 
securitatem debiti automatically reverts to the cedent once the secured debt is extinguished. 
…Scott…explains the reasoning behind these decisions as follows, with reference to the analogy of a 
pledge: 
'The accessory nature of pledge has the effect that on the discharge of the principal debt, the right of pledge is 
automatically extinguished. In the case of a pledge of corporeals the pledgee is, after the extinction of the right of 
pledge, still in possession of the pledged article, which he must then hand over to the pledgor. In the case of a 
pledge of incorporeals where only the power to realise the right is transferred, this power reverts to the pledgor 
automatically rendering it unnecessary for the pledgee to re-cede it to him.’ 
… 
As to the real meaning of the cedent's ‘reversionary interest’, I can do no better than to refer to the following 
explanation by Nienaber JA in Development Bank of Southern Africa Ltd v Van Rensburg…with which I 
respectfully agree: 
‘This reversionary interest, properly understood, refers to the cedent's interest in the debtor's performance (i.e. 
satisfaction of the principal  debt by the debtor) rather than to his interest in the cessionary’s performance (i.e. re-
cession of the principal debt on satisfaction of the secured debt – which is [or would be] a right ex contractu against 
the cessionary).’” 
With this as background, it seems eminently sensible to construct a generic pledge in securitatem 
debiti around the limited cession of the entitlement of determination (beskikkingsbevoegdheid) of the 
pledged right. First, this provides the pledgee access to and control over the as-yet-unrealised 
economic value of the performance upon a default event – i.e. it provides what was quoted with 
approval in Grobler above as the “power to realise the right”. 17  Second, by leaving a “nude” 
entitlement of enjoyment (genotsbevoegdheid) with the pledgor, it concretises the notion of the 
reversionary interest as the “cedent’s [patrimonial] interest in the debtor’s performance”. 
Yet debt securities represent a far more complex conglomerate of underlying obligations and other 
competencies in comparison to standard obligations. What does that mean in terms of coming to an 
accurate description of the pledge object? 
Four salient characteristics of securities are a helpful starting point in formulating this description. 
First is the nature of the patrimonial substance of a security. It is holdership of a claim or set of claims 
to future performance or performances, holdership of which provides the holder with patrimonial 
 
 




value approximating the discounted future value of the performance or performances in question.18 
This implies that the patrimonial value of debt securities is variable in specific ways and also that the 
value of a debt security is determined by more than just its terms of repayment.  
From the above typological features, as well as the nature of the underlying substance of the 
security, the economic worth of a debt security is not only a function of the terms of its discounted 
future cash flow, but also of the relative value of its pay-out compared to others in the prevailing 
macro-economic environment. Sometimes the sum of a debt security’s future discounted cash flow 
is very similar to its market price and thus its asset value. However, external macro-economic 
variables may, and most often do, influence the market price of a debt security by making it a more 
or less desirable asset in a particular interest rate environment. Primarily, differences between the 
interest rate offered by the security and similar-term prevailing market interest rates create 
opportunities for interest rate arbitrage, causing some fluctuations in the value of a given debt 
security despite a stable and predictable cash flow. Secondarily, the economic health of the issuer 
(borrower) may also influence its price irrespective of its coupon structure, as it impacts the default 
risk associated with that security.  
Second, functioning as a holistic complex of underlying rights and other competencies, securities 
can be described as having an enhanced proprietary character, so that in some cases the law 
appears to reify securities more than their obligationary nature technically accounts for.19 This has 
much to do with the unique interrelation between the underlying structure of securities and their 
economic functions, as has evolved over time. 
Third, publicity is a more important feature of policy in the conclusion of juristic acts where securities 
are concerned than seems to be the case for personal rights in general.20  
Fourth, among the prominent typological features of a security are that:21 
“1 2 one of its primary functions for the holder is ‘investment’ – i.e. the realisation of a net patrimonial gain 
flowing from claims to the performance tenderable in the context of the overall financial arrangement 
[“investment”]; 
1 3 performance is intended to be tendered over time at one or more certain or ascertainable future 
dates, rather than only immediately [“deferral”]…” 
 
 
18  Chapter 4, § 4 1 1. 
19  Chapter 4, § 4 1 3 and most importantly § 4 3 2. 
20  See Chapter 4, § 4 3 2 2. 




As was shown throughout Chapter 4, asset-holdership (or security-holdership) provides access to a 
multitude of potential functionalities of the entitlement of enjoyment (“genotsbevoegdheid”).22 What 
is required to juridically objectify such an incident-functionality (or set of incident-functionalities) is a 
particular exercise of legal subjectivity over it. It was also suggested that this is the basis for the 
creation of a limited real right with such an incident or set of incidents as its legal object. It was further 
shown that, unlike the general principles applicable to corporeal things, different incidents of a 
security may be simultaneously held by various parties.23 This notion of different elements of value 
distilled from the entitlement of enjoyment, and individually subjected to pledge, is in fact also at 
least acknowledged by a number of tangential propositions found in various existing authorities.24 
Thus one must find a principle by which not only the holistic value of the complex of performances 
envisaged by a security, but also subsidiary individual elements of economic value, can be pledged 
in accordance with the existing doctrinal principles relating to the pledge in securitatem debiti.  
This far more nuanced view of: (1) the nature of the underlying interest; and (2) the variability of the 
nature of potential legal objects which may be pledged in relation to securities must now be subjected 
to Lubbe’s first principles of the pledge of incorporeals. Those principles require that the object of 
pledge (i.e. the incident-functionality or set of functionalities determined by the parties as those 
elements of patrimonial value which must function as real security) must be “isolated” from future 
acts of disposition by the pledgor. This is to be done by providing the pledgee “feitelik-juridiese 
heerskappy wat, tesame met die publisiteitsfaktor, die jurdiese erkenning van die sekerheidsnemer 
se belang as ‘n saaklike reg veranker en regverdig.”25 
For securities it has already been proposed that:26 
“[the functional equivalent of] physical control in the realm of corporeals takes the form of effective factual 
control over the instrument-holder, which when coupled with the necessary mental element(s) of control 
 
 
22  A useful, though not exhaustive, list can be found in Lubbe “Cession” in LAWSA § 180 in n 19: 
 “A claim, so it is reasoned, confers on the holder of the right not only the capacity and hence the locus standi to exact 
performance (to collect interest, in the case of a money debt, and capital once the claim has matured) but also a variety of 
other functions, such as the capacity to alienate, waive, novate or renew it, to cancel the transaction giving rise to it, to vote 
or claim a preference where the right carries such a privilege, to apply for the debtor’s sequestration, to take advantage of a 
lien or suretyship, and so forth.” 
23  See Chapter 4, § 4 1 1 and § 4 3 2 1. This is not to say that the same incident-functionality may be simultaneously 
and separately held – the nemo plus iuris ad alium transferre potest quam ipse habet principle will still always apply 
to any specific and individualised held interest. 
24  For instance: in Blackman et al Commentary § 133, 5-366 – 5-367 it is noted that “The dominium is an attachable 
right, and on the insolvency of the cedent it entitles the trustee of his estate to control the realisation of the pledged 
asset. It has a money value, and can itself be ceded, and even pledged in securitatem debiti.”; further, Van Der 
Merwe et al in Contract 434-435 note the possibility of a “sub-pledge” to the extent that a pledgee can in fact pledge 
the extent of her interest in the original pledge object; and as per Van Der Merwe Sakereg at 463, according to 
Roman-Dutch authorities and case law (see n 258) a limited real right may be pledged to the extent of that right.  
25  Lubbe (1989) THRHR 491. 




constitutes effective control.  Further, control will always be determined with reference to the particular legal 
object in question.” 
Thus, in order to legitimately constitute a pledge in securitatem debiti in this context, it would appear 
that the pledgor must provide the pledgee with effective control over the pledge object, coupled with 
the requisite animus on the part of both parties. 
Typical incident-functionalities that could serve as the legal object of pledge are the incidents of 
alienation, use (for example voting rights), or the drawing of fructus.27 Isolated individual incident-
functionalities may also be combined in a set to serve as the object of the real security. In this way, 
with the sole exception of the most basic and empty reversionary interest, larger sets of incidents 
gleaned from the security-asset may also form the economic substance behind the pledge. Such a 
more expansive pledge would seem to be closest to the traditional notion of the pledge of securities 
in toto, “which…entitles the cessionary to the exclusive right to enforce the ceded right, a right which 
he may exercise in the event of non-payment of the principal debt.”28 
From a policy perspective, a particularly useful outcome of this conclusion is that it enables legal 
(and commercial) certainty regarding the variability in terms of which a specific incident-functionality 
(or set of such functionalities) may be chosen to satisfy the parties’ particular needs with respect to 
real security. 
This solution does not formally resemble the traditional notion of a pledge in securitatem debiti, as 
the entitlement of execution (and all its potential incident-functionalities) already resides, ab initio, 
with the instrument-holder. That holder has no patrimonial interest to pledge. Logically, the asset-
holder and a holder of lesser limited real patrimonial interest in the security are thus the only holders 
able to effect a pledge. Nonetheless, in function, this solution and the generic construction are the 
same. They both entail provision of effective control over an agreed-upon incident or set of incidents, 
except that the former effects this through the more indirect bestowal of control over the instrument-
holder who, in turn, directly holds the entitlement of determination. 
How, then, should the pledge of such an economic object be executed? It appears to be an 
established principle that a pledgee may, presumably depending on her economic needs, choose 
 
 
27  See Chapter 4, § 4 1 2: 
“there are many other incidents which have little to do with execution. Thus, lacking the incidents of execution, the remainder 
must include at least the various incidents of alienation (a personal right analogue to the ius disponendi). It also must include 
the incident of encumbrance, as a beneficial interest holder naturally remains entitled to cede a security in securitatem debiti.  
Further, it must also include the incidents of usus and fructus…” 




the manner in which (and to some extent the timing as to when) the value inherent in the real security 
is realised, so that:29 
“[t]he cessionary, as holder of the right to institute action…may proceed directly by claiming performance 
from the debtor and satisfying the principal obligation from the proceeds, or otherwise indirectly by taking 
[judgment] against the cedent and realising the ceded claim by means of a sale in execution.” 
There are a few important qualifiers in this regard. The direct method of realisation by direct 
enforcement may only be used where the right subject to the pledge is (1) enforceable, and (2) 
performance will yield value able to cover the entire principal obligation.30 Further, in terms of the 
alternative method of obtaining judgment for sale in execution, parate executie clauses appear 
permissible but are still subject to the courts’ oversight function in curbing its abuse by the pledgee.31  
In terms of the timing of execution, while there is no actual ex lege duty to realise the real security 
when its underlying performance becomes due, “the cessionary-pledgee, as holder of the capacity 
to enforce the right, is entitled to, and even obliged to, claim the proceeds of the ceded claim from 
the debtor as soon as it becomes due, even though the principal obligation might not yet be due at 
that stage”, unless otherwise arranged.32 
Here a crucial distinction between the acts of enforcement of the pledged claim to performance on 
the one hand, and of “satisfaction of the principal [i.e. secured] obligation by the appropriation of the 
debtor’s performance” must be strictly maintained.33 Absent default, the “reversionary interest” (i.e. 
any and all incident-functionalities which remain under the effective control of the pledgor) will remain 
with the cedent, meaning that prior to execution the insolvency of the pledgee cannot affect the 
entitlement of the pledgor to claim those proceeds upon satisfaction of the secured debt. In default, 
however, there will be an appropriation by the cessionary-pledgee of the underlying value of the 
pledged incidents in execution. 
On that basis, the only remaining issue at hand becomes a very practical one. If the pledge of 
securities is effected by a real agreement that requires providing effective control over the 
predetermined pledge object (i.e. quasi-traditio), coupled with the requisite real intent – how does 
 
 
29  Van der Merwe et al Contract 432-433 [own emphasis], citing Stephens v Whitford 1903 TH 231; Cape of Good 
Hope Bank v Melle (1893) 10 SC 280; Volhand & Molenaar (Pty) Ltd v Ruskin 1959 (2) SA 751 (W); Swacina v 
Volkskas Bpk 1964 (4) SA 716 (T); Britz v Sniegocki 1989 (4) SA 372 (D) 376; Registrateur van Aandelebeurse v 
Aldum h/a Onecorp Group 2002 (2) SA 767 (SCA). 
30  Van der Merwe et al Contract 433 & n 386. 
31  See SA Bank of Athens Ltd v Van Zyl 2005 (5) SA 93 (SCA); Juglal v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd t/a OK Franchise 
Division 2004 (5) SA 248 (SCA); Bock v Duboro Investments (Pty) Ltd 2004 (2) SA 242 (SCA); and Contract 
Forwarding (Pty) Ltd v Chesterfin (Pty) Ltd 2003 (2) SA 253 (SCA). 
32  See Van der Merwe et al Contract 433, n 385, & n 388-389. 




the pledgor provide the pledgee with “control over the instrument-holder” in respect of the incidents 
which serve as pledge object? Here one may examine two obvious techniques, and a more novel 
third. 
The first is to put the pledgee on the securities register – i.e. simply transfer instrument-holdership 
to the pledgee. In such a case there is no need to bestow control over the instrument-holder because 
the pledgee becomes the instrument-holder. As such it directly bestows the global entitlement of 
determination of the security and for that reason looks near-exactly like the traditional pledge of 
personal rights in securitatem debiti, but (as set out above) effectively concretises the real right for 
slightly more subtle reasons. 
From a policy perspective, this puts both parties in a very strong legal position vis-à-vis their 
respective interests. For instance, through the ex lege agency inherent in the relationship, the 
pledgor is well protected from any unlawful actions by the pledgee prior to the enforceability of the 
pledge. Conversely, the pledgee has the strongest possible basis with which to enforce her rights 
should the default event occur, as she becomes entitled to take what she is already entitled to 
enforce. The publicity element of the pledge is also well satisfied – registered holdership strongly 
evidences the existence of the pledge. 
A second common method is to have the pledgor provide the pledgee with signed transfer forms 
(otherwise blank or already filled in to reflect the pledgee as transferee), most typically along with 
the security certificate. The certificate is no longer required by either the Companies Act or its 
regulations for a transfer, though it is most often a requirement built into the company 
memorandum.34 This position must surely similarly apply in the case of pledge, though (as will be 
discussed below) it is particularly risky for all parties involved to conduct such a transaction without 
the accompanying certificate. 
This method is the most analytically interesting and also most illustrative of the value of the relevant 
outcomes of this work. Such a pledge leaves either the pledgor (as security-holder) or the instrument-
holder of the pledgor (as asset-holder) on the securities register. The role of the security certificate 
 
 
34  In the context of company securities, a 14(b) of Table B, Schedule 1 of the Companies Act of 1973 entitled the 
directors of a private company to refuse a share transfer if the instrument of transfer was not accompanied by the 
share certificate. Neither the 2008 Act nor its Regulations contain a similar provision.  
 However, regarding transfer of the security instrument, Deport (Henochsberg § 51, 214) states – correctly – of the 
modern legal position that: 
 “[a]s between the transferor and the transferee, it is the duty of the latter to obtain registration of the transfer. Section 51(6) 
does not require the certificate to be lodged together with the instrument of transfer but the Memorandum of Incorporation 
may preclude or restrict registration of transfer of a share unless the instrument of transfer lodged with the company is 




is typically crucial in this regard, but handing over of the certificate does not rise to the level of 
formality requirement for the valid constitution of the pledge. 
How does the method establish control over the instrument-holder? The analysis must begin with 
what has occurred on the level of incidents. To this end, the pledge object must be established. From 
these facts the pledge object appears to be the full extent of the value of the pledgor’s held interest 
in the security. This is because the pledgor has provided the pledgee, through provision of signed 
transfer forms, with mastery (heerskappy) over the ability (or rather incident-functionality) to dispose 
of the security to her advantage – i.e. the ius dispondendi. Thus, default can have as consequence 
that the pledgee either takes transfer of the security asset in own name to reap its benefits, or sells 
the security to a third party in execution upon default.35 
In this scenario it does not matter who the instrument-holder is, as all the pledgee must do to exercise 
her right in execution is complete the transfer form and provide the issuer with that transfer form. 
Theoretically, this would trigger the necessary actions on the part of the issuer in completing the 
disposition. 
In order to amount to a juristic act that successfully creates a limited real right of pledge, the handing 
over of blank (or partially filled in) and signed transfer forms must isolate the legal object (i.e. the as-
yet-unrealised value of the security asset as a whole) from future acts of infringement by the pledgor. 
It must do so by providing the pledgee control over the instrument-holder to an extent determined 
by the nature of the object which was pledged. The requirement of effective control is satisfied 
because control over the ius disponendi enables the pledgee, lawfully, to direct the instrument-holder 
in all matters regarding the realisation (through transfer, in execution, of holdership) of the economic 
value serving as real security. As the certificate is no longer required to complete the transfer, 
triggered by the default on the principal debt, the handing over of the forms will – as point of departure 
and barring any provision in the memorandum stating otherwise – satisfy this requirement. 
Nonetheless, it is anticipated that there may be an intuitive discomfort with this explanation. This 
discomfort stems from the fact that this juristic act does not necessarily create the impression of 
having sufficiently isolated the security from later acts of disposal by the pledgor. What would prevent 
the pledgor from fraudulently completing a second transfer form and (in order to transfer the security 
to a third party in violation of the pledge agreement) provide this form to the third party transferee to 
hand over to the issuer, who – none the wiser – will action the transfer? In the current scenario, 
 
 
35  The distinction between the pledge object itself (in this case the value of the security asset, or of the pledgor’s held 
interest therein) and the means of handing effective control thereof over to the pledgee (in this case the provision 
of the incident of ius disponendi) is crucial, as the two can easily be conflated in this context. A good example of 
the importance of this difference between can be found in Van Der Berg v Transkei Development Corporation 1991 




where no security certificate has been handed to the pledgee alongside the transfer forms very little, 
factually, prevents such an act. The risk is further increased as this second transfer form may be 
provided together with the security certificate, lending further credibility to the appearance of 
lawfulness of this second and unlawful dispositive act. 
However, unlike in the case of the transfer of uncertificated securities (or limited interests therein), 
the decisive test cannot be whether the pledgee’s intended relationship to the pledge object is 
immutably protected in fact. Instead, the question of sufficient isolation or protection is addressed by 
two mitigating factors. First, at the time of creation of the pledge, the handing over of blank, signed 
transfer forms puts the pledgee in a sufficiently strong factual position of effective control vis-à-vis 
the ius disponendi. It seems readily apparent that hypothetical factual occurrences cannot, on their 
own, be decisive in the prior creation of the real agreement of pledge. This is especially true when 
the hypothetical counterfactual position is premised on an intervening fraudulent act. 
The requirement is also forward-looking, requiring that the act must isolate the pledge object from 
future acts of disposal by the pledgor. This is not a problem, as after the creation of the pledge the 
pledgee’s relationship with that object is indeed still sufficiently protectable. If faced with a later, 
unlawful, disposing act by the pledgor, the pledgee must merely be able to approach the appropriate 
adjudicatory forum (typically a court) and prove the prior existence of the real right of pledge. To do 
so, the pledgee must show that on a balance of probabilities the pledgor did not have effective control 
of the ius disponendi and thus was not lawfully enabled to dispose of the security or any relevant 
incident thereof. The transfer forms alone should provide the pledgee with the evidentiary basis to 
do so. 
In sum, the manner in which control over the pledge object is bestowed by this method is sufficiently 
factually effective at its inception and sufficiently protectable thereafter. Nonetheless, it remains 
extremely risky to be party to such a pledge without the involvement of the certicate or certificates. 
Effective control of securities, as per § 4 3 2 2 of Chapter 4, requires effective factual control coupled 
with a particular controlling intent. The above is not to say that this is not the case with pledge. 
Rather, it is to say that where a pledgee is lawfully enabled to direct the instrument-holder with 
respect to the pledge-affected incident or incidents, that legal enablement provides a sufficiently 
factual basis for the required degree of on-going control. By way of analogy, consider the possibility 
that the pledgor of a car may subsequently and unlawfully reacquire possession of the car and 
purport to sell that car to a third party. This hypothetical eventuality cannot, by itself, cause the law 




further dispositive acts by the pledgor. However, an important caveat is the principle that if a pledgee 
voluntarily parts with control over the pledge object, she loses her real right.36 
Finally, although such a pledge will be effectively constituted, the position of the pledgee without the 
certificate is weakened by her evidentiary arsenal. If the blank transfer forms are not dated, the 
pledgee-plaintiff may be without the ability prove prior in tempore – this position may be so weak, in 
fact, that it might negate the constitution of a real right. This will make defending the right against 
subsequent unlawful disposition very difficult. Moreover, there is the possibility of losing the ability 
to enforce the pledge due to a successful invocation of the defence of estoppel, flowing in main from 
a reasonable reliance of the second, bona fide unlawful acquirer.37 The reliance will be further 
strengthened if the third party has received the security certificate. The element of publicity is of 
absolute importance. The handing over of the blank transfer forms sufficiently isolates the pledge 
object. However, the element of publicity is weak on such facts – that is the root cause of the 
weakened position of the pledgee. In § 4 3 2 3 of Chapter 4 it is stated that: 
“the true role of the security certificate is to indicate who has effective factual control of the security, or one 
of its subsidiary elements.  
Such an understanding of the role of the security certificate completes the view of the factual features of 
security-holdership. The evidentiary, publicity, and reliance-strengthening functions of the certificate are 
all elements of this deeper role as factual and physical indicator of control, allowing the law to better make 
factual determinations in a proprietary sense, without losing the essentially obligationary character of the 
securities construct in South African jurisprudence.” 
Thus, in terms of this method of pledging a security, handing over of the security certificate plays a 
critical role. Although not a formality requirement for the constitution of the pledge,38 handing over 
possession (in the true, corporeal, sense) of the certificate fulfils a powerful publicity function in 
strengthening the pledgee’s legal position, enhancing the certainty and defensibility of her rights. It 
 
 
36  See Van der Merwe et al Contract 435 & n 401-402. 
37  It would, strictly, be irrelevant whether this acquirer purportedly acquired the security, the security asset, or some 
limited interest in the security. 
For a full discussion of estoppel and reliance in this context, as well as the relevant authorities and principles, see 
Chapter 10. 





is therefore no surprise that this method of pledge, in practice, is most often supplemented by the 
handing over of security certificate alongside the blank and signed transfer forms by the pledgor.39 
This analysis shows that a pledge of a debt security in securitatem debiti using either of these two 
already prevalent methods is not only entirely in harmony with the outcomes of Chapter 4, but also 
very well accounted for using its deeper theoretical framework. 
However, based on the outcomes of this work, it is conceivable that there is also a third, as-yet 
probably unused and fairly simple method to effect the pledge of a security. It rests on the better 
understanding of the agency operative between instrument- and asset-holder. This method is to 
perform a juristic act to alter the relationship existing between the instrument-holder and asset-
holder, and thereby include a third party – the pledgee as interest-holder. There is no obvious reason 
why the content of agency cannot be altered by verbal or written agreement, or be supplemented by 
a mandate, and this is often seen in intermediated chains of holdership in the uncertificated context. 
The precise manner in which it is done need not be dealt with, as there is innate variability to effecting 
the necessary change. However, two suggestions seem most practicable. The first is to emulate the 
manner in which pledge is achieved in the uncertificated environment (as discussed in the following 
section). This would entail an alteration of the security instrument manifesting in the entry of the 
pledgee in addition to the instrument-holder in the securities register. This possibility appears to be 
recognised by the Companies Act if s 1 viz. “beneficial interest” is read with s 51(5) [own emphasis]: 
“[s 1]: “beneficial interest”, when used in relation to a company’s securities means the right…to: 
(a) receive or participate in any distribution in respect of the company’s securities; 
(b) exercise, or cause to be exercised, in the ordinary course, all or any of the rights attaching to the 
company’s securities; or 
(c) dispose or direct the disposition of the company’s securities, or any part of a distribution in respect 
of these securities… 
[s 51:]…(5) Subject to subsection (6), a company must enter in its securities register every transfer of any 
certificated securities, including in the entry… 
  (b) the description of the securities, or interest transferred…” 
 
 
39  See Blackman et al Commentary, § 133, 5-370 – 5-370-1: 
 “delivery of the certificate may, in the circumstances, be a vital factor as a matter of evidence of the cession.” 
 Though it has no equivalent in the Companies Act of 2008, s 136 of the Companies Act of 1973 (“Certification by 
company that security has been lodged for transfer”) is instructive in terms of the relationship between the certificate 




One should, however, be careful not to read too much into this expansive definition, specifically as 
it is aimed more at regulatory purposes. Moreover, the deeper interpretive complexities of the 
Companies Act are beyond the scope of this work. Suffice it to say that it appears as though a limited 
beneficial interest as described in (a) – (c) in the provision should probably correspond to the 
“interest” described in s 51(5)(b). As the security instrument manifests in the form of entry on a 
securities register, the effect would be to modify the security instrument itself to include the pledge-
holder as holder of an interest in a security.  
This would, by operation of law, create a tripartite relationship within the scheme of agency, and the 
register’s demarcation of the pledge-holder’s interest in the security would delineate the extent of 
the instrument-holder’s duties and fiduciary responsibility towards that holder vis-à-vis the asset-
holder. This method may even, depending on how it is recorded, bestow upon the pledgee the ability 
to deal with the issuer directly, providing specific incident-functionalities associated with the security 
instrument rather than only the security asset (i.e. incidents of execution as consequences of the 
entitlement of determination). 
A second variant is simply to formalise and modify the relationship between asset- and instrument-
holder to substitute the effective control of the asset-holder with that of the pledgee in respect of the 
pledge object. This would, similarly, make the instrument-holder beholden to the directives of the 
pledgee in a manner that sufficiently isolates the incident-functionalities agreed upon by the parties 
to serve as the object of real security. In so doing, the instrument-holder’s fiduciary agency should 
become beholden to all lawful directives of the pledge-holder regarding the incident-functionalities 
which are the subject of the pledge, and not the asset-holder. Such an arrangement fully accords 
with the underlying principles discussed in the beginning of this section: a degree of control over the 
(defined) pledge object is provided to the pledgee through control over the instrument-holder. The 
control is without doubt enough to sufficiently isolate the pledge object from future disposing acts by 
the pledgee, satisfying the requirements for the constitution of the real right. 
The ultimate conclusion of this section is that the principles applied to the pledge of corporeals are, 
with the necessary adaptation, far more doctrinally appealing and more pragmatic in the pledge of 
securities in securitatem debiti. Further, those methodologies that have been established in 
commercial practice are also not at all contrary to the outcomes of this work, but rather slightly 
improved by the more refined understanding of securities as provided in Chapters 4 and 5. 
 
9 1 2  Uncertificated securities as real security 
The discussion and outcomes of the previous section allow for a simpler and more concise 




apply the principled approach of the previous section in coming to a correct understanding of the 
statutory framework in place for the cession of securities in securitatem debiti. This section, unlike 
the previous section, must accordingly deal with all forms of such security cessions. The discussion 
centres around s 39 of the Financial Markets Act 19 of 2012. 
 
9 1 2 1 The scope of s 39(1)(a) 
The first provision which must be dealt with is s 39(1)(a). It reads as follows: 
“Pledge or cession of uncertificated securities in securitatem debiti – (1) (a) A pledge or cession in 
securitatem debiti, as constituted by an agreement, in respect of uncertificated securities or an interest in 
uncertificated securities held by a central securities depository, participant, authorised user or nominee, as 
the case may be, must be effected by entry in the central securities account or the securities account, as 
the case may be, of— 
(i) the pledgor in favour of the pledgee specifying the name of the pledgee, the number or nominal 
value of the uncertificated securities, the interest in the uncertificated securities pledged and the 
date of entry; or 
(ii) the cedent in favour of the cessionary specifying the name of the cessionary, the number or nominal 
value of the uncertificated securities, the interest in the uncertificated securities ceded and the date 
of entry, as the case may be.” 
This section provides that both any pledge of securities and any cession of securities can only – the 
use of “must” being strongly peremptory40  – occur through entry41  of the security-taker in the 
applicable securities account of the pledgor or cedent providing the real security. The minimum 
information which must be reflected by the entry is clear from the above.42 
 
 
40  Note in this regard the following view, which is supported here, in JL Yeats, R de la Harpe, R Jooste, H Stoop, R 
Cassim, J Seligmann, L Kent, R Bradstreet, RC Williams, MF Cassim, E Swanepoel, FHI Cassim & K Jarvis, 
Commentary on the Companies Act of 2008 2-1082: 
 “While s 39(1) of the FMA uses the imperative when prescribing the manner in which a security cession ‘must be effected’ by 
the relevant entries, it remains to be considered by our courts whether a failure to comply with such requirements would render 
the security cession void or voidable or possibly only unenforceable against third parties. While the FMA does not clarify what 
the consequences of non-compliance are, there is clearly a forceful argument that the security cession will not have become 
effective due to non-compliance based on the peremptory wording.” 
41  See the discussion on “entry” in § 5 1 1 of Chapter 5, and its ramifications as discussed in § 5 1 2 and § 5 1 3.  
42  In this regard the FMA provides more detail and clarity than its predecessor. Under s 43 the Securities Services 
Act, the “number of nominal value” of the securities subject to the cession was not a requirement, although in 
Blackman et al Commentary § 91A, 5-236-2 the suggestion is made that: 
“the STRATE rules and practice note [i.e. the Practice Note in respect of Rule 6.7.4 of the STRATE Rules effective from 1 
July 2006 – see n 1 therein] dealing with the information that must be disclosed to the pledgor do imply that a record in the 
securities account effecting  the pledge or cession should mention the specific securities that will be subject to the pledge or 
cession.” 
See also Yeats et al Commentary 2008 at 2-1075 n 292 regarding the contents of the entry as per Strate Rules in 




In light of § 5 1 of Chapter 5, the use of “held” in s 39(1)(a) should be distinguished from the use of 
“held” in s 38.  
On the one hand, s 38 deals with: 
“transfer of uncertificated securities or an interest in uncertificated securities on the uncertificated securities 
register held by a central securities depository or participant…by making debit and credit entries 
respectively in the central securities account or securities account…kept by the central securities depository 
or the participant…”  
Here the object of reference of “held” is clearly the uncertificated register itself, as “kept” by the CSD 
and CSDPs through their respective accounts. This is a clear reference to the custodial function, 
specifically that function at register-level. This also accords with the conclusion in § 5 1 3 of Chapter 
5 that “ownership” and status as being held collectively or not must be determined at register-level, 
though this may be influenced by what is contained in securities accounts at lower levels. 
On the other hand, s 39(1)(a) deals with: 
“pledge or cession in securitatem debiti…in respect of uncertificated securities or an interest in 
uncertificated securities held by a central securities depository, participant, authorised user or 
nominee…effected by entry…” 
In this case, the object of reference of “held” appears to be the securities themselves. Does this 
mean securities held in terms of the custodial function or administrative function? It is submitted that 
it cannot refer to the administrative function – an instrument-holder could indeed be a CSD, CSDP 
or authorised user in own name, or any (approved) nominee, but if that was the intention the list is 
incomplete because it does not refer to own name security-holders (i.e. those who are direct clients 
of a CSD or CSDP). 
The better reading is that it refers to the custodial function and therefore the manner in which real 
security is created and evidenced by entry within the system of accounts. It is useful for this 
discussion to understand the kind of entry required as follows:43 
“The entry (commonly referred to as ‘flagging’) must be recorded in the cedent’s (pledgor’s) securities 
account in favour of the pledgee specifying: (i) the name of the cessionary; (ii) the number or nominal value 








This raises a key question as to the intended import of the inclusion of non-register level custodial 
functionaries in s 39, especially in contradistinction to the clear limitation to register-level accounts 
in s 38.  
The first possibility is that it contemplates the creation of real security through entry in either register 
or non-register level securities accounts. Though plausible, this is not the preferred reading of this 
work. In § 5 1 3 of Chapter 5, it was argued that both asset-holdership and co-asset-holdership are 
determined at register-level (the latter occurring where security assets have commingled within the 
system of accounts and are thus held collectively). Chapter 8, in § 8 2, also makes it clear that 
transfer of asset-holdership occurs by means of quasi-delivery at register level. The commonality of 
these outcomes, for present purposes, is that real rights, and indeed real effect, are determined by 
what occurs on the uncertificated securities register.  
There is little reason why this should not also apply in the context of pledge or cession in securitatem 
debiti. Therefore, for real effect, it is submitted (based on the principles of effective control as 
articulated in § 9 1 1 above, coupled with the notion of register-level and non-register securities 
accounts articulated in § 5 1 2 of Chapter 5) that the entry must modify the uncertificated securities 
register itself.  
This brings one to the second possibility, which is supported as correct here. This approach posits 
that the reference to all keepers of securities accounts points to a distinction built into s 39(1), 
between securities that are held collectively and those that are not. This is most likely, again, “out of 
an abundance of caution, rather than as a result of technical exactitude”.44 The approach breaks the 
first portion of the provision into two parts:  
“A pledge or cession in securitatem debiti…in respect of [1] of uncertificated securities or [2] an interest in 
uncertificated securities held by a central securities depository, participant, authorised user, or nominee, 
as the case may be…” 
The first part refers to scenarios where securities are not held collectively, and is therefore custodian-
neutral. The second part refers to scenarios where they are held collectively, and therefore must 
specify that the commingling may occur because of the manner of custodial holding at CSD, CSDP, 
authorised user or nominee level. This becomes apparent through the analysis of § 5 1 3 of Chapter 
5, which establishes (contingent on the nature of the system and praxis of the various system actors) 
that: security assets commingle when, upon examination of instrument-holdership across all tiers of 
 
 




securities accounts, specific instrument-holdership at register-level of a bloc of securities cannot be 
allocated to the specific holdership of an individual holder of a specific number of security assets.45  
On that reading one may then interpret the rest of s 39(1), i.e. “must be effected by entry in the 
central securities account or securities account, as the case may be…”, narrowly as referring only 
to the register-level accounts of CSDs and CSDPs. In the same manner as has been done for s 37,46  
this allows one to reconcile (1) the FMA’s reference to custodians of all tiers, with (2) the fact that 
proprietary matters such as “ownership” and (in this case) real security must be determined at 
register-level, to prevent the fragmentation or “duplication of ownership [and for present purposes 
other limited real] interests”47 across the various tiers of holdership.  
This then brings the discussion to the difficult relationship between s 39(1)(a)(i) and (ii), and s 39(2). 
The latter subsection reads as follows: 
“This section does not apply to an out-and-out cession in respect of securities or an interest in securities 
and such a cession must be effected in accordance with section 38.” 
This section had no equivalent in the Securities Services Act: it appears to be a new feature of the 
legislative scheme. 
As per § 8 2 of Chapter 8 it should be clear that, as point of departure, s 38 governs transfers (i.e. 
cessions) of: (1) security-holdership; (2) instrument-holdership; and (3) asset-holdership. Therefore, 
the exclusion in s 39, as read with ss (1)(a)(i) and (ii) can be approached in one of three ways.  
The total exclusionary approach 
This approach holds that s 39 deals only with pledge, to the total exclusion of all fiduciary cessions 
in securitatem debiti. It starts with the following assumption:48 
“Section 39(1) of the FMA regulates cessions in security following the pledge construction, while s 39(2) of 
the FMA makes it clear that a transfer for security by way of an out-and-out cession (fiduciary cession) is 
permissible following the usual requirements for a transfer of uncertificated securities as regulated by s 38 
 
 
45  See specifically Figure 7 in § 5 1 3 of the Chapter 5.  
46  See § 5 1 3 of the Chapter 5.  
47  Meissner (2019) § 13 2 3 4, 244.  
48  This is the view of Yeats et al Commentary 2008 as per 2-1076 [own emphasis]. 
 Also note, also for what follows, in terms of pledge as the default construction, the comments of Yeats et al 
Commentary 2008 at 2-1075 n 291 – “Interestingly, s 39(1) of the FMA has reverted to the use of the Latin term ‘in 
securitatem debiti’ previously used in s 6 of the Custody and Administration of Securities Act of 1992, which had 
been repealed earlier by the subsequently repealed Securities Services Act, 2004, which simply referred to a 




of the FMA, read together with s 53(1) and (2) of the Act, and must be complied with to effect such a transfer 
for security.” 
This means that the sections regulate only a pledge, in the true sense, of: (1) the security or of the 
security asset (the nature of which is adequately dealt with in § 5 1 of Chapter 5).49 As supplementary 
interpretive support for this approach, Grobler v Oosthuizen made it clear that pledge was to be 
considered the default construction of a cession in securitatem debiti. There the dictum50 makes a 
number of issues clear: (1) due to policy considerations of legal and commercial certainty, (2) the 
pledge construction is to be considered the default construction of a cession in securitatem debiti, 
but (3) the parties may still expressly intend to make use of the fiduciary cession construction and 
this will be given effect to.51  
However, a fiduciary cession in securitatem debiti is an outright cession of an obligation or complex 
of obligations (e.g. a security), on which is superimposed a pactum fiduciae to ensure cession back 
to the pledgor if settlement of the secured debt has occurred.52 In such cases no reversionary 
interest, nor any element of a ceded right or set of rights, remains with the pledgor during the lifetime 
of the principal debt. 
 
 
49  Note in light of § 5 1 of Chapter 5, and for purposes of this entire section, the following from Yeats et al Commentary 
2008 2-1076 – 2-1077 and 2-1079: 
 “It is clear that the security over the uncertificated securities is still effected by way of a cession of the rights constituting the 
securities or interests therein, with added formalities…Section 39(1) of the FMA contemplates a cession in security of either 
the uncertificated securities or an interest in uncertificated securities. This gives rise to the ambiguity in relation to the transfer 
of ownership interests…On the one hand, the FMA contemplates the possibility of a co-ownership interest in respect of 
collectively held securities and, on the other hand, an interest in a specific number of uncertificated securities…  
From s 37(1) of the FMA, it appears that where securities are collectively held, the investor does not directly own any particular 
uncertificated securities. Accordingly, it would ordinarily follow that the investor could not effect a cession of the rights 
comprising any particular uncertificated securities as part of the security provided. Perhaps this is why s 39(1) of the FMA 
contemplates the possibility of a cession in security of uncertificated securities or an interest in uncertificated securities. Where 
the investor has only a co-ownership interest, it would follow that the cedent cannot cede more rights than he has and from 
this, it follows that the co-ownership interest would be ceded in security. 
[A]ccordingly, where the securities are held collectively in a securities account, the cessionary would only acquire security 
over the cedent’s co-ownership interest and therefore runs the risk of having to share in any shortfall in the relevant securities 
account.” 
50  2009 (5) SA 500 (SCA) [11], [17]-[18] and [24]. 
51  See also, for instance, comments in Lubbe “Cession” in LAWSA § 180 – “An important ancillary issue is whether 
the pledge construction has subsumed the entire field of security cessions, thereby in effect proscribing an 
alternative form of security, that is to say, a full cession coupled with a pactum fiduciae. The better view is that it 
has not done so. In the result parties should be permitted to structure their security either way. Whether it is to be 
the one or the other will ultimately depend on their intention. Where that intention is not clearly expressed, the 
pledge construction will prevail.” 
52  See for instance: Grobler v Oosthuizen 2009 (5) SA 500 (SCA) [17] (“the ceded right in all its aspects is vested in 
the cessionary”); Lubbe “Cession” in LAWSA § 180 (“…an outright cession on which an undertaking (pactum 
fiduciae) is superimposed that the cessionary will restore the principal debt to the cedent on satisfaction of the 
secured debt.”); Van der Merwe et al Contract § 12.5.3, 425-426 (“…a complete transfer of the right to the 
cessionary for the purposes of security only…”); D Hutchison & C-J Pretorius (eds) The Law of Contract in South 
Africa (2010) §14.6.1 367-368 (“…unlike pledge, the full title of the right passes to the cessionary; there is complete 
transfer of the right, albeit for security purposes only…); or Blackman et al Commentary § 133, 5-367 (“Instead of 
pledging his rights, the shareholder can simply cede them to the other party subject to an agreement…that, on 




If s 39 excludes all of these “out-and-out” cessions in securitatem debiti, it raises a serious question 
as to what type of cession s 39(1)(a)(ii) is referring to in contrast to a pledge in securitatem debiti as 
per ss (i). This approach to s 39 cannot solve this problem and requires a reading down of ss (1)(a)(ii) 
as redundant, so that s 39 only caters for the pledge construction, despite its express mention of 
cession in contradistinction to pledge. 
The qualified exclusionary approach 
This approach broadly follows the same logic as the total exclusionary approach, but attempts to 
remedy the issue of s 39(1)(a)(ii) as outlined above. It posits a third possible means of real security: 
the limited out-and-out fiduciary cession of smaller subsidiary elements of the entitlement of 
enjoyment by the asset-holder (e.g. a limited cession creating a limited real right usufruct) as security 
for a principal performance. It then posits that these special cessions are what is intended to be 
regulated by ss (ii), whilst out-and-out fiduciary cession in securitatem debiti of security- or asset-
holdership is what is referred to in ss (2) and must be regulated by s 38. 
When analysed at the level of incidents, it is clear that lesser, individuated incident functionalities of 
the security asset may53 be made subject to a limited real right vesting in a third party, such as a 
usufruct or quasi-usufruct in securities.54  
Asset-holdership of securities has more than one facet of economic value which may serve as real 
security. The chosen incident-as-object of real security may be the right to dispose of the security; it 
may lie in the right to enjoy performance by the debtor; or it may even lie in the right to enjoy the 
fruits of the security (e.g. dividends or interest in the form of so-called coupon payments) for the 
amount of time it takes to satisfy the amount outstanding on the defaulted-upon principal debt.  
Thus, at least theoretically, it should be possible for the cessionary and the cedent to expressly 
intend that an economically valuable incident functionality should be provided to the security-taker 
outright, but still subject to a pactum fiduciae for re-cession of that incident functionality provided the 
principal debt is repaid. The best example of this approach would be a fiduciary usufruct in 
securitatem debiti – i.e. the bestowal, by way of limited cession, of a usufruct coupled with an 
agreement to reverse the limited cession (and extinguish the limited real right) once the principal 
debt is duly repaid. 
The underlying legal mechanics of this are also reasonably clear: through a bilateral exercise of legal 
subjectivity an incident functionality, or set of incident functionalities, which has economic value is 
 
 
53  Barring some superordinate defect (e.g. unlawfulness) or policy obstacle (e.g. a contra bonos mores juristic act). 
54  See § 9 2 below, as well as specifically E Leos “Quasi-usufruct and shares: some possible approaches” (2006) 123 




made subject to a limited real right that is not a pledge. In § 8 2 1 of Chapter 8 it was argued that the 
cession (i.e. transfer) of uncertificated securities was an exception to the rule that cession need not 
be factually effective to be valid – quasi-traditio in the form of a debit and credit in the applicable 
securities accounts was a further statutory formality requirement. The same principle holds here: 
quasi-traditio in the form of electronic entry at register level (also known as flagging) is required by 
s 39(1)(a)(ii). Thus, entry coupled with the requisite real intent simultaneously perfects the limited 
cession and the limited real right. 
Admittedly this is a particularly esoteric construction, 55  but it enables one to take a broadly 
exclusionary approach and still make sense of the full import of s 39(1)(a), as well as ensuring full 
coverage of all kinds of security cessions in terms of the Act. 
On that basis s 39(1)(a)(ii) deals with cession of a limited real interest in securities in securitatem 
debiti, and s 38 deals with transfers of securities and perhaps also transfers of other limited real 
interests in securities not for purposes of securing debts. 
If this view is taken, there are three possible species of cession in securitatem debiti of uncertificated 
securities. The first is an out-and-out fiduciary cession effected in terms of s 38 (and the relevant 
provisions of the Companies Act) rather than s 39, the real effect of which is to bestow security- or 
asset-holdership upon the cessionary outright, subject to a pactum fiduciae. The third is a limited 
fiduciary cession effected in accordance with s 39(1)(a)(ii), the real effect of which is to bestow 
holdership of a limited real interest in a security upon the cedent outright, subject to a pactum fiduciae 
and flagging in the uncertificated securities register through entry in the relevant register-level central 
and securities accounts. This more limited fiduciary cession is also subject to the more stringent 
requirements and rules of s 39 as compared to s 38. The third is the pledge of the security, security 
asset or a specific incident functionality or set of functionalities (“or an interest in securities”) as 
pledge-object in accordance with s 39(1)(a)(i), establishing a real right of pledge. 
This is seemingly also supported by s 39(1)(c): 
“The pledgee or cessionary of uncertificated securities or an interest in uncertificated securities referred to 
in paragraph (a) is entitled to all the rights of a pledgee of movable property or cessionary of a right in 
movable property pledged or ceded to secure a debt.” 
There would appear to be little else to which “the rights of a…cessionary of a right in movable 
property…ceded to secure a debt” could be referring to, other than the cession of a limited real right 
 
 
55  Comments in Grobler v Oosthuizen (5) SA 500 (SCA) in [24] regarding the “esoteric” legal dynamics of the pledge 
seem more aimed at protecting legal laymen, and (whilst still valid) may be taken with a grain of salt in the context 
of the often large, sophisticated, and legally shrewd financial actors found in the context of securities and the 




such as the right of usufruct (irrespective, theoretically, of whether in respect of an interest-bearing 
bearer instrument in terms of the common law, or a security in terms of the Act). 
In very concise terms, s 39(1)(a) and (c) can be thought of as providing for quasi-delivery and 
publicity in the pledge or limited cession of uncertificated securities in securitatem debiti.  
Furthermore, s 39(1)(a)(ii), as a specialis provision, implicitly appears to recognise more limited 
cessions because of its requirement that the flagging entry must denote “the interest in the 
uncertificated securities” that has been ceded in securitatem debiti. The requirement to specify what 
interest has been ceded could be read as envisaging different kinds of interests, rather than merely 
ensuring coverage of securities that are collectively held. Therefore, that recognition can be argued 
to override the reference to “interests in securities” in s 38, which in context becomes a generalis 
provision. Thus, the reference in s 39(2) to s 38 could be read to exclude out-and-out transfers that 
are limited fiduciary cessions in securitatem debiti creating limited real rights. Importantly, the 
converse is that fiducia cessions in securitatem debiti of the full underlying interest (i.e. full security-
, or asset-holdership) remain covered by s 38. 
While plausible, this approach is not uncontentious, could be seen as somewhat strained in its 
reading of the provisions, and ultimately the inclusive approach, below, is both simpler and more 
compelling. 
The inclusive approach 
The third approach posits that s 39(2) could simply be a clarifying provision which confirms that any 
cession that is not in securitatem debiti (i.e. any cession which is not a pledge or a fiduciary security 
cession) must be effected in terms of s 38. This approach also reads s 39 as a specialis provision 
that overrides s 38 as a generalis provision, but in a broader way than the manner in which this 
reasoning is deployed as per the qualified exclusionary approach above.  
Thus, despite being on first principles substantively identical to an ordinary transfer, an out-and-out 
security cession (i.e. transfer of security- or asset-holdership) would be subject to a different regime 
of transfer than that of s 38. This would, presumably, be primarily due to a publicity-based policy 
imperative to require flagging within the uncertificated securities register. 
While this is favoured approach, legislative intervention to clarify this provision is strongly advocated 





9 1 2 2 Other relevant elements of s 39   
Due to the deep interpretive difficulties of the previous section, what follows will deal only with pledge, 
regardless of the correct approach to s 39(1)(a). 
The next relevant portion of s 39 is s 39(1)(b) read with (d). Again, in very concise terms, these 
sections appear to deal with effective control and real effect. The sections read: 
“(b) Uncertificated securities or an interest in uncertificated securities referred to in paragraph (a) may not 
be transferred or otherwise dealt with, and no instruction by the pledgor or cedent may be given effect 
to, without the written consent of the pledgee or cessionary.  
… 
(d) A pledge or cession in securitatem debiti effected in accordance with paragraph (a) is effective against 
third parties.” 
Section 39(1)(b), speaking to effective control, will be dealt with first. The pledge of a certificated 
security must, along with the requisite real intent, bestow effective control over the instrument-holder. 
It must further do so with respect to the incident-functionality or set of functionalities that satisfies the 
pledgee’s need for real security. As this entry must also specify the extent of the interest, quasi-
traditio by ledger entry demarcates exactly what is fictionally being handed over in the out-and-out 
cession or pledge of the limited real interest serving as security object. 
The effect of (b), however, is to regulate the exact nature of the effective control that such quasi-
delivery bestows. The provision is necessary because the quasi-delivery in question is: entry of the 
particulars of the security-taker onto the client securities account that reflects the instrument-holder 
of the (asset-holding) security-provider. 
This entry in the securities register adds the identity and particulars of the pledgee as real right-
holder to the register. Yet it should be seen to reinforce, rather than detract, from the dynamics of 
agency of the security instrument in affirming that the relationship is now tripartite, including the 
pledgee to the extent of her registered interest. This interpretation reads “without the written consent 
of the pledgee or cessionary” as modifying the manner in which instrument-holders may receive and 
execute instructions from holders of patrimonial interests in securities. Read thus, s 39(1)(b) 
operates to confirm and regulate, explicitly, a change in the scheme of agency that existed prior to 
quasi-delivery of the object of real security. 
The permissive authority it bestows on the pledgee operates to force the instrument-holder to 
exercise the incidents of execution in accordance with the directives of both asset-holder and (where 




agency to the latter. This further allows for a more defined view of the limitations of the asset-holder’s 
position once the entry has been made. It is extremely doubtful whether the Act is intended to limit 
the asset-holder’s ability to enjoy aspects of the security unaffected, or not impugned, by the interests 
of the real security holder. Thus one may, and probably should, infer that the ability of the security-
taker to refuse consent should be limited to those instructions issued by the former which adversely 
affect her security interests. 
Requiring the consent of a holder of real security before any acts of disposal can be concluded by 
any other holder is the very essence of effective factual control where required for the purposes of 
pledge. For a pledge in terms of s 39(1)(a)(i), it satisfies the full set of first principles set out in the 
previous section as they relate to the pledge of certificated securities. It provides a degree of 
heerskappy over the pledge object that sufficiently isolates it from interference by the security-
provider, thereby providing the foundation for the legitimate creation of a real right.56   
This is then accentuated by s 39(1)(d), which serves to reconfirm (albeit superfluously) the real 
nature of the rights of the pledgee.  
The cumulative effect of s 39(1)(a)-(d) can be summarised as follows. In terms of ss (a), entry of F’s 
particulars publicises a second, limited patrimonial interest in the security. In terms of (b), a 
negatively-formulated duty to adhere to the directives of F (in so far as she is entitled to direct C) is 
further created in support of the second securities account entry. As succinctly stated by Blackman 
et al, “the main reason for the ‘security entries’ is to give notice to the participant and third parties 
and to restrict transfers by the cedent”.57 
In terms of transmission, rather than transfer: 
“(e) Nothing in this section prejudices any power of a participant or central securities depository, as the 
case may be, to effect a pledge or cession in securitatem debiti to a person to whom the right to any 
uncertificated securities or an interest in uncertificated securities referred to in paragraph (a) has been 
transmitted by operation of law.” 
 
 
56  If one countenances the inclusive or qualified exclusionary approaches, a limited cession (e.g. a quasi-usufruct cum 
fiduciae) in terms of (ii) is of less foundational effect, but still important. In that context, it appears explicitly to 
entrench the position of a cedent in a manner which similarly protects and isolates the held real security-interest – 
not so that it might be duly recognised and constituted in law, but so that it may be sufficiently strong enough to be 
viable. One might argue that it is indispensable due to how tenuous the (very abstract) position of the limited 
cessionary in securitatem debiti of a patrimonial interest in an uncertificated security appears to be. 
In terms of this second interpretation, the security instrument remains undivided, and the instrument-holder still 
retains all incidents of execution of rights and other competencies.  




Transmission has been sufficiently discussed in Chapter 8, and those principles will – with the 
necessary modification – suffice also here. 
This leaves only s 39(3): 
“An interest in respect of uncertificated securities may be granted under this section, where applicable, and 
in the manner provided for in the depository rules, and is effective against third parties, in relation to a 
central securities account or a securities account, where such an interest extends to all uncertificated 
securities standing to the credit of the relevant central securities account or securities account at the time 
the pledge is effected.” 
This makes provision for a pledge granted over the totality or a portion of the totality of a security-
provider’s securities. Naturally a single securities account entry – which as a point of departure 
establishes instrument-holdership – may reflect a specified number of securities. Thus the applicable 
account often reflects an aggregated (i.e. global) instrument-holdership. The principles outlined 
above would then be equally applicable on that aggregated basis and no further discussion is 
required here.58 
A final issue concerns the effect of s 41(1) of the Act, which provides that: 
“An entry effected in terms of section 38 or 39 is valid and effective against third parties despite any fraud 
or illegality that may have resulted in the entry being effected, unless a transferee to the transaction 
resulting in the entry was a party to or had knowledge of the fraud or illegality.” 
When comparing this provision to its equivalent in the Companies Act – i.e. s 53(4) – the wording of 
the latter (“transfer of ownership”) suggests that it does not apply to transfers made in terms of s 39, 
so that these transfers may be regarded as governed solely by s 41(1) of the FMA. Unlike the 
Companies Act, this provision does not extend to entries made despite the insolvency of the security-
provider. This could potentially have important ramifications in the context of real security – if a 
pledge, limited cession, or fiducia cession in securitatem debiti is deemed a disposition that can be 
set aside, should the entry be reversible in the absence of fraud and knowledge? Such an order is 
retroactive, rendering the disposition at least voidable.59 However, that is not the same as illegality 
and if the letter of the Act is to be considered decisive the disposition could be reversible. Third, and 
most importantly, “knowledge” in s 41(1) of the FMA does not benefit from the expanded definition 
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of the concept in the Companies Act, and thus knowledge in these instances would presumably not 
include constructive knowledge.60 
However, s 41(3) of the FMA makes s 53(4) of the Companies Act applicable to an “entry” in terms 
of s 38 or 39 “with the changes required by the context”.61 Thus entries made despite supervening 
insolvency, though not mentioned in s 41(1) itself, remain protected, but in the same breath an 
expanded definition of “knowledge” in s 1 of the Companies Act rolls back the potential application 
of such protection.  
In light of these provisions, one might ask whether finality of transfer makes the same degree of 
sense in the context of real security as it does for purchase and sale of uncertificated securities.  
Where the real security is provided by means of a fiduciary cession in securitatem debiti, it is clear 
that the cessionary acquires the interest in question in an unqualified manner. Thus, finality of 
transfer operates unambiguously to protect the acquisition of that interest, such that the only 
recourse available for a cedent looking to reverse the cession as sine iusta causa would be liability 
in terms of s 55 of the Companies Act and perhaps also a claim of unjustified enrichment against the 
cessionary. Would-be cedents of uncertificated securities in securitatem debiti would, in this light, be 
well advised to be wary of structuring transactions in this manner. However, were one to follow the 
inclusive approach to s 39 as advocated for in the previous section, publicity of that cession would 
be achieved, as it would be flagged by entry at register-level (and in all likelihood in non-register 
level securities accounts as well). 
However, in the context of pledge this question provides an opportunity to resolve some of the natural 
tension between the real nature of pledge and the protection of reliance effected by s 41(1) of the 
FMA and s 53(4) of the Companies Act respectively. It has always been clear that a pledge is of an 
accessory nature, and the existence of the pledge is contingent (as a point of departure) on the 
nature of the secured obligation. It has also been settled that the pledgee need not be a direct party 
 
 
60  Section 1 viz. “knowing”, “knowingly” or “knows” of the Companies Act provides that: 
“when used with respect to a person, and in relation to a particular matter, means that the person either— 
(a) had actual knowledge of the matter; or 
(b) was in a position in which the person reasonably ought to have— 
(i) had actual knowledge; 
(ii) investigated the matter to an extent that would have provided the person with actual knowledge; or 
(iii) taken other measures which, if taken, would reasonably be expected to have provided the person with actual 
knowledge of the matter…” 
61  Section 41(3) reads: “Section 53 (4), (5) and (6) of the Companies Act applies to an entry referred to in subsection 




to the secured obligation (i.e. need not be the creditor),62 but at the same time that, as per Thienhaus 
v Metje & Ziegler Ltd: 63 
“a mortgage bond as a deed of hypothecation must relate to some obligation…If on a concursus creditorum 
a mortgagee, or a pledgee, fails to establish an enforceable claim which it was intended should be secured 
by the hypothecation, the bond or the pledge, as the case may be, falls away.” 
Here, the key issue in this regard is determining the appropriate balance to strike between the 
protection afforded a good faith outright transferee of a security on the one hand, and the protection 
the provision may afford a good faith pledgee on the other, in cases where their interests conflict. 
Specifically, the question is whether the principle of finality envisages the outright transfer of a 
security asset subject to any pre-existing pledge registered against it, or free from it:64 
“Where a pledge is noted, there is scope for debate as to what the consequence of a transfer by the 
cedent…in contravention of [what is now s 39(1)(b) of the FMA, requiring the cedent to obtain the written 
consent of the cessionary in dealing with her security] would be. Presumably, the transfer would, because 
of the contravention of such section, be illegal and therefore fall within the ambit of [what is now s 41(1)] 
and the protection extended to the good faith transferee. There is, however, a tension with [s 39(1)(b) and 
(d)] because usually a pledgee/cessionary would have a ‘real’ right to the subject matter…and the 
pledgor/cedent would not have the right to transfer the pledged [or ceded securities or interest in the 
securities]…It would appear from the entire uncertificated scheme, the intention is to elevate the importance 
of the subregisters and to uphold the integrity of the market by protecting good faith transferees and this 
may support [s 41(1)] trumping the common law position. In such circumstances, the pledgee or cessionary 
would no doubt have recourse against the participant. However, security is critical to business and financial 
structures and the credit worthiness of a participant may not be as good as the security of a pledge or 
cession in securitatem debiti bearing in mind, the securities could be worth billions of dollars.” 
This passage illustrates that considerations of commercial certainty and exigency (specifically the 
“integrity of the market”) in the purchase and sale of uncertificated securities point towards very 
strong protections of finality of transfer in general, but may also do so in the context of the provision 
of real security. The argument that the fruits of recourse against a CSD or CSDP could be far 
outstripped by the value of the lost securities is particularly compelling.  
Ultimately, the FMA itself provides a satisfactory answer.  
In terms of the position of the good faith transferee, s 38(1)(b) of the FMA provides that: 
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“(b) The transferee of uncertificated securities or an interest in uncertificated securities referred to in 
paragraph (a) is entitled to all the rights of a transferee of movable property.” 
On the position of the pre-existing pledgee, on the other hand, s 40 provides that: 
“(1) Despite any other law, if more than one interest or limited interest is entered against the same 
securities, priority must be granted to the interest or limited interest entered first in time in the securities 
account or central securities account, as the case may be.  
(2) (a) Despite subsection (1), the order of priority in any interest or limited interest may be varied by 
agreement between the parties.  
(b) Any variation referred to in paragraph (a) is not effective against third parties.” 
Then, finally, s 41(2) qualifies its finality of transfer arrangements in the following manner: 
“This section does not modify the order of priorities determined by section 40.” 
Despite the measure of flexibility in terms of how it can be structured, it should be regarded as 
axiomatic that the existence of a pledge must, by virtue of s 39(1), be reflected in the securities 
register. Thus, the term “interest” in s 40(1) must be read to include at least pledge and fiduciary 
cession in securitatem debiti as envisaged by s 39. The contrast inherent in the phrase “interest or 
limited interest” further suggests s 40(1) contemplates “interest” to include all forms of holdership 
than can manifest on the register, including instrument-holdership.  
Take the following example: a specific nominee is reflected in the register as holder of the security-
instrument and a specific pledgee in respect of the security is also reflected on the register. The 
register shows the latter was registered at a later date than the date of acquisition of the security-
instrument. This allows one to ascertain that the extent of the interest of the asset-holder (who will 
be evidentiarily reflected somewhere in downstream records, but is represented on the register by 
the instrument-holder) is limited by the extent of the pledge. Thereafter a third party takes transfer 
of the security without written consent of the pledgee, such that quasi-delivery to her chosen 
instrument-holder is reflected on the register at a later date than the date associated with the pledge.  
Section 41(2) would thus provide that the order of priorities determined as per s 40(1) remain 
unaffected and the transferee instrument-holder will (despite any fraud, illegality or insolvency) 
obtain an interest that is qualified to the extent of the prior registration of the pledge. That means the 
acquiring downstream asset-holder will also only obtain the extent of the security asset which was 
(quasi-)delivered – i.e. the security asset as encumbered by the pledge.  
This position is also supported by the terms of s 38(1)(b), which confirms that any acquirer is “entitled 




other things being equal, have to take constructive delivery of the thing because possession would 
be with the pledgee and, by analogy, a similarly limited form of quasi-delivery would have occurred 
in terms of the example above.  
 
9 2  Other limited real interests in securities 
With a more sophisticated and accurate understanding of the law as it relates to limited real rights 
of pledge in respect of securities, as well as a clear meaning to the second possible usage of 
“interests in securities”, all that remains is to discuss real rights other than pledge, or rather other 
interests in securities as meant throughout the rest of this work.  
A good example of both the practice and the concomitant theoretical problems can be found in the 
following statement:65 
“Under English law it appears that any number of equitable interests can be carved out of the equitable 
ownership of a share. This is presumably based on the English dual ownership construction where the 
beneficial interest in the shares held in trust by a nominee is regarded as divisible. The preferred view is 
that South Africa has not imported such dual ownership into its property law, and, accordingly, there may 
not be the same scope for divisibility under South African law. Nevertheless, it is generally accepted that 
shares can be purchased with dividend (cum dividend) or without dividend (ex dividend). As a result of a 
cum dividend purchase the purchaser acquires the right to dividends declared after the date of sale, i.e. he 
can claim these dividends even though he was not as yet registered as a shareholder of the company at 
the time when they were declared. Where there is no express provision to the contrary in the contract of 
sale, the sale is deemed to be cum dividend in respect of dividends declared after the date of the sale.” 
Nonetheless, the discussion here will be restricted only to one kind of real interest – the personal 
servitude. The emergent principles of a discussion of personal servitudes, specifically the usufruct, 
should be sufficient to illustrate the most cogent aspects of the broader theoretical position 
suggested here, including phenomena such as that of sale ex (or even solo) dividend. The first 
portion of this discussion will relate to the nature of the right and interest; thereafter, personal 
servitudes in respect of certificated and uncertificated securities will be discussed respectively. 
A personal servitude is so named as it operates in favour of a specific person, rather than merely 
against the specific asset in question. Thus these servitudes are inalienable and cannot devolve, 
 
 




and end either at the occurrence of a specified date or condition, or death of the holder (for juristic 
persons, who do not die, a limitation of one hundred years applies).66 
Though best known for their specific sub-species usus, fructus and usufructus, personal servitudes 
are in principle entirely variable in subject matter. This is most often expressed in respect of praedial 
servitudes, but is equally applicable to their personal counterparts:67 
“While the three servitudes of usufruct, use and habitation are generally regarded as personal servitudes 
par excellence, it must nevertheless always be remembered that personal servitudes may confer a vast 
variety of other entitlements and benefits on their holders, and, in particular, that most “praedial servitudes” 
may also be constituted as personal servitudes.” 
Whilst Roman law knew only a numerus clausus of personal servitudes, the more abstract South 
African property law does not. Aside from the usufruct and its lesser variations, a number of 
“servitutes irregulares” have specifically been recognised in the past, including the entitlement to 
trade on a specific piece of property, install and exploit a railway side-track, lay electricity cables or 
log an area of land and remove the lumber.68 
This is key. Embedded in the theoretical framework of this work is the notion that whilst the 
components of the creditor’s interest are two-fold (the entitlements of execution and enjoyment, 
respectively), the incident-functionalities which can be derived from holdership of these entitlements, 
especially of the latter through asset-holdership, are numerous and entirely variable. This is because 
an incident-functionality arises from the exercise of legal subjectivity over that interest, which accords 
with the more general principle that servitudes are variable in form and content.  
Accordingly, in South African law, the establishment of servitudes is principle- rather than case-
driven for things as well as (at least) securities as incorporeals. Under this discussion, the exercise 
of legal subjectivity over the security asset, when exercised in a certain specific way, can objectify 
such an incident, or set of incidents, and make it subject to a limited real right.  
The specific incident or set of incidents that are to be made subject of a particular personal servitude 
would therefore be revealed through how it is constructed through the actions and intentions (i.e. 
exercise of legal subjectivity) of the provider and receiver of the servitude. In constructing the 
 
 
66   Van der Merwe Sakereg 360 & 366, and Badenhorst et al Property § 14.2, 322 & § 14.4.1, 338-339. 
67   See Badenhorst et al Property § 14.4.2, 342 & n 183 [own emphasis]; see also the following statement at § 14.1, 
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regard to praedial servitudes, that their number is “practically unlimited” although certain general requirements have to be 
fulfilled.” 




servitude, the principle-based legal requirements for the establishment of the real right with that 
incident or set of incidents as object must of course be adhered to. Thus “[i]n the final analysis…any 
doubts as to whether or not a right is a servitude in any given case will have to be resolved by 
reference to the principles which determine the nature of a real right as a protected interest.”69 This 
is dealt with below when discussing the contexts of certificated and uncertificated securities 
respectively.  
However, before each can be dealt with, it must be determined whether the construct of a personal 
servitude, or that of a personal quasi-servitude, is the most accurate. This distinction has important 
consequences. To facilitate the analysis, the content of the usufruct will be discussed. From a policy 
perspective, the social and economic function of the construct is to provide a person (often a 
testamentary beneficiary) with income from an asset or assets (even entire estates) without 
ownership.70 Because a servitude, personal or praedial, confers “a real right to an advantage out of 
the property of another”,71 it is assumed that ownership of the asset (property)72 in question remains 
with the provider of usufruct or her heir or heirs. The beneficiary is provided with the ability to use 
the asset (usus) and to reap, use and enjoy the fruits (fructus) of the asset for the duration of the 
right. A duty to return the asset with its essential character and quality intact (salva rei substantia) 
upon the termination of the usufruct, also arises from its creation and bestowal.73  
The question of the full servitude versus quasi-servitude arises in the context of assets which, 
according to the principles of property law, are to be regarded as consumable. CG Van der Merwe, 
whose work on the first principles of South African property arising out of its common law sources is 
of great value here, describes consumable things as follows:74 
“Verbruikbare sake is sake wat, indien hulle volgens hul gewone bestemming gebruik word, deur sodanige 
gebruik verbruik word of aansienlik in waarde verminder, byvoorbeeld lewensmiddele, wyn, olie, kerse, en 
sigarette. Volgens sommige skrywers sluit dit ook verslytbare sake soos klere en meubels in wat nie deur 
gebruik geheel en al tot niet gaan nie, maar so verval dat dit nie meer vir hul oorspronklike doel gebruik 
kan word nie. Onverbruikbare sake is bestem om tydens die gebruik daarvan in stand te bly. Voorbeelde 
hiervan is ‘n grondstuk, ‘n motor, boeke, skilderye en ringe.  
 
 
69   Badenhorst et al Property § 14.1 321 & n 5. 
70   Van der Merwe Sakereg 360 & 362; see also Garmany NO v Templeton’s Executors 1936 SR 139, 161. 
71   Dreyer v Letterstedt’s Executors (1865) 5 88, 99; as per Badenhorst et al Property § 14.1, 321 & n 1. 
72   Which may be immoveable, moveable, corporeal or incorporeal – Badenhorst et al Property § 14.4 339 & n 156-
158. 
73   Van der Merwe Sakereg 360-361; Badenhorst et al Property § 14.4 339-340; CG Van der Merwe & MJ de Waal 
“Servitudes” in WA Joubert et al Law of South Africa Vol 24 (2 ed) 2010, § 581-583 & 591; and Fourie v Munnik 
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…Geld word ook as ‘n verbruikbare saak beskou en word geag verbruik te wees indien dit uitgegee is of 
met ander geld op so ‘n wyse vermeng is dat die bepaalde  muntstukke of note nie meer identifiseerbaar 
is nie.” 
Consumable goods, such as grain, cannot be used and enjoyed and nonetheless returned salva rei 
substantia. It follows that they cannot be made subject to a usufruct. Money, due to the fact it can 
be subject to transfer of ownership by commingling, is treated in the same fashion. Thus, from 
Roman times onwards, a quasi-usufruct construct was recognised to fulfil the same social and 
economic function with respect to these consumable assets.75 Importantly, the underlying mechanics 
of the quasi-usufruct construct works very differently to the usufruct. Due to the consumable nature 
of the asset or assets, a quasi-usufruct transfers ownership to the beneficiary, together with a 
concomitant duty to return an asset or assets equivalent (though seemingly not necessarily perfectly 
identical) to what was received. For the duration of the right, the quasi-usufructuary may use and 
enjoy the asset, and receive any fruits (e.g. interest payments) which the asset may yield.76  
On that basis the quasi-usufruct, and indeed all personal quasi-servitudes, appear similar to the 
fiduciary cession in securitatem debiti. Thus, the real nature of the quasi-usufruct appears open to 
question – is it not rather a mere personal right to cession or transfer in equivalence to the original 
cession or transfer? Nonetheless, this work will assume its real nature in line with the authorities it 
makes use of. 
By extension of the quasi-usufruct over money, it became accepted that a quasi-usufruct may be 
granted with respect to a personal right.77  The beneficiary of a quasi-usufruct to performance 
receives the benefits of performance and may similarly put to use the results of performance to 
garner further fruits. Where the performance is owed in money – i.e. in cases of a debt – the 
usufructuary may claim interest where performance is tenderable over time or at a later date. Thus:78 
“[t]he usufructuary may call in the debt and invest the money for interest, but the capital sum must be made 
good when the usufruct expires…At the end of the usufruct, the proceeds must, after deduction of 
expenses, be restored to the nude owner.” 
This implies that a claim to performance is a consumable thing. Broadly that makes sense – it is trite 
that “use and enjoyment” of performance extinguishes the obligation in terms of which performance 
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was tendered. What does that imply for personal servitudes granted with respect to securities? The 
current authority is Cooper v Boyes.79 This case revolved around shares, but it is equally useful for 
both debt and equity securities. The court, after an extensive and exhaustive discussion of the 
relevant common law, academic authorities and relevant company law principles, held that the 
underlying nature of the rights and other competencies of shares did not warrant their classification 
as consumable goods. As per the court:80 
“it is clear that there is no simple definition of a share. The various definitions emphasise a complex of 
characteristics which are peculiar to it. The gist thereof is that a share represents an interest in a company, 
which interest consists of a complex of personal rights which may, as an incorporeal movable entity, be 
negotiated or otherwise disposed of. It is certainly not a consumable article, such as money, even though 
a money value can be placed on it. Nor can it, by any analogy, be likened to a debt which may give rise to 
a claim of some kind or another, even though the debt and related claim may eventuate in an award of 
money being made to the claimant in respect of such debt. 
The fact that the value of a share in a company may fluctuate for a great variety of reasons, or that it may 
be affected by all manner of eventualities which may befall the company, such as liquidation, cannot change 
its essential nature. It cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be converted from an interest or 
conglomerate of personal rights into an article which will be consumed by its very use and enjoyment. 
There is, of course, no reason why it cannot be bequeathed by way of a usufruct. The usufructuary will 
have the right to receive dividends or other benefits accruing to the share, subject thereto that, on 
termination of the usufruct, the share itself must devolve upon the heir as ultimate beneficiary in whom the 
ownership thereof vests.” 
Although this has been subjected to criticism,81 the principle appears sound. It also seems to have 
been well received,82 and it is submitted that it should be accepted as a correct point of departure.  
The issue that it raises, however, is whether a similar pronunciation may be made of debt securities. 
This hinges on whether a debt security is to be regarded as consumable or not.83    
This question is more difficult than it seems. Unlike shares, debt securities’ operative lifetime is fixed. 
Debt securities may further, depending on how they are structured, diminish in value as they bear 
fruits (coupon payments). Yet one can similarly argue that sheep or cars, which are not regarded as 
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consumables, also have an essentially fixed lifespan and diminish in value through use. Indeed, 
corporeal assets are subject to depreciation. In a broadly similar manner, debt securities and other 
loans are subject to the equivalent but financial concept of amortisation. On the face of it, it seems 
strange that a car may have an operating lifespan of approximately ten years and be considered 
non-consumable, but a very expensive bottle of whiskey with an indefinite operative lifetime is 
considered consumable. Certain whiskeys may even appreciate while the value of cars typically 
depreciates. 
On the other hand, cars and sheep: (1) can be used iteratively throughout their operative lifespan, 
and (2) each instance of use does not markedly diminish its essential character and value. Once a 
bottle of whiskey is opened: (1) it can be used iteratively throughout its operative lifespan, but (2) 
each glass consumed will diminish its essential character and value by a very large measure. 
Nonetheless even this feels arbitrary, as it seems to hinge on rate of decay, rather than decay itself, 
through use and enjoyment. 
It is readily admitted that the above examples are cherry picked and that a great number of things 
are clearly consumable or not. What the above is meant to illustrate, however, is that examples do 
exist where the distinction is not as clear, and the ordinary metric of fundamental change or 
significant degradation through use and enjoyment is not the lodestar it purports to be. The ultimate 
aim is further to show that debt securities are a part of this category of more ambiguous instances. 
Could time, value, or value over time be a consideration in the determination of consumability (and 
thus in classifying debt securities using the distinction in Cooper)? It is possible, but such a variable 
approach, even if rooted in rate of decay, does not solve the essential lack of legal certainty, because 
the determination remains essentially subjective. 
It is submitted that there is a better way to analyse whether Cooper is correct in classifying debts as 
consumable.  
It is trite that a usufruct over the aforementioned car or sheep would entitle the usufructuary to drive 
the car or shear the sheep. Yet it would also entitle the holder to profit off, for example, a taxi service 
with respect to the car, or selling the wool of the sheep. This illustrates the distinction between natural 
and civil fruits. The former are natural (valuable) outflows of the thing, such as the literal fruits of an 
orchard; the latter indicate income generated through (profitable) juristic acts committed with respect 
to the thing.84  
 
 
84  “[D]ie reëlmatige, natuurlike voorbrengsels van die saak” in contrast to “die reëlmatige inkomste van die saak wat 




However, with regard to the whiskey the situation may be different. Through prudent economic action 
one may generate civil fruits from it, for example by selling tickets to a tasting. But is drinking the 
whiskey truly the use and enjoyment of its natural fruit, or use and enjoyment of the substance of the 
whiskey itself? Is it not more accurate to state that the whiskey generates no natural fruits, because 
its use or enjoyment of its substance is indistinguishable from the destruction of that substance? It 
cannot “naturally produce” anything separate from itself, whether tangible or intangible. The same 
could be said of oil or even grain. To use and enjoy these items is to destroy either them or their 
essential character, and only by taking prudent and profitable economic action with respect to their 
destruction (convert oil into petrol, or plant grain in soil) is one able to make them produce fruit. Any 
such fruit will clearly be civil in nature. 
On that basis, because destruction is: (1) in the technical legal sense a form of disposal, and (2) 
unavoidable in the process of use, enjoyment, and the generation of civil fruits, it follows that whilst 
disposal of the asset underlying a usufruct is unlawful, disposal of the asset underlying a quasi-
usufruct is implied. Put differently:85 
“[t]he ius abutendi cannot be conferred on a usufructuary...a proper usufruct is not possible over any 
property which, when used for the first time in the normal way, changes in substance, is extinguished or is 
readily consumed by use, such as oil, grain, food, money or cigarettes. In the case of such property there 
can be no meaningful distinction between the ius utendi and the ius fruendi (the right of use and enjoyment) 
on the one hand and the ius abutendi (the right of abuse or destruction) and the ius dispondendi (the right 
of disposal) on the other hand.” 
If in this context disposal and consumption are functional equivalents, may a quasi-usufructuary not 
only destroy the asset, but also profitably alienate it in order to reap civil fruits? The answer must be 
in the affirmative because they amount to the same thing. The transfer of ownership is, and indeed 
must be, required in the quasi-usufruct construct in order to enable the use and enjoyment of civil 
fruits, and conversely civil fruits can be generated through destruction or profitable alienation.86 
What does this analysis bring to the context of securities? It points to the viability of a right to use 
and enjoy the natural fruit as a leading metric of distinction between consumable and non-
 
 
85  Leos (2006) SALJ 132. 
86  See A Apers & AL Verbeke “Modern usufruct – empowering the usufructuary” (2014) Journal of South African Law 




consumable securities. It is – mostly87 – uncontentious that shares produce natural fruit, and this 
metric is the simplest and most elegant reason that can be offered as to why they are not 
consumables, despite being mainly constituted of obligations and thus bearing fruit through 
performance.  
What about debt securities? As shown above, a debt seems (as a point of departure) to be regarded 
as consumable, and thus subject only to the quasi-usufruct. It is submitted that despite its common 
law support, this is not necessarily a sound view when dealing with all debts, especially when dealing 
with debt securities. This is because debts do not resemble other personal rights, or money, in the 
ways that matter. 
Claims to (single or iterative) performance not tenderable in money do not typically attract any 
interest – performance simply occurs when it is due, after which the (or each successive) obligation 
is extinguished. Non-monetary performances are thus in all likelihood correctly regarded to be 
consumable. Physical money, on the other hand, also does not attract interest and is subject to 
commingling, making ownership of money tenuous. By reason of that fungibility coupled with its 
primarily possession-based usefulness, money is also correctly considered consumable through 
spending or mixing. 
Debt, however, may be different. The manner in which debt, and debt securities, can be structured 
is very different to other claims to performance. Debt typically consists of a capital sum loaned and 
interest, and consists of iterative obligations of repayment over an agreed upon period of time. When 
the capital sum lent is repaid, the recipient of those payments could perhaps be said to be consuming 
that asset. Yet it is difficult to accept that receiving interest payments amounts to consumption of the 
asset – they appear more akin to the natural fruits of the asset over its serviceable lifetime. Indeed, 
it is trite to state that interest is fructus on the principal sum lent. Even in the absence of provision 
for interest, debt in arrears will attract moratory interest.88 Thus, following the earlier-proposed 
 
 
87  As per Leos (2006) SALJ 135-138, this thinking is not entirely uncontentious in the context of shares and the quasi-
usufruct as outlined in Cooper v Boyes. The opposite view hinges on complexities in the nature of shares and of 
companies to argue company distributions are difficult to classify as natural fruits. Yet this view is mistaken. 
Principally, the argument states that any determination of what “state” of shares should be regarded salva rei 
substantia is, irrespective of the ultimate legal nature of a share, not a practical or even sensical proposition.  
But a company is an organic and dynamic legal phenomenon, so that arguments relating to complexities of company 
law and the nature of the juristic form do not provide a viable argument for why the decision in Cooper v Boyes is 
incorrect. Salva rei substantia, it is submitted, need only be ascertainable and not certain. Thus a more elegant, 
and effective, explanation is simply to regard distributions made by a company to its shareholders as natural fruits 
of those shares, and accordingly to state that the return of the right to use and enjoy natural fruits (to the nude 
asset-holder) is an adequate return of the asset salva rei substantia. In fact the potential immortality of juristic 
personality makes share-based distributions a possible perpetuity, and as such theoretically inexhaustible. 
Other arguments relating to the potentially misapplied distinction between consumables and fungibles is also 
unconvincing, by mere reason that fungibility relates the replaceability, which is neither here nor there in the context 
of the obligation to provide an asset or assets equivalent rather than identical.  




metric, the right of use and enjoyment of the natural fruits of debt is indeed viable. Could this be 
grounds for classification of debts as a durable, rather than consumable, asset?  
It is submitted that under the right circumstances, the answer must be in the affirmative. Considering 
the myriad different ways debt (and consequently debt securities) can be structured,89 it can be quite 
difficult to determine with certainty whether the creditor is receiving fruits, or consuming the capital 
sum, or to what extent a combination of both is occurring.  
Debt securities, specifically, best embody this ambiguity. Debt securities appear to be a structured, 
“commoditised” complex of rights and other competencies providing patrimonial gains over time. 
First, they can have what can rightly be referred to as a useful lifetime. Second, their intrinsic value 
may increase (e.g. discounted zero coupon bonds), decrease (e.g. vanilla bonds issued at face 
value) or even fluctuate (e.g. junk bonds in the right environment) over their useful lifetime, (which 
will, generally, be tracked by their price in the marketplace). Third and most importantly, their interest 
and capital may be payable together in fixed or floating coupons, or payable in a specific order 
despite a constant coupon (e.g. capital interest first and thereafter), or capital and interest may be 
paid at wholly separate intervals (e.g. interest during the term and capital at the end). They are 
bought and sold as (typically) depreciating assets.  
In this light, would it not be more sensible to suggest, as a point of departure, that the diminishing 
value of a typical debt security, as amortisation of the income receivable, be seen as more similar to 
the diminishing value of a movable, quasi-fungible corporeal asset? Could it not also be said that 
interest is as natural an outflow of a debt security as the usefulness and enjoyment derived from 
driving a car? If so, a debt security could very well be a durable asset. 
Yet according to Cooper v Boyes, it is not:90 
“On the question of usufruct of debts, however, Van der Keessel…qualifies the opinion of Voet, mentioned 
above, that, when a debt is given in usufruct, it is regarded that the money to be claimed under such debt 
is in fact the object of a quasi-usufruct. This is not acceptable, he says, when it relates to claims which have 
been granted on interests. The usufruct of such interest (ususfructus calendarii), Van der Keessel suggests, 
appears to be a true usufruct: 
'Sed hoc quidem de nominibus faenori datis non videtur accipiendum, hic enim ususfructus calendarii…videtur 
verus esse ususfructus…’ 
 
 
89  The various ways in which debt can be settled are too complex to discuss here. Suffice to say repayment can occur 
in successive payments over time, or can occur in one lump sum at the end of the term, and that successive 
repayments may represent only capital, only interest or a discounted combination of the total of both.  




It is not necessary to go into Van der Keessel's explanation of the aforesaid qualification since it does not 
appear to be supported by any other authority available to me and may even be considered somewhat 
pedantic.” 
Nonetheless Van der Keessel’s argument has great merit. Should the capital sum be the object of 
the right, the use and enjoyment of its natural fruit is not viable, as that is tantamount to its disposal. 
An obligation on the part of A to pay B R100 000 one year after it has been lent is certainly consumed 
when the amount is paid.   
Should the object of the right be only the interest, or both interest and capital, rather than the capital 
sum only, the position may be different. When pure interest is to be used and enjoyed in terms of 
the right, it patently has no effect on the substance of the debt. Thus the object of the usufruct simply 
must be regarded as durable. When a debt is repaid over time in a manner where each repayment 
is a portion of both the interest and the capital, the lifetime of the debt and the rate at which the debt 
reduces should determine if the analogy of using a car better fits the arrangement than that of burning 
oil, eating grain, or drinking whiskey. 
A second, equally important, argument to complement Van der Keessel’s stance is that the 
commercial reality has probably outgrown the origins of the quasi-usufruct approach to debt. 
Subjecting a debt to the quasi-usufruct construct is largely based on the premise that the money 
receivable in terms of the claim is the object of the right. As money is subject to the quasi-usufruct 
construction, so is debt; or according to the court in Cooper:91 
“In accepting the Roman legal principle that debts (nomina) should also be numbered among consumable 
things, Voet…explains that such debts should be equated with the money which can be claimed when they 
are sued upon: 
'Caeterum uti in auro, argento, aere, oleo, frumento, vino similibusque, ac in ipsa numerata pecunia quasi 
usumfructum constitui indubitati juris est…ita in nominibus quoque eundem admitti, post jurisconsultorum varietates 
obtinuit…in quantum nomine in usumfructum dato, pecunia ipsa data intelligitur, quae ex tali nomine venit 
exigenda…' 
('For the rest, just as it is undoubted law that a quasi-usufruct is constituted in respect of gold, silver, bronze, oil, 
grain, wine and similar things, and likewise in respect of coined money itself, just so, after differing opinions obtained 
among jurists, it was applied equally to debts: so to the extent that a debt is given in usufruct, it is regarded that the 
very money, which comes to be claimed on such debt, has thus been given…').” 
A critical flaw in this analogy is that, in the modern world, debt is no longer typically paid in money, 
but rather presents as a personal right against a financial institution (primarily banks) to make those 
 
 




funds available to the creditor and deduct those funds from the debtor’s available balance.  Debt is 
payable in debt, not money. The quasi-usufruct with respect to money exists to address the fungibility 
and expendability of money and the consequent effects of consumption through use or commingling. 
That imperative is not present with regard to debt, as in most cases “who is owed what” is 
meticulously accounted for through the national payment and banking systems. Bank balances are 
not, after all, subject to commingling. 
Natural fruits, by definitional logic, do not cause the essential substance of an asset to deteriorate 
any more than it naturally would – for instance, a fruit tree is not considered to be consumable. By 
the same reasoning, interest on a debt is the natural fruit of that debt. If the position of the current 
authorities is to be accepted this is a very curious scenario – an ostensible consumable which yields 
natural fruits. In this light, the extension of the quasi-usufruct to personal rights due to the analogy 
with money does not appear as clear cut as it has been accepted to be.92 
Now that the contextual ambiguity of debt as a consumable or durable has been established, it 
becomes clearer that a resolution must be sought in a return to first principles. From the preceding 
section, the first principles are also far clearer. Limited real interests in securities, such as pledge, 
are created (and function) at the level of incidents. The nature of the incident or set of incidents that 
serve as object to the right will determine the nature of that right.  
From the above, it initially appeared that debt may be durable or consumable, depending the 
outcome of “viability of natural fruit” test. But that is to misread the underlying position. In line with 
Chapter 4, as well as the modern nature of debt and money, the true position is that the incident 
functionality or set of incident functionalities that serves as the object of the usufruct may, depending 
on its nature, be durable or consumable. Because the level of incidents is driven by action – i.e. the 
exercise of legal subjectivity – it is dynamic, rather than static. This is also, incidentally, why the 
doctrine of subjective rights fails properly to account for phenomena such as limited real rights to 
obligations: it is too static.   
Although the object of a usufruct appears to be naturally limited to the right of use and enjoyment, it 
follows that that which is to be used and enjoyed may be variable. In respect of debt securities it can 
refer to: (1) the principal debt or a portion thereof, (2) the interest or a portion thereof, or (3) both 
interest and capital or a portion thereof. A “portion of” may further be determinable with reference to 
time (pointing to a durable object), or value (pointing to a consumable object).  
Thus, the ultimate position is as follows. Where a right of use and enjoyment over an incident or set 
of incidents of a debt security entails the use and enjoyment of natural fruits, that right of use and 
 
 




enjoyment is a usufruct. Where the use and enjoyment of natural fruits are not viable in the exercise 
of such a right, it is a quasi-usufruct.  
To conclude this discussion, consider three different debt securities. Debt security A is a security 
issued at face value for R500m, with a yield-to-maturity of 10% over a lifetime of five years. Each 
quarterly coupon payment is a mixture of interest and capital. Debt security B is issued at 61,4% of 
its face value of R500m, i.e. R307m, and it does not pay any coupons over its five year lifetime. It 
also has a 10% yield-to-maturity. Debt security C is issued at a face value of R100m, also with a five 
year term and yield-to-maturity of 10%, but its quarterly coupon payments cover only interest, and 
the R100m is repaid in one lump sum on its termination date. 
Debt security A diminishes in value over its five year lifespan and provides twenty identical payments 
before it is extinguished. Debt security B increases in value, but provides no payments until its 
expiration, at which point it provides payment of interest and capital in full. Debt security C diminishes 
in value as its interest is repaid, but its capital amount is not consumed over its operative lifetime. 
The nature of the personal servitudes which can be granted over these securities are different and 
varied. The above seems to point to the fact that the structure of the usufruct (as evidenced by the 
intent of the parties, the surrounding factual matrix and the manner in which effective control is 
bestowed to perfect the right) will determine its durability or consumability, as the case may be.  
With this in mind, one may now turn to the far simpler mechanics of granting these rights with respect 
to certificated and uncertificated securities respectively.  
 
9 2 1  Certificated securities 
The case of certificated securities is simple, because a distinction has now been properly made 
between the debt on the one hand, and the incident or set of incidents which may serve as the object 
of a usufruct in respect of a debt security. Here it is key to remember that, unlike corporeal things, 
various incidents of incorporeal assets may be subject to the simultaneous effective control – i.e. 
quasi-possession – of more than one person.  
Where it is clear that the concept of natural fruits is not viable for such an object, the right is a quasi-
usufruct and full holdership over that object must pass to the quasi-usufructuary alongside the 
appropriate degree of effective control over the instrument-holder.   
Where natural fruits appear viable, the ordinary rules of usufruct apply and effective control over the 
instrument-holder with respect to that object will – together with the requisite real intent – suffice. 




construction is also a simple matter, as the creation of all limited real rights in respect of certificated 
securities may follow the same proprietary principles set out in Chapter 4, most importantly § 4 3 2. 
This was fully discussed in § 9 1 1 above.  
In summary it can be described as follows. Where an asset-holder wishes to isolate an incident-
functionality or set of incident-functionalities, and make it subject to a limited real right in favour of a 
third party, she must: bestow lawful effective control over that incident or set of incidents to the party 
in whose favour the right is to function, doing so with the requisite form of real intent. 
Using the example of security C above, the asset-holder must provide control over the instrument-
holder (i.e. control over the “executer”) in respect of all coupon payments save the final payment, 
and the two parties must have the corresponding intent to give and receive the personal servitude 
as real right. The various ways in which this can be done has also been fully canvassed in § 6 1 2 
1, but due regard must be had to the nature of the incident-functionality in question (as object of the 
real right) to ensure that the right is adequately constituted.  
 
9 2 2  Uncertificated securities 
Uncertificated securities pose a slightly more vexing question and brings one back to the meaning 
of “an interest in an uncertificated security” as found in the FMA.  
As was learned in § 5 2 of Chapter 5, the direct (and sometimes allocated) nature of holdership of 
the South African settlement system under the FMA makes it clear that the international concept of 
“interests in securities” cannot manifest in the domestic environment. Even where securities are 
immobilised in the true sense, the central securities account of the CSD indicates the notional bearer 
of the security and such securities would most likely function as registered securities do.93   
Nevertheless, to recap some of the work in the previous section, s 38(1) of FMA reads: 
“[t]he transfer of…an interest in uncertificated securities on the uncertificated securities register held by a 
central securities depository or participant must be effected in the manner provided for in Chapter 2, Part 
E of the Companies Act, where applicable, and the depository rules, by making the debit and credit entries 
respectively in the central securities account or securities account of the transferor and the transferee kept 
by the central securities depository or the participant.” 
 
 
93  Even s 1 viz. “deposit” indicates this, reading “‘deposit’” means a deposit of securities, and includes a deposit by 




The FMA also seems to contemplate the registration of limited real interests, as evidenced by s 
36(2)(a)(ii) of the FMA: 
“(3) (a) No central securities depository or participant may become the owner, co-owner, holder, pledgee 
or cessionary for the purpose of securing a debt, of securities merely because of— 
… 
(iii) the registration in its name of— 
(aa) securities; 
(bb) limited rights in securities; 
(cc) other rights in securities; 
(dd) benefits in respect of securities; or 
(ee) benefits accruing to securities.” 
Section 37(2) seems to acknowledge that “[i]n so far as any limited right exists in respect of any 
securities at the time of…deposit or accrual, such limited right extends to the interest of such co-
owner and to any securities delivered to that co-owner.” Section 51(5)(b) of the Companies Act, 
included by reference in s 53(3), and thus part of the FMA by virtue of s 38, also contemplates “the 
description of the securities, or interest transferred…”.  
Most importantly, there are the terms of s 40 of the Act: 
“40.   Ranking of interests in securities – (1)  Despite any other law, if more than one interest or limited 
interest is entered against the same securities, priority must be granted to the interest or limited interest 
entered first in time in the securities account or central securities account, as the case may be. 
(2) (a)  Despite subsection (1), the order of priority in any interest or limited interest may be varied by 
agreement between the parties. 
(b) Any variation referred to in paragraph (a) is not effective against third parties.” 
However, if “interests in securities” is taken to mean limited real rights in respect of securities, there 
is a significant problem regarding their creation within the scheme of the FMA. The problem, 
ironically, is real security. The pledge or limited outright cession of one or more specific incident-
functionalities in securitatem debiti is done in accordance with s 39 of the Act. The methodology 
prescribed is clear: the pledgee or limited cessionary must be entered alongside the instrument-




corresponding debit. That methodology, sensible though it is, is limited in terms of s 39 to acts (other 
than out-and-out transfer of the security) that are aimed at providing real security.  
Accordingly, all other limited interests in uncertificated securities must be bestowed in accordance 
with s 38, which – if given a plain language interpretation – requires a debit and credit of the 
respective securities accounts. This implies, like an outright transfer of the security asset, that quasi-
delivery in the form of a transfer of the security instrument is required. Yet this does not quite make 
sense. It is submitted that there are four ways of approaching this problem, none of which are 
particularly satisfactory.  
The first is to assume that a limited real interest other than a pledge or limited cession in securitatem 
debiti can only be created through an agreement making the limited interest-holder the instrument-
holder. Thus, a debit and credit takes place in the applicable securities account, satisfying both the 
quasi-delivery and effective control requirements in the creation of the limited real right. On the 
patrimonial level, the asset-holder remains asset-holder, but the instrument-holder also has a limited 
beneficial interest in the security, for example: (1) for a viable debt security, the right to enjoy the 
natural fruits of the debt, or (2) for a share, a full usufruct over the security. However, the key issue 
with this method is that it renders s 40 of the FMA ineffective except in so far as s 39 is concerned, 
as there will be no formal record of the nature of this limited real interest in the security in the 
securities account – merely a record of a new instrument-holder.  
The second is to assume that the intention of the legislature was to effect the granting of all limited 
real interests in securities in the manner provided for in s 39. This then leads one to a purposive 
interpretation of s 38, whereby one must bend the language of the statute somewhat to allow only a 
credit to the securities account of the grantor of the personal servitude, such that it reflects the names 
of the instrument-holder and the limited real right holder. Despite being a non-literal reading of s 38, 
this approach accords with s 51(5)(b) of the Companies Act and sections 36(2)(a)(ii), 37(2) and 40 
of the FMA. 
The third way is to accept that, barring the implicit statutory requirements imposed on the granting 
of real security, all limited real interests in securities occur outside of the framework of the FMA. As 
no direct provision for this is made, it could be argued that “limited interests in uncertificated 
securities” refers only to rights of real security and all other limited real rights are a matter inter partes 
between asset-holder, instrument-holder and grantee of the right in question. In this case the security 
of transfer protections of s 41 of the Act are not available to these kinds of limited interest holders, 
and ss (2) of that section only applies to holders of real security as reflected in the priority established 
by s 40.  
The fourth is to assume that a debit and credit is necessary, but that the record of the limited real 




all the provisions of the Act can be satisfied, but at the cost of considerable practical inelegance. In 
terms of this approach, a first debit and credit will transfer the entirety of the security-asset to the 
grantee of the right in accordance with the principles of § 6 1 1 2 above. However, the details of this 
transfer in the securities account will specify the nature of the limited real interest. Thereafter, a 
second debit and credit will transfer the security asset back to the grantor of the limited interest, but 
the original entry in favour of the grantee will remain, such that both grantee and grantor will have 
entries in their respective securities accounts reflecting the extent of their interests in the particular 
security. 
However, in the final analysis, this issue is of very limited application in the context of debt securities. 
Thus, no final determination will be made here about which method, or combination of methods, is 
correct or viable, although the outcome of a such an analysis is of far greater importance in the 
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10  Good faith acquisition of debt securities 
In Chapter 8, the requirements for the acquisition of securities, through transfer and transmission, 
were re-examined and clarified in light of the outcomes of Chapters 4 and 5.  
For both certificated and uncertificated securities, the law also affords measures of protection to a 
good faith transferee of security-holdership despite the fact that the transfer is legally defective. In 
the context of certificated securities, this protection is limited to the defence of estoppel by 
representation,1 best confirmed in Oakland Nominees (Pty) Ltd v Gelria Mining & Investment Co 
(Pty) Ltd.2 In the context of uncertificated securities, the protection is afforded by s 53(4) of the 
Companies Act and s 41 of the FMA (which provisions offer a protection far more widely effective 
and available than that of estoppel). 
Due to the fact that neither the policy basis nor the purpose and effect of these mechanisms is 
perfectly identical, it is better to deal with each separately. Common to each, however, is the fact 
that the protection of a legally defective but good faith acquisition of a security may well serve to 
override various legal mechanisms which exist to protect the true holder of a security, or a limited 
real interest in a security (which protections are more fully discussed in Chapter 11 hereafter).  
Before these certificated and uncertificated contexts can be discussed, one must deal with what the 
protection of good faith yet defective acquisition of securities seeks to achieve. There appears to be 
a simple and intuitive answer to this question – it seeks to protect the good faith acquirer’s acquisition 
of value. In the certificated context, as will be shown below, the law acts to correct the detriment the 
defect in question will cause the acquirer. The focus on detriment, as evidenced by the requirements 
of estoppel, implies a potential patrimonial loss. Thus, it becomes clear that the focus, when dealing 
with certificated securities, must be on the security asset. In the uncertificated context, on the other 
hand, the desired outcome is more complex – it serves to protect specific acquirers from patrimonial 
detriment, but also more broadly to protect the integrity and liquidity of the securities market as a 
whole and therefore focuses on both the asset and instrument. This implies that, to a certain degree, 
 
 
1  The res iudicata principle the South African procedural, or adjective, law is also considered erroneously by some 
to be a form of estoppel (see principally LTC Harms “Estoppel” in WA Joubert et al Law of South Africa Vol 18 (3 
ed) 2015 § 50-78), and will be excluded from discussion in this work. Accordingly, reference to estoppel in this work 
should be taken to mean estoppel by representation. 




the protections of s 53(3) of the Companies Act and s 41 of the FMA have a more depersonalised 
teleological function in its focus on collective stability rather than individual autonomy, which 
accounts for the structural differences between those provisions and estoppel.  
 
10 1  Certificated securities and estoppel 
The precise legal nature of estoppel is a matter that is not yet settled in South African law – some 
authorities consider it delictual in nature,3 others have argued that it flows from an underlying “risk 
principle” supported by needs of legal and commercial exigency;4 also, it has been conclusively 
decided that it could not have been derived from the exceptio doli, as this Roman law principle was 
never received in South Africa.5  
Though the most convincing account of its nature is an explanation that characterises it as flowing 
from the foundational private law imperative of giving effect to, and balancing out, the autonomy of 
legal subjects. This explanation can be summarised as follows.6  
Legal acts are acts of legal subjectivity to which the law will give effect because (1) they are willed 
by suitably capable doers, and (2) countenanced by the positive law. However, it may occur that a 
legal subject exercises her autonomy in a manner that fosters an unfounded belief on the part of a 
third party in a certain set of facts, and the latter similarly exercises legal subjectivity by relying on 
those (untrue) facts, leading to that party’s detriment. In such cases, the law may on an exceptional 
basis choose to treat the fiction as fact for its purposes. The requirements of the defence of estoppel 
serve as rules used to discount the relative legal interests of the two parties, allowing the law to 
make a choice between two horizontally competing manifestations of autonomy. That choice is made 
on the basis of whether a reliance on the impression created is sufficiently reasonable to merit legal 
protection at the cost of others. It follows that the nature and quality of the conduct giving rise to the 
representation itself (i.e. the first exercise of autonomy) influences the stringency of the 
requirements, through which the choice between competing interests is made. 
 
 
3  See for instance as originally suggested by JC de Wet ‘Estoppel by Representation’ in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 
(1939); NJ Van der Merwe & PPJ Olivier Die Onregmatige Daad in Die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 6 ed (1985) 277-280; 
or Scottish Rhodesian Finance Ltd v Taylor 1972 (4) SA 434 (R). 
4  See principally JC van der Walt “Die beskerming van die bona fide-besitsverkryger: ‘n vergelyking tussen die Suid-
Afrikaanse en Nederlandse reg” in JJ Gauntlet JC Noster: ‘n Feesbundel (1979) 73-96.   
5  See Bank of Lisbon and SA v De Ornelas 1988 (3) SA 580 (A).   
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This explanation demonstrates that the contractual doctrine of objective corrective consensus, the 
(more recently emerging) notion of ostensible authority and estoppel are all examples of a higher 
order balancing of competing exercises in autonomy in the context of reliance. It also explains and 
ties together the reason all three include an examination of the quality of conduct that created the 
impression that was relied on.  
In that light:7 
“[d]ie opvallende kenmerk van die estoppel-leerstuk is juis dat dit dien ter korreksie van verskillende 
instellings van die privaatreg wat te herlei is tot die ideal van individuele outonomie. 
… 
In wese kom estoppel in die privaatreg ter sprake waar ‘n party gebondenheid aan ‘n regshandeling ontken 
met verwysing na omstandighede waaronder die outonomie-beginsel die oplegging van regsgevolge 
negeer. ‘n Beroep op estoppel trag om hierdie poging te fnuik met verwysing na beleidsoorwegings wat die 
oplegging van regsgevolge vereis, of met die beroep dat die erkenning van regsgevolge vereis word ter 
beskerming van die outonomie gestalte van die vertrouende party. Die tegniese vereistes vir ‘n geslaagde 
beroep op estoppel verteenwoordig die uitgekristalliseerde oordeel van die reg aangaande die behoorlike 
balans tussen hierdie kompeterende beginsels en belange. 
In situasies waar die outonomie van die party wat regshandeling ontken die swaarste gewig dra, sou hierdie 
voorkeur verwesenlik kon word deur die vereistes vir ‘n geslaagde beroep op estoppel te verskerp, 
byvoorbeeld deur die stel van ‘n skuld- or streng nadeelvereiste…Hierteenoor staan situasies waar 
regsekerheid in die verkeer voorrang geniet. Aan so ‘n beleidsvoorkeur kan uitdrukking gegee word deur 
die vereistes vir ‘n geslaagde beroep op estoppel te verslap, byvoorbeeld deur weg te doen met die 
skuldvereiste or nadeelvereiste.” 
This is vitally important to understanding the role of fault in estoppel as it pertains to certificated 
securities. The currently accepted requirements for showing that a reliance is sufficiently reasonable 
for it to be protectable is found in the case of vindicatory estoppel. In Oakland Nominees (Pty) Ltd v 
Gelria Mining & Investment Co (Pty) Ltd, the court makes the following observations:8 
“Our law jealously protects the right of ownership and the correlative right of the owner in regard to his 
property, unless, of course, the possessor has some enforceable right against the owner. Consistent with 
this, it has been authoritatively laid down by this Court that an owner is estopped from asserting his rights 
to his property only –  
(a) where the person who acquired his property did so because, by the culpa of the owner, he was 
misled into the belief that the person, from whom he acquired it, was the owner or was entitled to 
dispose of it; or 
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(b) (possibly) where, despite the absence of culpa, the owner is precluded from asserting his rights by 
compelling considerations of fairness…[the court’s further reference to the exception doli has been 
omitted]. 
See Grosvenor Motors (Potchefstroom) Ltd v Douglas, 1956 (3) SA 420 (AD); Johaadien v Stanley Porter 
(Paarl) (Pty) Ltd, 1970 (1) SA 394 (AD) at p. 409. 
These two cases relate to estoppel in respect of ownership of movables. There seems no reason for not 
applying these principles to a case such as the present one where the plaintiff seeks a declaration that it is 
the 'owner' of shares. 
As to the formulation in (b), supra, the occasion has not yet arisen for its further development by this Court. 
Certainly it does not arise in the present appeal, having regard to the pleadings, the evidence, and the 
arguments in this Court. 
As to (a), supra, it may be stated that the owner will be frustrated by estoppel upon proof of the following 
requirements - 
(i) There must be a representation by the owner, by conduct or otherwise, that the person who disposed 
of his property was the owner of it or was entitled to dispose of it. A helpful decision in this regard is 
Electrolux (Pty) Ltd v Khota and Another, 1961 (4) SA 244 (W), with its reference at p. 247 to the 
entrusting of possession of property with the indicia of dominium or jus disponendi. 
(ii) The representation must have been made negligently in the circumstances. 
(iii) The representation must have been relied upon by the person raising the estoppel. 
(iv) Such person's reliance upon the representation must be the cause of his acting to his detriment. As 
to (iii) and (iv), see Standard Bank of SA Ltd v Stama (Pty) Ltd, 1975 (1) SA 730 (AD).” 
Most of the points made by the court have, over time, settled into accepted law. However, two key 
points of consideration merit further discussion. The first is the court’s recognition of possible further 
development of the faultless estoppel in matters relating to holdership of the security asset. The 
second is whether, in light of the pronouncements in Electrolux (Pty) Ltd v Khota9 coupled with the 
refinement of the securities concept as found in Chapter 4 of this work, any further insights arise into 
the law as it relates to estoppel and certificated securities. These issues are related and will be dealt 
with below in the course of a review of the requirements for estoppel in the context of debt securities. 
To further examine these related points, due regard must be had for a further element of the Oakland 
decision:10 
“company share certificates with blank transfer forms are not, in law, negotiable instruments. There is 
therefore no basis, in law, for regarding them as being excepted from the principle stated above; although 
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their transferability, as distinct from negotiability, may, depending on the circumstances, be relevant in 
considering the question of negligent representation, supra.  
… 
A nominee is an agent with limited authority: he holds shares in name only. He does this on behalf of his 
nominator or principal, from whom he takes his instructions; see Sammel and Others v President Brand 
Gold Mining Co Ltd, 1969 (3) SA 629 (AD) at p. 666. The principal, whose name does not appear on the 
register, is usually described as the 'beneficial owner'. This is not, juristically speaking, wholly accurate; but 
it is a convenient and well-understood label. Ownership of shares does not depend upon registration. On 
the other hand, the company recognises only its registered shareholders. As indicated in para. (ii) at the 
commencement of this judgment, it is a practice among brokers of the J.S.E. to have a nominee company. 
The practice is a convenient one and is accepted as proper by the J.S.E.” 
The concept of the nominee can now be better understood as instrument-holder – i.e. the person 
who has holdership of the incidents of execution of a security. This is more than just the role of an 
administrative agent – the nominee has holdership of one of the two legal objects of which securities 
comprise. As a result, the instrument-holder: (1) is the only person who may realise and enforce the 
content of the security as rights and other competencies operative between issuer and asset-holder; 
but (2) must do so primarily in the interests, and under the instruction, of the asset-holder. It should 
also be clear that it is the asset-holder who should be regarded as the “owner” of the securities, 
being entitled to at least a residual patrimonial interest.  
This allows for a far clearer restatement of the requirements for raising a successful estoppel.  
First, there must have been a factual representation (by commission or omission) that the legal act 
that is at issue vis-à-vis the security was lawfully viable. Here guidance can be found in the Electrolux 
case, as cited in Oakland, in the context of the vindicatory estoppel:11  
It is clear from the authorities in our law, as well as in English law, that the owner's mere entrusting a person 
(not being a factor, broker, or agent for selling) with the possession of its articles is not sufficient to produce 
the representation that the dominium or jus disponendi was vested in the possessor [citing thereafter 
various authorities including, importantly, Grosvenor Motors (Potchefstroom) Ltd v Douglas, 1956 (3) SA 
420 (AD) 425E]. The respondent would not be entitled to assume from such mere possession that the 
possessor was authorised to dispose of the articles. If he made such an assumption he would only have 
himself to blame for his gullibility. 
… 
To give rise to the representation of dominium or jus disponendi, the owner's conduct must be not only the 
entrusting of possession to the possessor but also the entrusting of it with the indicia of the dominium or 
jus disponendi. Such indicia may be the documents of title and/or of authority to dispose of the articles, as 
 
 




for example, the share certificate with a blank transfer form annexed, as in West v De Villiers, 1938 CPD 
96, and the other cases referred to therein; or such indicia may be the actual manner or circumstances in 
which the owner allows the possessor to possess the articles, as for example, the owner/wholesaler 
allowing the retailer to exhibit the articles in question for sale with his other stock in trade…” 
The functional equivalent of possession in the securities context, as shown in Chapter 4, is effective 
control, manifesting as control over the instrument-holder (which may include actually being that 
holder). The control in question will depend on the legal question at hand – in this case it refers to 
the kind of control required to dispose of the asset. Thus, as correctly pointed out by the court, mere 
instrument-holdership is insufficient in constituting the kind of representation necessary to found a 
defence of estoppel against a quasi-vindicatory action. What is necessary is to show a representation 
(ascribable to the asset-holder) that the person who effected the defective disposal had effective 
control over the incident(s) of disposal. A good example, again in the vindicatory context, is 
possession of blank yet signed transfer forms coupled with the security certificate, as mentioned by 
the court above. Under the right circumstances, either such transfer forms or merely the certificate 
itself (as a vital indicium of control over the instrument-holder) could create this impression. 
Nonetheless one should tread carefully when dealing with each set of facts, as one of the key 
indicators of control in the Gelria case was also the fact that the nominee had “nominee” in its name. 
Each case of alleged representation must, as is required, be carefully evaluated on its merits. 
Finally, by way of induction, this can be generally restated as a requirement that the representation 
must have been one of effective control over the incidents pertaining to the estoppel in question. In 
this regard, the following is a useful guideline on the dynamics of representation of effective control 
in light of the nature of intangibles augmented by document, but that are not negotiable 
instruments:12 
“mens [moet] ’n onderskeid tref tussen twee kategorieë van vorderingsreg. Die eerste is die soort 
vorderingsreg ten opsigte waarvan ’n dokument die enigste bewys is. Dit is waar die vorderingsreg eintlik 
in die dokument beliggaam word soos byvoorbeeld ’n verhandelbare stuk, waar die reg nie onafhanklik van 
die dokument kan bestaan nie. Die ander soort vorderingsreg is een ten opsigte waarvan ’n dokument 
bewys bied, maar nie die enigste bewys nie; die reg bestaan onafhanklik van die dokument. ’n Voorbeeld 
van so ’n vorderingsreg is juis ’n andeel in ’n maatskappy. Die aandelesertifikaat is wel prima facie bewys 
dat die geregistreerde aandeelhouer wie se naam daarop verskyn die reghebbende is, maar hy mag in 
werklikheid nie die sogenaamde “beneficial owner” wees nie, maar slegs laasgenoemde se genomineerde 
(Standard Bank v Ocean Commodities, supra, te 289AC). Of hy mag, soos Botha beweer Fick gedoen het, 
sy regte al vervreem en oorgedra het en nie eers ’n genomineerde wees nie. Anders as in die geval van 
 
 




grond kan daar dus, ondanks die inskrywing in die register, ondersoek word wie die werklike reghebbende 
is: Randfontein Estates, supra, te 982.” 
Second is the possible application of a requirement of fault. Here it must be considered whether 
faultless estoppel is possible with respect to securities. The point of departure in vindicatory estoppel 
cases appears to skew in favour of fault, as recently further entrenched by the Supreme Court of 
Appeal in Absa Bank Ltd v Knysna Auto Services.13 Some analysis based on first principles is 
necessary in order to determine whether the requirement as laid out in Oakland and applied in 
Knysna Auto is indeed correct. The question that needs to be asked, in light of the discussion at the 
start of this section, is whether the autonomy of the estoppel-denier (i.e. in seeking an application of 
the ordinary principles of law) should outweigh the estoppel-raiser’s desire for legal certainty (i.e. a 
corrective overriding of those ordinary principles favouring the expression of her autonomy). 
In the context of securities, and debt securities in particular, this is not an easy question. It must be 
noted, also, that this does not hinge on the quality of the intent or negligence of the representor as 
estoppel-denier. Rather, it is a prior inquiry into the nature of the transaction in question. It must 
depend, as a matter of policy and principle, on both the general nature of such transactions as well 
as the character of the particular transaction in question. Its outcome, in turn, will determine whether 
a secondary inquiry into the state of mind of the representor is necessary or not – i.e. whether fault 
is a requirement. 
Here one might want to outline three different typical transactional contexts for some further insight. 
First is the very private buying and selling of typically lower-value debt securities found in smaller, 
more intimate business environments. Second is the buying and selling of sub-investment grade 
debt securities in the so-called leveraged finance (i.e. non-investment grade debt) environment, 
where frequency and size of debt securities transactions, size of businesses, and the value of 
individual debt securities is quite variable. Third is the buying and selling of investment grade 
securities, where businesses are typically public and very large. Each of these contexts indicates a 
spectrum of transactional complexity, a spectrum of skill and knowledge on the part of the parties 
involved, and a spectrum of value, or size, of the transaction (and thus potential loss). 
Each of these contexts is to some extent similar to two classical, yet divergent, cases of estoppel – 
vindicatory estoppel and discounting estoppel. They resemble the vindicatory estoppel, which mostly 
requires fault, due to the protection against rightful recovery of asset-holdership (“ownership”) of a 
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movable merx. Yet they also resemble the discounting estoppel, which mostly does not require fault, 
as they ultimately entail the trading of discounted debt.  
As noted, vindicatory estoppel traditionally requires fault. On the other hand, in the discounting 
cases, faultless estoppel is traditionally asserted because (1) an intentional act by a third party 
occurred, which (2) was unintentionally enabled by the estoppel-denier because the latter “armed 
[the former] with a document which was used to mislead the other party to action”.14 Depending on 
the context, this third party may be an instrument-holder, or some institutional intermediary to the 
transaction (as is most often the case in the second and third transactional contexts sketched above). 
Yet contrary to the traditional justification provided by the courts,15 a more nuanced understanding 
of the doctrine of estoppel as discussed above, points to a simpler and more objective question that 
can be asked (of any instance where estoppel is raised in the securities context) as to the need for 
a fault requirement or not – the reasonableness of the reliance. This approach, directly aimed at the 
higher-order reliance principle of which estoppel is a manifestation, suggests looking to the context 
of the transaction to determine whether a methodology inclusive of fault, or one exclusive of fault, 
should be used to discount the competing interests of the parties.  
When examining this question, the suggestion made by Lubbe is to ask whether the representation 
was “made intentionally in order to induce a reaction on the part of the representee”,16 and if so, to 
do away with the fault requirement. However, in the complex financial environment of debt securities 
and their attendant policy considerations, it is submitted that there may be another criterion which 
better distinguishes cases requiring an inquiry into fault from those which do not: the “sophistication” 
of the representee (i.e. her knowledge and skill). Considering the financial environment in which debt 
securities operate, it is submitted that the expected ability to assess, and if necessary to combat, 
conduct aimed at inducing a specific reaction on the part of the counterparty is the better measure. 
Virtually all securities transactions will involve conduct aimed at inducement (in the plain language 
sense) to transact and so, once again, commercial law requires a slightly different articulation of the 
underlying reasonableness of the estoppel-outcome. 
This line of reasoning is not to be confused with the approach of cases such as Connock’s (SA) 
Motor Co Ltd v Sentraal Westelike Ko-Operatiewe Maatskappy Bpk17 or Monzali v Smith.18 These 
cases seem to suggest that the reasonableness of the conduct of both representor and representee 
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need to considered on the facts. The approach suggested is closer to the court’s characterisation of 
the English law position – i.e. as per the Connock case that:19 
“[t]he reasonable man postulated by the objective test in English law is one in the position of the representee 
and not the representor.” 
However, the suggested approach does not emulate the English position, it merely draws from it. 
The position taken here is that the sophistication of the representee will determine whether the 
quality of the conduct of the representor is at issue or not. This is much more in line with the preferred 
explanation of South African estoppel as discussed above – a policy-aware a priori evaluation of the 
factual matrix to determine the stringency of the requirements for a successful defence of estoppel 
(and consequently the upholding of an erroneous reliance as reasonable despite the objective law 
otherwise not countenancing it). 
Thus there is an argument to be made out that the need of an “unsophisticated investor” for legal 
simplicity, predictability and ultimately certitude in her securities transactions outweighs the asset-
holder’s entitlement to rely on the operation of the more complex ordinary principles of law. 
Conversely, where a more sophisticated investor requires the defence of estoppel regarding a 
financial transaction relating to debt securities, the opposite appears true – more can be expected 
of that investor in terms of vetting and understanding a transaction. Additionally, such an investor is 
also better placed to absorb that loss and pursue a claim in delict, or undue enrichment for the loss.  
This distinction allows consideration of the qualities of the person raising the defence, but also a 
weighing of this against the complexity of the transaction and the adroitness of all its various other 
participants. It is submitted that an application of mind regarding the relative sophistication of the 
party in question will generate outcomes which are predictable, consistent, and (most importantly 
from a policy perspective) fair. This is not to say that the inducement-criterion would be ineffective – 
it is simply to suggest that in the context of securities transactions, sophistication is a better 
articulation of the underlying policy considerations. 
The third and fourth requirements articulated above in the Oakland case warrant no further 
discussion, as they are uncontentious and well understood in the South African law of estoppel. A 
valuable supplementary resource to the discussion above may also be found in Commentary 2008, 
under § 51.20 
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Finally, one must briefly discuss Makate v Vodacom Ltd21 for the assertion of ostensible authority, a 
fairly recent and new legal mechanism also based on the underlying principle of reasonable reliance. 
Here, seemingly, no negligence is required, and the majority judgement makes it clear that:22 
“estoppel and ostensible authority are different, even though there may be some overlap between them. 
Ostensible authority is the power to act as agent indicated by the circumstances, even if the agent may not 
truly have been given the power. Estoppel, as observed in the West, is the rule that precludes the principal 
from denying that she gave authority to the agent.” 
The complexities of ostensible authority deserve and require a fuller treatment than is possible here. 
What is clear, however, is that there may be scope for application of this remedy in the context of 
the transfer of securities as alternative to estoppel and (perhaps contrary to the majority opinion in 
Makate) that a similar inquiry into the reasonableness of the reliance as a function of the 
sophistication of the relying party in the context of the transaction would generate results that are 
consistent with the deeper-order policy considerations of which the remedy is an outflow.  
 
10 2  Uncertificated securities and finality of transfer 
Estoppel is not the mechanism by which the good faith, but ultimately defective, acquisition of 
uncertificated securities is achieved. Instead, a far more drastic, widely applicable statutory measure 
has been introduced. In the Companies Act, s 53(4) reads: 
“A transfer of ownership in accordance with this section occurs despite any fraud, illegality or insolvency 
that may – 
(a) affect the relevant uncertificated securities; or 
(b) have resulted in the transfer being effected, 
but a transferee who was a party to or had knowledge of the fraud or illegality, or had knowledge of the 
insolvency, as the case may be, may not rely on this subsection.” 
Importantly, the Act’s definition of “knowledge” is also couched quite widely, as per s 1: 
“‘knowing’, ‘knowingly’ or ‘knows’, when used with respect to a person, and in relation to a particular 
matter, means that the person either –  
(a) had actual knowledge of the matter; or 
(b) was in a position in which the person reasonably ought to have –  
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(i) had actual knowledge; 
(ii) investigated the matter to an extent that would have provided the person with actual 
knowledge; or 
(iii) taken other measures which, if taken, would reasonably be expected to have provided the 
person with actual knowledge of the matter…” 
Section 53(4) is received into the more generally applicable legal framework of uncertificated 
securities found in the FMA – specifically, s 41 of the FMA reads: 
“Acquisition by bona fide transferee – (1)  An entry effected in terms of section 38 or 39 is valid and 
effective against third parties despite any fraud or illegality that may have resulted in the entry being 
effected, unless a transferee to the transaction resulting in the entry was a party to or had knowledge of the 
fraud or illegality. 
(2) This section does not modify the order of priorities determined by section 40. 
(3) Section 53 (4), (5) and (6) of the Companies Act applies to an entry referred to in subsection (1) with 
the changes required by the context.” 
Read together, these provisions are the domestic invocation of the principle of finality, effecting what 
is known as‘security of transfer in the uncertificated securities market. This was already touched on 
in Chapters 5 and 8, with the thrust of the principle being described as follows:23 
“[a] transfer is secure if the transferee, being a good faith purchaser, is able to retain the transferred asset 
free from adverse claims.” 
The conclusions of the relevant analysis in that chapter also bear a measure of repeating here:24 
“From a functional-policy perspective, finality of transfer simultaneously protects two discrete elements of 
the system. On the one hand, it protects the mechanics of the market infrastructure by ensuring transfers 
of instrument-holdership are irrevocable. This enables the critical capacity for volume and velocity needed 
by the trading infrastructure itself, ensuring transactions need not be halted, investigated, and possibly 
reversed (especially if the security in question has changed hands several times after the originally 
defective transfer). On the other, it protects the value-chain of the market infrastructure by ensuring that 
transfer of asset-holdership is also irreversible – thus a good faith, and ‘for value’, acquirer can be assured, 
assuming the evidentiary basis for such an acquisition is strong, that the acquisition is firm. These two 




23  Benjamin Interests in Securities 73. See Chapter 5, § 5 1 3; and Chapter 8, § 8 2 2. 




It would be difficult to assert that this policy position is solely aimed at protecting the position of nominees 
within the system, rather than also the value chain of securities transfer itself…by affording the transferee 
finality of transfer, that good faith acquirers obtain the benefits of securities transferred to them, and that 
trading systems do not have to reverse the flow of value. It is submitted, in this light, that in order for these 
rules to function properly, “ownership” must refer to asset-holdership; conversely, if it did not always mean 
asset-holdership, a good faith acquirer of value would have to fall back on the difficult remedy of estoppel 
(as between her and other relevant intermediaries), a state of affairs these provisions seemingly aim to 
prevent.” 
In the previous section, it was noted that under the preferred explanation of the nature and workings 
of estoppel, estoppel, ostensible authority and the contractual doctrine of objective corrective 
consensus appear to be manifestations of “die erkenning van ‘n vertrouenskomponent in die 
regshandelingbegrip”. 25  It is submitted that the principle of finality is a fourth demonstrable 
manifestation of that recognition, though only in a limited sense. As mentioned in the previous 
section, an analysis of the finality principle seems to indicate that there is a second, more 
depersonalised and objective policy outcome underlying these provisions. The principle functions 
equally, if not more, to protect the integrity of the uncertificated securities market or markets as a 
whole. It does so by ensuring that reliance on the debiting and crediting of securities accounts wholly 
overrides almost all other legal rules which may indicate such entries have to be reversed.  
This means that a different approach is required. These provisions do not, like estoppel, discount 
competing autonomies of individual legal actors. Instead, these provisions serve to balance the 
private law principle of autonomy (including its reliance-component) as a whole with the competing 
principle of legal certainty (invoked in furtherance of commercial market efficiency and efficacy). 
Their effect indicates that legal certainty is the overriding value, such that the point of departure 
becomes that all reliance is reasonable, subject to a certain limited set of exceptions. 
Thus, to understand these provisions the question is inverted, becoming one as to when reliance is 
unreasonable. In performing this analysis, one may return to the first principles articulated in the 
previous section as a useful analytical framework in better understanding the statutorily provided 
exceptions – i.e. knowledge of, or participation in, the kind of fraud, illegality or insolvency envisaged.  
The first important question is how to reconcile the subtle differences between s 53(4) of the 
Companies Act and s 41 of the FMA. The former states that a “transfer occurs” despite any fraud, 
illegality or insolvency, but prevents transferees who were party to, or with knowledge of, such 
defects from “relying” on the section. The latter states that a “transfer is valid and effective against 
third parties” despite any fraud or illegality, “unless” transferees were party to, or had knowledge of, 
 
 




those defects. Then s 41(3) of the FMA makes the Companies Act provision applicable “with the 
changes required by the context”. 
Ultimately, however, excessive peering at the divergent language is unnecessary. The thrust of the 
provisions is the same – securities account entries are final unless certain exceptions can be proven. 
Only two important issues arise. The first is should insolvency be read into all applications of s 41? 
The second question is should constructive knowledge as indicated by the Companies Act’s 
definition similarly be read into all applications of s 41? 
From § 8 2 of Chapter 8 and § 9 2 of Chapter 9, the premise of s 53(2) of the Companies Act and s 
38-39 of the FMA is clear – quasi-delivery of the security instrument causes transfer, by operation 
of law, of holdership of the security asset or a limited real right in securitatem debiti. In light of the 
finality provisions, this causes an irrevocable patrimonial transfer, which protects the integrity of 
securities market.  
In what ways could insolvency, in accordance with s 53(4)(a)-(b) of the Companies Act, affect the 
securities or result in the transfer being effected in a manner where, but for the principle of market 
integrity, that transfer should be reversed? From a purposive perspective, the section is clearly aimed 
at cases where the insolvency would, or rather should, have led to the transfer’s reversal. The Act 
can be read to make provision for cases where insolvency impaired the validity of transfer because 
the securities have been affected, as well as where insolvency impaired the validity of the transfer 
itself. Regarding the former, this could only be a reference to dispositions without value which may 
be set aside in terms of the Insolvency Act.26 In so far as insolvency affects the ius disponendi, it 
limits the ability of the estate to transfer that property without receiving sufficient counter-value, 
preventing detriment to the estate’s creditors. 
In fact, more generally, it is difficult to imagine a transfer which (1) needs to be reversed in terms of 
some application of the positive law as it relates to insolvency, and (2) which is reversible but not 
unlawful. Even voidable transactions become retroactively unlawful once reversal has been elected. 
Thus the reference to insolvency in the Companies Act may simply be tautological and is implied in 
the FMA’s  use of the term “illegality”. It is contended that “illegality” must be read so that it includes 
unlawfulness, thereby including criminal and civil defects. In the broader context this must be viewed 
as a sound outcome, and it allows this first issue to be sidestepped. 
The more difficult issue is whether the definition of “knowledge” of the Companies Act should be 
generally applicable by virtue of s 41(3) of the FMA. The term is not defined in the latter Act, and 
importing the former Act’s definition would widen the scope of challenges to finality of transfer by 
 
 




including constructive knowledge also. Here it must be remembered that only prior knowledge, 
including perhaps constructive knowledge, would suffice to have an entry reversed.  
If a transferee were party to a form of transfer-prohibiting fraud or illegality (inclusive of insolvency), 
the law states that reliance on the records of the applicable securities account or securities accounts 
becomes unreasonable, and the true asset-holder’s volition in seeking recovery of the securities 
overrides the need for certainty and market integrity. If a transferee had actual knowledge of a form 
of transfer-prohibiting fraud or illegality (and by implication insolvency), the same reasoning applies. 
Thus, it would appear that the most sensible manner in which to resolve this interpretive difficulty is 
to similarly ask whether policy dictates that legal certainty in uncertificated securities transfers should 
be overridden where, as per s 1 of the Companies Act, a transferee: 
“(b) was in a position in which [she] reasonably ought to have –  
(i) had actual knowledge; 
(ii) investigated the matter to an extent that would have provided [her] with actual knowledge; or 
(iii) taken other measures which, if taken, would reasonably be expected to have provided [her] 
with actual knowledge of the [fraud, illegality or insolvency]…” 
This brings one back to the analysis of the previous section and its resolution through the use of the 
“sophisticated investor” test to determine whether fault should be included in the requirements for a 
valid defence of estoppel. Making use of the sophisticated investor construct could provide a sound 
basis for determining what reasonable steps would be on the part of the transferee to gain knowledge 
of the soundness of the transaction. It could, thus, provide the application of the law with a broader 
spectrum of options to effect an inherently fair and economically efficient outcome.  
But what would its effect be on number of reversals that could potentially be affected and, thus, on 
the stability of the market? Here it must be remembered that s 41 extends to transfers of securities 
as well as transfers of limited real interests in securities, in markets where the use of securities as 
collateral is a vital component of the financial system. Ultimately, this line of inquiry cannot be 
resolved here. Its resolution would require more empirical evidence than is available in the course 
of this work and must be left unanswered.  
What has been illuminated, however, is that there are measurable criteria for determining when 
reliance is unreasonable in this context, and that inclusion of constructive knowledge cannot unduly 
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11  The protection of holdership 
In this chapter two important mechanisms for the protection of security-, asset- and (potentially) 
instrument-holdership will be discussed: the contentious quasi-spoliation construct as suggested in 
Tigon v Bestyet Investments (Pty) Ltd1 and the quasi-rei vindicatio. 
More than anywhere else in this work, this chapter attempts to abandon the doctrine of (quasi-) 
possession and embrace, through the outcomes of § 4 3 2 2 of Chapter 4 and indeed Chapter 4 
generally, a doctrine of effective control. Its structure is outlined, for corporeals, by Van der Walt & 
Pienaar as follows:2 
“the distinction between ownership, possession and holdership is explained with reference to lawfulness 
and the intention of the controller in each case…ownership and lawful holdership [all other real rights] are 




1  2001 (4) SA 634 (N). 




As a result, this chapter in many instances challenges commonly held views on the nature and 
workings of these remedies. Its analysis attempts to use the theoretical framework developed in this 
work to push some of the boundaries of contemporary securities law, and to outline a view that is 
underpinned by a clearer set of first principles.  
 
11 1  Quasi-spoliation and rectification 
The mandament van spolie is a complex, exhaustively debated, and often contentious legal concept 
in South African law. Its extension, by way of the so-called quasi-spoliation construct, to the 
deprivation of quasi-possession of incorporeals, is similarly difficult. It is not possible, or appropriate, 
to deal with all its theoretical and judicial aspects here. The purpose of this section is simply to 
critically re-evaluate the dicta of Tigon and its subsequent treatment by the courts and relevant 
authorities, doing so against the refined view of holdership and effective control of securities 
developed in Chapter 4.  
In Tigon it was held that deprivation of quasi-possession of shares could amount to spoliation and 
thus could be subject to a spoliation order. The salient aspects of the judgment read, somewhat 
extensively, as follows:3 
“the key issue for determination in this appeal is whether, through the removal of Bestyet's name from 
Tigon's share register, any form of 'possession' or 'quasi possession' or 'dispossession' is in issue. 
… 
The right which Bestyet claims has been infringed is the right to be reflected on the register of members as 
the holder of the shares. The removal of the name does not deprive the holder of any form of possession, 
nor has the holder been deprived of any right relating to possession. 
The rights of a shareholder are personal rights and not real rights and the keeping of a register of members 
is a statutory requirement which merely reflects prima facie evidence with regard to the listed members of 
the company. The claim which is sought to be enforced is not one for restoration of physical possession 









It seems to me that a distinction (not always recognised) may be drawn between the share itself, which is 
an incorporeal moveable entity, and the bundle of personal rights to which it gives rise. The argument that 
we are here dealing with purely personal rights to which the protection of the mandament van spolie does 
not extend is, therefore, not correct. The incorporeals, consisting of the shares, are, by statute, movable 
property and possession is exercised by the holder negotiating, pledging, bequeathing or otherwise dealing 
in the shares. The holder also exercises possession by being registered in the register of members and 
thereby being able to vote and receive dividends.” 
By characterising entry onto the members’ register as quasi-possession of shares, the court 
purported to extend, at least in theory, the application of quasi-spoliation to the deprivation of quasi-
possession of non-servitutal incorporeal rights. This case has been subjected to marked criticism. 
The most obvious is that, even according to the authorities cited in the judgment, “[t]he remedy…is 
limited to instances where the exercise of a right is so closely connected with possession of corporeal 
property that the loss of the right can be regarded as an infringement of possession of the corporeal 
object itself.” 4 Indeed, subsequently, the courts have seemed to affirm this need for “corporeal-
adjacency” 5  in the application of quasi-spoliation (or conversely, its limitation to servitutal 
incorporeals). Specifically, the High Court’s reliance on the extension of the remedy to non-servitutal 
rights in Xsinet (Pty) Ltd v Telkom SA Ltd6  was overturned by the Supreme Court of Appeal in 
Telkom SA Ltd v Xsinet (Pty) Ltd.7 In that case, with reference to a number of authorities, the court 
remarked as follows:8 
“[It was argued that] the quasi-possession of the right to receive Telkom's telecommunication services 
consisting of the actual use ('daadwerklike gebruik') of those services must be restored by the possessory 
remedy. This is, however, a mere personal right and the order sought is essentially to compel specific 
performance of a contractual right in order to resolve a contractual dispute. This has never been allowed 
under the mandament van spolie and there is no authority for such an extension of the remedy. See, for 
example, Zulu v Minister of Works, KwaZulu, and Others;  Van der Walt 1989 (3) THRHR 444 at 449; 
Kleyn 'Possession' in Zimmerman and Visser Southern Cross: Civil Law and Common Law in South 
 
 
4  640, citing Zulu v Minister of Works, KwaZulu, and Others 1992 (1) SA 181 (D) 188H; Plaatjie and Another v Olivier 
NO and Others 1993 (2) SA 156 (O) 159I-160G; and Shoprite Checkers Ltd v Pangbourne Properties Ltd 1994 (1) 
SA 616 (W) 619J-620D & 622B. 
 See also AJ van der Walt & PJ Sutherland “Dispossession of incorporeals or rights – is the mandament van spolie 
the appropriate remedy?” (2003) 15 South African Mercantile Law Journal 95 97-100 for an invaluable summary 
and analysis of the application of case law authorities to that effect.  
5  As briefly discussed also in Chapter 4, § 4 3 2. 
6  2002 (3) SA 629 (C) 637F-G & 638H-J. 
7  2003 (5) 309 (SCA).  




Africa (1996) at 830; Harms in Joubert (ed) The Law of South Africa vol 11 (1st re-issue) para 343 fn 4 
at 305; and Sonnekus Sakereg Vonnisbundel 2nd ed at 168.” 
On the Tigon, Xsinet and Telkom cases Badenhorst et al provide the following further commentary:9 
“The mandament has never been used to enforce personal, contractual rights. Since there was no authority 
for such an extension, the mandament van spolie could not be granted under these circumstances. It would 
thus seem as if incorporeals will be protected if they constitute an incident of possession of a corporeal 
thing. The question of whether the exercise of such a right is in fact incidental to the corporeal thing would 
be a question of fact, resulting in each case being dealt with differently.” 
Crucially, in Zulu v Minister of Works, KwaZulu,10 which together with Bon Quelle (Edms) Bpk v 
Munisipaliteit van Otavi11 make up the loci classici on quasi-spoliation, the court states unequivocally 
that:12 
“If the protection given by the mandament van spolie were to be held to extend to the exercise of rights in 
the widest sense, then rights such as a right to performance of a contractual obligation would have to be 
included, which would be to extend the remedy beyond its legitimate field of application and usefulness.” 
Based on the above, it would seem that quasi-spoliation in respect of personal rights as property is 
dead.  
However, could its extension to securities as non-servitutal incorporeals be justified? For very 
specific reasons it is submitted that use of the remedy in the securities context is not only theoretically 
justifiable, but eminently necessary.  
The one set of impediments to its application in the securities context consists of more technical 
legal issues. The first is that “the fundamental feature of the mandament van spolie (it always relates 
to corporeal things, whether directly or indirectly) remains as an insurmountable obstacle to its 
extension where the name of a member is unlawfully removed from the register of members.”13  
The purpose of the quasi-spoliation remedy is to have restored an incident of possession of property. 
In this regard the Telkom case articulates this best:14 
 
 
9  PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar, H Mostert & M Van Rooyen The Law of Property 4 ed (2004) § 13.2.1.3, 300. 
10  1992 (1) SA 181 (N). 
11  1989 (1) SA 508 (A). 
12  Zulu v Minister of Works, KwaZulu 1992 (1) SA 181 (N) 159J-160A. 
13  Van der Walt & Sutherland (2003) SA Merc LJ 102.  




“The leading case on the quasi-possession of incorporeals is Bon Quelle (Edms) Bpk v Munisipaliteit van 
Otavi (supra). 
…[which] describes the nature of the quasi-possession of a servitude as follows: 
''n Onliggaamlike saak soos 'n serwituut is natuurlik nie vatbaar vir fisiese ''besit'' in dieselfde sin as wat daardie 
uitdrukking gebruik word met betrekking tot liggaamlike sake nie, maar wel vir quasi-possessio wat bestaan uit die 
daadwerklike gebruik van die serwituut. (Waar ek later in hierdie uitspraak die uitdrukking ''besit van 'n reg'' gebruik, 
bedoel ek dit in hierdie sin). In die samehang van die mandament van spolie neem, soos later sal blyk, die 
daadwerklike gebruik van 'n beweerde serwituut die plek van die besit van 'n liggaamlike saak.' 
… 
In my opinion the learned Judge was not correct in concluding on the facts that the use of the bandwidth 
and telephone services constituted an incident of Xsinet's possession of its premises.” 
Up to this point it has been implicitly assumed that the operative scope of quasi-spoliation must, 
accordingly, be in relation to an incident of possession flowing from holdership of a servitude (most 
typically the servitutal incident of use). However, it has convincingly been argued 15  that the 
applicability of quasi-spoliation should not be limited to the context of incidents of servitutal 
possession only – rather that it should be limited to restoration of disturbed physical possession.16 
Thus, as argued in Chapter 4,17 the factual, and technically incorporeal, incident (rather than right) 
must for present purposes exhibit an “adjacency” to a corporeal thing. 
A deeper understanding of the legal nature of securities has a marked impact on correctly 
interpreting this position. The court in Tigon avers that “[t]he holder [of a share]…exercises 
possession by being registered in the register of members and thereby being able to vote and receive 
dividends” and a similar view is expressed in Commentary 2008, in which the authors state that 
“[t]raditionally, registered title has been regarded as comparable to ‘quasi-possession’”.18  
 
 
15  See generally AJ van Walt “Toepassing van die Mandament van Spolie op Onroerende Sake” (1986) Tydskrif vir 
die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 223; Van der Walt & Sutherland (2003) SA Merc L J 97-100. 
16  AJ van Walt (1986) TSAR  223 – “die duidelike uitgekristaliseerde vereistes vir die verlening van hierdie remedie 
verseker juis dat dit slegs toepassing kan vind waar daar op die een of ander wyse van die onregmatige en 
eieregtige versteuring van fisiese beheer oor 'n saak sprake is.” 
17  § 4 3 2. 
18  Tigon v Bestyet Investments (Pty) Ltd 2001 (4) SA 634 (N) 643; and JL Yeats, R de la Harpe, R Jooste, H Stoop, 
R Cassim, J Seligmann, L Kent, R Bradstreet, RC Williams, MF Cassim, E Swanepoel, FHI Cassim & K Jarvis 




It is contended that this is incorrect. Instead, as shown in § 4 3 2 2 of Chapter 4, an asset-holder 
exercises effective control over the patrimonial contents of a security through control of the 
instrument-holder.19  
Despite its unintuitive appearance, this construct of effective control is a more functional and robust 
concept that so-called quasi-possessio, with more consistent and useful outcomes (as demonstrated 
throughout Part 2 of this work). Effective control (as a legal fact) can only be lost if actual factual 
control over the instrument-holder is lost. As a factual construct, this would need to be determined 
on the basis of the particular set of facts, for the specific purpose it is being determined.  
This can happen, informed by the diagram outlined by Van der Walt & Pienaar as in § 11 above, by 
replacement of the instrument-holder by a person who, bona or mala fide, refused to adhere to the 
asset-holder’s directives. However, it can also be lost in the case of an instrument-holder “gone 
rogue”, who has (again bona or mala fide) acted in a manner which indicates that she will no longer 
act to exercise the security’s incidents of execution on behalf of and in the interests of the asset-
holder. Thus, a change in names in the securities register may be the effect of a quasi-spoliation 
order, but it is not the outcome. The desired outcome of such an order would be the restoration of 
effective control over the affected incident-functionalities in question to the asset-holder, in whatever 
manner appropriately achieves this. 
This also far better accords with the well-established principle that “[quasi-]possession exist[s] in the 
exercising of a professed right and that it [is] not necessary for the applicant to prove the existence 
of his right as such, as this would be contrary to the principles of the mandament van spolie.”20 
This is somewhat of a departure from currently accepted views.  
First, it is counter to the currently held view that the mandament can only, and should only, be brought 
by the person who has been removed from the register (i.e. whose instrument-holdership has been 
dispossessed). It is argued, however, that upon closer examination of the relevant first principles21 
it becomes clear that instrument-holdership and effective control (quasi-possessio) are not the same, 
and that what must be restored is therefore not lost instrument-holdership, but rather lost control, 
 
 
19  Unless the asset-holder is also instrument-holder – then control exists through security-holdership. Even in this 
case it would be making a theoretical mistake to state that control flows from instrument-holdership (i.e. registration). 
Control in these cases flow from being asset- and -instrument-holder, as a mere instrument-holder does have factual 
control over another’s security asset unless that control is usurped – see Chapter 4, § 4 3 2 2.  
20  As per Badenhorst et al Property § 13.2.1.3, 297 [own emphasis] and numerous authorities cited in n 105 & 106; 
as well as specifically Bon Quelle (Edms) Bpk v Munisipaliteit van Otavi 1989 (1) SA 508 513-514. 
21  Most importantly that the exercise of the incidents of execution (residing in the instrument and therefore bestowed 
upon its holder) is lawfully constrained by the directives of the asset-holder, but may factually be exercised outside 
the boundaries of those directives in manner quite similar to the exercise of the incidents of possession of a 




however that restoration may be achieved. Moreover, this enables (as discussed below) a useful 
distinction between rectification and the mandament.  
Second, it may practically be a moot point to argue that the restoration of control may take other 
forms than the replacement of the spoliating instrument-holder (as this is the easiest and most 
common manner in which to restore effective control), but the restoration of control by other means 
must at least be recognised as a theoretical possibility flowing from the demonstrable fact that lawful 
instrument-holdership and factual control cannot be equated with one another.  
This is an important respect in which Tigon is deeply flawed. While it is true that “possession is 
exercised by the holder negotiating, pledging, bequeathing or otherwise dealing in the shares [or 
other registered securities]”, that “possession” is in fact exercised by the asset-holder through the 
instrument-holder. Thus it is patently incorrect to assert that “[t]he holder also exercises possession 
by being registered in the register of members and thereby being able to vote and receive 
dividends.” 22  Instead, the true de facto and proper controller (the holder of the incidents of 
enjoyment) has control through control of the instrument-holder, unless that control is factually 
usurped or lawfully (and partially) given away through the creation of limited real rights such as 
pledge or usufruct over the security. 
There has been, because quasi-possession is a factual construct, an inherent importance attached 
to instrument-holdership (i.e. registration) within the approach of the law up to this point. However, 
one can now come at the problem with the understanding that (1) the security asset and instrument 
are separate legal objects in the true sense, capable of separate holdership, and (2) on that basis, 
control of the incidents of enjoyment is exercised through the instrument-holder, but by the asset-
holder. This allows one to move away from the “sham concept”23 of quasi-possessio and the legal 
contortions historically required for its application in this context, toward a sharper discussion of the 
factual control-dynamics that should serve as the basis for an application of the mandament.  
While this significantly clarifies the first principles which would hypothetically apply to the remedy in 
context, it does not quite surmount the problem that the incorporeal in question must seemingly be 
corporeal-adjacent. There are two implicit lines of reasoning that underlie this requirement. The first 
is that the mandament is paradigmatically, or systematically, remedy that is a function of the law of 
property, as primarily concerned with things. The second, related to the first, is that to extend the 
quasi-spoliation remedy to personal rights would confuse or conflate it with the contractual remedy 
of specific performance and, perhaps, with other remedies found in the law of obligations that enable 
 
 
22  Tigon v Bestyet Investments (Pty) Ltd 2001 (4) SA 634 (N) 642-643. 




the enforcement of personal rights. This second line of reasoning is evident in the pronouncements 
of Telkom SA Ltd v Xsinet (Pty) Ltd24 and Zulu v Minister of Works, KwaZulu.25 
The first of these lines of reasoning can be dealt with speedily. There is no true consensus on the 
exact nature of the mandament van spolie, but there is agreement that restoring “despoiled 
possession” is its function. 26 As already discussed in Chapter 4 the contours of the remedy, as well 
as of the notion of possession on which it is founded, prompted AJ Van der Walt to recognise that 
there are aspects to subject-object relationships which do not relate to substantive rights as such, 
and a recognition of other subjective relationships is necessary to offer an acceptable explanation 
of the existence and protection of subjective relationships which are not subjective rights.27 This 
recognition enables the development of the notion of “effective control”, thoroughly dealt with in § 4 
3 2 2 of that chapter. This provides a useful manner in which to understand “possession” of 
securities.  
More importantly for these purposes, Van der Walt convincingly posits that the mandament cannot 
necessarily be considered a phenomenon of the law of things, because possession itself (as a 
substantive yet wholly factual construct) is not a purely law of things-related issue. Instead, it appears 
to function to protect possession as a “private law relationship” not reducible to a private law right or 
any dimension thereof.28  
But this does not, automatically and without more, make a case for the remedy’s application to 
securities. Thus, the second line of reasoning must be dealt with – the infringement on the territory 
(and remedies) of the law of obligations. It is submitted that as a point of departure, this line of 
reasoning is correct and the mandament should not be extended to “dispossession” of obligations. 
A spoliation order would no doubt be tantamount to an order for specific performance if the 
entitlement of determination were held by the applicant, and would indeed be a summary order at 
that. 
However, in cases where the splitting of the components of the creditor’s interest has occurred, this 
reasoning breaks down. In these cases, a person with a patrimonial interest in an obligation does 
not have the entitlement of determination with respect to the right, and therefore the ability to obtain 
 
 
24  2003 (5) 309 (SCA) 314 para [14].  
25  1992 (1) SA 181 (N) 159J-160A. 
26  AJ Van der Walt “The doctrine of subjective rights: a critical reappraisal from the fringes of property law” (1990) 53 
Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 316 321, and a legion authorities cited in 42. 
27  Van der Walt (1990) THRHR 325. See also Chapter 4, § 4 1. 
28  This is the overall point made in Van der Walt (1990) THRHR 316, which has been accepted in this work, mainly 




an order of specific performance is not juridically available to her. There are only three currently 
conceivable instances where this may occur: (1) the pledge in securitatem debiti of obligations; (2) 
the granting of a different limited real interest (for example a personal servitude such as a usufruct) 
over an obligation; and (3) scenarios involving the ab initio dichotomous structure of securities. Such 
cases move the issue beyond the realm of the law of contract and indeed also the law of obligations, 
as the dynamics of holdership of individuated and proprietary legal objects, gleaned from personal 
rights, are at issue.  
Those kinds of separated holdership adhere more to principles of property law and in this context 
become a function of effective control as factual control coupled with a particular state of mind. This 
is also supported by the notion that unlike the entirety of an obligation, specific incident-functionalities 
can indeed only be held by one particular person at a particular time. This also supports the Supreme 
Court’s seeming exclusion of the application of the mandament to settle contractual issues.29 
As has been adequately demonstrated, in line with the paradigm of effective control outlined by Van 
der Walt & Pienaar,30 effective control over an incident can be lawful or unlawful, and bona fide or 
mala fide.31 Thus in these scenarios, it should be clear that effective control over an incident-
functionality of the obligation may be unlawfully usurped, in good or bad faith, by the holder of the 
entitlement of determination. One example is a pledgee who continues to collect and consume a 
debt after the principal obligation has been settled. The best example, however, is the “rogue” 
instrument-holder factually acting outside the bounds of the relationship between her and the asset-
holder. 
Central to this argument, in the context of securities, is the notion that securities have an enhanced 
proprietary dynamic and for certain purposes can be understood in a manner more akin to things 
than other obligations.32 Where securities are concerned, holdership of the asset as the means to 
enjoy the applicable performance(s) is equally, if not more, important than the actual performance 
to which it entitles the holder. Securities may not be corporeally-adjacent, but as incorporeals they 
uniquely exhibit many of the characteristics of property ordinarily associated with things. Quite 
simply, while not associated with possession of a corporeal thing, it is contended that securities are 
indeed sufficiently proprietary in nature to militate in favour of the application of a quasi-spoliation 
 
 
29  FirstRand Ltd t/a Rand Merchant Bank v Scholtz NO 2008 (2) SA 503 (SCA) para. [13], noting importantly that “The 
mandement van spolie does not have a catch-all function to protect the quasi-possessio of all kinds of rights 
irrespective of their nature.” 
30  See the diagram quoted above in § 11. 
31  Chapter 4, § 4 3 2 2. 




order to restore effective control. This may or may not, from a theoretical standpoint, take the form 
of registration in the securities register. 
This brings one to the final element of the technical set of impediments to its application – the notion 
that rectification is the more appropriate remedy in the circumstances where the mandament is 
sought to be applied.33  
Rectification is best understood first with reference to s 115 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973. It is 
not within the scope of this work to provide an exhaustive analysis of the remedy (and the myriad of 
technical complexities to which it is subject under the regime of the 2008 Companies Act). It is 
sufficient to be able to provide a concise overview of the remedy as it exists today (against the 
backdrop of s 115) in order to compare and analyse it against the purer common law spoliation 
remedy currently under discussion. Section 115(1) provided that: 
“If – 
(a)  the name of any person is, without sufficient cause, entered in or omitted from the register of 
members of a company; or  
(b)  default is made or unnecessary delay takes place in entering in the register the fact of any person 
having ceased to be a member,  
the person concerned or the company or any member of the company, may apply to the Court for 
rectification of the register.” 
Thus, rectification under s 115 was concerned with erroneous entry or omission in terms of the 
register of shareholders. The remedy was not directly concerned with ownership, so that:34 
“[first]…where shares have been registered in the names of persons who are not true owners (for example, 
for the convenience of the owners), then, if the true owners desire registration in their own names, the 
proper course is not rectification of the share register, but transfer of the shares into their names. 
[Second]…where the application for rectification is based solely on the bare assertion of ownership, 
independently of the ordinary formal requirements for transfer of registration (e.g. s 133 transfer), it is open 
to question whether a s 115 application is appropriate at all…It is submitted that s 115 is better limited to a 
narrow inquiry as to title to registration (comparable to restoration of possession, but different) and not a 
broader competition as to better title (including ownership comparable to a vindication) between the 
applicant and current person registered in a register. An unregistered owner has different remedies to 
 
 
33  See specifically Van der Walt & Sutherland (2003) SA Merc L J, § 6, 104-108. 
34  Blackman et al Commentary 5-314-2, 5-314-4 and 5-324. The authors also note, at 5-314-3 that “our courts have 
of late either confused the issue [of ownership in contradistinction to title to registration] or decided to take a much 




procure registration…[But, third, it] has been understood to empower the court (inter alia), if so advised, to 
determine the ownership of shares, although ordinarily the summary jurisdiction which  the provision 
confers on the court will not be exercised to decide intricate, difficult or complicated issues relating to the 
ownership of shares.” 
What must have been demonstrated by the applicant is that the members’ register is wrong due to 
an incorrect entry or omission occurring for whatever reason, including an entry that was correct but 
has subsequently become incorrect, so that the court, whose power to order rectification is entirely 
discretionary, is enjoined “to go into all the circumstances of the case and to consider what equity 
the applicant has to call for its interposition.”35 Thus it has also been stated that its ambit includes 
“not only putting right something which is wrong on the register, but also an alteration of the register 
so as to make it reflect the state of affairs which the applicant is entitled to claim that it ought to 
reflect”.36 The application was a summary one, “which provides a remedy analogous to a spoliation 
order”.37  
Importantly, the section and the circumstances articulated in ss (1)(a) and (b) were neither 
“exhaustive of the court’s power to order rectification” nor limited the court’s power to alter the 
register or “other registers and returns”.38  
What is clear is that the remedy was aimed at summary, restoration of instrument-holdership. 
With this background, the first issue that must be settled in terms of the current dispensation is the 
possible applicability of s 161(1) of the Companies Act (“Application to protect rights of securities 
holders”) as an avenue through which rectification may be pursued. The overall scheme (and indeed 
title) of the section makes it clear that (1) it is a rights-based remedy, and (2) that it does not exclude 
available common law remedies. 
Even if it enables rectification, which it likely does,39 it should not function as an alternative to the 
quasi-spoliation remedy, because this statutory and more narrow rectification remedy (as per its title) 
protects rights by restoring lawful instrument-holdership, and not factual control over the instrument-
 
 
35  See Blackman et al Commentary 5-314-4 and 5-322; see also the useful list of examples of instances where 
rectification has been pursued, provided at 5-314-4 – 5-315.  
36  Orr v Hill 1929 TPD 885 892. 
37  See Blackman et al Commentary 5-323 and 5-324. 
38  See Blackman et al Commentary 5-310-3 & n 2 therein.  
39  See compelling arguments made in Yeats et al Commentary 2008 – which contains an excellent treatment of 
rectification overall in § 50 – in favour of the use of s 161 at 2-697 – 2-699 & 2-703, including the meaning of “holder” 




holder. This misconception is particularly muddied by the fact that it is most often assumed that a 
restoration of instrument-holdership amounts to restoration of control over the instrument-holder. 
Instrument-holdership relates to the global holdership of the incidents of execution, functioning 
comfortably within the realm of private law rights. Yet it is not the equivalent of effective control, 
which is most often (mis)understood as “quasi-possession”, and which is a factual construct residing 
within the superordinate, broader realm of private law rights and relationships).40 Put differently, “s 
161(1) could facilitate an application for rectification by a person who qualifies as a holder of 
securities…provided the application is solely directed at an order determining the right to registered 
title”, but it does not directly and summarily address the factual dimension of control in the manner 
that the remedy of a spoliation order does.41  
The section also purports not to exclude other common law remedies, opening the door to the 
rectification remedy developed by the courts under s 115. However, even if one were to accept that 
rectification, as envisaged in and developed through s 115, is embedded in the common law by 
virtue of stare decisis, there are three further obstacles that militate in favour of distinguishing 
rectification from the mandament in the current context.  
First, because rectification only addresses erroneous entry or omission from the register, it does not 
provide relief to an applicant whose instrument-holder is correctly reflected on the register, but who 
has nonetheless lost control over that instrument-holder, and has therefore lost effective control over 
the securities in question. 
Second, because the common law remedy finds its origins in s 115, it may be that it is only available 
to holders of shares and not to holders of company debt securities. However, this line of reasoning 
is admittedly somewhat tenuous, as the thrust of the remedy is clearly a correction of what is now, 
under the 2008 Companies Act, the securities register, and may very well be available mutatis 
mutandis to any person concerned with that register.  
Third, and ultimately most importantly, even if one were to accept that it is available to persons 
concerned in respect of any company securities, the principled distinction between restoration of 
instrument-holdership and restoration of effective control remains. Thus, the better and more 
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conservative approach remains to regard the rectification as “comparable to restoration of 
possession, but different…”42 
This leaves only s 163 of the Companies Act, seemingly also allowing rectification on specific 
grounds. The most important elements of the section read as follows: 
“163.   Relief from oppressive or prejudicial conduct or from abuse of separate juristic personality of 
company – (1)  A shareholder or a director of a company may apply to a court for relief if— 
(a) any act or omission of the company, or a related person, has had a result that is oppressive or 
unfairly prejudicial to, or that unfairly disregards the interests of, the applicant; 
(b) the business of the company, or a related person, is being or has been carried on or conducted in 
a manner that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to, or that unfairly disregards the interests of, the 
applicant; or 
(c) the powers of a director or prescribed officer of the company, or a person related to the company, 
are being or have been exercised in a manner that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to, or that 
unfairly disregards the interests of, the applicant. 
… 
(2) Upon considering an application in terms of subsection (1), the court may make any interim or final 
order it considers fit, including – 
… 
(k) an order directing rectification of the registers or other records of a company…” 
These provisions have been suggested as another manner in which rectification can take place 
under the Companies Act, although the precise nature and manner in which the remedy functions 
under the current Act is not settled or certain. 43  Section 163 makes it quite clear that only 
shareholders may avail themselves of this remedy. It follows that holders of what the Act calls “debt 
securities” or “debt instruments” may, by virtue of the words of the section, not make use of the 
provision. This essentially means that statutory rectification is unavailable for holders of company 
debt securities. As should be clear, this is in any event not the kind of rectification that is relevant in 
discussing the mandament. 
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720 – 2-737. 
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However, there is a more fundamental problem with rectification as the appropriate remedy (if it is 
considered a summary remedy and, more importantly, if it is to be considered as an equivalent or 
more appropriate alternative to the mandament). A more accurate analysis of quasi-possessio – i.e. 
effective control – reveals that rectification may not adequately address the factual state of affairs 
that a quasi-spoliation order strives to remedy. Rectification by a “shareholder”, in the manner 
provided for by s 163 above, could be read in two ways. First, it could be read as meaning the 
instrument-holder (as the company is not generally compelled to answer to any other person, 
including an asset-holder). This would limit the scope of application of s 163 even further, and 
ultimately should not be supported as the remedy is clearly aimed at a change in instrument-
holdership with respect to equity securities.  
Thus, it should in all likelihood be read in a different way – to mean that the asset-holder of an equity 
security may approach the court to effect a change in instrument-holdership. The first problem with 
this is that by contrast the mandament may be used by any person whose effective control was 
spoliated and should not be limited to use by an asset-holder only. Pledgees and other holders of a 
limited real interest seem the best examples. The policy-function of the remedy is to foster legal-
political stability on an interim basis by discouraging persons from resorting to self-help. 44 
Rectification on the other hand seems only aimed at enabling an (equity) asset-holder to regain 
instrument-holdership, or at replacing an existing asset-holder (and probably only on the basis of 
“oppression”, although that need not be further discussed). This leaves any number of lawful or 
unlawful holders (i.e. controllers) of limited incidents over the security unaccounted for, 
demonstrating that the scope of an application for rectification is significantly too narrow for it to be 
equated with a quasi-spoliation order, and these latter scenarios are exactly what the mandament is 
for. 
The second problem is that, as noted above, effective control over one of more of a security’s 
patrimonial incident-functionalities, as a factual construct, does not rest on the identity of the 
instrument-holder alone. It also, perhaps even more importantly, rests on the factual matrix and state 
of mind of the instrument-holder vis-a-vis her controller. It further rests on the specific incident-
functionality or set of incident-functionalities in question, with most cases pointing to one or more 
incidents of the class use and enjoyment. All that rectification under s 163 might achieve is a change 
in instrument-holdership, which does not necessarily (but admittedly may often) amount to 
restoration of effective control of the incident or incidents at issue in the application.  
For these reasons, it is inappropriate to state that the kind of rectification that could perhaps be 
effected through s 163 (which is in any event unavailable to holders of debt securities) is the correct 
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remedy to achieve the policy-outcomes ordinarily associated with spoliation of incorporeals. Again, 
the (now) common law summary rectification as developed through the 1973 Act may well be an 
available and appropriate alternative to the mandament in this context, but it is not within the scope 
of this work to explore this issue. 
Through a deeper analysis of the mandament in light of: (1) the legal nature of (debt) securities, and 
(2) the more doctrinally and theoretically sound construct of effective control, there appears to be no 
true technical legal impediments to the application of the quasi-spoliation order in this context. In 
fact, there is a demonstrable need and clear application for the remedy as a temporary restorer of 
effective control of a security’s underlying patrimonial interest, or an incident thereof.  
Finally, to conclude the section, it is perhaps prudent to briefly discuss whether there is a policy-
basis underpinning this conclusion. A useful starting point is the following:45 
“The Tigon judgment is totally devoid of any policy argument but it is not difficult to conceive of one for 
extending the mandament. The [Companies Act of 1973] states that an incorrect entry in the register of 
members may be removed only by rectification, at least where the member does not consent to such 
removal…It is apparent that Parliament frowns upon self-help in the form of a unilateral removal of a name 
from the register…Shares [and, it is submitted, other securities] are perhaps the most important asset of 
our time… 
But there are stronger policy arguments against extending the mandament to the unlawful removal of a 
name from the register of members.  
The mandament is aimed at protecting the legal order against self-help in situations where self-help can 
typically spark conflict and violence.” 
With rectification having been dealt with, the only policy argument presented above for non-
extension of the remedy is that its purpose (prevention of violence through prevention of self-help) 
is not served in this context.  
With respect, this greatly oversimplifies the purpose the mandament serves. The function of 
possession that the remedy is typically regarded as protecting, is the so-called legal-political function 
– a temporary (and often urgent) restitution of the status quo ante in furtherance of social, political 
and legal order and stability.46 In this light, to reduce the function of the mandament to the prevention 
of violence and to further reduce the concept of violence to physical violence (thereby excluding 
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economic violence) is too narrow. Access to a crucial store of wealth in the modern age cannot be 
said to be immaterial to legal-political stability. Indeed one need only to extend the policy argument 
to cover economic violence (for instance in the form of fraud, theft, or embezzlement of the funds or 
wealth of vulnerable persons such as pensioners) in order to satisfy a value-driven inquiry into its 
necessity in the context of securities. One may further venture to suggest that the argument also 
fails to account for the fact that physical violence is very often caused by economic and financial 
reasons such as may arise from the dispossession of securities without a means for the temporary 
(and urgent) restoration of control over the patrimony they contain.  
Support for this view is also found in Commentary 2008, where the authors remark:47 
“Surely any form of self-help has the risk of sparking public violence, particularly if it involves the deprivation 
of valuable property (corporeal or incorporeal), and shares are often far more valuable than corporeal 
property. In any event, the risk of public violence is not the only policy behind preventing self-help; property 
rights and the right to have disputes resolved by our courts are today protected by the Constitution. The 
Supreme Court of Appeal has held that self-help clauses are unconstitutional, for example, in the context 
of notarial bonds which can involve incorporeal rights. It is therefore submitted that there are very good 
policy reasons for the courts intervening to prevent self-help.  
This extends to any attempt by a company to unilaterally deprive a person of registered title, which is best 
served by a summary process. Also, the fact that s 115 of the 1973 Act provided specific relief weighed 
heavily on the conclusions of Van der Walt and Sutherland and the omission of a comparable provision 
from the Act means that this is no longer a supporting factor with regard to the current position.” 
Its temporary, and often urgent, nature is a final important factor. It is trite that mandament does not 
require proof of the lawful merits of the applicant’s right to restored control. 48  Consider the 
complexity, resource-intensiveness and potentially slow-moving task of instituting action, or even an 
application, to recover usurped control to debt security coupon payments through proving a lawful 
right or entitlement. Such a process could prove wholly inadequate for a plaintiff or applicant who, 
for example, needs urgent relief to avoid impending insolvency or liquidation, or who needs to cast 
a vote at an imminent company annual general meeting on matters of great consequence to her 
investment. Securities have the added characteristic of high liquidity (i.e. they are easily and quickly 
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disposable for value), making the prevention of spoliation even more time-sensitive. It is certainly 
conceivable that issuers would not be interested in, nor be incentivised to become involved in, such 
disputes.  
In this light the second, policy-driven set of impediments to the remedy’s application also do not 
amount to an insurmountable argument against its limited application to securities as a somewhat 
unique form of incorporeal property (but perhaps also to matters of control over other limited real 
rights in obligations). 
In conclusion, this section has shown that an extension of the quasi-spoliation remedy to securities, 
once the construct and dynamics of effective control as “quasi-possessio” are properly understood, 
is fully warranted and indeed necessary. The fact that Tigon has, seemingly, been referred to or 
considered in a small number of subsequent judgements also becomes far more palatable.49 
In a final observation, it should be noted that there seems to be no reason why this remedy cannot 
be used in the context of both certificated and uncertificated securities – a successful application for 
the remedy need not necessarily cause a change in instrument-holdership (although plainly it mostly 
does), it must merely restore control over the instrument-holder to the applicant on a temporary 
basis. 
 
11 2  A case for the explicit recognition of the quasi-rei vindicatio 
In Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd and Another v Ocean Commodities Inc and Others,50 the 
Supreme Court of Appeal indicated a willingness to consider an action for the recovery of share and 
debenture certificates, along with signed transfer forms, as a remedy approximating the vindicatory 
action. However, the court did not make it clear whether it was explicitly recognising a quasi-rei 
vindicatio outright and appears conflicted throughout the relevant portions of the judgment:51 
“Here it is necessary to examine the basis of Ocean's claim and the nature of the defence, or defences, 
raised in opposition thereto. Before this Court…the respondents…submitted that Ocean was the beneficial 
owner of the shares and debentures in question; that, as such, Ocean was entitled, prima facie, to be 
placed in possession of the shares; and that the onus was on appellants to establish some right to withhold 
possession from Ocean. He stated that in essence Ocean's claim was a vindicatory one. 
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I think that this submission may perhaps over-simplify the position. [Here the court goes on to provide a 
rigorous and oft-cited analysis on the nature of shares and the similar nature of debentures]… 
…I am not sure that in strict law counsel is correct in categorising Ocean's claim for delivery of the shares 
as a vindicatory one. A share's character as a bundle of personal rights and the fact that neither the Harris 
brothers nor Ocean at any time enjoyed full and untrammelled "ownership" of the shares (with all the rights 
incidental thereto) makes it difficult to fit the claim into the mould of the true rei vindicatio…Nevertheless, 
as I shall show, the claim is in some respects analogous to the rei vindicatio. 
… 
There is thus much to be said for the view that the cause of action should be classified, or characterized, 
as one analogous to the rei vindicatio in respect of property situated within the jurisdiction and that in that 
event the lex situs (i.e. South African law) would be the correct lex causae.” 
The origin of this tentative analogy can be found in Oakland Nominees (Pty) Ltd v Gelria Mining & 
Investment Co (Pty) Ltd,52 a case which appears (also implicitly) to lean towards the availability of 
the quasi-rei vindication. As per the court:53 
“Although both sides dealt with the case on the footing that the plaintiff's claim was vindicatory, what was 
claimed was basically a declaration that the shares were vested in Gelria. Although 'ownership' may, 
juristically, not be accurate in relation to the rights of the person in whom the shares vest, for convenience 
the descriptive labels of 'owner' and 'ownership' will be retained in this judgment.” 
Although it cannot be said with total certainty, the hesitation regarding the vindicatory nature of the 
action gives the impression that the court (1) was inclined to give the action a quasi-vindicatory 
character, but (2) was prevented from doing so by a doctrinal and theoretical uncertainty as to 
whether such an approach was defensible.  
It is submitted that this work allays uncertainty to the extent that such a claim, to borrow from the 
phrasing in Standard Bank above, can indeed “fit the mould” of the vindicatory action.  
Traditionally, invocation of the rei vindicatio requires a claimant to prove: (1) ownership of the thing; 
(2) the existence and clear identifiability of the thing; and (3) possession of the thing by the defendant 
at the time of the instituting of action by the claimant.54  
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As to the first requirement, as per § 5 1 3 of Chapter 5, asset-holdership is a more than sufficient 
construct to be used in place of ownership. Regarding the second requirement, though the security 
asset is fungible, it is difficult to argue that asset-holdership or co-asset-holdership in a fungible bulk 
is not identifiable through the demarcatory effect of the security instrument in question. Thus this 
requirement is perfectly applicable even to securities of the same class and issue, both because 
they are serially or globally numbered and evidenced by register entry. In terms of the final 
requirement one must turn to the discussions of § 4 3 2 2 of Chapter 4 and the previous section. 
From this, it is quite clear that replacement of (quasi-)possession with effective control55 exercised 
by the defendant animus domini is an entirely feasible and coherent approach to this requirement.  
This makes plain that an application of the quasi-rei vindicatio in the context of securities is viable 
from a theoretical and practical standpoint. It is, therefore, submitted that the time has come for 
South African law to recognise, explicitly, the application of the vindicatory action to securities and 
to do so in the above terms. 
The only two issues which may nonetheless affect the viability of this standpoint are the matter of 
rectification and the effect of the finality of transfer provisions as discussed in § 10 2 of the previous 
Chapter. 
In terms of the first, as outlined in the previous section, the statutory avenues for rectification are s 
161 and s 163 of the Companies Act. Both can again be dealt with quite easily. In terms of the 
former, subsection (2) makes it quite clear that it applies “in addition to” any remedies available in 
terms either of the Act (read: s 163) or the common law. Yet, perhaps more pertinently, s 161 does 
not contain any substantive requirements or prerequisites. The section merely provides that the court 
may be approached by a securities holder for: a declaratory order (see ss (1)(a) – “an order 
determining any rights…”); or an order which proactively shields (see ss (1)(b)(i) – “any appropriate 
order necessary…to protect any right”), or retroactively addresses harm (see ss(1)(b)(ii) – “any 
appropriate order necessary…to rectify any harm done…”).  
Regardless of whether it is more appropriate to read the requirements of the quasi-rei vindicatio into 
proceedings under s 161, or to consider it a free-standing common law remedy, the section does not 
function to preclude recognition, and pursuance, of a vindicatory action. Finally, it is also not received 
into the FMA and thus cannot serve the interests of holders of uncertificated non-company securities. 
Section 163, on the other hand, is only available to asset-holders of (company) equity securities and 
only where conduct as outlined in s 163(1)(a)-(c) of the Companies Act has occurred. The outcome 
of rectification is a substitution of instrument-holders, which may, under the right circumstances, 
 
 




have the effect of restoring effective control over the security to the asset-holder (i.e. “owner”). Thus, 
it would appear that rectification may indeed be used as a means to “vindicate” equity securities. 
However, as a means to emulate vindication, its usefulness is obviously bounded. First, the limited 
applicability of the provision excludes it use by holders of any company securities “other than 
shares”56 and it is unavailable to holders of securities not issued by companies. Second, it may only 
be used where the asset-holder has lost lawful effective control of the security due to very specific 
types of conduct, and only where that conduct was by the company, a related party or a director of 
the company, as per s 163(1). Thus the action may be unavailable in cases where an instrument-
holder has taken unlawful control of the security as well as where unlawful control has been 
bestowed on another outside party under the guise of asset-holdership. These kinds of cases are 
usually where the vindicatory action is most useful. In sum, rectification via s 163 in its current state 
does not come close to providing a remedial dispensation in which the quasi-rei vindicatio is 
obsolete.  
The second issue is the effect of s 41 of the FMA, and by extension, s 53(4) of the Companies Act. 
Where the exceptions embedded in those provisions are not activated, the vindicatory action will not 
be available to the asset-holder of an uncertificated security. It is uncontentious to assert that these 
statutory provisions operate to exclude any conflicting common law rule.  
Further, however, the sections prevent a plaintiff from satisfying the requirements of the vindicatory 
action. Section 41 protects the validity of a register entry, which extends also to transfers of asset-
holdership (“ownership”) by operation of law. Section 53(4) augments this by stating that a transfer 
of ownership in this manner will be regarded as having “occurred” despite the listed defects which 
may retrospectively affect its validity. Thus any person wishing to invoke the vindicatory action will 
be unable to prove asset-holdership in terms of the first requirement of the action.  
Nonetheless, what if those exceptions found in the security of transfer provisions are evident and 
can be proven – i.e. fraud, illegality (which has been shown to include civil unlawfulness) or 
insolvency? In such cases, the remedy is not only useful, but eminently necessary. The FMA does 
not provide a free-standing, statutory remedy to a person in cases where a securities account entry 
is reversible. Instead, s 38 refers to “Chapter 2, Part E of the Companies Act” and, more specifically, 








“A court may not order the name of a transferee contemplated in this section to be removed from an 
uncertificated securities register, unless that person was a party to or had knowledge of a fraud or illegality 
as contemplated in subsection (4).” 
The basis for such a court order is not specified. Here company securities must be distinguished 
from non-company securities. In terms of the former, s 161 and s 163 remain available as a basis 
for such a court order. However, this has been dealt with above, with the conclusion that in such 
cases the quasi-rei vindicatio would appear to remain available as a manner in which to obtain the 
court order removing the name of a person from the uncertificated securities register. In terms of 
non-company securities, the remedy is indispensable as a basis for such an order and an alternative 
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12   Final remarks  
It was the aim of this study to:1 
“establish a consistent and coherent legal description of the South African positive law as it relates to debt 
securities…[it] focuses on four core issues: (1) the legal history, (2) the legal nature, (3) the classification, 
and (4) current legal challenges relating to debt securities.” 
This was done using a methodological framework that broadly followed the framework used in DV 
Cowen & L Gering’s The Law of Negotiable Instruments in South Africa,2 overlaying the above four 
key elements of the research problem with three of the authors’ four approaches.  
First, in terms of the historical approach, it laid analytic foundations by analysing the economic and 
legal history of debt securities in South Africa. Second, using that as foundation, it applied the 
analytic-systemic approach to the current state of the law, coming to a number of strong conclusions 
with respect to both the legal nature and classification of debt securities in modern South African 
law. Finally, in terms of the functional-policy approach, it brought the outcomes of the previous 
analysis to bear on a select number of pertinent or contentious issues regarding debt securities in 
contemporary South African law. Due to the significant scope and breadth of this exercise, as well 
as the uniquely domestic nature of the legal problem, the comparative approach was selectively 
used to augment – where relevant – these problems, rather than utilised as a free-standing pillar in 
this dissertation. 
Yet a great number of relevant legal areas, topics and problems regarding South African debt 
securities were not dealt with here.3 This is not to say these problems are unimportant or do not 
exist; instead, dealing with issues of general application, and putting the focus on the harmonisation 
 
 
1  Chapter 1, § 1 2. 
2   See 7-15. 
3  Pertinent examples include debt securities and company law (specifically s 43 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008); 




of the interaction between private law and securities law, was judged the better use of the already 
considerable volume of this work. A study of debt securities and the Companies Act alone could 
justify its own stand-alone dissertation. It is hoped that this work, aimed primarily as it is at first 
principles, can form the basis for further study (and some necessary legislative reform) regarding 
these and other problems. 
What follows, to conclude the dissertation, is a concise overview of the key outcomes of the work.  
 
12 1  Historical outcomes: the commoditisation of debt, English influence, “debentures”, and 
share-centricity in the legislative evolution of securities law 
The historical analysis undertaken serves an enabling function – specifically it enables the re-
evaluation of current principles (principally driven by statute) against their origins and historical 
context. This facilitates a better interpretation of the relationship between the statutory and common 
law principles currently at play; equally importantly, it allows for novel and sometimes contentious 
positions (both in terms of principles and policy) to be articulated with a stronger and more informed 
foundation for doing so. 
In terms of Chapter 2, the first key insight is from the development of the first proto-debt securities. 
This development demonstrates an enduring and fundamental feature of (debt) securities – the 
notion of the “commoditisation” of obligations in order to tap the general public for funds in the 
financing of large public and (later) private enterprises. In many senses this commoditisation is a 
heuristic – the debt in which securities are rooted does not necessarily function all that (if at all) 
differently to ordinary debt. However, the heuristic allows one to think of and deal with that debt more 
as an asset and less as an obligation to performance sounding in money. 
This is vitally important not only for the constitution and operation of markets and designing of 
secondary uses and instruments (as seen most prominently in securities’ collateral and securitisation 
functions) based on debt and equity securities, but more locally and importantly for present purposes 
in that it justifies and drives the enhanced proprietary characteristics of securities. This underpins a 
great many aspects of this work, most notably the notion of effective control,4 the more ready 




4   Outlined in Chapter 4, § 4 3 2.  
5  As seen throughout Part 2 of this work.  




The second is a proper understanding of the marked English influence on the South African 
securities system, most importantly: (1) its regulatory approach; (2) the manner in which the role and 
structure of the banking system impacts on the emergence and development of securities markets; 
and (3) the legal developments resulting in registered securities, which dominate South Africa’s 
financial system in contrast to the bearer securities which dominate most systems making use of a 
Civilian private law.  
The final key insight of the chapter is the lack of debt securities in the early domestic landscape, 
prevailing essentially until the 1980s, which lays critical foundations for the critical assessment of the 
legal developments that follow in Chapter 3.  
Chapter 3 has a number of critical and interdependent outcomes. It demonstrates the principal 
influence of company law (and its markedly English character) on the overall legal landscape in 
terms of securities, as well as the reception of the English conception of a debt security (“debenture”, 
but also later “bonds” and “notes”) as a “[secured or unsecured] written acknowledgement of debt”,7 
as evident in early 20th century legislation. It then outlines the gradual “ascendancy of the securities 
concept” as a legal signifier for the regulation of shares and debentures during the latter-half of the 
20th century, beginning with the Companies Act 61 of 1973 and culminating in the total 
dematerialisation of exchange-traded securities and the (effective) erasure of the debenture concept 
in the Companies Act 71 of 2008. Within this development one also sees a convergence of the 
underlying structure of debt and equity securities as registered securities, and a corresponding 
decline in the appropriateness of the above-mentioned definition of debentures. 
It further shows that due to the prevalence of equity securities (i.e. shares) in South Africa, the legal 
focus of this securities concept was mainly on shares but also that this “share-centric” securities 
concept was at the same time employed to regulate all securities. Thus, although debentures and 
shares began to look and function in a very similar manner, share-centricity meant the integrity of 
the legislative framework and common law definition in their application to debt securities began to 
become increasingly questionable (this is particularly demonstrable when dealing with the 
dematerialisation of debt securities). 
This issue – primarily one of legal certainty – occasions a re-examination of the legal conception (a 
wider inquiry than merely assessing the definition) of debt securities in light of whether there is a set 
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of first principles that might govern all registered securities and that can be used to (1) revise the 
legal definition (and classification) of debt securities in South African law, and (2) harmonise the 
obvious and difficult tension between the received English-law nature of registered securities and 
South Africa’s Civilian private law in more practical legal matters.  
 
12 2  Analytical-systemic outcomes: the asset-instrument dichotomy, holdership and control; the 
classification of debt securities 
Chapter 4 is in many senses the keystone of the study – it answers the question of whether a set of 
private law-rooted first principles can be identified in respect of South African registered securities. 
It answers this question in the affirmative, enabling a harmonisation of the securities concept with 
the Civilian nature of the domestic private law, leading to a full and appropriate understanding of 
debt securities within the domestic legal system.  
It confirms the rejection in South Africa of the English law doctrine of constructive trust (around which 
English law registered securities, as received domestically, are built), and instead demonstrates that 
an analysis of the exercise of legal subjectivity with respect to the two-fold components of private 
law rights (i.e. entitlements of determination and enjoyment, or beskikkings- and 
genotsbevoegdheid)8 enables the description of personal rights in terms of subsidiary incidents, 
flowing from these components. 
On that basis it is able to demonstrate that South African securities are comprised of two 
interdependent, but functionally separate, 9  legal objects rather than the two different kinds of 
ownership (i.e. equitable and legal) of English trust law. The first construct is referred to as the 
“security instrument”. In essence, it is a locus for (holdership of) the incidents10 of execution over the 
underlying interest in a security. It typically manifests as entry of the instrument-holder into the 
securities register and the issue to that holder of a security certificate; or, in the case of uncertificated 
securities, merely electronic register entry in the uncertificated securities register. Second is what is 
called the “security asset”. It generally corresponds with the proprietary dimension ascribed by the 
law to a security – i.e. patrimony as the economic end-benefits of the rights and other competencies 
 
 
8  As most pertinently articulated in GF Lubbe “Sessie in securitatem debiti en die komponente van die 
skuldeisersbelang” (1989) 52 Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 485. 
9  As mentioned in Chapter 1, this interdependent separateness is not to be confused with the full separation and 
severability of “registered ownership” and “beneficial ownership” as advocated in JL Yeats, R de la Harpe, R Jooste, 
H Stoop, R Cassim, J Seligmann, L Kent, R Bradstreet, RC Williams, MF Cassim, E Swanepoel, FHI Cassim & K 
Jarvis (2018) Commentary on the Companies Act of 2008. This will become through the totality of this Chapter and 
the next. 




contained in a security. It, in turn, is the locus for (holdership of) the incidents which remain after the 
incidents of execution have been shorn from the underlying interest.  
In addition to enabling a far more sensible approach to the meaning of “issue” of securities, this 
reconceptualisation of the securities concept further allows one to give concrete and detailed legal 
content to what is traditionally described as the sui generis relationship of agency between “beneficial 
owner” and her nominee (the holder of “registered title”) – i.e. a fiduciary agency arising from the 
underlying proprietary structure of asset- and instrument-holdership respectively. It further provides 
a fully defensible and rational basis for understanding the dynamics of holdership (for “ownership”) 
of and effective control (for quasi-possessio) over securities as assets. This, in turn, is the key to 
sounder applications of pre-existing private law principles which are already evident, but deeply 
uncertain, in the current legal system (which is the foundation for large portions of Part 2 of the 
study).  
Chapter 5 takes the outcomes of Chapter 4 and applies them to the uncertificated securities 
environment. The focus turns away from a rationalisation of private and securities law and addresses 
a number of difficult and uncertain problems within the legislative system that enables uncertificated 
securities and their holdership. By showing that the putative term “deposit” has a very broad meaning 
arising from its legislative history, it is able to distinguish and inform from the Financial Markets Act 
(19 of 2012) the custodial and administrative elements of the depository system for the “custody and 
administration of uncertificated securities”. From that distinction it is able to make better sense of the 
manner in which the uncertificated security instrument is “held” and consequently the precise manner 
in which the co-ownership of the underlying beneficial interest of asset-holders is understood and 
how it functions (i.e. the dynamics of “ownership” as per that Act and the Companies Act of 2008). 
It also allows a discussion of the meaning of “interests in securities” as found in the Act and in 
international parlance, distinguishing the manner in which Civilian (bearer-oriented) and pure English 
(registered) securities deal with intermediation from the unique manner in which it must occur in the 
mixed-legal system of the domestic environment.  
Finally, in Chapter 6, the particularly difficult issue of how to classify (and therefore identify) debt 
securities is dealt with. The problem is especially vexing in light of the eiusdem generis approach of 
most legislation dealing with securities, combined with the substantive variability of debt securities 
themselves and the purposive variability of each act purporting to deal with those securities. 
Ultimately, it is concluded that a typological approach is the only viable methodology to deal with this 
problem, and it outlines a number of necessary and thereafter possible indicia with which to make 






12 3 Functional-policy outcomes: harmonised application of private law to securities and statutory 
clarity  
The functional-policy analysis makes up Part 2 of the study. It is a policy-aware application of the 
theoretical framework developed in Chapters 4 and 5 (and supported by the historical insights of 
Chapters 2 and 3) to a select number of themes and legal issues of the current environment. 
Principally it shows that the theoretical reconceptualisation of Chapter 4, and the clarity it brings to 
the uncertificated environment as per Chapter 5, has actual explanatory and problem-solving value. 
It is not deemed necessary to summarise the various outcomes of Part 2 here.  
In conclusion, it is hoped that this work has improved and rationalised our understanding of the legal 
nature of debt securities in South African law and further that, in so doing, it has provided some 
much needed clarity to the broader field of securities law. It is further hoped that the framework of 
incidents analysis developed in Chapter 4 and applied throughout Part 2 of this work may assist in 
coming to grips with the far greater and more complex problem of the relationship between the law 
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